'Ars lnfirma' Ars Infirma - Aspects of 'auto-poiesis' in Heidegger and Stoic doctrine: An investigation into the incertitude in art by Klega, Michal
'Ars lnfirma' 
Aspects of 'auto-poiesis' in Heidegger and Stoic doctrine 
An investigation into the incertitude in art 
Michal Klega 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Of the University of London in Fine Art 
Department of Visual Arts 
Goldsmiths College 
University of London 
2008 
Content 
Abstract 
Introduction 
Chapter I Art and a 'Way of Life' 
1. What is Socrates' Way of Life? 
4 
5 
13 
23 
28 
31 
33 
37 
38 
2. Agon an Reality 
3. Art as a 'Way of Life' 
4. The Possibility of 'Making Art' 
5. ' Awareness' (prosoche) 
6. 'Way of Life' and the 'Sway of Being' 
Chapter II Heidegger's Authenticity and Work 43 
1. The Constitution ofa 'Self' in 'Being and Time' 47 
a. Being and Dasein 48 
b. Existence 53 
c. Anxiety 57 
d. Turning away from Beings 59 
e. 'Care-structure' 61 
f. Authenticity ofDasein and 'Being-towards-Death' 65 
g. 'Willingness-to-have-Consciousness' 67 
h. Being-guilty' 69 
i. 'Resolve' as Care 70 
j. 'Care' and 'Oikeiosis' 71 
k. Self and Guilt 74 
1. Fate and History 76 
m. Conclusion 77 
2. 'Poiesis' and 'Challenging-forth' 78 
a. The Origin of the Work of Art 82 
b. Poiesis and Mastery 96 
c. Poiesis and Science 102 
d. Art and the Artist 105 
e. Art and the "Unumgangliche" III 
f. Conclusion 116 
2 
Chapter III Antiquity and the 'Way of Life' 
1. The Concept of'agon' 
2. The Concept of 'logos' 
3. Socrates' Care of the self 
4. Stoic Doctrine 
a. Oikeiosis as Familiarity 
b. Categories 
c. Fate and Detennination 
d. Pathe 
e. The Unity of the Soul 
f. Exercises 
g. The Virtuous Choice 
h. The Therapeutic Aspect of 'logos' 
i. Virtue as Wisdom 
j. Virtue and Conversion 
5. Conversion 
Chapter IV Heidegger and the Stoics 
1. Conversion and the Self 
2. The "Ungeheure" and the Self 
3. Consideration, Decision and Volition 
4. 'Agon', 'Polemos', and 'Logos' 
5. Conversion and Enthusiasm 
6. Arete and Poiesis 
Conclusion 
Abbreviations 
Bibliography 
122 
124 
128 
138 
141 
146 
147 
148 
151 
154 
157 
159 
163 
166 
169 
171 
176 
178 
180 
182 
187 
190 
197 
201 
207 
208 
3 
Abstract 
This research investigates a possible agency for 'making art'. It focuses on the 
convergence of 'life' and 'art' by comparing two conceptions of self-understanding: 
the Heideggerian 'Dasein', and the Stoic quest for the 'virtuous act'. These serve as a 
paradigm for the possible integration of the 'self of the artist and the 'work' as an 
'ethics' of enduring in 'incertitude'. 
The first aspect of the convergence of 'life' and 'work' is the separation of the 'in-
strumental' and the 'virtuous'. I refer to Huizinga's research into the concept of the 
'agon' and the concept of 'conversion' as elaborated on by Pierre Hadot The second 
aspect deals with the Stoic therapeutic concept of philosophy, which leads to the 
third aspect which is the 'comportment' within which questioning is guided by the 
disposition of 'discretio', a tact towards the aporia of 'knowledge'. Giorgio Colli 
points to the words of the 'oracle' as the symbol of language, because it discloses 
and withdraws (truth) at the same time. The concept of 'logos' he develops I relate to 
Heidegger's 'letting-be' (Gelassenheit) as the originary comportment to beings in the 
movement of concealment and unconcealment as the site of 'truth'. 
I argue that the necessary conditions for 'art' originate in the 'agon' as ordeal and ac-
tion as well as in the psychagogical methodology of 'awareness' (prosoche) which 
underpins the possibility to interrogate the particular mode of constituted conscious-
ness as it expresses itself in 'comportment', and the concept of 'phronesis, which 
moderates disclosure and withdrawal, concealment and unconcealment I argue that 
this mode is itself a 'poiesis', which has as its temporal 'telos' its own existence as 
the origin of art itself 
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Introduction 
This thesis was written within the remits of a combined theory and practice based 
course, and emphasises therefore aspects of interest rooted in my own practice_ 
These are not related to the particular forms of the work I produce, but to the inter-
nal modality which drives such activity in general and accords with my experience_ 
The barriers between art and life have been blurred for some time now but there is 
still a 'desire' for the 'creative' artist as a 'personality' _ To narrow this vast subject to 
a more manageable size, I have used Martin Heidegger's interpretation of Greek on-
tology in Being and Time as a starting point and compared it with the Greek under-
standing of the self and its constitution and formation_ Heidegger's 'retrieval' (Wied-
erholung) of Greek ontological thought and the rejection of Platonic teleology as 
'metaphysics' appears in relation to the Presocratics as a reconfiguration of the ar-
chaic 'agon' - as a 'judgment by ordeal': the telos is the fate as logos_ Virtue is a dis-
closure of the possibility of disclosure itself and therefore an 'ethos', a comportment 
I investigate certain modes of speaking about the possibility of making art, as they 
are presented in Greek psychagogy or 'paideia', where the' self' is revealed in its 
ethical dimension as a product of 'consideration' and a form of 'aletheia' _ The first 
access to such an approach became, in the progress of my investigation, the writings 
of Martin Heidegger, while the Greek idea of a 'care ofthe self' related these in-
sights to the everyday experiences of human actions and exercises_ The 'way oflife' 
is central to human beings only_ Life is always 'artistic' in this sense, and the Greeks 
understood their life to be such a 'work of art' _ This is therefore a thesis guided by 
the particular interest of an artist to understand the strange presuppositions of 'crea-
tive' forces, which he follows but does not control and which are not a mere 'subjec-
tive' fancy, but an ontological inquiry into one's own 'being'_ 'Being' is always ar-
tistic and not in our controL 
The thesis is generally about the concepts of the appearance of a self within its eve-
ryday structures and its possibility and parameters_ In my own experience, making 
art is first about one's 'self', how it is fitted into its environment and its sensitivity in 
questioning incongruencies and contradictions within such an environment The state 
of mind which enables proper questioning has to achieve both, the loss of the com-
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fort of what is taken for granted as much as unfolding what is around rather than ar-
bitrarily proposing 'new beginnings'. However, it is also the exercise of the mind 
(not only of the artist) which I am most interested in and which is expressed by ques-
tioning the Greek and especially Stoic practices which are expressly designed to 
withdraw from a myopic concentration on the things that we take for granted and be-
gin to question: not the things but a 'self' which we always already have become in 
our dealings with beings without consideration about the possibility and the modes of 
such dealings. 
To have an idea is 'not' to have the certitude of knowledge. Art can never be the 
'terra firma' of knowledge. There are ideas, they are neither mine nor are they yours. 
The artist has an idea. They come into a mind, they are not eternal, they are bound to 
a particular time. What is the 'Being' of such ideas and the mind apprehending 
them? 
The first chapter opens up the question of how a 'way of life' and 'art' are connected 
in general. The concepts within which this discourse takes place are drawn from the 
Greek experience, which still dominates our understanding. The development from 
the Greek 'agon', 'logos' and the Socratic expression of 'a rete' and 'agathon' as a 
transcendent principle devaluing 'worldly' goods are the basic elements of this re-
search. From there, the question of production (poiesis) arises as the main question 
of how 'existence' becomes a creation and how agency is attributed by the Stoics, 
and, alternatively, in Heidegger's Being and Time. Heidegger's Dasein is 'authentic' 
when it understands itself as the 'possibility' for the site in which beings find their 
truth. In becoming 'authentic' Dasein turns away from its 'objects' towards its own 
Being. 
Pierre Hadot is one of the few commentators on ancient philosophy who points out 
forcefully that philosophy was a 'way oflife' and not 'science' or 'metaphysics'. 
Moulding a virtuous character means to live the 'eudamonic' life. To do this, the 
'self' has to understand itself, and its own constituted character. By way of self-
'decomposition' it has to undo the discourse of mere survival (instrumentality), 
which tied it to passions and attachments. This procedure is what is called 'askesis' 
or 'exercise' and ultimately leads to a 'con-version' of the foundations on which the 
previous understanding was based. 
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Heidegger's path tries to revert the reflective strategy of the Stoics by placing em-
phasis on Dasein's always underlying immediate (un-self-conscious) intuition of be-
ings and a reassertion ofthe 'attunement' (Gestimmtheit) as the originary aspect of 
'receiving-perceiving' of phenomena as they 'present themselves'. Artistic practice, 
in terms of 'poiesis', is important for Heidegger as the agency that fonns a collective 
'way oflife'. This 'poiesis' is 'inspired' in the sense that it is not the self or individ-
ual artist but his 'listening' or being the medium of a historic movement This 'poie-
sis' takes place in a space antecedent to the constitution of a 'self', which today de-
tennines 'Being' as technology and metaphysics. 
Coming back to the Greek experience of 'self-improvement' as self-constitution, the 
concepts of 'poiesis' and the archaic 'agon' supply the notion of transcending the 
sphere of mere' survival'. This navigates the difficult path of the Greek concept of 
'truth', which lies in discourse and which has the duplicitous character of revealing 
and hiding (disclosing and withdrawing). 
The second chapter is concerned with Heidegger's insights into the constitution of 
consciousness, which allow us to supplement the Stoic doctrine with an understand-
ing of a historical constitution of a 'self' which is inherent in current artistic prac-
tices. The argument here is that ifthere is anything like a 'critical' practice it is 
'critical' in terms of an ontological inquiry into the conditions ofthe possibility of 'a 
consciousness' . 
The agency of this 'poietic' constitution is 'polemos' or strife, mentioned in 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' and translated as 'Aus-einander-setzung': setting apart; 
meaning differentiation into what is and is not and which is a kind of 'judgement by 
ordeal' decided by other powers, the' gods' ,just as the archaic agon was a 'judge-
ment by ordeal'. Because (scientific) 'reason' is constituted, the 'cosmic reason' ap-
pears as a purely contingent rupture. 
In the second part of this chapter I will discuss Heidegger's concept of 'poiesis'. In 
his appropriation of the concept Heidegger introduces the curios distinction between 
two products of 'techne': on one hand the tool on the other the work of art. I discuss 
the differences and implications on the mode oftechne as production without a 
'metaphysical telos'. 
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The third Chapter looks at the genesis of Stoic doctrines. The Stoics harvest many 
concepts and methods from Greek thought, from Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aris-
totle and their own immediate predecessors, the Cynics. They put all this to work in 
their psychagogy. They also develop 'interiority' as the human partaking in the uni-
versal 'logos' but without the 'modem' dependence of intelligibility on the internal 
'ego'. The Stoics see their methodology in medical terms. 
I follow the discovery of 'logos' as the cosmic law, which is open to all humanity as 
a 'pharmakon' and which heals the illness of the mind, meaning the insistence of 
passions with their own but deficient logic. Giorgio Colli's instructive book 'The 
Birth of Philosophy'] , investigates the duplicity of 'logos', which discloses and with-
draws, and lohan Huizinga's book on the Greek concept of 'play' (agon) which 
describes the route of the devaluation of the world of possessions as the mode of an 
economy between the divine and the human sphere are important sources here. 
'Agon' and 'logos' constitute an economy of excess by their focus on the transcen-
dent realm of the divine, eternal and perfect in relation to which all finite things are 
without value. The 'agon' is the perfect expression of this economy by subjecting 
everything to the 'judgement by ordeal' . 
The concept of 'paideia', which is introduced by Socrates, is a concept relevant to 
'artistic' production. The formation of the youth into a responsible and virtuous self, 
gives him the problem of the 'techne psyche': the production is only understandable 
within the' eidos' which is the atemporal paradigm. The very use of the concept of 
'paideia' as a making, reveals the difficulty inherent in the Greek concepts of pro-
duction which Heidegger tries to reformulate to avoid the idea of an atemporal 'ei-
dos'. Paideia as the art of education is also the art of the constitution of a 'self'. The 
teacher however cannot 'know' what the 'eidos' of one particular soul should be be-
cause 'virtue' is only intelligible from the particular situation - as is art - as 'pre-
dicament'. Art is for Heidegger the whole constellation of work, artist and audience 
This super-subjective happening that determines 'truth' is not the action of a subject 
but rather' ordeal' . 
1 I am using the German translation: G. Colli, Die Geburt d. Philosoph ie, 19751 dt. 1981, (GdPh here-
after) 
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From these difficulties the Stoics think the 'eidos' of this 'techne psyche' as 'logos' 
itself, while avoiding to mention that this 'logos' is itself duplicitous, just as the con-
cept of 'arete' is in the context of the 'agon'. Ultimately the 'production' of the 'self' 
has to be understood without an atemporal 'eidos', which means it has to become 
equivalent to a phronesis, i.e. having its telos in itself 
I will try to explain Stoic practice by focusing on 'prosoche' as their most effective 
method of exercise. It develops into a second degree 'consciousness', ever aware of 
those 'pathe', which drive the rationalisation of acts that do not have their 'telos' in 
themselves. The practice of 'prosoche' disrupts the 'logic' of 'pathe' by becoming 
aware what one is doing. On the one hand 'existence' is brought into the universal, 
on the other, awareness itself is not aimed at something particular. It is neither 'the 
self' nor 'the non-self' who is in control. It is a paradoxical balance of not looking 
for something and not looking for some 'thing', an object, rather being open and 'let-
ting-be' . 
The external world is devalued while virtue is the perfection of intention which can-
not be articulated in the particular. Virtue is 'what has its telos in itself': it is circular, 
the perfect form is action and without' eidos'. The Stoics see conversation through 
the concept of 'virtue': turning from the attachment to the secular things to the sacred 
world; a 'jump' into the circle of perfection. Conversion denotes this 'jump' as an 
existential turning. It is the formalisation of the 'way of 'life' against the animal life 
of mere survivaL Survival is not enough to be human - because man has access, to 
'logos' even iflimited, i.e. temporaL There would be no existence without time, and 
so perfection excludes existence. The Stoic is a 'prokopton' who is on the way to the 
event of 'conversion'. The 'prokopton' has not the certitude of disposition of the 
sage. His 'intentions' are not virtuous. With the help of 'prosoche' he is on the path 
to disillusion the false logic of 'passions'. 'Conversion' is lodged within the world of 
the 'agon' and 'arete', making the 'self' independent of material survival, and pre-
paring the identity of the individual logos with the cosmic logos. 
In the fourth chapter I will attempt to align the various concepts I have dealt with in 
this research and make them operative towards a 'way oflife', which underpins criti-
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cal artistic practice, questioning the constitution of consciousness, within the 'onto-
logical domain'. 
I propose, that the realm of inquiry has to be within the' existence' of the artist with-
out differentiating between 'work' and 'life'. This means making art is a 'way of 
life', as much as is 'philosophy'. The cluster of attributes, which is called 'artist', is 
the realm of my inquiry in so far as it is a 'constituted' entity and therefore open to 
'ontological' inquiry. I argue that the making of art as a 'way of life' is 'paradig-
matic' because the 'everyday' constitution of consciousness is taken implicitly as a 
symptom of the illness of a non-transparent constitution itself. 
The first point, is the 'tum' from the 'instrumental' to what is 'arete' and which is 
philosophical 'conversion'. This 'turning' rules the whole discourse from the 
Presocratics to Heidegger, who tries to overcome the modem fortification of this di-
chotomy into calculability. Overcoming the animalistic 'will to life' is at the begin-
ning and its overcoming by 'arete' and 'logos' traverses the whole history to its pre-
sent manifestation as modem science by which the demands of certitude have 
brought what was liberating in the concept of arete right back into the 'instrumental'. 
Art has participated in this discourse by embodying 'what is not instrumental', calcu-
lable, categorisable and derivative. The 'agon' relates to 'arete' which is the guiding 
concept of the 'care of the self from Socrates to the Stoics but originates in the ar-
chaic time referring to the 'agon', which is determined by which action is 'virtuous', 
and 'virtuous' is he, who prevails in the 'agon'. 
Art is not instrumental, it inhabits the realm which is not the external world (the 'on-
tic'), and thus it is in the realm of 'ontological' inquiry, which is the Heideggerian re-
lation to the givenness of Being as excess (Uberfluss). As described in the previous 
chapter, the act of art has its 'arche' and 'telos' in itself' and these relate it to the phi-
losophical 'way oflife'. 'Logos', and by extension 'physis' is the' arche' of man, the 
way he 'dwells'. These are concepts of Being in Heidegger's terms. This does not 
mean, however, that the work of art is not constricted within the external world, but 
it does mean that the 'self' which does perform the act as the original 'poiesis' cannot 
be determined merely by its instrumentality in the' external' world. 
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I conclude therefore that, to perform the task of 'poiesis', the artist needs a way to 
become 'aware' of the constitution of his own 'self' as being affected by - rather 
than 'representing' objects. Only in 'logos' (and Heidegger's "die Sage" is close to 
this) can this selfbe composed and thus also decomposed. Within such existence the 
'possibilities' of' Dasein' are historically unfolded. Such a state of' critical' pre-
consciousness is paradoxical and thus only practicable within the realm of immediate 
experience, and only within a concept of 'logos', which discloses and withdraws at 
the same time. Artists, as philosophers, 'perform' this antinomy within the 'logos' 
because 'awareness' depends on consciousness but its 'object' is what pertains to 
what constitutes consciousness. 
The philosophical conversation leads to conversion, to a different understanding. It is 
not only a practice, it is also a 'poiesis'. In the exercises of the Stoa the' self' is also 
produced according to the 'eidos' of virtue and logos, which however are not a 
proper 'eidos'. Presocratic 'dialectic' and Stoic 'therapy' gives us a practice at hand 
which is similar to those points made by Heidegger about the essence (Wesen) of 
truth. Art as poiesis sets up the ontological foundation, not because it is a socially 
privileged production, but because the specific character of its 'object' or'disci-
pline', namely the constitution of understanding, has' ontological' character already. 
'Prosoche' breaks the immanent 'logic' of 'pathe' - and the passion of 'certitude' is 
such a one too. 'Prosoche' makes consciousness open to its own constitution as com-
portment. That way art is 'ontological' research. 
Heidegger's concern for the formative power of Being lacks an investigation how the 
'individual' effort comes about, how the 'listening' to Being is achieved within the 
'self' or 'consciousness' of art The Stoics on the other hand are only concerned with 
how 'consciousness' comes about and analyse it in all their exercises to uncover the 
motives for actions and by this practice they uncover the whole relation to 'beings' 
which Heidegger calls 'fallenness' (Verfallenheit). Both then proceed to find a realm 
in which beings appear without being immediately understood in an instrumental 
fashion, for the Stoics it is 'arete' for Heidegger the self-understanding ofDasein as 
care. 
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The concept of discretion prevents the sage from the insistence of a calculable certi-
tude and is therefore related to the artistic practice. 'Discretio' is the faculty of 
judgement that produces itself. The philosophical conversation is a logos, which is 
between perfection and the absence of logos. Philosophical logos is a form of 'tact-
fulness' toward what is to be distinguished and where not to distinguish, which de-
termines what 'is' truth, in the very act of distinguishing. This 'tactfulness' appears 
in Heidegger's Anaxagoras essay as 'esteem' (tisin), the 'just' (dike) way in which 
beings interplay with each other. And this is the way things presence.2 
I found the best way to articulate my inquiry, was to repeat aspects of interpretations 
but each time follow a different line of inquiry. In a line of repetition I will cover the 
various perspectives that these statements allow, in particular Heidegger's. As an art-
ist I 'collect together' shapes of thoughts and layer them until something is eluci-
dated. In this text I try to find shapes of thoughts and test their possible application to 
the everyday consideration with which artists disclose - possibly inadvertently -
some form of 'truth'. Confusion is certainly at the heart of such a questioning, and 
there is still as much confusion at the end as there was at the beginning. But confu-
sion and consideration is what drives art and philosophy. 
For some of the Heideggerian vocabulary I have used my own translations, but I al-
ways indicate the German original to avoid any confusion. At times I found it prefer-
able to use the German original, like Dasein instead of 'being there', Entschlossen-
heit instead of 'resolve' or the 'Ungeheure' instead of 'uncanny', which resonates 
too strongly with the Freudian use of the tenn. Greek vocabulary is used either in the 
way Heidegger translates it or in accordance with the Liddell and Scott Greek Eng-
lish Dictionary, as currently available on the Perseus website (www.preseus.tuft.edu) 
2 "Awesen des Awesenden", Der Spruch des Anaxagoras, in Holzwege, (SdA hereafter), p.358 
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Chapter 1 
, Art and a Way of life' 
I will use this first chapter as a launching pad for questions relating to the 'making' 
of art, rather than the artwork itself. My main interest lies in the possible ways a 
'self' is constituted and re-constituted experimentally by artists as the practice which 
grounds the work of art. Art, then, would not be a product of a subject, instead, as for 
Heidegger, the work of art originates from the 'strife' (polemos ') between the 
'world' and 'earth'. The site of this 'strife' he calls 'Da-sein'. Heidegger and Stoic 
philosophy seem to be concerned, in complementary ways, with this constitution of 
this 'site' as the site of 'truth', out of an interaction between a universal form of the 
absolute and a particular existence. The Stoics sum up the Greek heritage of 
Presocratic 'logos', particularly Heraclitus and the Socratic 'care of the self'. Hei-
degger's fundamental-ontology, on the other hand, points us to an 'understanding' 
which relates to 'Being' and which is always antecedent to all other ways of know 1-
edge, and which is not itselfthe 'object' ofa 'knowledge'. We have always already 
understood something before we know 'objects' and this understanding is 'absent', 
'nothing'. These underlying practices of understanding, "die Sage" as he will later 
come to call them in 'On the Way to Language', circumscribe the historical unfold-
ing of Being as 'aletheia', the 'play' of disclosing and withdrawing. This strategy in-
terprets human 'subjectivity' as a process which is constituted in unconscious prac-
tices and comportments. On the other hand, the Presocratic concept of 'logos' uses 
the same figure of withdrawing and disclosing, for instance in the words of oracles. 
The divine words tell the truth but they also hide it from man. There is a cruelty in 
this withdrawal of the oracle, in which a god reveals fate, but withdrawing it from 
human reason in the depth of the words at the same time3. Greek philosophy is about 
navigating this ignorance in relation to the divine 'logos' and it is brought into view 
ultimately by the Socratic tum to the 'care of the self' as a dwelling in thought and 
discourse, as a 'way oflife'. 
3"Der Gatt kennt die Zukunft, er offenbart sie dem Menschen, aber er scheint nicht zu wollen, daB der 
Mensch auch begreift. 1m Bilde Apollos steckt ein Moment von BoBheit, von Grausamkeit, das in der 
Mitteilung der Weisheit zum Ausdruck kommt. So sagt denn Heraklit, ein Weiser: »Der Herr, dem 
das Orakel in Delphi geh6rt, sagt nicht und verbirgt nicht, sondem deutet an.«" Colli, GdPh, p.16 
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A 'way of life' is the answer to a question. The question is something like, 'How do 
we live?' or 'How am I?' and in question is the 'am' rather than the T. This 'I' is 
aware of itself, not as a 'subject', but as a work and something that sets itself into be-
ing; 'becoming what one is'. The suggestion is, that we can quite well choose our 
way of life; we are, after all, in control of 'something'. There is, after all, life always 
already before we have asked the question about a way of life. In this way we seem 
to have already determined the internal space of a 'self as the material, which we 
can mould according to a fulfilment, a 'telos'. This 'telos' is not arbitrary but linked 
to a concept of 'nature'. Only what is already given can be completed. We are what 
we will be in advance. Philosophy is a transformative way of life because it 'gives' 
fonn4. This form however is not 'aesthetic', and it determines the approach to the 
'self itself and to beings. The whole of 'life' is transformed within a framework of a 
discourse of intentions, which is the life according to 'arete', virtue. Within this con-
text a critique of one's own life needs to find a gesture of justification; the 'way of 
life' has to be validated in some way. The only validation which used to be available 
to the Greeks was in the form of tradition ('nomos'), which means that we 'always 
already' have 'a' way oflife given to us by gods or tradition. If this 'nomos' loses its 
normative value, a different form of consensus has to be found. The Greek 'logos' 
has opened the space within which a 'freely' considered 'way oflife' can be prac-
tised. Life in discourse is a changed life. It is 'free', as we shall see, only if it is in 
accordance with 'logos' and 'physis'. This difference, that wilfulness points at an as-
sertive control, hints already to the problem of control. The 'way oflife' is a 'giving' 
of form, as is art. It is a 'poietic' practice. However, like the form of 'life', 'art' 
needs not only freedom but also a validation. Art is not science, which has validation 
in its mathematical form. Instead, artistic practice operates in the realm which pre-
cedes the hiatus between subject and object. 'Knowledge' implies control and certi-
tude. A Socratic 'way oflife' dispels apparent and unsubstantiated 'knowledge' and 
Socrates' refutes all suppositions with even the most spurious arguments; not be-
cause they are 'wrong', but because the 'attitude' that someone 'knows' needs to be 
crushed to allow the openness for a different, more considered and circumspect 'way 
of life'. The origin of artistic practices is therefore a different comportment which is 
not characterised by control and calculation. 
4 "Rather, it means that philosophy was a mode of existing-in-the-world, which had to be practiced at 
each instant, and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual's life.", Hadot, Phi-
losophy as a Way of Life,,(PhWL hereafter), p. 265: 
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Heidegger's writings analyse possible ways of understanding ourselves and 'under-
standing' as a self-relation but not in tenns ofa subject. 'Da-sein' is the site 'as' 
which meaning takes place in a dynamic temporal wal. Heidegger (re-)introduces 
the 'movement' and strife contained in the idea of understanding. The concept of 
'polemos' (Aus-einander-setzung) which appears in key places of Heidegger's writ-
ings6, is confusing at first because it contains so many possible interpretations. The 
Greek concept means 'strife', but 'Aus-einander-setzung' also means 'differentia-
tion' and 'consideration'. I will come back to this later in this chapter. The being of 
'Dasein' itself is 'polemos' as a means by which 'meaning' is gathered ('legein') 
anew. 
Being on a path which ends abruptly is a "Holzweg,,7. One has to retrace one's steps 
and start again. What is more important than 'arrival' in a predestined place is the re-
gion itself. The 'paths' of' Holzwege' are not the one 'way' or the path of reason, 
but they mean that 'being on the way' is a movement and strife ('polemos') of un-
derstanding and its originary constitutive character, which is not an object of knowl-
edge. In such a way the human work is driven by synthesis of conscious ( and finite) 
knowledge and the unconscious totality of the sway of 'Being,9. In this synthesis art, 
which is not purely an aesthetic phenomenon any more, is able to inquire into pre-
suppositions of understanding. 
The Greek 'way of life', before Socrates, was 'theoretical'. Observation of nature 
and cosmological speculation as much as Sophistic argument, targeted the concept of 
'tradition' (nomos) with the concepts of 'logos' and 'physis'. Socrates' inquiries, un-
dennined all this frenzied competition for knowledge. His critique subverts the ideas 
of the new speculative natural knowledge as much as it dismisses the purely fonnal 
arguments of the Sophists. But Socrates does not offer an alternative to this knowl-
edge of 'mastery'. Instead, he insists on personal responsibility, a 'mastery' of the 
5 "Dynamis and Kinesis are the origin ofHeidegger's term Ereignis. This word describes a moving 
entity's disclosive structure, its being" Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind, in Philosophy of 
Mind, p.308, 
6 Heidegger. Sein und Zeit, p.384; Einftihrung in die Metaphysik, pA7 and Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerks, p.34. 
7 one can translate a 'Holzweg' as wood path leading nowhere, but also as something like being led 
'up the garden path', a false trace 
8 Heidegger, 'Holzwege', in Denkerfahrungen, pA I 
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'self _ The integrated idea of a 'self emerges in the insistence of Socrates by making 
it the only matter of knowledge from which all other knowledge can emerge_ The 
question about the 'way of life' in antiquity was explored by a multitude of compet-
ing schools lO, who all called for the transformational-philosophical 'way oflife'_ 
As silent as Socrates was about concrete 'rules' of virtue I I , so are the Stoics, who do 
not propose an edifice of concrete 'rules' either. Instead they teach a practice of life 
which is governed by virtuous motives_ There are no 'given' rules, which could ever 
be used to analyse the complexity of a situation; it is not about lengthy deliberation 
either - how much time do we have to react when a ship capsizes? Immediate action 
is required_ So if there is no time to deliberate or to consult a book or a commission, 
there has to be a 'faculty' that is always with US I2_ We usually call it the soul or self, 
it is the character of the unity of our faculties that is shaped in one way or other to 
react to the vagaries of life_ Therefore the way our soul, as the whole of our faculties, 
is shaped determines the way of life we lead_ Philosophy gives form to life, which 
becomes a 'work' in progress, 'being-at-work'( energeia)_ What the philosophies of 
antiquity proposed was a shape that is flexible and consistent, joyful and considered 
in all aspects_ Just this is a way of life, where the 'intention' is always 'virtuous', 
leading to 'appropriate actions' (katechonta and katorthoma) in any given situation_ 
Actions are therefore understood to be 'good' or 'bad', dependent on the intention, 
which is the only thing in our controL To be 'good' means to be morally good and 
this also means to be 'happy' (eudaimonia), to live a fulfilled life_ 13 'Virtue' is more 
than just a behaviour or an attitude_ Instead it is a 'durable disposition' of the SOUI 14, 
which unfailingly follows the cosmic 'physis,15_ Virtue seems now to be a form of 
knowledge which is independent of external ends and is instead the origin of internal 
intentions_ Virtue is a measure of the soul's alignment with the universal 'logos'_ All 
9 Bowie, Schelling and modern European Philosophy, p_53 
10 "In the view of all philosophical schools, mankind's principal cause of suffering, disorder, and un-
consciousness were the passions: that is, unregulated desires and exaggerated fears_ People are pre-
vented from truly living, it was taught, because they are dominated by worries_ Philosophy thus ap-
pears, in the first place, as a therapeutic of the passions_ Each school had its own therapeutic method, 
but all of them linked their therapeutics to a profound transformation of the individual's mode of see-
ing and being_ The object of spiritual exercises is precisely to bring about this transformation_" Hadot, 
PhWL, p_ 83: 
II the four virtues are: temperance, courage, justice, wisdom 
12 like the fist fighter who has his weapons with him all the time, unlike the sword fighter, Marcus Au-
relius, Meditations, VI. 
13 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p_15 
14, poion' is a durable disposition, Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p_52 
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actions are performed only because their intentions are in accordance with the 'lo-
gos' (katorthoma). This action is also an 'ontological' decision about how beings, 
how the external world, affects us. 
The Greek term for the 'way oflife' is 'bios', as opposed to 'zoe', the 'biological' 
life. The Greeks were not only aware of the fact of the difference but they made it 
their most enduring invention: "they invented form-in-itself', as Nietzsche says.16 
Through the radical criticism of the Sophistic schools which utilised the art of rheto-
ric, form has been divorced from the content and became a manipulable entity.17 
The 'way oflife' is separated from the biological life. Life as 'pure' - and political-
form excludes the production of sustenance. Recently Giorgio Agamben has shown 
how deeply this separation has influenced all of occidental thought, by tying this dis-
tinction to 'good' and 'bad'. In 'Homo Sacer' Agamben inquires into the classical 
division of 'bios' and 'zoe': zoe is the 'natural' or 'productive' life, the biological 
body, 'bios' on the other hand is the 'way oflife' meaning the political, the form and 
structure oflife. The Greek 'bios' of the polis flourished to the exclusion of the 'bare 
life' form the public life. 18 
'Bios' is a "qualified" life. In the Stoic context 'quality' (as the 2. category) is 
'poion' - from 'poiesis', a form-giving. The form is here already understood as a 
made form, at least distinct and excluded even in a juridical way from the productive 
life of a household. In Stoic discourse, the constitutive 'poiesis' is applied to both, 
bios and zoe, the public and private, but under the topic of virtue, which used to be-
15 "kata physin bios", Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.22I, 
16 "Die Gefahr der Griechen lag im Virtuosentum aller Art; Mit Sokrates beginnen die Lebensvirtu-
osen, Socrates der neue Dithyramb, die neuere Tragoedie, die Erfindung des Rhetors! Der Rhetor ist 
eine Griechische Erfindung der spaeteren Zeit. Sie haben die "Form an sich" erfunden (und auch den 
Philosoph en dazu). - "The danger of the Greeks is their virtuosity in all sorts; the virtuosi of life 
emerge with Socrates, Socrates the new Dithyramb, the new tragedy, the invention of the rhetor! The 
rhetor is a Greek invention of a later date. They invented the form-in-itself (and also the philosopher)" 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke Vo!.III. Ed. Schlechta p.I045 
17 Colli, GdPh, p.89 
18 "In the classical world, however, simple natural life is excluded from the polis in the strict sense, 
and remains confined-as merely reproductive life-to the sphere of the oikos, "home" (Politics, 1252a, 
26-35)" .... "It is true that in a famous passage of the same work, Aristotle defines man as a politikon 
zoon (Politics, 1253a, 4). But here (aside from the fact that in Attic Greek the verb bionai is practi-
cally never used in the present tense), "political" is not an attribute of the living being as such, but 
rather a specific difference that determines the genus zoon. (Only a little later, after all, human politics 
is distinguished from that of other living beings in that it is founded, through a supplement of politic-
ity [policita'] tied to language, on a community not simply of the pleasant and the painful but ofthe 
17 
long only to the 'bios', the public life. Life encompasses everything - it is 'absolute' 
through 'logos' but finite and mortaL The concept of 'qualifying' is inherent in a 
way life. There is a decision to be made on the basis of the 'logos' which enables this 
distinction about the conduct of a life. This means effectively that public conduct be-
comes a 'fonn-in-itself without the content of 'life' as the will to life: survival 
("F onn-an-sich" as Nietzsche put it). The virtuosity of life itself is for Nietzsche a 
life which has forgotten bare life. Or rather, the 'way of life' is inherently (or the 
heritage of) the virtuous life of the mythical hero who, to be virtuous, risks the bare 
life (the oikeios, estate or means of productive life) in order to follow the rules of the 
virtuous (dis )play (' agon ,).19 In this sense' ethics' is understood as the application of 
the virtuous rules of play to the exclusion of the 'bare life' - or its complete irrele-
vance in relation to the life of the soul. Socrates' 'care of the self', after all, is pitched 
precisely against the pursuit of the private life of riches and indulgence etc., which is 
part of the 'bare life'. Virtuosity, as Nietzsche says, denies the 'bare life' in favour of 
the virtuous 'play' (agon).20 
The Greek distinction between phronesis (praxis) and techne (production-poiesis) is 
concerned with 'bare life' as 'production of life' and praxis as a 'way oflife'. In this 
sense the archaic and Socratic 'arete' coincide by denying any value to the 'bare 
life', instituting the perspective of the virtuous play in the fonn of' care for the self' 
in public discourse. The reversal between the value of the private and public life, 
'bios' and 'zoe', are at the root of the possibility to understand 'life' in tenns of 
'fonn'. Nietzsche takes this to be the source of nihilism itself and much of his cri-
tique of Socrates is precisely about this division between the Dionysian and Apollo-
nian approach. However, Nietzsche ignores that this radicalisation is moderated by a 
good measure of therapy of the unbearable pain ofthe naked life. Even the philoso-
pher provides for the necessities of life, but without calling them 'virtuous'. Just like 
Socrates, the Stoics understand that it is the intention which makes an act 'good' or 
'bad', but unlike the radical interpretation by the Cynics, they do not play out their 
'bare life' in public. They nevertheless agree with them about the irrelevance of this 
good and the evil and of the just and the unjust.)". Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.33 f. 
19" . It thus has its place in a sphere superior to the strictly biological processes of nutrition, reproduc-
tion and self-preservation." Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.ll 
2o"Und wie der Vater die Schoenheit und Begabung seines Kindes bewundert, an den Akt der Entste-
hung aber mit schamhaftem Widerwillen denkt, so erging es dem Griechen." Friedrich Nietzsche, 
FiinfVorreden, Werke Vo!.III. Ed. Schlechta, p.277 
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from the point of view of reason. They just abide by common decorum and quietly 
accept that the virtuous way of life encompasses the private as well as the public life. 
In its 'excess of meaning', art opens the possibility ofa form for the 'way of life'. 
This is what Heidegger works out in 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. Art grants 
shape to a 'world' which is the unified background of a 'communal' understanding. 
In Greek tenns, it enables 'fonn as such', and it is what Nietzsche ascribes to the 
Greek enlightenment. Work on the disposition of the self uncouples itself from 'bod-
ily' necessity and at the same time it becomes 'ontologically' virulent. The 'ergon' of 
the act of making art is not just' ontic' it is also ontologically inquiring into historical 
manifestation of 'Being'. 
Art and ethics are understood to be without (external) purpose, they have purpose in 
themselves. Heidegger's 'present-at-hand' ("Zu-handenes"), the term describing the 
network or field of inherent and universal practicability needs art as giving fonn to 
tradition: in the 'excess of meaning' the ends and aims receive their fonn. Tradition 
and rootedness, all the possible relations of a 'world', present themselves out of this 
excess of meaning. In its excess, art is already a paradigm precisely because it is 
'outside' the utilitarian context ofthe 'stuff ("Zeug") of the 'present-at-hand'. Tradi-
tion and its language are the trace of the polemos of such a discourse. 
A vocabulary of 'not being in control' in relation to the production of works of art 
cannot be sought in the 'purity' of 'law' and universality. Universality is always poi-
soned through the denial of its own constitution.21 . To avoid this Heidegger declares 
in SZ that to make 'Being' a question of 'ontology again, one has to go through the 
'ontic' practices of Dasein as the "hermeneutic of Dasein,,22. This is reminiscent of 
Hamann's objections to Kant's transcendental ambition that it is only expressible in 
21 "Entspringen aber Sinnlichkeit u. Verstand als zwey Stamme der mensch!. Erkenntnis aus Einer 
gemeinschaftlichen Wurzel, so, daB surch jene Gegenstande gegeben und durch diesen gedacht wer-
den; zu welchem Behuf nun eine so gewaltthatige, unbefugte, eigensinnige Scheidung desjenigen, 
was die Natur zusammengefligt hat! Werden nicht aile beyde Stamme durch eine Dichotomie und 
Zweyspalt ihrer gemeinschaftl. Wurzel ausgehen u. verdorren? Sollte sich nicht zum Ebenbilde un-
serer Erkenntnis ein einziger Stamm beBer schicken mit 2 Wurzeln, einer obern in der Luft und einer 
unten in der Erde? Die erste ist unserer Sinnlichkeit Preis gegeben ; die letzte hingegen unsichtbar und 
muB durch den Verstand gedacht werden, welches mit der Prioritiit des Gedachten und der Posteri-
oritiit des Gegebenen oder Genommenen, wie auch mit der beliebten Inversion der reinen Vernunft in 
ihren Theorien mehr tibereinstimmt." Hamann, Metakritik tiber den Purismus der Vernunft in lohan 
Georg Hamann, Briefwechsel. p.2l 0-216 
22 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (SZ hereafter), §8, p.38 
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'impure' language (contaminated with experience), i.e. it is governed from a particu-
lar historical situation that can never be 'universal', 'pure' etc .. 
Now, I will try to describe, why I think that 'art' has inherited the philosophical prac-
tice to detennine a 'way of life'. The way one conducts oneself is a comportment to-
wards things. Art is a skill to query one's own comportment. Comportments deter-
mine how we see things and how we let them address US. 23 I consider the philosophi-
cal 'way oflife' to operate on the ontic as well as on an 'ontological' level, by ques-
tioning those presuppositions that pertain to the possibility of understanding. In par-
ticular, when Heidegger detennines the possibility to understand with "pure letting-
be-present [Anwesend-sein-lassen] of what manifests itself,24 , instead of the scien-
tific 'detennining in advance the object of knowledge', it is through a comportment 
(of anxiety or sadness or calculation) that we can switch from the latter to the first. 
Comportment as 'Stimmung,25 is 'plastic' and the Stoic psychagogy was imminently 
concerned with such 'comportment', because it detennined in advance how things 
present themselves to us. Here 'ontic' fonn seeks to detennine the 'ontological' for-
mation. 
One could detennine a 'way oflife' as 'tradition', what one is 'used to'. 'Dasein' is 
detennined already by an understanding of 'Being,26, which means, it always al-
ready, in advance, understands what it means 'to be' - all consideration takes place 
on the foundation of such a antecedent decision about the 'nature' of 'beings', which 
Heidegger calls 'project'. Nevertheless, this antecedent understanding is historical 
and thus plastic. Heidegger denies this 'project' to be open to the individual, but in 
'The Origin of the Work of Art' he posits the artists (poets) with a capacity to inau-
gurate a change in this understanding of 'Being' .27 
Art (modem Western art at least) has to do with tradition and discovery. A tradition 
within which we have always already understood things by taking them for granted 
23 Moerchen, Heideggers Satz: »'Sein' heiJ3t 'An-wesen'«, in Merker (ed) Innen und Aussenansichten, 
p.193 
24 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p.ll 0 
25 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p.211 
26 "Seinsverstaendniss ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins." Heidegger, SZ, §4, p.l2 
27" Was die Dichtung als lichtender Entwurf an Unverborgenheit auseinanderfaltet und in den RiJ3 der 
Gestalt vorauswirft, ist das Offene, das sie geschehen laBt und zwar dergestalt, daJ3 jetzt das Offene 
erst inmitten des Seienden dieses zum Leuchten und Klingen bringt." Heidegger, Der Ursprung des 
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in one way or another and a dismissal of such tradition, is this not a 'polemos' in a 
Heideggerian way? Virtually everything we understand is based on what we presup-
pose without being aware of it. One way to unearth some of these presuppositions is 
philosophy. Philosophy, as we know its heritage from Socratic dialogues, is a way of 
life which does not pretend to 'know' and in its proceedings it forces the participants 
to jettison their 'presuppositions'. It perceives life itself as a work of art. Art - mod-
em art - has become a procedure which, by operating outside the strictures of scien-
tific methodology, acts as a 'critical,28 faculty, re-opening again those dimensions 
which the scientific methodology has closed down and sealed from 'view' to exert its 
program of self-justification and auto-poiesis 'ex nihilo'. Therefore it is important to 
find a 'path' within the play between 'tradition' and 'auto-poiesis' - the volatile state 
of truth each saeculum produces. 
I will delimit the development of the idea of a 'way of life' as a process of inquiry 
into one's own practices and its development in Stoic philosophy, by interpreting this 
practice in relation to the Greek 'agon' as the immediate source of the question of a 
'way oflife', which was the 'virtuous' life in the archaic age. The Stoics, as the heirs 
of Socratic inquiry, saw the purpose of the 'way of life' as a consideration of the in-
tention of acts. This exercise shaped the faculties into a new 'character' as an endur-
ing 'form' - constituting a 'way oflife'. 'Knowledge' was not to be accumulated in 
an abstract sense as a philosophical system29, but only as an exercise to mould the 
character. This 'logos' is still, in its applications, dependent on the idea of 'wisdom' 
of the archaic past. The Stoic sages and their god may have a perfect 'logos', mere 
mortals however, which most philosophers are, are not sages. Stoic exercises are 
mostly directed towards the daily turmoil of living in an apparently unhinged world. 
Here the Stoic obsession with 'passions' has its justification. Passions are 'wrong' 
judgements about the occurrences oflife. The 'logos' of the Greek enlightenment 
becomes culture-critical, and virtue is the critical terminus which opens a view on 
'Being', on the possibilities to encounter beings. But it expresses itself indirectly in 
the 'care of the self. 
Kunstwerks, in Holzwege: (UKW hereafter), p.58 
28 krisein, which seems to me to be also a "setting-apart", an 'Aus-einander-setzung' a 'polemos' 
29 it was never meant to be a knowledge as 'hard science' but as exercise or skill- Nietzsche's verdict 
is correct to this degree. 
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Historic fate, destiny and necessity compete with human assertion of freedom, but 
for both, Heidegger and Stoa, 'will' is dubious and at the same time the essence of 
man (Dasein)3o. For Heidegger 'will to power' is the essence of technology, for the 
Stoics, the will for security, control of the external world, the control of destiny is 
precisely the misapprehension which leads to incomprehensible suffering. It is, like 
the essence of technology, not comprehended because it will not reveal its 'presup-
positions' . 
At certain junctures Heidegger's and Stoic philosophy seem to be almost excluding 
each other, while they appear so close at others. One has to keep in mind against 
whom the authors argue and who the interlocutor is. Tendentiously the Stoics 
strengthen their concept of the 'logos' and rationality in almost hyperbolic propor-
tions, while Heidegger, on the opposite side, unearths the genealogy of modem 'ra-
tionality' of science and locates it in the Presocratics. Heidegger's dependence on 
Heraclitus though, matches Stoic reliance on him. Universality, volition, logic are 
things that the Stoa establishes while Heidegger is busy disenchanting them. But 
first, it is not the same rationality as that of the modem science and secondly the mo-
tivation of the Stoa is to establish a field of mental training, a doxology within which 
the soul is embedded to make the tum into its 'way of life', as a change of 'charac-
ter'. Stoic 'reason' is therapeutic and therefore defined as human nature. Thought is 
'reason' already and it is always already present by nature. Stoic practice 'leads' to-
wards the 'non-willing willing', the will which is not a 'will to power', but equally 
not 'passivity'. For both, Stoa and Heidegger the most appropriate' action' is to elu-
cidate how things are as they present themselves to make sense of them. Stoic exer-
cises create a character-disposition within which the judgement by which sense is 
made of things is itself determined. Stoa is still much closer to Heraclitus 'physis' 
than to Cartesian science. This is where there is a closeness between Heidegger and 
Stoa. 
1. What is Socrates' way of life? 
In the mythological archaic age nature as cosmos created a unity with the 'nomos', 
the moral tradition. With the emergence of'theoria' as a philosophy of nature and 
30 "the being of beings is the will [ofDasein]" Heidegger, Poetic, Language and Thought, p.IOO 
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speculative cosmology mythical understanding of occurrences is converted into the 
concept of' law' as 'logos', which still governs political-moral order. For Heraclitus 
'logos' is the unifying normativity of nature and nomos. However, for him it already 
demarcates the distance to the actual social practices of his polis3l . In no way does he 
thus legitimate the actual 'nomos', on the contrary, it is a sharp critique of a nomos 
which is practised without any relation to 'logos'. 'Logos', 'kosmos', 'physis' and 
'nomos' are a unified whole and critical of the actual political order. The emergence 
of this 'fourfold' as 'critical' concept forces a differentiation in the application of the 
Greek agon. Agonic 'arete' has to be hannonised with 'physis', 'polis' and 'logos'. 
The archaic 'agon' is the feudal concept to triumph at any const. All material consid-
erations are secondary: the 'bare life' is indifferent. 
In tenns of the agon, what is instrumental is not' arete'. Once 'physis' becomes the 
critical paradigm and united with 'logos', what is 'outside' nature is not virtue or the 
good and rational but the psycho-physiologically unbalanced, a category of ill-health. 
The concept of 'physis' becomes normative through the influence of medical science 
(Hippocrates), it validates 'physis' as what is always conducive to life, a lawful and 
'healthy' way determining all life. This means that ultimately, for the Stoics, 'logos' 
is 'physis' and therapeutic. As the 'agon', 'physis' is a form of culture critique refer-
encing a natural law as the archaic agon referenced the divine order in the form of a 
judgement by ordeal. I will come to the 'agon' in a later section. 
Socrates' practice is a discourse about being 'virtuous'. What is most important for 
humans is to be virtuous, i.e. that nothing but virtue has value, i.e. the ethos ofthe 
'care of one's self (and not other things or spurious (speculative cosmological) 
knowledge etc.) A key point here is, that Plato uses the Socratic 'agathon' as a para-
digmatic 'form' (idea) for an 'ontological' understanding of 'being' itself32. This ap-
proach integrates the' ontic' and 'ontological'. It is important for my purpose to con-
nect ontology with art to stress this connection between ontology and the 'ontic' on 
which Stoic practices are based. 
31 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.12 
32 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p 18; Plato, Gorgias 504a-508a 
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The Stoic therapeutic of the self depends on Socratic practices. His 'way oflife' was 
exemplary, even though he was not considered a 'sage' in Stoic terms. The literature 
on Socrates and Plato is often concerned with the validity, logic or otherwise of this 
argument, or the coherence of a 'theory ofknowledge,33. Socrates tricks unsuspect-
ing passers-by into a cumbersome disputes and forces them into admitting their igno-
rance. Is this the Socratic 'way oflife'? Socrates does not just want to prove his in-
terlocutors wrong and find a 'true' definition of 'justice' or any other subject What 
he does, though, is to "confuse" people, so their apparent 'knowledge' is revealed as 
. d 34 ma equate. 
Thus he shows that there is a different kind of 'knowledge', which is grounded in the 
question of a considered conduct of one's life. Since 'beliefs' are so far unsafe and 
easily refuted, it is only the objective to live virtuously that is left as the basis for in-
quiry. Socrates therefore shapes the way of his life, to question the 'way of life' of 
others. Donning the hat of ignorance, his figure becomes the question of his inter-
locutors' 'self -understanding. The 'way oflife' in Socrates' case is the unity of his 
thoughts and actions. It is the 'dwelling in philosophy,35: thinking (,dianoia') about 
one's actions by giving account The Socratic 'care of the self is the 'good life' 
which is 'eudaimonia', and later the Stoics understand it as a carefree life, 'care' un-
derstood as caring for external matters rather than for ones 'self .36 Only then Plato 
formulates the 'good' (agathon) as an ontological concept 
Heidegger takes the opposite approach: we have to know what man is to propose an 
'ethics,37. But for this purpose he also refers to the 'perplexity' (Verlegenheit) about 
33 in particular Vlastos and the whole analytical school 
34 "Socrates is 'atopos', without place or out of place. The philosopher is in between worlds, the hu-
man and the divine, wise and ignorant, which means he knows about his limits, his life is itself what 
Socratic discourse points to. "I am utterly disturbing (atopos), and I create only perplexity (aporia)" 
Hadot, Ph WL, p.31 
35 "For by nature, my friend, man's mind dwells in philosophy" (Plato, Phaedrus, 279a) ... Philosophy 
- what we call philosphy - is metaphysics' getting under way, in which philosophy comes to itself and 
to its explicit tasks. Philosophy gets under way only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence into 
the fundamental possibilities ofDasein as a whole." Heidegger, What is Metaphysics, in Basic Writ-
ings, Routledge, London 1978, p.112 
36 'How' we 'see' or understand things; the Good, 'agathon', is the possibility to understand; in Besin-
nung, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 66, p.l 06; G .Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.l22 
37 "SolI nun gemaB der Grundbedeutung des Wortes 'ethos' derName Ethik dies sagen, daB sie den 
Aufenthalt des Menschen bedenkt, dann ist dasjenige Denken, das die Wahrheit des Seins als das an-
fangliche Element des Menschen als eines eksistierenden denkt, in sich schon die urspriingliche Ethik. 
Dieses Denken ist aber dann auch nicht erst Ethik, weil es Ontologie ist." Heidegger, Wegmarken, 
p.l87: 
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what it means to 'be' .38 However, it is important to see, that a 'way of life' is also a 
therapeutic unravelling of the constitution of a sUbjective consciousness from every-
day existence (the 'ontic') or rather the state of 'Fallenness' (Verfallenheit) into 
'Facticity'. Socratic inquisition is a method that invalidates any human 'knowledge' 
just as 'understanding' which is at the source of'Verfallenheit' and the forgetting of 
the 'question ofBeing,39. 'Thought' and (ideal) 'truth' are what determines, from 
there on, the space of metaphysics but within it also the seed of a 'self' which is con-
stituted as an 'ergon' according to 'nature,40 
The care for thought, truth and soul, which Socrates stipulates as what is more neces-
sary than all else, is equated with a verifiable form of knowledge of virtue, it has to 
be verified in discourse. What is so confusing is that Socrates insists on an external 
and absolute truth, while at the same time insisting that we should only behave ac-
cording to the better argument41 . If we try to understand it from the point of view 
against which Socrates put this idea forward, then the answer is: it was clearly natu-
ral philosophy and sophistry which pretended to pursue and teach 'knowledge' and 
'virtue'. Natural philosophy of the 5th century excelled in medical and cosmological 
speculation and the term 'nature' ('physis'), became an expression of uncorrupted 
value opposed to the concept of the 'nomos', as the corruption of human nature. If 
we assume that Socrates criticises the 'new' knowledge of natural speculation trying 
to find the universal laws of nature, like Leukippus, Democritus' Atomism and the 
Sophists' relativisation and critique of tradition and 'nomos', then we will also see 
38,"Denn offenbar seid ihr doch schon lange mit dem vertraut, was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn ihr den 
Aus-druck,seiend' gebraucht, wir jedoch glaubten es einst zwar zu verstehen, jetzt aber sind wir in 
Verlegenheit gekommen« (Plato, Sophistes 244a) Haben wir heute eine Antwort auf die Frage nach 
dem, was wir mit dem Wort »seiend« eigentlich meinen? Keineswegs. Und so gilt es denn, die Frage 
nach dem Sinn von Sein emeut zu stellen. Sind wir denn heute auch nur in der Verlegenheit, den Aus-
druck »Sein« nicht zu verstehen? Keineswegs. Und so gilt es denn vordem, allererst wieder ein Ver-
standnis fur den Sinn dieser Frage zu wecken." SZ, p.l 
39 note the similarity between 'Seinsvergessenheit' and the Platonic 'anamnesis' in Meno; 'the 'idea 
of ideas' determines the question of Being, while the for the Stoics the self formulates the question of 
Being by its attempt to partake in the universal a-temporal logos. The difference to Heidegger is the 
temporality [perfection] "Ganzheit" of the 'care-structure' in SZ, §65, p.328; §72, p.374 
40 Plato, Apology, 29d-e.; "Thus, Socrates brought his interlocutors to examine and become aware of 
themselves. "Like a gadfly," Socrates harassed his interlocutors with questions which placed them in 
question, and obliged them to pay attention to themselves and to take care of themselves: "What? 
Dear friend, you are an Athenian, citizen of a city greater and more famous than any other for its sci-
ence and its power, and you do not blush at the fact that you give care to your fortune, in order to in-
crease it as much as possible, and to your reputation and your honours; but when it comes to your 
thought, to your truth, to your soul, which you ought to be improving, you have no care for it, and you 
don't think of it! ".Hadot, PhWL, p.28 
41 Plato, Crito, 46c 
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that Socrates does not teach knowledge at all. All knowledge is only of value if it is 
grounded on virtue, or at least a dialectical validation of the best possibility. Wis-
dom, proper 'knowledge', is for gods, men can only understand their own 'not being 
in control' i.e. not having 'wisdom' - being only a 'philo' -sophos. Art does not 
'know' either, it is in 'dialogue' and is very good at finding out perceived 'knowl-
edge' which is just presupposed without exchanging it for new certainties. This 'pro-
visionality', which is also a 'not being in control', has to be kept in mind, so as not to 
make it a 'knowledge'. Its character is a 'knowledge' in suspension, while, on the 
other hand, the attention to one's own actions is the shaping of one's actions as 'vir-
tuous'. Ifthe shaping of one's own actions is to be justifiable it also has to be 'ra-
tional' ('logos'). The inquiry into the possibility of knowledge is also an inquiry into 
the 'Self which is constituted by the 'care' it is given. By creating "perplexity" Soc-
rates also creates an ontological incertitude. 
Socrates is the intermediary between wisdom and ignorance: wisdom is unachievable 
for humans but: enthusiasm to understand can be inspired; this is the 'Eros' of 
paideia; everyone can take care of his self and discourse helps to disillusion one's de-
lusions about one's own knowledge. This awareness of ignorance, or even the provi-
sionality of beliefs, is a different 'knowledge' because it is only discernible in one's 
own comportment. The eros-inspired enthusiasm does not teach 'something', it does 
not lecture but confuses. Being the 'a-topos' between wisdom and ignorance, gods 
and men, Socrates is in the position of the archaic hero, in that he disregards the 
(utilitarian) reality in favour of arete. But the 'agon' with Socrates is one that no one 
can 'win', because Socrates does not compete for knowledge. He has prepared this 
trap by the denial of all knowledge. This means that everyone has to follow the in-
quiry in his own life, as a way of life - life is thought, "dwelling in thought", without 
certainty. 
Socrates reverses the aims of natural philosophy to arrive at a knowledge of the cos-
mos. He says, '1 do not know' but he means 'we cannot know', we are 'not in con-
trol' (except in taking care of our self, which we can re-construct). Similarly, the Sto-
ics speak about the sage, but no Stoic actually admitted to be such a sage. The wise 
and always rational sage is a 'terminus a quo', which only guides the psychology of 
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the exercises, as the path of insight. The sage is a model which mediates the divine 
and human reality.42 
Heidegger's "on the way ... " and Socrates' as 'a-topos' reveal a similar structure of 
incertitude. It is an appeal to careful thought and this means a questioning of the 
conditions for the possibility of understanding, which means the question about the 
constitution of understanding. 
The Stoa grew out of the Socratic-Platonic connection of ethics and ontology; it is 
the constant questioning about the "good" and appropriate life according to 'physis' 
and 'logos'. What is appropriate to human life is the 'way' we understand and from 
there the 'way oflife' is the framework of any understanding; the 'good' therefore is 
what enables an interpretation in the first instance, the 'way of life' as opposed to the 
animal-life, which does not have a 'world'. 
The Stoics think that life and the world that is 'not in our control' exit within a unify-
ing logos. Man partakes in this logos and is thus able to cope with (apparent) adver-
sity. 'Logos' validates behaviour: the knowledge of behaviour is discerned in phi-
losophical practice, the 'way oflife' as dialogue and for the Stoics specifically as 
'therapeutic' dialogue - is an 'auto-poietic' figure; constant self-inquiry leads to a 
constant reshaping of the 'self'. The way oflife is 'energeia' setting itself into being 
(i.e. into its completion). True 'life' ('bios') is the 'practice' of philosophy. The vali-
dation of the disposition to 'appropriate actions' lies in the practice of life as phi-
losophy, not in an instruction. Life is the 'ergon' oflife [and it is where I seek to po-
sition art as a work which is not dissociated from 'life', which is operative as inquiry 
into the 'way oflife']. This 'appropriate action' is based on the making sense of a 
situation, and it is this 'way of making sense' that sense is kept open as the source of 
the virtuous 'life'. 
The 'external world', which is not in our control, opposes our 'will'. However, when 
the 'will' is attuned to 'reason' we will not have need for such 'control'. The first 
'will' expresses a 'will to power', the second a 'letting-be'. This illustrates the dif-
ference between modern 'scientific' reason and the 'reason' of antiquity which H re-
42 Hadot, PhWL, p.147 
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constructs. Controlled knowledge institutes the subject-object relation of knowledge, 
while the Stoic practice of awareness (prosoche) does not operate with preconceived 
understanding. 'Logos' as universal law is a critical term against the apparent arbi-
trariness of gods and fate of myths and as such the ontological foundation, normativ-
ity, of a practice of life. The hypothesis of an universal logos denotes a necessity, but 
only one which we know ex negativo: what happened was necessary but not in the 
sense that we could understand and extrapolate all future from it. 
2. Agon and 'Reality' 
Agon dispenses with 'reality' as a value: nothing matters except the right comport-
ment and appropriate action. This agon is a divorce from attachment to 'things' and a 
re-institution of the symbolic in the mythical order. The divine order transcends the 
life of accumulation. In the pure excess of the 'agon' material has no other value than 
lies in its waste and destruction. In the pursuit of the 'arete' all material good be-
comes irrelevant. 
'Agon' is 'play' in general as competition. It is of archaic origin and pertains to aris-
tocratic-feudal traditions. The competition is divorced from the 'private' concerns of 
life. It is performed more or less according to rules, but not always a ritual (relig-
ious). More importantly, it is understood as the judgement par excellence, 'judge-
ment by ordeal/god'. This point becomes important if we look at Heidegger's oppo-
sition to the synthesis of Hegel's 'dialectic', opting for the concept of 'polemos' in-
stead. I will argue that this 'judgement by polemos', which gives persistence to a 
form of Being, is similar in structure to the Greek agon. The Greeks competed in 
every field, from gymnastics to tragedy, from dialectics to 'wisdom' (Colli): it is 
about' arete' .43 What is virtuous cannot be gathered from things, it is not in accumu-
lation but in the excesses. So, when the 'polis' exerted its democratic forms, ideas of 
brute aristocratic 'agon' have been transferred (by Socrates) into the individual's 
soul according to the measure of discourse and dialectics. 'Polemos' and 'agon' 
show certain similarities, by being the determinate and constitutive events of an on-
tological outlook. But there are differences. Polemos as "Aus-einander-setzung" (set-
ting-apart) introduces a space within which beings can appear. The agon on the other 
43 'inventing virtuosity': Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke Vol.III., 1979, Ed. Schlechta p. I 045] 
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hand simply withdraws validity from things that appear to us by detennining the 'in-
tentions' with which we address them. As long as this 'intention' stays non-
instrumental it is virtuous. This, however, first enables precisely the fonn of 'excess' 
as possibility (dynamis/kinesis 44) which is at work in the polemos itself. 
The practice of the Sophists was not a question of what is 'true', but a question to 
prevail and to win the 'agon', which resembled the mythical conception of a 'judge-
ment by ordeal'. The opinion which prevails is the right opinion. Against this ap-
proach Socrates uses the Presocratic method of dialectics, from which sophistic 
'rhetoric' itself derived. Socratic dialectic interrupts the Sophistic speech by forcing 
upon it the method which destroys all 'positive knowledge,45. The private 'askesis' 
of the Presocratics 46 which prevented assumptions about possible expressions of 
truth have become public and thus agonic displays to curb the excesses of Sophistic 
'relativism' .47 
The Presocratic 'dialectic' destroyed all 'positive knowledgeo - it was an askesis of 
disillusionment. Socrates introduces this shift of focus, to the practices of the self as 
a comportment inside the 'aporia', where Socrates and his interlocutor do not 
'know', the 'absolute' truth is infinitely deferred. The agon of opinions ends in a 
blind alley for both, so the agon of knowledge has to be applied within the self as 
what is in the immediate responsibility of the self, as a way of life to pursue the 
'agathon'. In mystical and archaic times the outcome of the 'agon' can be blamed on 
'the gods'. This cannot be said for the 'agon' in the Socratic sense, there the solution 
is to move the 'agon' into the place where oneself is entirely responsible by the vir-
tue of partaking in the 'logos'. Although the Sophists claim knowledge and universal 
'truth', according to the concept of 'physis', they fail the Socratic test of prove their 
knowledge and are thus discovered as ignorant themselves 
Under these circumstances 'knowledge' is in a strange 'double bind'. On one hand it 
is supposed to be universal, in the concepts of 'physis' and 'logos', on the other it is 
44 Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind, p.308 
45 Colli, GdPh, p.81 
46 the Presocratic dialectical exchanges were not held publicly and were not meant to sway opinion 
one way or the other as was the rhetoric speech of the sophist, Colli, GdPh, po92 
47 Buddhism knows the 'agon' as the contest of the better 'discretion' too. No meeting between two 
masters passes without an exchange of subtle observations (or actions) pertaining to the 'proper' un-
29 
never a concrete human knowledge. The perfect knowledge is purely divine (al-
though the 'soul' as partaking in the divine is able to recollect this knowledge; but 
because it is never perfect it is always lacking and is thrown back into incertitude). 
The rules of the 'agon' then mutate into 'law' and 'nature', (physis, logos). However, 
if the rule of the game is a universal law of nature, the consequences of the applica-
tion of the law can only lead to one 'truth'. Therefore fate, as the decision of the 
'agon' gives way to the truth of the universal 'logos'; humans participating in the 
play of 'logos' are able to make considerate, if not 'wise' (and perfect) decisions. 
'Considered life' is not a 'life according to 'the law of (scientific) 'reason', instead it 
is a life under 'supervision', considerate but also experimental, inquisitive and atten-
tive to what is 'hidden' in the argument 'Logos' as consideration maintains the char-
acter which reveals and hides at the same time. 'Truth' as perfection (virtue (-osity)) 
is therefore always deferred. 
The 'harmony of opposites' originates movement liMen do not know how what is at 
variance agrees with itself It is an hannony of opposites48, like that of the bow and 
the lyre."49. This 'happening' is in constant flux ofa 'polemos' (,Auseinander-
setzung' = setting apart of a frontier, or 'RiB' ('peras')) moving the 'RiB' as the fron-
tiers between concealment (withdrawal) and unconcealedness (disclosure); world and 
earth.so Heidegger used the Heraclitus fragment 53 to expound his concept of 'pole-
mos' and under his hand 'polemos' becomes the concept of movement of 'Being' it-
self, expressing the same idea of a judgement by ordeal as the archaic 'agon'. 'Pole-
mos' is 'production' in the interpretative sense - it bestows the possibility of mean-
ing, which Heidegger calls "worlding"SI which is the place of Dasein: "Polemos is 
Dasein"s2. The interpretative movement is also what drives Stoic consideration 
which is the power that constitutes the 'durable disposition' ofthe converted self 
The fact that arete and agathon are the 'termini a quo' only means that these are non-
instrumental- transcendent and in such a way the 'logos' is also "polemos" as an 
derstanding of the dichotomy that all is one and the one is aIL 
48 i.e. the "Fuge" which Heidegger later uses in terms of 'dike' justice. 
49 Heraclitus, fragment 51 
50 'Riss', 'peras', 'limit', 'form': is basically the shape, that which gives form and without which there 
is no distinction, in Zollikon Seminars p.184; see also: Sheehan, Heidegger, Aristotle and Phenome-
nology, in Philosophy Today, XIX, Summer, 1975 p.93 
51 "die Welt weltet", Heidegger, VA, p.l79 
52 Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.16 
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"ontological concept", which "describes our relation to Being as what Heidegger 
calls Dasein,,53. 
Properly understood there are two 'events' of Being, the first (Seyn) opens 'the open' 
and the second, the Being (Sein) ofDasein determines the its possibilities in a con-
stant polemos (Aus-einander- setzung). This is the determination of the interpretative 
action which has in its eyes 'Being' as the perplexing question of the 'presencing' 
(Anwesen) of beings. 
3. Art as a 'Way of Life' 
The function of philosophy as a 'way of life' in antiquity has a confusingly similar 
structure to Heidegger's movement of Being and Dasein. Both are poietic, consti-
tuted in 'agon', or 'polemos' respectively, manifesting themselves in the virtuous 
'self or the 'authentic Dasein'. Polemos is poietic by deciding the durable form in 
which Dasein and Being interact, and this is 'manifest' in the 'The Origin of the 
Work of Art ,54, where the 'work of art' determines the form of Being of a people. 
Conversely the Stoics use an agonic 'arete' as their ontological terminus of 'pole-
mos', which registers the ontological situation and in such a way moulds the individ-
ual character through the use of 'logos' which is equally ontologically determinant in 
Heidegger's 'polemos'. 
If, according to Heidegger, the work of art constitutes the emergence of a historical 
mode of Being in terms of the 'polemos', as an emergence of truth, then the 'poietic 
praxis' of the individual artist has to be accounted for in some form. Obviously, Hei-
degger limits the scope of the horizon to the factual "Geworfenheit" ofDasein into a 
pre-existing form of Being. The 'enowning' defines the epoch of the unfolding of the 
shape of Being that has been granted and the individual just colours in one or the 
other aspect. Alternatively, it may be that what Heidegger has in mind, at least in his 
essay 'Gelassenheit', is the awareness which leads to a natural interpretation of this 
inescapable destiny. In any case, the individual cannot be responsible or the author of 
such movement, it has to be the 'people' or collective 'Mitsein' which gives form to 
Being. But if 'Gelassenheit' is individual in the sense of a dialogue like the consid-
53 Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.IS 
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eration of philosophy, 'letting-be' as 'Anwesen'ss that means that beings are not in-
terrogated in the fonn of their being but let-be in their own 'being-as' what they are 
disclosed as. The 'thinker' accepts the predestined emerging truth, but at the same 
time he is aware of the danger of withdrawal from view of the 'true' roots of this 
emergence, i.e. Being. 
If it is possible for artists and philosophers to "listen" to Being, in a comportment of 
"Gelassenheit" as defined by Heidegger: "non-willing willing",S6 it should be possi-
ble to describe this "listening" in tenns of the Stoic 'prosoche' which is itself the es-
sence of the 'way of life' that has an inherent 'awareness' of the ambiguity of con-
texts within which we 'always already' operate, i.e. it is ontological in its direction. 
'What we take for granted' ('das Selbstverstandliche') is a fonn oftruth that is im-
pressed on us and which is discernible in the attentive 'way of life'. 'Prosoche' in the 
tenns of a "non-willing willing" is an activity that is beyond active and passive, sub-
ject and object. It is important to keep in mind that it has nothing to do with a passiv-
ity such as scientific 'detachment', nor with Meister Eckhard's 'Gelassenheit' as a 
non-willing and surrendering to God. 
'Prosoche' is an action of thought (dianoia), although it is not an argumentative 
thought. It is an exercise of things coming into thought. Equally this does not mean 
that this is volition. "Willing - non-willing", in a way is already 'prosoche', because 
it is not focused 'on things', but instead on one's 'reaction' to them and by extension 
one's 'self. Equally, Heidegger's 'meta-discourse' ofa prehistory of thought and 
'logos' as the outcome of a historical 'polemos' is beyond the scope of Stoic inquiry. 
What Heidegger calls "Epoche", the 'epoch' as derived from the Greek 'epochC', a 
withholding, within which a specific mixture of disclosure and withdrawal consti-
tutes truth, mirrors the method of the individual exercise in antiquity. The purpose is 
not to be misled, through a wrong opinion into an action, or more radically, not to be 
governed by wrong judgements. In Heidegger's ontology, the 'strife' of withholding 
54 UKW hereafter 
55 Moerchen, Heideggers Satz: »'Sein' heiBt 'An-wesen' «, in Merker (ed) Innen und Aussenansichten, 
p.l93 p.l92 
56 Heidegger, Ge1assenheit, 1959, p.51, 
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and disclosing' results in an enduring situation (of Being and Dasein), of an 'inter-
pretation of beings' . 
Therefore the practice of the artist has necessarily to follow, knowingly or not, a path 
that encompasses a mode of existence within which he successfully or not, practices 
the particular attention ('prosoche') to how his and the epoch's mode of understand-
ing, that, which is necessarily invisible as 'what is taken for granted' ("selbstver-
standlich") opens up in contradictions, within which things disappear in their 'as-
structure'. Art on the other hand is not part of this 'as-structure' as Heidegger shows 
in the UKW, art is that which makes beings appear in the comportment of 'letting-
be' as the "Anwesen"s7. Things 'address' us - "an-wesen", and this is the non-
representational, non-calculative 'being' of things. 'Prosoche' is the Stoic tool, with 
which they perform a similar task. Virtue is non-instrumental, non-calculative and 
only in the virtuous intent do things appear 'as what they are' through the act of 
judgement of the 'sage'. In Heidegger's analysis the historical provisionality of 
knowledge as 'energeia' is reappropriated. This latency, the provisional, the feeling 
of 'not being in control' that is similar to the unpredictability of skidding over a wet 
surface, enables the possibility to an awareness of what Heidegger would call "listen-
ing". 
4. The Possibility of 'Making' Art 
For the Greeks the work of art was production in the sense of labour. This is part of 
'production' in the sphere of the 'zoe' and not 'bios', in which 'free men' did not en-
gage; the labour of material production is called 'poiesis' while the 'free' activity is 
'praxis', i.e. political (public) practice. Aristotle distinguishes three species of 
knowledge (sophia, phronesis and techne) but the primary is sophia as that knowl-
edge which is not applicable to the production of anything. 'Phronesis' is the knowl-
edge of (political) actions that are performed for their own sake and 'techne' the 
knowledge of actions which produce material works, or works of art, which is still 
one and the same thing for the Greeks. 
57 Moerchen, Heideggers Satz: » 'Sein' heif3t 'An-wesen' «, in Merker (ed) Innen und Aussenansichten, 
p.193, 1989, p.194 
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In Heidegger we find some overlap, if not an identity, between an originary 'poiesis' 
and 'praxis' while 'theoria' seems to have been sublimated into both, but this is not 
quite true. In The Zollikon Seminars he describes 'theoria' as the original and highest 
mode of comportment: self-reflection.58 Heidegger describes 'theoria' as the form of 
access to 'comportment' and thus defines comportment as what gives access to 'Be-
ing' itself as "letting come to presence of presencing itself'. At the same time ener-
geia is, according to Aristotle, as Heidegger writes, that what has fulfilled its becom-
ing into presence. 59 
Energeia is Aristotle's concept of 'actus', 'reality' (completion or perfection). In 
Heidegger's interpretation energeia expresses the totality of the 'work' in its process 
of being (Anwesen and Ab-wesen). His translation of energeia as "Sich-im-Werk-
und-Ende-haben" is a setting into work of truth itself "without machination". The 
work of art presents the originary form or shape of an 'epoch' of Being, as the tem-
poral shape of the horizon of all possibilities of 'knowledge' which is then unfolded 
into all its possible manifestations. The work of art is therefore, in its 'es-
sence'(Wesen), that which engenders the 'truth' of the epoch - just as the Stoic 'life 
according to physis' is a self-poiesis, manifesting 'physis' as a living truth. The work 
of art is here understood as what sets itself into work as 'energeia'. The work of art 
has almost the character of a force of nature - art becomes an auto-poietic process in 
the strife between Being and Dasein, world and earth. 
On the other hand, the Stoa has also developed away from the original Aristotelian 
differentiation. The production of the durable disposition (hexis or diathesis) is un-
derstood as a 'poiesis' (in terms of 'physis' to060, but it remains unclear how far this 
has turned to an integration of the region of 'zoe', into the praxis of philosophy. I 
think one could risk the interpretation that the 'praxis' of philosophy is also a 'poie-
sis', 'labour', as a 'refurbishment' of the soul, a rewiring the disposition of the self. 
This then would receive the character of 'life' as an auto-poietic work (of art); it 
58 'Theoria is the highest form of energeia: the highest form of 'putting-oneself-to-work' (without 
machination) letting come to presence ofpresencing itself... comportment [Verhalten] - wohnen - be-
ing-absorbed by something is original way of existence." Zollikon Seminar, p.160 
59 "Die 'energeia' erfiillt das Wesen der reinen Anwesung urspruenglicher, sofern sie besagt: das Sich-
im-Werk-und-Ende-haben, was jegliches "Noch nicht" der Eignung zu ... hinter sich gelassen, ja 
besser gerade' mit vor' in die Erfuellung des voll-"endeten" Aussehens gebracht hat." Wesen und 
Begriff der 'physis' ... , Wegmarken, p.356 
60 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p. 116,180 
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would encompass the public and private, 'bios' and 'zoe'. The normative 'eidos' as a 
'telos' is then 'recovered' in Stoic practice via the normative concept of 'physis' it-
self, but tempered by the concept of 'logos' which, at least at the edges, remains that 
which not only reveals but also hides. The idea of living according to 'physis' is 
'auto-poietic, if we take Aristotle's definition of 'physis' - that which has its telos in 
itself. As much as the Stoics Heidegger's sees the interaction between 'physis' as the 
original 'Being', 'logos' and human action - 'energeia' as the site that determines 
'Da-sein' . 
Since those Stoic acts which are performed to shape the 'disposition' are performed 
for their own virtue, the poietic 'techne' is reflexive. Virtue causes sophia.61 In this 
way virtue is a virtuous act which 'produces' an 'eudaimonic' life. 'Virtuous life' in 
the form of 'hexis', the durable disposition is itself 'energeia,62 
Art production is a shaping of external material, but the act is performed for its own 
virtue. Like the virtuous act of the Stoic, art is cause and telos in itself. The fonn of 
human disposition is 'logos' which means that having 'logos' lets humans know the 
virtuous, i.e. non-instrumental way oflife. One could say that life traverses the ontic 
and the ontological, because Dasein has a concept of Being in one way or other and 
modem art is the only occupation which does not predefine its disciplinary realm in 
terms of objects. This is important, because according to Heidegger, Dasein's exis-
tence is not an object, nor a subject manipulating objects, instead it is 'site' of a set-
ting-into-work-of-truth. Existence, life and its mode is truth-setting in the same form 
as the work of art. 
In the UKW Heidegger dismisses conventional approaches to the work of art. Here 
he already defines the "work" of art as ontologically superior to the mere 'thing' by 
virtue of its function within the 'polemos', which gives form to Being. His conclu-
sion is that the work of art allocates a form of 'Being' to a people. A 'polemos' has 
taken place which establishes an enduring form which "first makes beings visible". 
'Being' is the unfathomable totality of the' Absolute' which the work of art only 
'hints' at (Wink). The work of art is not a representation - 'Being' cannot be repre-
61 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p. 181 ... 'poietika' can be main and auxiliary cause of eudaimonia, 
"Eudaimonia ist ... ein Produkt von Tugenden und besteht aus tugendhafter Tatigkeit". 
62 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.175 f. 
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sented since it is not an 'object'. But it is also not 'created' by an artist as such. Nev-
ertheless, Heidegger gives to the artist - the poet and thinker - a particular relation-
ship to "Being'. The artist is an exemplary and prophetic figure, who does not draw a 
design from his own 'mind'. Instead, it is this motive of an attentivity to 'Being' 
which inspires his pursuit of a 'polemos', or the' other inception', to come forth in 
his work. His work has to be reciprocitated by the audience. The tentative fourfold of 
art, artwork, artist and audience enables together the 'bestowal' of 'Being'. Heideg-
ger minimises therefore the artist as 'individual'. Nevertheless, the position of the 
someone who 'listens' to 'Being', is not desperately alien to the 'inspired' genius of 
the Romantics. Works of art are not related to obj ects but to the "coming to presence 
of presencing itself'. 
Artist and audience are already involved in a 'world' (Being-in-the-world), they al-
ready have an understanding of Being. Art conceives a paradigm-shift which some-
what changes the' comportment' to beings of everyone. This is the 'polemos' which 
connects Dasein and Being in a reciprocal relationship (,Kehre'). Dasein is always in 
this relation to beings and only in this 'strife' is 'Being' unfolded'. It has to come 
into 'question', it has to be 'perplexing' that there 'is' (Being). 
The Stoics see their own life as a 'being-at-work', 'energeia', their acts are created 
(poiesis) and the cause of this creation is virtue. This virtue is not comprehensible as 
an external thing, instead it has already an ontological character insofar as it deter-
mines the comportment in the act itself, which reveals beings in one way or other. 
Arete' and the related 'agathon' are transcendent. The work of art operates not in the 
realm of 'beings' and instrumentality but in the 'ontological' realm of 'logos', which 
itself is transpersonaL 
Trying to root any practice in an 'understanding' other than everyday practices, as 
Heidegger shows (in SZ), will not be able to find its ground in any discourse (be-
cause the very idea of grounding itself is a secondary effect of discourse in the first 
place). Dasein is always already 'in-the-world', i.e. it has a understanding of Being, 
which means that it is possible to reveal the "meaning of Being" by a hermeneutic 
process going from the most basic ontic understanding to the ontological analytic of 
Dasein. This is the thesis of SZ. The Stoics, as I have mentioned above have a simi-
lar theory termed 'oikeiosis'. It is the idea of a natural development ofthe human be-
ing from the necessities of life towards virtue and the non-instrumental use of 'rea-
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son', which changes the 'meaning' of external things. Therefore we can see that the 
access to the 'ontological' inquiry of 'art' is perfectly legitimate because the 'aes-
thetic' object does not 'represent', instead it 'hints' at the 'absence' that is 'Being' 
but is related to it by the 'polemos' of the' care for the self. 
5. 'Awareness' (prosoche) 
Pierre Hadot, my main reference for 'philosophy as a way of life', which is the title 
of an English translation of his essays, lays the emphasis of understanding ancient 
philosophy on its practical and therapeutical application to everyday life. In particu-
lar the exercise ('askesis') of awareness channels all the other, technical exercises 
into a constitution and 'conversion' of the self.63 
'Prosoche' is the most fundamental of all Stoic exercises.64 Vigilance is meant as the 
flexibility of spirit, not to be misguided by whatever presents itself, not to be swayed 
into false assent. 'Prosoche' is the 'techne' of the considered life. It is the skill to dis-
criminate situations and not to act in pursuit of something else than the 'appropriate 
act' itself. But this is not mere quick-wittedness of thought. It is necessary for the 
philosopher, but it goes further, because it also pertains to the mental hygiene of 'af-
fects'. It is a habituation towards a mediation of affects (pathe), and the rational part 
of the soul. Although the Stoa technically understands the soul not to be divided, it 
nevertheless still needs to talk about the parts ofthe soul to explain its practices. 'Ra-
tional' disposition or comportment reveals the 'irrational', inadvertent drives', with 
rational judgement. This is Aristotelian heritage, which the Stoa expands into a 'psy-
chagoge', in which the 'rational' disposition is exercised to interrupt involuntary ac-
tions and reduces their immediacy. The Stoics think that we are carried away by 'pa-
63 "According to the Stoics, Ariston was right to consider philosophy as a practice, but the logical and 
physical parts of philosophy were not purely theoretical. Rather, they too corresponded to a lived phi-
losophy. For them, philosophy was a unique act which had to be practised at each instant, with con-
stantly renewed attention (prosoche) to oneself and to the present moment. The Stoic's fundamental 
attitude is this continuous attention, which means constant tension and consciousness, as well as vigi-
lance exercised at every moment. Thanks to this attention, the philosopher is always perfectly aware 
not only of what he is doing, but also of what he is thinking (this is the task of lived logic) and of what 
he is - in other words, of his place within the cosmos. This is lived physics. Such self-consciousness 
is, above all, moral consciousness, which seeks at every moment to purify and rectify our intentions. 
At every instant, it is careful to allow no other motive that one which has its 'telos' in itself' ? Yet 
such self-consciousness is not merely moral; it is also a cosmic and rational consciousness. Attentive 
people live in the constant presence of the universal Reason which is immanent within the cosmos. 
They see all things from the perspective of this Reason, and consent joyfully to its will." Hadot, 
PhWL, p.l38 
64 Rabbow, SeelenfUhrung, 1954 p.241-57 
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the', and thus we lose control over what is closest to us, our 'way of life'. 'Pathe' lets 
beings appear in an "as-structure" because they have their end outside themselves, 
we are afraid 'of' something, we desire 'something' etc., there is always something 
which we understand 'as' a 'being' from these affects6s . There is a scope to under-
stand these in terms of Heidegger's 'attunements' (,Befindlichkeit, Stimmung') 
which are a preconceptual understanding of 'beings' in SZ66. On the other hand vir-
tue is solely for itself, it is totally circular and transcendent by turning from the 'as' 
of things to the (non-objectivising) 'as' of the 'self' (Dasein). This turn shifts the 
ground of ontology - at least implicitly - from 'beings' to 'Being' which 'gives' 
through 'Dasein' and the Stoic soul which partakes in 'logos' respectively. 
This is another' ontological' aspect of 'prosoche'. Socrates abandoned the notion of 
a factual knowledge precisely because it appeared spurious in the face of not know-
ing anything about ones own self. Ifwe can not give account of our own action then 
the 'factual knowledge' of "What 'is' x ... " will become so far removed (from cer-
tainty) and questionable, so that the knowledge of one's 'self' appears the only pos-
sible course of action. What the Stoa performs is on one hand a habituation ('ethos'), 
on the other, it is the Socratic inquiry into the ambiguous character of any knowl-
edge. The Stoa fortifies against the possible failure of (external) actions by intensify-
ing the process of interpretation (of a situation) and queries deeper into the ontologi-
cal realm by questioning judgement and intent as being at issue. Intentionality is to 
understand something 'as' something in advance, as it is described by Heidegger in 
'Being and Time' toO.67 This 'what' we 'know in advance', in various strata of inter-
pretation is also a work. 
6. Way of Life and the Sway of Being 
In a late text Heidegger introduces a traditional term into his vocabulary: "Gelassen-
heit,,68. It is difficult to entangle what is the 'ontic' behaviour of the individual and 
what is 'ontological' inquiry69. Heidegger clearly states that we detach ourselves 
65 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.136 
66 SZ, §34, p.160 f. 
67 SZ, §32, p.I49 " ... als-freies Erfassen ... " 
68 Heidegger's Gelassenheit is probably best translated as "letting-be", otherwise 'repose' would be 
better than the confusion with 'detachment' 
69: " Aber wir k6nnen auch Anderes. Wir k6nnen zwar die technischen Gegenstande benutzen und 
doch zugleich bei aller sachgerechten Beniitzung uns von ihnen so freihalten, daB wir sie jederzeit 
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from the attachment to technical objects and 'let them be' as something which is not 
of our innermost concern.70 In the comportment of such repose, things will touch us 
in a different way, ontic repose has an ontological consequence: technology cannot 
bend and confuse our 'essence' (Wesen). In the following dialogue between three 
'characters' Heidegger considers "Gelassenheit" as a concept that gives access to 
human 'essence' (Wesen) by way of understanding the essence of thought as "Gelas-
senheit", as an alternative to 'will' (to power) i.e. a non-representational thinking,71 
which he calls "letting-be". "Letting-be" is the comportment towards beings, but it 
appears also from the text that it is in some way 'teachable' as an attitude of the indi-
vidual observer. The distance between ontic and ontological seems blurred but its 
similarity to 'prosoche' seems to become clearer. Both are activities which let ap-
pearances emerge in their own way, without being deceived and forced into a par-
ticular comportment. In both cases the 'will' (to power) which is in Stoic terms a 'pa-
the' is a comportment without proper consideration. This consideration is to the Sto-
ics' not yet a re-presentation before a 'subject', so still not a 'will to power'. As giv-
ing account, 'prosoche' does not predefine objects. Although the Stoic process of 
making judgements is always accompanied by what we got used to call a 'proposi-
tions' (axiomata)72, the underlying concept of 'logos' still encloses the deceptive 
form which the Stoa inherited from Heraclitus: logos is duplicitous, it reveals as 
much as he deceives. Truth resides either in the (immaterial) proposition of a 'lekton' 
(and is changeable, i.e. can become false) or the hypokeimenon and is thus an attrib-
ute of the self, and is only present in the sage in connection with virtue. In short, it is 
a physical attribute of the 'pneuma' and as such a 'disposition' (but dependent on 
virtue).73 
The Stoic way of life is therapy to live in a "state of truth", which is part of the dis-
position of the 'hypokeimenon', that, which is later translated as subject, expressing 
what lies before something, which 'grounds'. From there the step to modem subjec-
loslassen. Wir k6nnen die technischen GegensUinde im Gebrauch so nehmen, wie sie genommen wer-
den mussen. Aber wir k6nnen diese Gegenstande zugleich auf sich beruhen lassen als etwas, was uns 
nicht im Innersten und Eigentlichen angeht. Wir k6nnen «ja» sagen zur unumganglichen Benutzung 
der technischen Gegenstande, und wir k6nnen zugleich «nein» sagen, insofern wir ihnen verwehren, 
daB sie uns ausschlieBIich beanspruchen und so unser Wesen verbiegen, verwirren und zuletzt 
ver6den." Heidegger, Gelassenheit, 1959, p.22 
70" ... was uns nicht im Innersten und Eigentlichen angeht ... " Gelassenheit, p.22 
71 Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p.33 f. 
72 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.68 
73 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.75 
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tivity is evident. Truth resides in the subject: but only the virtuous subject. This is 
then translated as the transcendental subject, i.e. a subject which is identical with the 
logos. 'Being' and 'Dasein' fonn the movement within which 'truth' is fought out 
into its persistent manifestations. Originally, this was a question of virtue - a way of 
life. 
I hope I have at least touched upon some traces of similarity between classical 'com-
portment' and Heidegger's conceptualisation art. Philosophy as a 'way of life', from 
its Socratic inception, was the attempt to reconcile the 'physis' (and 'logos'), the 
(critical) concept ofa universal atemporal 'law', and the individual, concrete actions 
of life. Today, according to Heidegger, it is science and technology which are under 
critique by a way oflife (tradition), precisely because science gathers its strength 
through its assertion of a universal law that eternally constitutes all truth. 
Superficially Heidegger at times seems to favour 'tradition'. 'Tradition' is what 
Dasein always already operates inside as Geworfenheit and 'facticity', while at the 
same time it breaks open this tradition in the strife for a new interpretation and tech-
nology par excellence is precisely what makes its 'tradition', its' genealogy', invisi-
ble. In a way, this is a new qualitative feature oftechnolog/4. The 'missing', or 
withdrawn access to the 'tradition' of technology makes it impossible to grasp its es-
sence and break its surface in a strife for a new, appropriate interpretation. Technol-
ogy hides its origins to appear 'universal', instead of being constituted historically in 
a 'polemos'. This means that man as Dasein, the site of interpretation and meaning, 
is unable to open up its possibilities to interpret beings in a different way, instead it is 
dragged along by one single totalising interpretation, which appears to persist indefi-
nitely. The full view of tradition is therefore necessary for a proper assessment of 
technology. In later writings Heidegger thinks that the absence of Being (and the in-
visibility of tradition) is what points into the new interpretation. The work of art as 
non-technical or scientific does not 'represent' something. Although it is an object in 
a 'technological' sense it operates in a different realm. Its only 'gesture' is to point 
towards something 'absent' from the particular discourse of technology. 
74 "W 0 dieses herrscht, vertreibt es jede andere Moglichkeit der Entbergung. Vor aHem verbirgt das 
Ge-stell jenes Entbergen, das im Sinne der ,poiesis' das Anwesende ins Erscheinen her-vor-kommen 
laBt." Heidegger, Die Frage nach der Technik, in Vortage und Aufsatze (VA hereafter), p.35 
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The dark reign of myth, that has been the target of criticism by the Presocratics, has 
been replaced by a dark reign of technology, being constituted by the absence and 
withdrawal of access to its modalities, and its historical mode of Being. One could 
say that the critical thrust of Socratic and Heideggerian inquiry has the same direc-
tion. Heidegger sees, following Nietzsche, that the atemporality of Platonic 'idea' is 
part of the 'commencement' of technology. On the other hand, the Socratic tradition, 
other than the Platonic, i.e. the Cynics, has picked up the anarchic and critical side of 
Socratism, which is the 'care of the self as an 'ethical' auto-poiesis (production of 
law and law of production folded into one). As for Heidegger the "as-structure,,75, 
the concept of 'oikeiosis' is the Stoic concept of what we are close to, and familiar 
with, it is the web of traditions that give us hold from which the philosopher will step 
back in conversation and conversion. But that which appears initially close is the fur-
thest away and what is the closest appears furthest away (i.e. Being). What is really 
the closest to us is the question of our own 'Being', which the Greeks only touched 
on with the concept of 'physis'. 
Stoic ethics (like the Socratic) works as a disclosure of ignorance. The constitutive 
moment is the enlightenment by ignorance. Although Stoa presents the Stoic sage as 
the model character who has an unfailing judgement, this judgement is not just based 
on some universal perfect knowledge by partaking in cosmic 'logos', but instead on 
the perfection of his' character'. The Stoa is interested purely in a situation for action 
and this means for a 'moral judgement' , not a judgement about the essence of a 
thing. All things partake in the universal logos and as such, they are not in question 
as in regard to an opposition to the self 
The similarity of outlook between Heidegger and Stoa, even if for different reasons, 
is to "become what one is" (i.e. energeia), i.e. according to 'physis' or 'Being' and 
neither is possible without self-understanding and 'strife'. The departure for the Sto-
ics is 'oikeiosis' and for Heidegger the immediate 'ready/present-at-hand' (ZuNor-
handenheit) of the 'V or-structure' . Both, the Stoics and Heidegger, then proceed to 
overthrow what is familiar by interpreting it as being mediated by 'logos' and in 
Heidegger's case by the 'understanding of Being' of 'Dasein', which is the 'closest' 
75 'closeness' as 'present-at-hand' which constitutes the ontological-existential realm, Zollikon Semi-
nars, p.83 
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- the clarification of one's own 'Being'. Ultimately for both, this is 'language', a 
'language of Being' which governs tradition and discourse and as such mediates 'Be-
ing'. The Stoics provide an ethical interpretation which founds inadvertently an on-
tology, while Heidegger attempts an 'fundamental-ontology' which never gets to the 
ethics and thus for its purpose the making of art by an 'individual' who is somehow 
separated from the collective 'Mitsein' is irrelevant. Still, the 'poietic' character who 
listens to 'Being' is an individual after all. I will attempt to find a path navigating 
these various connections between 'life' as a 'being-at-work' and art as a catalyst in 
which the strife of 'world and earth' is manifested in a temporal being in more detail, 
to recover a meaning for the 'individual' artist, in the following chapters. 
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Chapter II 
Heidegger's Authenticity and Work 
In this chapter I will try to highlight the pertinence of some of Heidegger's key con-
cepts for artistic practice, without exhausting their function within Heidegger's work. 
Equally, as it is not my aim to analyse the work of art but, instead, the actions of the 
'artist' and his 'poietic' function, which is not identical with being a subject or 
'author'. I will concentrate on the process of self-disclosing of Dasein which Hei-
degger calls the 'Entschlossenheit', usually translated as 'resolve'. One should keep 
in mind that it is a 'disclosure' (Erschlossenheit) but instead a disclosure of Dasein 
itself In this form of self-disclosure Dasein becomes 'poietic' in terms of, and within 
its limited possibilities which are contained in the forms of 'traditions' or 'heritage' 
(Erbe); as its apriori horizon of facti city. 
To show how the mode of Being is produced - in the manner of a work of art - by 
Dasein in an entirely non-subjectivistic way, I describe how Dasein discloses itself as 
described in 'Being and Time' first and then shift the perspective to the UKW (in its 
standard version of Holzwege) to explain Heidegger's concept of 'poiesis' and its re-
lation to artistic agency. There needs to be a form of author-ity which is disclosive of 
its own constitution. Dasein is the Heideggerian operator ofthe making of sense in 
generaL It is a field within which meaning happens in time. Understanding has a 
mode which is primarily inherited but which has also a possibility of change. Form 
'is given' to Dasein by its heritage but its possibilities are not at its disposal while 
only it can step into a 'polemos' by which possibilities are unlocked for it which 
have already been given in the 'arche' of 'Seyn'. 
Dasein is a pure performance of meaning. This performance cannot have a 'telos' or 
'eidos' which then would already have determined a rule of historical development. 
For Heidegger Dasein is free in the sense that a metaphysical telos (of ideality) can-
not be discerned. It is self-disclosure and does therefore not disclose an 'eidos' but 
rather the structural disposition of disclosure which is only guided by tradition and 
project. 
It appears to be important to describe the way Heidegger realises a self-disclosure of 
Dasein and its importance to the later in UKW as a balancing of action and author-
ship as a freedom within the heritage of Being. 
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Heidegger frames the self-disclosure of Dasein in terms of existence rather than an 
ideal essence. All existence is conditioned and cannot expect to create a tabula rasa 
for a new re-construction in an ideal image. On the other hand, to be compelling the 
conditional position of truth has to appear to be unconditional. It is in the very struc-
ture of Dasein' s self-disclosure as care-structure - and this means as constituted in a 
hermeneutical process, that both, poiesis as production and phronesis as the right ac-
tion begin to merge by allowing 'poiesis' to produce without an 'eidos'. I will argue 
that the formation of Dasein in and by its existence is later in the UKW transformed 
along the lines of a 'poiesis' without 'eidos' in effect becoming a phronesis which is 
poietic. 
The figure of the artist does not 'know' what it is doing because what it is doing is 
not only grounded in this 'facticity' and possibilities (Spielraum) contained in it but 
it also inquires into its constitution. Therefore it is so difficult to speak about 'it', and 
to find a form of language to describe the process of appropriation of these 'possibili-
ties'. These possibilities precede and detennine all 'intentionality' which is possible 
for Dasein but they are at the same time themselves constituted. 
In this chapter I will therefore describe Heidegger's concept of Dasein as the' exis-
tence' who's form is conditioned historically, and equally re-constituted by the (feed-
back) actions of this existence as performance. Dasein and Being are the two aspects 
of this unified performance. Authenticity is then interpreted as self-disclosure which 
enables the productive movement as agency of art. Therefore it should be possible to 
use this structure to make more explicit the artistic workings beyond mere 'author-
ship'. Thereafter I will look at Heidegger's concept of 'poiesis' in which he attempts 
to capture the Greek concept of human agency which is involved in the 'emergence' 
of a world as truth and which is the' constitution' and condition of such a truth 
within the limiting factor of human finality. The 'openness' of Dasein to the event of 
Being is the only human agency, it is never 'passive' but equally not authorial. The 
comportment which Heidegger calls 'letting-be (Gelassenheit) is a way of disclosure 
which does not challenge beings into re-presentation but instead lets them address 
Dasein by their own presencing. Dasein's activity of 'letting-be' is the non-
intentional agency which is 'poietic' of the forms of meaning. It is therefore possible 
to grasp Heidegger's movement of artistic production within his concept of 'pole-
mos' within the authentic self-revelation of Dasein as that which brings beings forth. 
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I will compare this self-revelation as the possibility of production with the Greek 
concepts of 'agon' and 'arete' and in particular with the Stoic ideal of self-
improvement as an autopoiesis of the 'way oflife' in tenns of a work of art in the 
next chapter. To make the relation to the Stoics clearer, I will insert some anticipa-
tory explanations about the relationship between Heidegger's text and Stoic doctrine 
throughout this chapter. 
A scientific theory already 'knows', as a discipline, what it is looking for. It looks for 
whatever is apprehensible as an object of knowledge by a method. What is a possible 
object has been already detennined, it is already there as a being (Anwesendes). Hei-
degger's thinking tries to understand 'how' these 'beings' came to our 'understand-
ing' before we 'knew' them in a scientific way. The how of understanding beings, is 
'Being'. Beings 'are', they are present to us (Anwesend) without us knowing how 
this 'presence-ness' (Anwesenheit) is given to us. Art as such does not employ meth-
ods. Instead artists, if I may generalise, pick up what presents itself and try to ques-
tion 'that' it appears in one way or other. And this is the actual 'domain' of art, if it 
has any 'domain' at all, it is the 'what is taken for granted' which is 'truth' as an 'a 
priori' givenness. The question of how practices of meaning are constituted by tradi-
tion and by 'what we take for granted as self-evident' ('das Selbst-verstandliche') is 
artistic without immediately understanding art as a practice which detennines these 
practices in a founding gesture as Heidegger suggests in UKW. When Heidegger de-
scribes the function of 'the work of art' as a material catalyst for the appearance of a 
'world,76, art and artistic 'poiesis' (Dichtung) has become a paradigm for a human 
'bringing forth' which is appropriate, rather than the contemporary way of 'challeng-
ing', which is technology. This 'poiesis' is not the bringing-forth of an object, but of 
'truth', as the 'a priori', the condition of the possibility of all understanding. Heideg-
ger also counts statecraft, sacrifice, thought, etc., but excludes 'science', as founding 
gestures of 'truth,77. However, I will concentrate on the possibility of artistic 'poie-
sis'. The work of art 'functions' as a constitutive event by bringing about an uncon-
ditioned 'open' as a different way to understand 'how' things are understood to be 
meaningful to us. The 'openness' (Offenheit) or 'clearing' (Lichtung) is 'made', set 
into the work, 'by' and 'as' truth. 'Truth', is 'subject and object' of this activity78. 
76 like the Greek temple in UKW, p.27 
77 UKW, p.48 
78 UKW, p.63 
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What is an acceptable explanation is determined as the 'form' (RiB or Gestalt), of 
this 'open-ness' (Offenenheit). The 'open-ness' (Offenheit) which is set into the 
work is what encompasses all possibilities of understanding. It is transcendent in the 
sense, that as Dasein we cannot assume an 'outside' view. The actual fact of 'open-
ness' (Offenheit) as such is not controllable by 'method'. Heidegger describes the 
historical differentiation within the concept of 'making', the Greek 'poiesis' as 'phy-
sis', which gradually shifts towards the agency of this 'making' until this agency 
founds and grounds the whole of the 'objective' world as 'subjectivity'. What is lost 
in this concept is the un-conditioned (UnvennitteIte), Un-geheure79, excess (Uber-
fluB)8o. 
I will attempt a short description of Heidegger' s concepts, with a focus on the com-
plex possibilities of 'poiesis' within the various layers of disclosure. Intermittently I 
inserted some remarks which relate to the next chapter on the Stoa, to highlight par-
ticular junctions of conceptuality which explain the course of interpretation of Hei-
degger's texts I have chosen. I will concentrate on 'Being and Time', where Dasein 
is presented as condition of the possibility of self-disclosure as 'care'. 'Care' (Sorge) 
itself is the interpretative effort which is tied into the undisclosable facti city of exis-
tence. In the second part I will describe the functions of 'poiesis' in relation to this 
facticity, the enclosed possibilities and the 'incalculable', as it is presented in the lec-
ture UKW and further essays on technology and science (in VA) which contain Hei-
degger's considerations on the process of how truth comes about and his critique of 
technology and the character of "oblivion" which operates in science. 
Discovery (Entdecken) of beings is based on the disclosure (Erschlossenheit) of Be-
ing in the 'Being-in-the-world'. This is the 'a priori' structure which determines the 
Being of Dasein, and makes it open to beings and disclosing' as' something, in terms 
of , in-order-to' (Um-zu) and 'for the sake of' (Umwillen) which determines the pre-
sent out of the future (project). 'Open' means disclosure (Erschlossenheit) for dis-
covery (Entdecken). Disclosure (Erschlossenheit) is the intuitive understanding of 
the copula 'is' on which all discovery is principlly based. All actions of Dasein are 
disclosive within 'Being-in-the-world', in all aspects of dicovery, explication, under-
79 UKW, pAO 
80 UKW, p.61 
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standing of 'something as something'. I use 'disclosure' for both, the 'Entdecken,sl 
and 'Erschlossenheit' (of Dasein as being-in-the-world, Befindlichkeit u. Verstehen, 
finally 'as 'Sorge,)Sl;. Heidegger's concept of understanding is guided by the imme-
diate intuitive understanding in the act of 'circumspection' (Umsicht), which is al-
ways intentional in the horizon of Dasein's 'project' (Entwurf). The work of art is 
always outside this 'circumspection' (Umsicht), as we will see, because it is incep-
tive and incommensurable within the previous context However, it is more related to 
Dasein's self-disclosure as 'care-structure', and so as 'interpretative' in essence. The 
'enowning' (Ereignis), in terms of inception of a new 'paradigm' out of the 'excess' 
(UberfluB) can only come 'upon' Dasein that is itself 'open to the way beings appear 
by themselves. Only such a Dasein will be able to be receptive enough for the change 
in the sway of Being. 
1. The constitution of a Self in Being and Time 
Dasein 'exists', by way of some fonn of understanding (,fore-structure' - Vorstruk-
tur) which allows it to operate in a totality of meanings which constitute its world. 
Dasein is 'in-advance-of-itself in a 'world' by 'being-in-the-world', it has 'exis-
tence' only by having a 'world'. This means, Dasein is 'Da' (there), as the time of 
the possibility of its understanding. It has duration by way of understanding and ex-
ploring beings, which are accessible to it only by way of meaning within a 'being-in-
the-world'. To ask a question about the meaning of 'something', there has to be some 
understanding in advance, 'a priori', to be able to formulate it in relation to what 'is'. 
Dasein therefore 'knows' about the 'Being of beings' to which it relates and which it 
investigates. Beings appear to Dasein by virtue of Dasein' s Being as 'openness'. 
Dasein is not a 'being' although it exists in a being called 'human'. In 'Being and 
Time' Heidegger discloses the ontological, or 'a priori' structure of such a being. 
Since this investigation happens from 'within' this 'being' as Dasein, it is based on 
what Dasein already takes for granted about itself Dasein has to make its own Being 
transparent to itself by an ontological disclosure. To do this Heidegger describes at 
length the 'everyday' understanding of Dasein in relation to beings. Then he goes on 
to describe how Dasein' s disclosive activity has to tum onto itself as the site of this 
disclosure. Dasein realises itself as individual 'self, with individual 'possibilities' of 
81 "ontisch-ontolog.Bezug zur Welt", sz, § 18, p.85 
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disclosing beings. The mode of the Being of Dasein determines 'truth' in the sense 
that, if we look at things, we 'know' about their 'truth' already - because their Being 
is determined by our own Being as disclosing beings, i.e. Dasein's Being-in-the-
world. It turns in circles: Dasein is what has Being and Being is only as the 'exis-
tence' of Dasein. Realising the possibilities' given' to Dasein is the mode in which 
Being manifests itself in time. Dasein is in 'strife,83 with Being to realise the possi-
bilities hidden within the inaccessible 'ground' of 'facticity'. The appropriated pos-
sibilities then alter the 'project' (Entwurf), within which the totality of the limited 
and finite 'totality of purposes' (Bewandnisganzheit) is acted out. 
It is curious that Dasein is still a some' -thing', which has to disclose itself to itself 
'as' itself, just as Hegel's Absolute Spirit. The way to this 'self' however is individ-
ual because of the finality of Dasein and its 'understanding' of its own death as part 
of itself in its 'authentic' 'project' (Entwurt). The self discloses itself as 'being-in-
the-world'. Being 'is' only when beings appear 'as' something, have 'meaning' 
within a totality, which is the intentionality, the relationality, which is always already 
'there', i.e. 'existence'. The self understands itself as that in which 'Being' is opera-
tive in a way that gives truth. This is what Heidegger means when he speaks about 
Dasein being 'handed over to Being', or 'es gibt' (is given) only 'as' that which 
makes the establishment of truth possible, the 'openness' itself. 
a. Being and Dasein 
We always already know something. Somehow we find our way around without 
knowing how. The fact that we understand 'is' something. This 'is' is Being. It is in 
this 'that' we have always already disclosed something, before we understand some-
thing 'as' something. Dasein is "ahead-of-itself' in a 'world' which makes it possible 
for beings to be. Being is only as the Being ofbeings84, because Dasein understands 
beings, it also understands, i.e. discloses, Being first85. Disclosure constitutes Dasein 
and Being. 
But an account of the 'that something is' is difficult and historically philosophers 
82 " .. die Entdecktheit des innerweltlichen Seienden gruendet in der Erschlosscnheit" SZ, §44, p.220 
83 UKW, p.34; Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.63 
84 SZ, §l, p.9 
85 "Sein aber "ist" nur im Verstehen des Seienden ... " SZ, §39, p.183 
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have privileged beings, rather than to ask about the mode of 'Being' as such, which 
enables a cohesive totality of meaning within which we always already operate. The 
Being of beings is the question of metaphysics, the question of Being as such is Hei-
degger's ontology. According to him, we do not even have a language to speak about 
Being other that to say that it 'is not' since it 'is' not a 'being'. This lack in language, 
however, also leaves a trace86 by which Heidegger hopes to follow what cannot show 
itself as being but what makes it possible to understand something at all. Heidegger's 
approach is to go from the given 'everyday' understanding of human beings to the 
transcendental structures which make human history possible as a history of Being. 
Being and Dasein are not simply two entities, rather, they are forces within which a 
form of consciousness constitutes itself as a 'disclosive' (Erschlossenheit) function 
of its own 'existence'. Ultimately Dasein has to disclose (Entschliessen) itself to it-
self in its ontological structure. This movement' discloses' Being as the historicity of 
Dasein's intercourse with Being. Heidegger insists on the unity of Being and Dasein 
as one detennines the other. Being 'is' not, and Dasein cannot 'be' without 'Being'. 
He goes on to analyse the most general possible ways how Dasein takes care of its 
own Being. 
One question which Heidegger avoids, and has to avoid, is the question of 'agency' 
which is important to the question of 'art'. He attempts to describe a structure which 
precedes and constitutes the object and subject, the temporal and eternal. By doing 
this, the 'eternal' becomes historic but it is still inescapable 'fatum'. 'Temporality' is 
not 'time', it gives time, within it the possibilities of Dasein are realised and among 
them is the measurable time. Human action is restricted to the slow 'unfolding' of 
the' given' Being. Art is an action, and action is in need of an actor. Commonly the 
actor has a 'knowledge' of the matter. But this is not the case, neither for art nor for 
Heidegger's understanding of the movement of Dasein. The 'matter' of art is ques-
tioning, and it questions the constitution of possibilities of such 'knowledge'. There-
fore the movement ofthe 'actor' as 'autor' is different from those who have a purely 
'technical' knowledge. This questioner cannot rely on the safety of the unquestion-
able presence of beings, nor on his own integrity as the grounding subject of know 1-
edge. The movement of Being and Dasein is historical, which means that it persists 
and changes. The tension between persistence and change expresses itself in Heideg-
86 Heidegger, SdA, p.360 
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ger's use of the word 'Streit' (strife) to describe the movement between 'earth and 
world87 or Being and Dasein88 This is the old problem of all ontology since Plato and 
Aristotle: how to understand identity and change in time89. Heidegger sets out to find 
a different solution by investing humans with 'Dasein' in 'existence', as the site of 
the movement of the 'poiesis' of 'meaning', which is constituted in the temporality 
as change and persistence but at the expense of human 'mastery'. Temporality en-
ables the possible modes (Seinsmodi) of Dasein.9o Being is only through Dasein by 
virtue of its temporality (Zeitlichkeit) because it has been redefined as 'meaning'. 
What has been the a-temporal 'essence' is enclosed in the temporality of existence, 
because temporality is not 'time', but the cohesion of 'Geworfenheit' and 'Entwurf 
within the horizon of past, future and presence. The facticity of Dasein which has 
been 'thrown' into a form of Being 'inherits' the 'project' (Entwuri), which projects 
meaning onto the temporal horizon, the finite limits of the concrete Dasein. There-
fore, Dasein has always a Being and Being finds always Dasein; This Being is 'a pri-
ori' to Dasein. Nevertheless, since Being is invested into time of Dasein's existence, 
it is in change. So agency is divided between what is always already and the interpre-
tative efforts of Dasein - as Mitsein, as a community ( or collective) of a 'Volk', a 
people which share a tradition of interpretation. Being has always been given in ad-
vance to Dasein as the sense that gives meaning through the 'project' and as the fi-
nite field of possibilities open to Dasein as the future being-able-to-be (Seinkonnen) 
as it is the for-the-sake-of-which (Worum-willen) of Dasein's actions91 . What this 
does not explain is the (artistic) inception of the un-conditioned (Unvermittelte) from 
the excess COberfluB) of the foundation (Stiftung, Schenkung)92. 
In traditional ontology, humans are beings among other beings, they share one Be-
ing. Heidegger on the other hand insists that the specific difference is that humans as 
'Dasein', have access to the 'is' and that in philosophical history this was interpreted 
in various but erroneous ways. In 'Basic Problems of Phenomenology' Heidegger 
discusses the four theses about Being93 . What has been omitted according to Heideg-
87 UKW, p.34 f. 
88 Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.75 
89 hyle and morphe, essence and existence, subject and object, etc 
90 "Die Grundmoeglichkeiten der Existenz ... ", SZ, §61, 304; "Zeitlichkeit zeitigt ... ", SZ, §65, 328ff 
91 Dasein is futural in this sense, governed from the sense which is bestowed by its 'project' 
92 UKW, p.61f. 
93 "1. Kant's thesis: Being is not a real predicate; 2. The thesis of medieval ontology (Scholasticism) 
which goes back to Aristotle: To the constitution of the being of a being there belong (a) whatness, 
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ger is the question of what such Being actually means in the first place and "from 
which antecedently given horizon - do we understand the like ofbeing,,94. In 'Being 
and Time' Heidegger has already differentiated between Dasein as the temporal ho-
rizon in which beings can appear in one way or another and the movement of the 
originary disclosure of beings as it precedes all other forms of possible disclosure 
and thus gives persistence although not 'eternity'. Existence is finite temporality and 
therefore it has limits which cannot be set by Dasein but the persistence of the mode 
of Being is expressed by 'facticity and 'thrownness' which determine the 'project' 
(Entwurf) within the temporal horizon. 
In UKW this relationship is brought into sharper relief. The terms Dasein and Being 
belong together in a mutual movement of production. In Dasein Being finds a tempo-
ral manifestation. Being 'gives' Dasein the 'project'(Entwurf) and all finite possibili-
ties contained in it to disclose. Disclosing means Being. The relationship between 
Dasein and Being is one of effort and strife (,polemos', "Aus-einander-setzung"). In 
this fateful movement it is the whole of the 'world' (of Dasein as 'being-in-the-
world') which is determined by the outcome. There seems to be little room for the 
individual action. Quite apart from the fact that such action is performed by an indi-
vidual 'constituted' as a 'subject', it can always only repeat a past and inauthentic 
tradition. Nevertheless, Dasein is acting, it is wrestling 'meaning' from Being, even 
though this Being determines all that is 'given' to Dasein. This interaction is the 'on-
tological' possibility ofDasein 'having a world' (,being-in-the-world'). It is not 
enough that Being gives to Dasein possibilities, Dasein equally has to act out all the 
possibilities given to it95 . Truth, as 'aletheia', is defined by the interaction of Dasein 
and Being. This 'strife' reveals 'truth' which is temporal and constituted in the prac-
tices 'given' by Being. 'Truth' in Heidegger's terms is not correspondence but in-
essence (Was-sein, essentia), and b) existence or extantness (existentia, Vorhandensein); 3. The thesis 
of modem ontology: The basic ways of being are the being of nature (res extensa) and the being of 
mind (res cogitans); The thesis of logic in the broadest sense: Every being, regardless of its particular 
way of Being, can be addressed and talked about by means of the "is". The being of the copula." 'Ba-
sic Problems of Phenomenology' , (BPPh hereafter), p.15 
94 Heidegger, BPPh, p.16 
95 Here we find a dual Being (Seyn and Sein): the first 'gives' as a begining, the inception, which then 
unfolds as Being which is unfolded by Dasein and thus brought into its truth: " ... he employs the ar-
chaic spelling Seyn to distinguish this truth of Being from the Sein investigated in Being and Time, 
the sense of Being. Heidegger sees Seyn as more primordial than Sein, because the former determines 
the givenness of any particular articulation of the sense of Being that Dasein grasps in its historically 
located understanding of Being; the truth of Being (Sein) first grants the parameters of Dasein's Be-
ing-in-the-World." Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.73. 
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stead the original 'being-in-the-world' as the form in which beings can be disclosed. 
All other understanding is based on this original process of disclosure. Truth is first, 
it is the 'a priori' of any understanding. However, 'truth' is also a result of 'strife' 
(Streit, polemos) and thus it is 'historical' in Heidegger's terms. Essence and truth 
are joined together as the historical shape of existence in Dasein. Existence is the 
sum of Dasein' s actions by which it discloses aspects of Being: existence is 'strife' 
for possibilities. This 'strife' is action. Only in such a performative mode can any in-
ception occur. The 'agens' of Dasein is its existence in all its disclosive modes. 
The question which concerns the mode of 'production' of this 'truth' is at the centre 
of Heidegger's ontology. Dasein is, what is 'concerned' with Being, and thus the lo-
cus of a 'world' in which beings appear 'in truth'. Accordingly the individual Dasein 
is not a creator ex nihilo of such a world. It is always already there, Dasein is thrown 
(geworfen) into a mode of existence, and "Verfallen" (fallen) into a relation with be-
ings, and thus ignorant of 'Being'. The 'concern' with beings makes Being 'invisi-
ble'. Only through the concern with beings can Dasein interact with Being. Therefore 
the work of art gathers beings into a world - the Greek temple discloses a world. It 
needs to be 'there', in the 'world', on the 'earth' and from 'earth'. So, in the fact of 
the world is Being itself revealed. The Greek temple is a 'total work of art'. It deter-
mines how a people understand. It is 'material' which through its fonn defines what 
'matter' means. I will expand on this in the second part of this chapter. 
Since it is the 'individual' who, although born into a ready-made 'world', still 'pro-
duces' or 're-produces' the way in which things 'appear', this 'appearance' (,Anwe-
sen') of beings in the 'world' ofDasein, is what is produced between Dasein and Be-
ing in the 'polemos', i.e. in temporality. This is what Heidegger tries to tell us: that 
only the 'mode' of production of meaning really 'is', in that it is that, which 'gives' 
the possibility of presence (Anwesenheit) through Dasein, which not only interprets 
beings, but at the same time is aware of its own 'Being', its relationship to 'Being', 
in an interpretative way; which is what Heidegger calls 'polemos': "Aus-einander-
setzung". The 'polemos' is about the Being ofDasein and from this 'decision' the 
Being of beings is determined. 
In his critique of modern science and technology, Heidegger locates the root problem 
of the possibility of understanding in the Greek interpretation of 'Being' itself, the 
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'first beginning'. The Greeks were aware of the possibility of appearance itself, but 
more concerned with the appearance of beings, the Being of beings. Being and Time 
is an attempt to reopen the question of the "presencing of presencing itself 96. Dasein 
is aware of its faculty of interpretation. Heidegger means the whole framework 
which' gives' the possibility of interpretation, which makes the meaning of things 
possible as "Anwesen" and which he calls 'world'. Therefore it is not the 'individ-
ual' Dasein but the 'world' which operates in Dasein, and "worlds,,97. This world 
however is determined in the 'strife' between Dasein and Being, guided by the 
'givenness' of the 'first beginning', the 'first inception,98. 
Production is 'poiesis', original poiesis 'happens' in the relationship between Dasein 
and Being. The two models of production which Heidegger describes in his later lec-
tures, are the Greek (Aristotelian, 'physis' and 'techne') and the modem technological. 
Both modes 'bring-forth', but in different ways. What is important is, that 'agency' 
has been fractured into a structure of movements to dispel the idea of an acting sub-
jectivity, be it human or divine. The term "Da-sein" is a 'place-holding' name deter-
mining the site of a process. Nevertheless, this name is deceptive in the sense that it 
appears as if Heidegger is speaking about an individual 'Da-sein' in Being and Time, 
but it becomes clear that the function of Dasein as 'care-structure' is ontological - or 
rather replacing Kant's transcendental subject. 
b. Existence 
The essence of Dasein is existence99. Existence is based on Dasein's 'project' 
(Entwurf). The 'project' discloses Dasein's Being in its possibilities. 100 Dasein is 
able to grasp its possibilities as its existence; in an unreflective and unthematic way, 
the act of executing its possibilities is the existence of Dasein. Disclosure is the exis-
tence and essence of Dasein and thus constitutes the 'open' (das Offene) within 
which beings can presence themselves. The term 'existentials' is therefore Dasein's 
equivalent of the term of' categories'; they describe the condition of the possibility 
of Dasein as a being that is concerned with Being, i.e. the 'How?' beings presence 
96 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p.160 
97 UKW, p.30 
98 "unueberholbar" SZ, §65, p.330 
99 " ... Wesen des Daseins ... die Existenz." SZ, §45, p.231 
100 "Das Dasein entwirft als Verstehen sein Sein auf Moeglichkeiten" SZ, §32, p.148; v. Hennann, 
Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.8 
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(Anwesen) themselves in the totality of possible relations. They are not 'properties' 
of a (eternal) 'being' (hyle, hypokeimenon) but 'possibilities' of Dasein' s existence 
itself (i.e. disclosing). 
'Being' is the "transcendens schlechthin"IOI - Being is the ultimate "universality". 
The ontology of human Being begins with the insight that humans have an under-
standing of their own 'existence'. Heidegger calls it 'world' and Dasein is always al-
ready in a world, it is 'in advance of itself (Sich-vorweg-sein) 102. "Being-in-the-
world" is the 'grounding constitution' (Grundverfassung)103 ofDasein, its "dwelling 
in" in its 'existential' form in a world, 'Being' and 'Being-in'(a world). The 'being-
in-the-world' of Dasein is not explicable within classical ontological categories 
which only apply to beings which are not-Dasein and do not have 'world'. Dasein is, 
always already in a 'world'. To have a 'world' from which beings can emerge is an 
'existential' as a form of category without which Dasein cannot be articulated or 
made sense of104. The 'Being-in-the-world' takes place as 'aisthesis', 'noein' and 
'logos', speaking and understanding of world, but it is misunderstood and becomes 
'invisible' as an 'existential' (Daseinsverfassung)105. 'Existence' already means to be 
in time, to exist as actuality from birth to death but not as a succession of mo-
ments l06. Dasein is temporality and any self is grounded in it107. This means, by its 
very existence Dasein has disclosed its world in some form. Dasein has no existence 
without some form of disclosure. When Heidegger says that Dasein is concerned 
with its Being, he means that Dasein discloses along the finite possibilities 'given' to 
it in its 'thrownness' (Geworfenheit) into undisclosable facti city (Faktizitat) which 
Heidegger calls 'project' (Entwurf). 
The question of Being can therefore be only asked out of this 'existing' ofDasein. 
Dasein's 'difference' is to be concerned with its existence, and this means to care 
about its own constitution ("Seinsverfassung' 108) which determines its existing. The 
most important qualification of Dasein is therefore the thesis that 'existence' is the 
101 "Sein ist das transcendenc schlechthin." SZ, §7C, p.38 
102 "Das sich-vorweg-sein ... charakterisiert als In-der-Welt-sein." SZ §41, p.l92 
103 SZ, §13, p.59 
104 SZ, §12, p.54 
105 SZ, § 12, p.59 
106 "Momentanwirklichkeiten" SZ, §72, p.374 
107 SZ, §66, p.331 f. 
108 SZ, §4, p.12 
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"Substanz des Menschen" (substance ofman)109. Existence is temporality within 
which understanding takes place as the disclosing 'project' (Entwurf) 1 10. The 'pro-
jection' (Entwurf) onto the temporal horizon 1 1 1 , i.e. Dasein's finity ('being towards 
death') makes Dasein 'futural' in the sense that it has finite possibilities-to-be 
(Seinkonnen) within the horizon, but it has the possibility to discover all its possibili-
ties within this finite temporality as its 'not-yet' (noch-nicht). Existence is the 'be-
coming what one is' from the futural 'being-in' possibilities which are governed by 
the inception (arche).II2. In short, the form of the 'project' (Entwurf) makes 'inner-
worldly' beings comprehensible to Dasein l13 in a historical form which changes only 
at a glacial speed. 
That Dasein exists means: it has a temporal horizon, determined by its 'thrownness' 
(Geworfenheit), which is the 'a priori' of understanding and also determines the 
'project' (Entwurf) which then guides discovery (Verstehen, Befindlichkeit and 
Rede). Dasein's always already 'Being-in-the-world' (In-sein, In-der-Welt-sein) as 
disclosure of the totality of the world enables the 'discovery' (Entdecken) of the rela-
tions of beings. Heidegger uses the examples of nature and tools as 'present-at-hand' 
(Vor-handen) and 'ready at hand' (Zu-handen). 'Attunement' (Befindlichkeit) is 
'equiprimordial' (gleichursprunglich) with understanding ('V erstehen). "V erstehen' 
is constituted by the existential of the 'project' ('Entwurf). Understanding has the 
character of a 'project' (Entwurf) which means, it is governed by 'thrownness' (Ge-
worfenheit) 1 14. Dasein 'projects' itself onto its own possibilities, it 'is' its possibili-
ties ll5. 'Attunement' (Befindlichkeit) and 'understanding' (Verstehen), which are 
both 'equiprimordial' with 'speech' (Rede), and form the way Dasein 'discovers' the 
meaning of beings and structures their possibility to appear' as' beings in its 
(Dasein's) 'world'. These are modes of understanding within 'Being-in-the-world'. I 
will come to Heidegger's critique of technology and science later in relation to his 
109 "Die Substanz des Menschen ist die Existenz." SZ, §43, p.212 
110 "Entwurf ist der Spielraum des Faktischen Seinkonnens." SZ, §31, p.145 
III BPPh. p.xxv. 
112 " •.. werde, was du bist!" SZ, §31, p.145 
113 "Das Seinende "hat" nur Sinn ... " SZ, §65, p.324? 
114 "Das V erstehen ist, als Entwerfen, die Seinsart des Daseins, in der es seine Moglichkeiten as 
Moglichkeiten 'ist' .... Und nur weil das Sein des Da durch das Verstehen und dessen Entwurfscharac-
ter seine Konstitution erhalt, weil es 'ist', was es 'wird' bzw. nicht wird, kann es verstehend ihm 
selbst sagen: "werde, was du bist!"." SZ, §31, p.145 
liS "Die Geworfenheit ist aber die Seinsart eines Seienden, das je seine Moeglichekiten selbst ist..." 
SZ, §39, p.181 
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lecture UKW. 'Speech' (Rede) is dividing and composing (Gliedern), becoming 
statement, assertion and judgement exerting increased control about the network and 
relations between beings (Bewandnis), and thus detennining the 'Being' of beings 
(Zuhandendes and Vorhandendenes). The process of 'unveiling' itself is not in view 
as such because beings are unveiled 'as' something, i.e. within an instrumental func-
tion. All such disclosure uncovers (Entdeckt) beings in terms of being-at-hand (Zu-
handenheit = Bewandnis) I 16. But all such disclosure is founded on 'totality of pur-
poses' (Bewandnisganzheit) and an anticipatory self-understanding ofDasein's 'for-
the-sake-of' (Worum-willen) and 'being-able-to-be' (Seinkonnen) I 17. The under-
standing of beings is always secondary to the original disclosure of existence as 'be-
ing-in-the-world' . 
Dasein is always concerned with beings. The 'way' it 'discovers' (Entdecken) beings 
is constituted by 'being-in-the-world', and the 'being-in-the-world' as disclosedness 
(Erschlossenheit) grounds the possibility of understanding (Entdecken) as 'unveil-
ing', i.e. truth. Dasein is not before 'attunement' (Befindlichkeit) and 'understand-
ing' (Verstehen) but only 'in' and 'as' it, and thus in the disclosure (Erschlossenheit) 
of 'being-in-the-world'. These 'existentials' are the 'a priori' of the existence of 
Dasein. Otherwise Dasein would be just a 'being' and not Dasein. 
On the ontological level the 'condition of the possibility' of 'Dasein' to understand 
its own 'Being' beyond being a 'being', lies in its withdrawal from beings with 
which it is concerned and which are present- or ready-to-hand. The description of 
this withdrawal begins with Heidegger's use of the concept of 'anxiety' (Angst) in 
Being and Time, Chapter 6 and continues in Section 2. In encountering beings, 
Dasein has always already understood its own Being but not thematically. Every 
form of disclosure which Dasein performs is only possible within the 'being-ahead-
of-itself' of Dasein in a 'world' within its own possibilities (Seinkonnen) as the hori-
zon of its 'project' (Entwurf). Without this 'becoming' as possibility there would be 
no Dasein 118. 
c. Anxiety 
For Dasein to recognise its Being, i.e. what it means, to itself, to exist, it has to re-
116 " ••• Seinsart der Bewandniss (Zuhandenheit) ... " SZ, § 18, p.87 
117 "Die Struktur der Weltlichkeit ... worumwillen es existiert." SZ, §67, p.334 
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treat from its care for beings ('Besorgen') which are not Dasein. Heidegger describes 
this moment as 'Angst', anxiety, within which the 'obvious' 119, the interconnections 
of meaning, the intelligibility as the framework within which things made sense, dis-
integrates, thus forcing Dasein to confront its own Being which is different from the 
Being of beings. 
Dasein has to ask what it means to exist 'as' Dasein and not as a thing. Dasein has to 
disclose its 'way of life' by which it determines the way beings' appear' to it within a 
totality of meaning. This inescapable totality is the aspect of 'existence', 'thrown-
ness' and 'fallenness'. The possible historicity of this aspect is authenticity and 'po-
lemos' to unfold all possibilities. Authenticity has to begin with a disclosure. This 
disclosure begins with the 'attunement' (Stimmung) of anxiety. This anxiety dis-
closes the question of 'being-in-the-world' but unthematically, i.e. not in a discourse. 
'Anxiety' is a mode of , attune me nt' (Befindlichkeit), and related to 'pathe,120. For 
the Stoics, 'pathe' are disclosive of beings, in the way we 'care' about beings, be-
cause 'pathe' have an object (of fear or desire etc.). Heidegger's anxiety, however, 
goes further in so far it is 'being-in-the-world' as a whole which is in question and 
not something 'innerworldly' (innerweltliches) 121. Anxiety discloses the uncannyness 
of the everyday familiarity of 'being-in-the-world')122. "Unheimlich' means 'un-
canny' but also 'not at home', 'outside'; Dasein is 'outside' itself 'with' beings. 
'Attunement' (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety discloses Dasein as 'fallenness' ('Vefallen-
heit') to the inauthentic disclosure of its (Dasein's) Being.123 Dasein 'is' only 'as' its 
relation with beings, and this also means that it 'is' this relation, since 'beings' do 
not have Being beyond Dasein. 
According to the Stoics, 'pathe' are disclosive of things. However, pathe, like anger, 
fear, etc. disclose things in a way which causes suffering. It is not virtuous to 'be' 
angry although the sage may act in an angry way if it is appropriate. Just as he eats if 
it is appropriate. However, if the intention of the self is constituted by anger, it is not 
118 SZ, §46, p.236 
119" ... die Fragwuerdigkeit alles Selbstverstandlichen." SZ, §67, p.334 
120 SZ, §29, p.138 
121 SZ, §40, p.187f. 
122 "die Unheimlichkeit des alltaglich Vertrauten 'In-der-Welt-seins'" SZ, §68, p.342 f. 
123 SZ, §38, p.175f 
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virtuous. What does this mean? It means, that the 'pathe' disclose unthematically, in-
tuitively but by giving a certain 'logic' to their disclosure. In this intuition things be-
come what they are not. The Stoics exercises seek to disrupt this logic - a case of 
Heidegger's broken hammer - by virtue of which, the context of purposes is opened 
to inquiry. However, the Stoic sage also has a 'pathe', it is called 'eupatheia', and 
grounded the intuitive disclosure in the Stoic 'logos'. 
Dasein is in its 'world' until the substantial cohesion of this world becomes ques-
tionable in the 'attunement' (Befindlichkeit) of 'anxiety'. The object of anxiety is not 
an innerworldly being but the "'Being-in-the-world' itself'.124 What was disclosed as 
the totality of the 'present- and ready-at-hand' loses its relevance l25. The 'Meaning-
lessness' (Unbedeutsamkeit) of the 'world' points to the 'groundlessness' (Nichtig-
keit) of the Being of Dasein itself. The 'groundlessness' will tum Dasein's 'project' 
(Entwuri), which has been hidden in the 'They' (Man) until now, as the 'received' 
disclosure, into an authentic 'project' of 'self-disclosure' in which Dasein discloses 
itself (Entschlossen) as 'nullity' (Nichtig) and thus as 'care' in terms of absentiality. 
From this point onwards a different way of self-thematisation begins. Dasein's abil-
ity to have a 'world' becomes an immediate issue for Dasein l26. Dasein is anxious 
about nothing in particular, which Heidegger translates as being in the attunement of 
'unheimlich' as a 'not-being-at-home', Dasein is "un-homely" (un-zuhause) in the 
'world' which is disclosed by the 'They' (Man), and which determines the mode of 
'fallenness' (Verfallenheit). Dasein tries to avoid this anxiety by 'fleeing' into its en-
gagement with beings, which gives familiarity to Dasein 127. 'Being-in-the-world' is 
all-encompassing belonging and being at home-ness, while the more "primordial" 
state the 'not-being-at-home' is: the "Un-zuhause,,128. Anxiety discloses to Dasein its 
'Being-in-the-world', in the elements of 'existence', 'facticity' and 'fallenness,129. 
124 " ..• wovor die Angst sich aengstet ist das In-der-Welt-sein selbst." SZ, §40, p.187 
125 "Die innerweltlich entdeckte Bewandnisganzheit des Zuhandenen und Vorhandenen ist als solehe 
iiberhaupt ohne Be1ang ... Welt hat den Charakter volliger Unbedeutsamkeit." SZ §40, p.l86 
126 "Die Angst benimmt so dem Dasein die Moglichkeit verfallend sich aus der "Welt" und der Offen-
tlichen Ausgelegtheit zu verstehen." SZ, §40, p 187 
127 " .•• Flucht 'in' das Zuhause der Oeffentlichkeit ... " SZ, §40, p.189 
128 "Das Un-zuhause muss existential-ontologisch als das urspriinglichere Phanomen begriffen wer-
den.", SZ, §40, p.189 
129 "Das Sichangsten ist als Befindlichkeit eine Weise des In-der-Welt-seins; das Wovor der Angst ist 
das geworfene 'In-der-Welt-sein; das Worum der Angst ist das in-der-Welt-sein-konnen. Das volle 
Phanomen der Angst demnach zeigt das Dasein als faktisch existierendes In-der-W elt-sein. Die fun-
damnetalen ontologischen Charaktere dieses Seienden sind Existentialiat, Faktizitat und Verfallen-
sein." SZ, §41, p.191 
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What is really disclosed is the 'precarious' position of Dasein as a 'being-in-the-
world' which is disclosed as 'groundless' in anxiety. This is why Dasein recognises 
itself as a being which has a 'world', but that it has this world only in the continuous 
disclosure of its possibilities which are finite through its thrownness (Geworfenheit 
and Entwurf) within a temporal horizon l3O. It is 'precarious' precisely because it has 
no 'substance', but rather creates its own persistence in time by being concerned with 
its own Being. Conversely this also means, as said before, that it has already under-
stood its 'Being' by virtue of 'having a world' and the process of 'being-in-the-
world' means to have a project, possibilities, and finity. By this we see that there is 
no foundation or grounding to Dasein other than its comportment towards things. 
The mode of the Being of Dasein is put into question by 'anxiety'. In such way anxi-
ety discloses Dasein as 'being-in-the-world' as its own product. The agency of this 
production, however, cannot be consciousness or subjectivity, since Dasein always 
precedes (a priori) such constitutions. 
d. Turning away from Beings 
We should pause here for a moment and recapitulate. The 'attunement' (Be-
findlichkeit) of anxiety makes Dasein aware of its 'Being-in-the-world'. Dasein is 
'anxious' not about some 'beings' but about its 'Being-in-the-world' as the frame-
work which makes beings visible l3l . This makes Dasein aware of itself as the locus 
of its 'world', it becomes aware of its Being as different from the Being of beings. 
Dasein is anxious about its Being as 'disclosing' (Erschlossenheit). 
This tum of Dasein from beings to its own state of affairs, reveals this relation as dif-
ferent from its relation to things to which it, until now, tended with contention. 'At-
tunements' (Befindlichkeiten) are various 'comportments' which disclose beings in 
one way or other. 'Attunements' identify beings in particular ways - for instance 
'fear' discloses its object as 'fearful'. This comportment validates external objects in 
their meaning. We could go through the Stoic quadriga of 'pathe' and recognise that 
these equally define 'things' in their meaning. However, things themselves as objects 
of 'pathe' define the 'self' of the Stoic, who wishes to escape this involvement and 
130 BPPh, p.xxv. 
131 " ••• sondern die Angst erschliesst als Modus def Befindlichkeit allererst die Welt als Welt." SZ, §40, 
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'change' his 'self'. Heidegger's 'beings', with which Dasein is concerned, detennine 
Dasein's self-understanding and thus its comportment to 'beings'. Dasein is the 
'other' to beings, by enveloping them in its 'world' and opening them up in meaning. 
Dasein is affectible by beings only according to its 'project' (Entwurf). The Stoic and 
Socratic 'arete', defines the human self - and its Being - in opposition to things that 
are desired (in pathe). The Stoic 'pathe' defines things, and makes the 'self' to un-
derstand itself out of its relation to things and beyond them. This is precisely what 
happens in Heidegger's ontology. In 'attunement' (Befindlichkeit) and 'understand-
ing' (Verstehen) we address 'beings' in one way or other without being aware of the 
'being-in-the-world' which detennines this possibility. Stoic 'arete' is the human 
comportment that directs the view from external affairs towards the constitution of a 
self as 'work'. Only the self-disclosure as partaking in 'logos' discloses the self as 
the moral subject who's intentions and moral choices at once need beings as material 
for judgement and transcend these beings in a virtuous act. As Heidegger says in 
UKW about the 'work of art': in it, truth sets itself into work and it is set into work 
by the work of art. Truth is both, the subject and object of such a 'work' 132. The truth 
needs the material 'being' of the work. Truth works in beings and thus Dasein has 
'access' to Being through beings. Heidegger describes what precedes agency. Truth 
is both, subject and object, it creates what will make it possible to divide subject and 
object. But truth still needs the material work, made by an agency, which has already 
been constituted by a truth. 
The ontological possibilities of Dasein are still dependent on the individual existence 
and the way oflife becoming thematic in it and in its 'works'. Because this themati-
sation does not mean that the way oflife, the fonn of existence is taken as an 'object' 
itself, access to this realm is categorically different from the approach to beings. This 
turn, therefore, from external attachments to self-understanding, is the point in which 
the ontological possibilities become fluid and accessible. 'Understanding' of these 
cannot be objectifying, it can only be perfonned 'in' and 'as' existence. Thus the in-
dividual existence becomes a 'work' of an ontological movement, which does not 
have authorship but is brought about within the movement, which Heidegger calls 
'strife' or 'Aus-einander-setzung'. Life, for Greek philosophy, is a 'work' of art, just 
p.186 
132 UKW, p.63 
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as art is a 'work' for Heidegger133 . It is brought about by a 'poiesis', which does not 
take its measure from 'beings', but from its own partaking in the universal 'logos', 
which is itself Heidegger understands as "a word for Being,,134. 'Being' is never 
'produced', nor is 'Dasein' as the site of the clearing; in a technical way, but it 'Da' 
is produced in the 'strife', which sets and grounds the 'world' of Dasein. In the same 
movement 'truth' as 'aletheia' emerges in a historical 'form' (RiB, Gestalt etc), un-
conditioned and yet not arbitrary. 
e. 'Care-structure' (Sorgestruktur) 
It is an unenviable task to describe Heidegger's 'care-structure' in just a few para-
graphs. So I will try to highlight the main aspects, which lead Heidegger to under-
stand 'care' in terms of temporality. 'Care' does not mean care. Instead it describes 
how sense is established a priori but still remains historical instead of an eternally 
unchangeable 'substance', from which everything else derives. That Dasein 'exist' 
already means that it exists 'in time'. However, to make sense of beings, it needs sta-
bility. Tradition provides this stability in the shape of facticity. Dasein is 'thrown' 
into a mode of disclosure already. It does not need, and indeed would be unable to 
establish sense out of itself alone. Dasein has to be outside itself existing in a world 
already. The sense it is thrown into makes Dasein 'open' towards beings, they can 
then 'appear' as beings within Dasein's 'world'. Dasein exists only as what dwells in 
disclosure, which it has not chosen, but with which its understands beings. Therefore 
Dasein is 'with' beings and concerned with them because they appear in Dasein as 
the 'openness', which makes them visible in meaningfulness (Bewandnis). This 
'care-structure' constitutes the condition of the possibility of disclosure. 
The 'care-structure' (Sorgestruktur) is the Being of Dasein, which is constituted by 
'existentiality' (Existantialitaet; "sich-vorweg"), facti city (F aktizitat; "Schon-sein-
in") and 'fallenness' (Verfallen "Sein-bei,,)I35. 'Care' (Sorge) is the 'sense' ofthe 
133 'work' in Heidegger's sense as the 'Urstreit' set into the earth (material or 'dust') of the body of 
Dasein. As the 'work' in UKW is 'productive' of truth and produced by truth (by truth setting itself 
into work) 'life' as 'work' is productive of truth just as the Greek temple is. 
134 Heidegger, SdA, p.360 f. 
135 "Das Sein des Daseins besagt: Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) as Sein-bei (innerweltlich 
begenendem Seienden). Dieses Sein erfiillt die Bedeutung des Titels 'Sorge', der rein ontologisch-
existential gebraucht wird .... Die Sorge charakterisiert nicht etwa nur ExistentialiUit, abgeloJ3t von 
Faktizitat und Verfallen, sondern umgreift die Einheit dieser Seinsbestimmungen." SZ, §41, p.l92 f.; 
"Die Struktur der Sorge als sich-vorweg-schon sein in einer Welt - als Sein bei innerweltlichem 
Seienden birgt in sich Erschlossenheit des Dasein." SZ, §44, p.220 
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Being of Dasein, it gives Dasein the possibility of disclosure (Erschlossenheit) 
(which is its Being). The possibility of disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) lies in the 
'care-structure' itself Dasein discloses (erschlieBt) its own Being, through the struc-
ture of its involvement with beings. I 36 
Although the 'care-structure' precedes Dasein's involvement with beings, Dasein has 
to interpret backwards from beings towards its Being to disclose its own Being the-
matically. 'Care' names the temporal and 'a priori' structure of intentions (projects), 
which govern Dasein's existence by opening it to beings 137. 'Care' (Sorge) is not a 
particular relation, it is what enables a relation, but always based on the particular 
situation within which Dasein factually 'exists', is 'thrown' and 'fallen', which then 
determines the limits of 'possibilities' from which Dasein can choose. There is no 
clean slate on which Dasein could constitute itself. It is always already 'thrown' 
(Geworfen) and this means that it also lives within a 'project' (Entwurf), which de-
termines its possibilities (and who's constitution it cannot disclose). To disclose this 
to itself authentically, however, Dasein has to recognise itself as being-in-the-world 
and thus understanding itself from its 'world', and this means through 'beings' alone. 
Dasein 'is' ('exists' by virtue of) 'care' (Sorge) because it is concerned in the various 
aspects in relation to beings, 'world' and its own Being. It is not the purpose of this 
chapter to trace the many aspects of Dasein's self-disclosure. 'Self-disclosure', how-
ever, put the 'agency' of Dasein's disclosing on a different level. The disclosure of 
Dasein itself demands a different nomenclature from the disclosure of beings. It is 
the moment that Dasein grasps itself not as a being, but, by disclosing (Erschliessen) 
itself 'authentically', it opens itself up to the possibilities of its own future disclosing 
as its Being. It opens these possibilities not in a 'discursive' manner, but as the finite 
future, which governs its presence by virtue of being possible. Heidegger's point of 
departure has been the' everydayness' of Dasein's understanding and he finishes with 
Dasein's 'authentic disclosure' as 'resolve' of its very own possibilities. Heidegger 
calls the authentic self-disclosure of Dasein 'Entschluss', an commonly translated as 
136 "Als Grundverfassung des Daseins wurde die Sorge sichtbar gemacht. Die ontologische Bedeutung 
dieses Ausdrucks druckte sich in der "Definition" aus: Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in (der Welt) als Sein-
bei (innerweltlich) begegnenden Seienden. Damit sind die fundamentalen Charaktere des Seins des 
Daseins ausgedruckt: im Sich-vorweg die Existenz, im Schon-sein-in ... die Faktizitat, im Sein bei ... 
das Verfallen .... " SZ, §50, p.249f 
137 "Die Sorge liegt als ursprungliche Strukturganzheit existential-apriorisch "vor" jeder, das heiJ3t 
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'resolve'. The main issue is Dasein's turn from its relation with beings, to a relation 
with its Being-in-the-world, which it is always already within, and finally to its own 
'individualised' and that means mortal and finite self in the process of 'resolve' 
(Entschluss) . 
This authentic disclosure is Dasein' s "very own Being-able-to-be" ("eigenstes 
Seinkonnen") 138. Dasein is always already within its possibility of the 'for-the-sake-
of' (Umwillen)139. In the 'for-the-sake-of' (Umwillen) the present is determined by 
the future 'project' / intention. The authentic self-disclosure of Dasein means that it 
also discloses possibilities, which are not disclosed by the inauthentic disclosure of 
the 'They' (Man). The 'They' is the average unchallenged disclosure within the chat-
ter of the innerworldly purposes of the community in which no 'self' is established. 
The 'project' does not reveal real future possibilities because Dasein has not yet dis-
closed itself as a 'being-towards-death'. Therefore it is still unable to disclose 'care' 
as its very own Being and its disclosure is still tied to the concern with beings as a 
surrogate for the 'authentic' understanding. The difference lies in Dasein's self-
disclosure as finity and thus the limit of 'being-able-to-be' (Seinkonnen). Only the 
'authentic' Dasein achieves this dislocation of disclosure as finity, which changes 
Dasein's relation to beings and 'Mit-sein' with other people. 
The Being ofDasein is its self-disclosure as 'being-able-to-be' (Seinkonnen)14o. The 
'for-the-sake-of'(Umwillen) ofDasein is the disclosure meaning the sense, which 
governs in fonn of the 'project' (Entwud) this 'being-able-to-be'(Seinkonnen)141. 
These possibilities are obscured by the 'fallenness' (Verfallen) to the 'They' (Man), 
the received inauthentic 'project' (Entwurf). The disclosure which depends on the 
average 'They' (Man), however, prevents Dasein from understanding its ownmost 
'for-the-sake-of' (Umwillen), to which it is able. It is captured by 'projects', which 
are inauthentic because they are not rooted in Dasein' s disclosure of its own death. 
The 'projects' of the 'They' (Man) are diversions, which let Dasein avoid disclosing 
its world and its possibilities authentically because it would have to disclose its own 
irnrner schon 'jeder' faktischen "Verhaltung' und "Lage" des Daseins." SZ, §41, p.193 
138 SZ §41, p.l92 
139 "Diese Seinstruktur des wesenhaften "es geht urn ... " fassen wir als 'Sich-vorweg-sein' des 
Daseins." SZ §41, p.l92 
140 SZ, §41, p.191 
141 "Diese Seinstruktur des wesenhaften "es geht urn ... " fassen wir als das 'Sich-vorweg-sein' des 
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'nullity' (Nichtigkeit) (the fact of not being grounded in an eternal essence, to put it 
in the language of metaphysics). Dasein' s authentic self-disclosure reveals possibili-
ties as aspects of sense. Dasein is able to exhaust these possibilities. In the gesture of 
its self-disclosure, Dasein produces a change of its comportment. This gesture will be 
described (in UKW) as the disclosure of possibilities, which are contained in the 
ground, which the work of art sets up. Dasein is not to be understood as agency - dis-
closure always happens to Dasein and is not the volition of a consciousness. Never-
theless Dasein has to be productive of possibilities as a strife between Being and 
Dasein, to appropriate its ownmost 'being-able -to-be' (Seink6nnen) in which Being 
can manifest itselfl42. There is neither subject nor object in the work of Dasein and 
Being. What is still possible under Heidegger's interpretation, is, that the 'polemos' 
between Dasein and Being is the originary 'agency' and artistic production. And be-
cause Being is never without Dasein and Dasein always has a Being the 'polemos' is 
an auto-poiesis of the historical mode itself This historicity expresses the relation of 
persistence and change. Although incalculable, it unfolds within its possibilities, and 
this means within some form of necessity. Care (Sorge) therefore expresses the per-
sistence of Dasein in a mode of Being, its predicament, but also - in authenticity - its 
propensity for a poietic unfolding within it. 
The 'care-structure' describes Dasein as an event mediated by the 'project', which is 
based on Dasein being 'outside', or 'not-at-home' (Un-heimlich); being thrown into 
a world and concerned with beings. Although its understanding is based on a previ-
ous disclosure, this disclosure is not disclosed as such in understanding innerworldly 
beings. By becoming 'authentic' Dasein realises its 'ownmost' possibilities as rooted 
in facticity. These possibilities are disclosive as a 'for-the-sake-or (Umwillen) giv-
ing basically the 'sense' or 'intention of the project as the 'ground' of meaningful-
ness to Dasein, but they continue to be determined by 'tradition' (i.e. facticity) and 
the finite possibility ofthe future. Dasein does not only have possibilities, it 'is' 
nothing else but its possibility. Dasein 'as' its possibility-project-sense is the Being 
of its own groundl43 . Dasein is 'through the mediation (and acceptance) of tradition 
(thrownness and facti city) and the ensuing 'project', which bestows sense, its own 
Daseins." SZ, §4l, p.192 
142 "Das Seinkonnen ist es, worum-willen das Dasein je ist, wie es faktiseh ist." SZ, §4l, p.193 
143 "Dasein ist nieht ... Grund seines Seins ... wohl aber ist es als Selbstsein das Sein des Grundes." 
SZ, §58, p.285 
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ground. It is a mediated auto-poietic event of meaning of Being. 
For Heidegger the' care' -structure is decisive, because it explains Dasein and Being 
in their unity as persistence and change, and thus overcoming the original Greek hia-
tus between the temporality of the world and the divine a-temporality. Furthermore it 
makes it possible to understand this complex as the process of making sense, without 
involvement of subject and object. Meaning is produced without subject and object 
of 'knowledge'. 
f. Authenticity of Dasein and 'Being-towards-Death' 
Dasein has to become 'authentic' by its own self-disclosure as 'care-structure'. This 
is to recognise itself not only in its 'being-able-to-be'(Seinkonnen), which means in 
its 'not-yet' (noch-nicht) exhausted possibilities in which Dasein persists in its Being 
by 'being-disclosive', but also in its temporal finity as 'being-towards-death' (Sein-
zum-Tode/Ende). Dasein is able to disclose its own death, unlike the death of others, 
by anticipating it as the ultimate and 'ownmost'(eigenste) 'possibility,144 because it 
is originally 'in-advance-of-itself (Sich-voraus-sein) as 'existence' 145. Death is the 
ultimate impossibility of the 'Da' ofDasein l46. 'Being-towards-death' discloses 
Dasein's 'nullity' (Nichtigkeit) 147_ not being an 'eternal' substance - and precisely 
because it discloses itself as finite, it also defines finite temporality as the hidden 
ground of Dasein's 'historicity' itselfl48. 
Heidegger defines death as the loss of the 'Da' ofDasein l49. Dasein could not make 
'sense' of its death, ifnot for the above mentioned fact of its anticipatory existence. 
The experience of the death of another human being fails in the sense that death is 
always 'mine' (jemeinig)150. Because death is what makes Dasein 'complete' (Gan-
144" ... Sein zum Tode als der eigensten Moeglichkeit." SZ, §62, p.307 
145 SZ, §50, p.25l 
146 "Die Sorge ist Sein zumTode .... Moeglichkeit der schlechhinnigen Unmoeglichekeit des Daseins" 
SZ, §65, p.329 
147 Dasein as groundless 'nullity' - i.e. not a being - is also the disclosure of 'being-guilty' (Schuldig-
sein), i.e. as being a cause. 
148" ... ist der verborgene Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins." SZ, §74, p.386 
149 "Das erreichen der Ganze des Daseins im Tode ist zugleich Verlusst des Seins des Da." SZ, §47, 
p.237 
150 "Am sterben zeigt sich, das der Tod ontologisch durch Jemeinigkeit und Existenz konstituiert 
wird." SZ, §47, p.240 
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zsein)ISI, by bringing it to an end, it is necessary to experience death as 'mine' (je-
meinig). It is the ultimate 'possibility' because the understanding of death as possi-
bility also discloses the being-able-to-be (Seink6nnen) as Dasein's 'ownmost' (ei-
genste) possibility'. The 'completion' of Dasein as temporality has a beginning and 
an end. It's finality of the 'between' birth and death, constitutes the authentic self-
disclosure as 'care' which is 'temporality'. It turns disclosure back onto the structure, 
in which disclosure and understanding is possible as 'existence', i.e. being-in-
advance in the world: 'existence, facti city and fallenness.' In the 'fallenness' to be-
ings and the 'They' (Man) death is dealt with only as the death of others - it is 
avoided 152. 
Dasein is 'being-towards-death' but the 'authentic' way to understand its 'own' 
death is necessary to a finite 'completeness' - or 'perfection' - which is usually not 
possible for 'temporal' beings. To be 'complete' Dasein has to disclose its finality in 
a way in which it is not 'deficient', but is embraced as that futural form of 'being-
able-to-be' (Seink6nnen) in which Dasein can become 'complete' in the 'not-yet' of 
'being-in-advance-of-itseIr by disclosing 'death' as its 'ownmost' 'being-able-to-be' 
(Seink6nnen)153. Heidegger seeks the possible structure of 'Dasein in its totality' (for 
Ganzsein read 'perfection'). Death, then, can be experienced through the 'authentic' 
being-in-ahead ofDasein because 'care' is Dasein's 'grounding constitution' 
("Grundverfassung,,)ls4. However, 'care' (Sorge) is always related to something else, 
while 'death' is the concept of ultimate non-relationality (unbeztiglich).155 This has 
an implication on the form of the 'project' (Entwurf). If the sense of death is the to-
tally non-sensical, how could Dasein have a relation to its 'ownmost' possibility of 
death? This most radical possibility is necessary for Dasein's self-disclosure as 'nul-
lity' (Nichtigkeit) in which Dasein is brought before its own groundlessness. This 
then 'turns' Dasein around in its comportment to beings and 'Mitsein'. In a relational 
sense, Dasein could not understand its own 'death,IS6. Therefore, Dasein's structure 
151 implicitely a 'telos' in Aristotle's sense 
152 " •.. Flucht vor ihm ... " SZ, §51, p.254 
153 I follow Sheehan's interpretation, Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosphy of Mind 
154 SZ, §52, p.259 
155 "Der volle existential-ontologische Begriff des Todes HiBt sich jetzt in folgenden Bestimmungen 
umgrenzen: 'Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbeztigliche, gewisse und als solche un-
bestimmte, untiberholbare Moglichkeit des Daseins' Der 'Tod ist' als Ende des 'Daseins' im Sein die-
ses Seienden 'zu' seinem Ende." SZ, §52, p.258 f 
156 Das bisher tiber den Tod Erorterte laBt sich in drei Thesen formulieren: I. Zum Dasein gehort, so-
lange es ist, ein Noch-nicht, das es sein wird - der standige Ausstand. 2. Das Zu-seinem-Ende-
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has to be supplemented further with the possibility not to understand its death in 
terms of the 'They' (Man). Being-towards-death discloses Dasein's orientation as be-
ing addressed from the future, which is essentially what the concept of 'project' 
(Entwurf) says: it is a 'not-yet' - and if it should ever become complete, it will not be 
a 'Da' -sein, because for existence there needs to be movement and time of the 'Da' 
(There-). If the 'Da' of existence is missing there is no Being and when Dasein is 
dead there is no Sein' (Being), which could be 'Da'. 
'Authentic' and 'inauthentic' are modes of 'existence' .157 They describe Dasein's 
mode of disclosure in relation to the 'They' (Man). The disclosure ofthe 'ownmost' 
(eigenste) possibility of death is a necessary condition for Dasein to disclose itself 
authentically, outside the 'They' (Man). Only when Dasein has turned from 'fallen-
ness' (Verfallen -to beings and the 'They') will it disclose its own Being as the 'care-
structure' and assume a disclosive comportment to beings and 'being-with' (Mit-
sein). 
g. 'Willingness-to-have-consciousness' (Gewissen-haben-wollen) 
Dasein has to disclose its own 'Who' as a 'Self I58. Until now it has understood its 
'death' solely from a "Man-selbst" without even an awareness of its 'being-lost' 
(Verlorenheit) to the 'Man', which has made those decisions of its 'Being-able-to-be' 
(Seinkonnen) invalid. Dasein's own 'Being-able-to-be' (Seinkonnen) is not a 'new' 
possibility but Dasein already 'is' this possibility, which has been obfuscated by its 
'being-lost' to the 'They' (Man). 'Gewissen-haben-wollen' is the 'ownmost' form of 
disclosure of Dasein, and is constituted by understanding (Verstehen), attunement 
(Befindlichkeit) and speech (Rede)159. The 'call', Heidegger says, is the 'call of 
care' 160, out of the 'Unheimlichkeit' (ofthrownness - Geworfenheit), which brings 
Dasein to face its 'nullity' (Nichtigkeit) 161 - i.e. Geworfenheit, meaning, the 'that 
Dasein is', has not brought itself into its 'Da,162 and that it is not 'itself because it is 
kommen des je Noch-nicht-zu-Ende-seienden (die seinsmaJ3ige Behebung des Ausstandes) hat den 
Charakter des Nichtmehrseins. 3. Das Zu-Ende-kommen beschliesst in sich einen fUr das jeweilige 
Dasein schlechthin unvertretbare Seinsmodus." SZ, §48, p.242 
157 SZ, § I 2, p.53 
158 SZ, §54, p.267 
159 SZ, §60, p.295 f. 
160 SZ, §58, p.286 
161 "Der Rufer ... ist das Dasein in seiner Unheimlichkeit ... das nackte 'DaJ3' im Nichts der Welt" SZ, 
§58, p.286 f. 
162 SZ, §58, p.285 
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'fallen'(Verfallen). The 'call of conscience' has the mode of 'care' 163. 'Nullity' 
(Nichtigkeit) however, also constitutes 'thrownness' and thus 'care'l64. Nullity 
(Nichtigkeit), we see now is Dasein not being a 'being'. Dasein is the opposite, it 'is' 
nothing, except what is 'not-yet', but equally, it has no ownership or control over its 
possibilities-to-be (Seinkonnen) of its 'project' (Entwurf) because it has been thrown 
into facti city. Its 'self' is spurious and precarious because it is pure temporality of 
existence without essence. 
Heidegger's solution is the 'call of conscience'. Commonly (in the ontic realm) the 
'voice of conscience' is a form of 'understanding' (Erschlossenheit) something. 165 
Conscience discloses some-'thing'. 'Conscience' is a science, a 'knowledge' of 
something. 166 However, in an 'existential-ontological' aspect, this 'call'(Ruf) does 
not disclose any- 'thing', instead it calls back into the own-self of Dasein out of the 
"Man-selbst,,167. The 'call' is the opposite of 'chatter' (Gerede) of the 'They' (Man), 
it is 'silence', a pure happening of 'transport' from 'Verlorenheit' to the 'Man' into 
Dasein's 'authenticity', which calls itself back into its 'own-ness'. The 'call of con-
science' is complemented by a 'willingness-to-have-conscience' (Gewissenha-
benwollen) as the specific 'listening' (horen) of the 'call'. This choice to hear and to 
choose one's 'self-being' (Selbstsein), Heidegger calls 'Entschlossenheit' 168. 
The 'call' discloses what has been closed from Dasein's view l69, namely, that Dasein 
is thrown and exists as a being, without being in the way of the (innerworldly) 'pre-
sent-at-hand'. The 'Who?' of the 'call' is no innerworldly concrete being and thus 
makes Dasein aware of its 'Being' as 'care'. The 'caller' is a pure 'that' of 'being-
thrown' and 'not-being-at-home' (un-zuhause), "das Dasein in seiner Un-
heimlichkeit"l7o. The 'attunement' of 'anxiety' reveals Dasein's 'being-in-the-world' 
as 'not-being-at-home' (un-zuhause) and tears it out of its 'self-forgotten being-lost' 
("selbstvergessene Verlorenheit"). In other words, the call of 'conscience' (Gewis-
163 "Der Rufhat die Seinsart der Sorge. In ihm "ist" das Dasein sich selbst vorweg, so zwar, daB es 
sich zugleich zurueckrichtet auf seine Geworfenheit" SZ, §59, p.291 
164 SZ, §58, p.285 
165 "Das Gewissen gibt 'etwas' zu verstehen." SZ, §54, p.269 
166 Ge-wissen, Wissen = knowledge, or 'gewiss sein', being certain of s.th. 
167 SZ, §55, p.271 
168 " •... existenzielle Waehlen der Wahl des Selbstseins, ... " SZ, §54, p.270 
169 "Als 'was' sich das Dasein zunachst und zumeist versteht in der Auslegung aus dem Besorgten her, 
wird yom Rufiibergangen." SZ, §57, p.274 
170 "Die Unheimlichkeit enthuellt sich eigentlich ... "SZ, §57, p.276 
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sen) enables Dasein to disclose its 'self and assert its 'ownmost' (eigenstes) 'pro-
ject' (Entwurf) and 'possibilities-to-be' (Seinkonnen)I71. However, it is still in the 
form of the project (Entwurf) as determined by Dasein's 'Geworfenheit', in which 
Dasein finally grasps its ownmost 'possibilities-to-be' (Seinkonnen). The 'project' 
(Entwurf) of Dasein's ownmost 'being-able-to-be' (Seinkonnen) is therefore the 
'free' choice of these possibilities into which Dasein has already been thrown, It has 
disclosed the pure 'that' of its existence as 'care', as the nullity (Nichtigkeit) of the 
undisclosable facti city of its existencel72. 
What does the 'call-of-conscience' do? Heidegger says, it is a 'thrust' (St06)173. We 
will come across it in UKW again as one function of the work of art. It 'thrusts' the 
viewer out of his slumber into a different 'truth setting itself into work', a trajectory, 
which cannot be 'deduced' from the past trajectory. It is the incomprehensible 
change from one mode of truth into another, which is operative in the work of art. 
h. 'Being-guilty' (Schuldigsein) 
Like death, 'being-guilty' (Schuldigsein) is what 'is' not and points to a mode of the 
Being of Dasein. In another context174 Heidegger interprets the category of ground 
(cause, (Ursache), aitia) as 'Schuld'. To be 'schuldig' means to be the 'ground' of 
something 175 " ... urspriingliches Schuldigsein." means to be a reason of ... - not of 
'something', but ofthe 'nullity' (Nichtigkeit) of Dasein. As 'care' Dasein is not un-
der its own control, it is thrown into existence and 'fallen' (Verfallen) to beingsl76. 
Dasein is the 'ground' for its own 'there' (Da) - and 'projects' itself only within the 
possibilities it has been thrown into. Dasein has to become the 'cause' (Ursache) for 
what it has been thrown into. In this sense Dasein has to 'accept' its' guilt' of not be-
ing in control of its Being while being the 'cause' of its manifestation in 'care' 
(Sorge). Dasein's possibilities are solely within the 'Geworfenheit' - facticity, which 
is given to it (by tradition) and undisclosable to it. 
171 "Der durch die Angst gestimmte Ruf ermoglicht dem Dasein allererst den Entwurf seiner Selbst 
auf sein eigenstes Seinkonnen." SZ, §57, p.277 
172'''Das Gewissen offenbart sich als Ruf der Sorge': der Rufer ist das Dasein, sich angstigend in der 
Geworfenheit (Schon-sein-in ... ) urn sein Sein-konnen. Der Angerufene ist eben dieses Dasein, auf-
gerufen zu seinem eigensten Seinkonnen. (Sich-vorweg ... )." SZ, §57, p.277; §68, p.348 
173 "Aufruetteln" §55 p.271; "Stoss" is also used in UKW to describe the poietic work of art. 
I74 VA,p.15f. 
I75 "Schuld haben an" ... "das Grundsein fuer..." SZ, §58, p.283 
176 " ... 'nicht' von ihm selbst in sein Da gebracht" SZ, §58, p.284 
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As 'care' (Existenz (Entwurf), Faktizitat (Geworfenheit) and Verfallen (Uneigen-
tlichkeit» Dasein can not but appropriate the limited possibilities for itself, by dis-
closing itself (,Entschliessen') as 'Grund' (cause) of its own Being177. Dasein is the 
'being-able-to-be' (Seinkonnen) as 'care,178. By disclosing its not being in control 
Dasein can be 'authentic' and appropriate its given finite possibilities, by not being 
deceived into the deception, by 'beings' and the 'They', that it does not have 'limits' 
because it cannot disclose 'death' without destroying the 'They'. 
'Being-guilty' is therefore not a 'deficiency' as the 'call of conscience' may have 
suggested. Heidegger calls 'being-guilty' (Schuldigsein) a 'being-ground for' 
(Grundsein fuer)179. It is essentially the 'ground' of existence as the 'not-yet' (noch-
nicht) but in terms of the 'own' rather than 'They' (Man). Only when Dasein makes 
the transition from the being-lost (Verloren) to the 'They' (Man), to being its own-
most self, can it authentically disclose its own Being as care. It is the authentic self-
disclosure (Erschlossenheit) of Dasein in its ownmost possibility of being (Seinkon-
nen) as being 'guilty'. The 'call of conscience' is the ownmost 'being-able-to-be' 
(Seinkonnen) of Dasein in its 'being-guilty. 'Guilt' as 'cause' is more originary than 
'care' and constitutes the possibility of 'care'. Dasein is grounded on 'facticity', 
which is the 'heritage' (Erbe).180 
i. Resolve (Entschlossenheit) as 'Care' 
'Entschlossenheit' means the 'authentic' disclosure of the Being of Dasein as care in 
its ownmost 'possibility-to-be' (Seinkonnen). It also modifies the 'discoveredness' 
(Entdecktheit) of 'world' and disclosedness of 'Mit-sein' of others l81 . Dasein in its 
Being-towards-death as the ultimately authentic 'projection' (Entwurf) of the 'being-
able-to-be' (Seinkonnen) constitutes the completion of the authentic disclosedness 
(Entschlossenheit) of itself. At the same time, its revealed mortality enables the facti-
177 "Schuldigsein konstituiert das Sein das wir Sorge nennen." SZ, §58, p.286 'Grundsein' is 'Ursa-
che-sein' (cause) SZ, §58, p.282 f. 
178 "Die gemeinte Nichtigkeit des Entwurfs, i.e. 'nicht durch es selbst' (p.284) geh5rt zum Freisein des 
Daseins fiir seine existentiellen Moglichkeiten. Die Freiheit aber 'ist' nur in der Wahl der einen, das 
heisst im Tragen des Nichtgewahlthabens und Nichtauchwahlenkonnens der anderen." SZ, §58, p.285 
179 SZ, §58, p.283 
180 SZ, §73, p.383 
181 "Diese eigentliche Erschlosenheit modifiziert ... in ihr fundierte Entdecktheit der "Welt" ... " SZ, 
§60, p.297 
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cal existence as the 'being-in-the-world' and temporality ofDasein. 
Dasein discloses itself as a 'self' - as opposition to the 'They'. Not only does this 
mean, that it has a more appropriate understanding of its own Being, it has also a 
grasp of the difference to the average and everyday opinions, which prevent better 
self-understanding. Facing the ultimate possibility of its own death, its 'ownness' be-
comes the reason of its 'nullity'. It is itself, but has no controL All attempts at 'secur-
ing' control emanates from its concern with 'innerworldly' beings and the 'They' 
(Man)182. So this 'disclosure' is a form of 'ontological' understanding which effects 
Dasein's relations in its 'Being-in-the-world' itself 'Being' is only comprehensible 
in the passage through beings. Somehow though, it is accessible by the 'silence' of 
the 'call-of-conscience', without 'consciousness' present 
j. 'Care' and 'Oikeiosis' 
I would like to insert a few anticipatory remarks regarding the Stoic doctrine. This 
will give a perspective on the next chapter on Stoic psychagogy and help to connect 
it with Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's process of disclosure. Both begin with an 
intuitive involvement with beings, a 'natural' understanding which is mediated by 
custom. The natural state of humans for the Stoics is a similar dwelling in the midst 
of things, which they call' oikeiosis'. It concerns human development as general an-
thropology. But it also involves this separation between the absorption in the external 
world and the slowly emerging possibility to understand one's understanding (disclo-
sure) as constituted, as 'work' itself - and I think it is an ontological understanding-
as what can also dissociate itself from the immediacy of the external by partaking in 
the universal logos. It draws a hiatus between things and virtue. This hiatus is gov-
erned by the relations to things which emerge naturally in their usage on the one 
hand, and the question of the virtuous 'intent', which is itself defined as having its 
'telos' (end) in itself, outside and beyond the immediately present things. Not to use 
external things in a habituated way, but radically considering the framework in 
which they 'appear' as desirable or otherwise, gives the Stoics access to an 'onto-
logical' approach to the structure of the self - and simultaneously - this freedom en-
ables them to change the 'habituation' by way of 'askesis'. The 'detachment' from 
182 "Was sich das Dasein dergestalt zu verstehen gibt, ware dann doch eine Kenntnis von ihm selbst." 
SZ, §58, p.287 
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things, questions the whole framework within which external things appear 'as' 
something or other by leaving all external things in an ethical 'limbo'. The Stoics see 
the 'oikeiosis' as 'inauthentic' in terms of the assessment of the relations to external 
things. So the idea of 'oikeiosis' overlaps with Heidegger's 'being-in-the-world'. But 
people are too busy interacting with beings, through the discovering 'pathe', which 
makes us blind to the 'real' nature of humans. 
Heidegger is quick to deny the possibility that there is an originary possibility of de-
tachment from 'being-in-the-worldI83 . Dasein becomes aware of its very own Being 
'as' having Being by 'Being-in-the-world'. Dasein exists originary only in the way, 
that it is 'affected' by beings, and this means through 'being-in-the-world' as the ho-
rizon of possibilities which enable the care (Besorgen) of things. The 'care'-structure 
underlies the 'concern with' (Besorgen) by making Dasein aware of its Being as 
'openness', which is able to have a relation to beings, but in the limited way of 'exis-
tence', 'thrownness' and 'fallenness'. This is not the point the Stoics try to make. But 
it is the 'fallenness' (Verfallen) to the opinion of the 'They' (Man) and this means 
'inauthenticity', which is the Stoic target too. However, what they make explicit is 
the effort of 'authentic' understanding, which takes place inside of and as existence -
as a way of life and not as theorising about life. The 'for-the-sake-of (Urn-willen) is 
for Heidegger the 'strife' in which Dasein's possibilities are disclosed. The 'for-the-
sake-of-itself is equivalent to the 'telos-in-itself of the Stoic virtue. It is the abso-
lute, and therefore transcendental site, which grounds - 'a priori' - the ontological 
structure in terms of 'giving' sense: the form of truth. 
The Stoic exercises to live 'in accordance with nature', disclose the 'self as 'thrown' 
into the world. Its facticity is equally inaccessible, but the Stoic receives consolation 
from the detachment from beings. This, I think, is a marker, which expands on Hei-
degger. The Stoic concept of 'living in accordance to nature' is an 'absolute' and 
transcendent, as it coincides with 'virtue'. However, it also indicates 'health ofthe 
soul'. Therefore truth is linked to a 'good' which is contained in actual living, 'exis-
tence'. Without 'existence' no 'virtue'. No 'thrownness' can make people deny the 
possibility of a redemption from suffering. Any definition of 'suffering' is always a 
critique of a form of 'being-in-the-world'. It is therefore not necessarily the 'drive' to 
183 "als-freie Erfassen" SZ, §32, p.149? 
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assert consciousness or certainty and security. The Stoic 'certainty' lies in 'virtue'. 
Virtue is rooted in the appropriate intention towards things. It therefore apparently 
operates in the realm where Heidegger's 'in-order-to' (Um-zu) and 'for-the-sake-of 
(Umwillen) operate. However, virtue is not a 'material reason', it is in the comport-
ment of interpretation which is precisely 'outside' the external things. The Stoic turn-
ing understands beings from 'Being' - from 'physis' and 'logos'; just as Heidegger's 
'turning' (Kehre) (or one of its aspects) attempts to find the way back from Being to 
the 'being-in-the-world' ofDasein. Whatever is understood to be a 'good life' (eu-
daimonia) will define the transcendent itself. Virtuous life is the most general con-
cept (unbestimmt) so much so that it becomes an ontological concept for the 
Greeks l84. The 'health of the soul', is both a philosophical-transcendental category as 
much as a medical and therefore it functions as a definition of 'human nature' in re-
lation to 'physis' and 'logos'. This is what Heidegger rejects: the eternal 'nature of -' 
is what caused all the contradictions within modem metaphysics. 'Suffering', the 
'awareness' of 'suffering' are 'philosophical' terms which relate to a definition of 
what it means to be human. 'That' man suffers is the result of his nature: he is 'in-
between' 'life' and 'logos'. In 'logos' his pains oflife' are revealed as an animalistic 
drivenness. Philosophy as a 'way of life' is a therapy of the logos to alleviate this 
human position of being 'in-between'. This 'in-between' or 'on-the-way' is an at-
tribute of philosophers, of Socrates but also a staple expression of Heidegger himself 
giving us an indication about the 'work' of the constitution of understanding. I will 
return to the topic of 'in-between' in the next chapter. 
In Being and Time the term 'possibility' has a temporal function by being the 'for-
the-sake-of-self' ofDasein's 'project' (Entwurf) which gives Dasein its 'futural' 
structure. Dasein is determined by its 'possibilities', which it chooses for its future, 
in its present and its past. This particular structure resembles the Aristotelian concept 
of 'kinesis' or 'dynamis' by understanding the 'arche' with its 'telos' as a form of 'be-
coming what one is' 185instead of relying on an external 'unmoved mover' as Aris-
totle does. Dasein, in its "ek-static temporality", is becoming what it always already 
is, by virtue of its 'project' which emanates from its 'possibilities' into which it is 
grounded by is facticity and not from a metaphysical substance. However, these 
184 Platonic 'Good' is the idea of the ideas, Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelling'S 
Philosophical Development, p.127 
185 Sheehan, Dasein, in A Companion to Heidegger, p.204 ff. 
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'possibilities' are limited by the 'first inception' (arche) and finite, through Dasein's 
'being towards death'. This temporal construction of 'presence' in 'absence' gives 
Dasein the ability to encounter beings 'as' something but more importantly also to be 
itself as the site of such encounters, which Heidegger calls "being-able-to-be" 
(Seinkonnen). "This Being-able-to-be is that for the sake of which any Dasein is how 
it is.,,186 This also describes how Dasein is 'ahead of itself' as 'becoming what one 
is' by the detennination of the first inception in finite possibilities. 
Dasein is 'ek-static', standing out into temporality which is not just past, present and 
future, but is the temporal ground of the whole 'care-structure'. One aspect of 
Dasein's 'ek-static' temporality is to determine Dasein's finity not as something 'de-
ficient', but instead as fulfilling its perfection in its overarching fulfilment of being 
the possibility of Being in its historical materialisation: 'becoming what one is' via 
the 'project' and temporality. Despite 'existence', 'facticity' and 'fallenness' (Exis-
tenz, Geworfenheit, Verfallenheit), Dasein achieves the 'perfection' of its finite exis-
tence by being the 'site' ofBeingl87. In disclosing itself, as the temporal site, of-
care-structure' , Dasein is the 'openness' to beings as being 'meaningful'. This struc-
ture seeks to overcome the dichotomy between matter and knowledge, the finite and 
infinite. On the other hand, 'repentance' (Kierkegaard) is the "natural relation of man 
to God"; which can not be borne out of deficiency but of identityl88. 'Repentance' 
and 'guilt' are the relation to something more original and authentic than a relation to 
'beings' as Zuhandenes. 
k. Self and Guilt 
But why should Dasein have to become 'authentic' (i.e. self) when it could persist in 
the 'Man-sein'? Heidegger seeks an existential-ontological foundation for the possi-
bility of understanding the being which cares about its Being. Being is something 
Dasein already understands to having by its actions (Umsicht), but the question re-
mains, how this Dasein itself is constituted differently from other beings. To have 
Being, Dasein needs to exist in-the-world already, otherwise it would not have the 
'projects' necessary to encounter other 'beings' and other 'Dasein'. It has to be 'in-
186 Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.91 
187 Kierkegaard's concept of guilt is not a deficiency either. in Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt-
consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development, p.30 
188: Opposition to God means identity with God = atheism. Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt-
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advance-of-itself in its understanding - 'ek-static'. Being precedes Dasein in factic-
ity, although it cannot be without Dasein's existence. Dasein cannot constitute itself-
it is made what it is 'by' being 'thrown'. This self is not the transcendental '1' of 
Kant or Husserl, it cannot be 'separated' out of its involvement in its own 'world'. 
On the contrary, it has to 'choose' the Being into which it has been 'thrown' already. 
Nevertheless, this 'choice' seems to constitute a point of transcendence within which 
Dasein is a 'self' and is able to disclose itself in a particular situation; thus 'being-
able' not to take control, but to have awareness of 'nullity' (Nichtigkeit). This 'nul-
lity', or 'absence' usually points towards a 'transcendence', something which is not a 
'present-at-hand' or 'ready at hand' (Vor- and Zuhanden), but nevertheless, can be 
disclosed in some sort of 'purpose': "Worum willen ... ". There has to be a 'pro-
ject'(Entwurf) to make sense, and this 'Entwurf' is always 'given' by Dasein being 
'thrown'. The reason Heidegger seeks Dasein's ownmost "Seinkonnen" as 'care' 
(Sorge) is a temporality independent of the 'vulgar' concept of time. Dasein and its 
involvement cannot be understood merely in the 'They' (Man). Instead, every Dasein 
in its care-structure has to reach a totality (Ganzsein) of its own. It has to be a self-
constituting being which has its 'telos' in itself, 'becoming what one is' means being 
'perfect' at each moment of its own becoming. 
It is the same figure of thought of Dasein's thrownness in which the Greeks discover 
ontology: by pushing concepts to their limits of 'perfection'; which then become 
transcendent as tenns of 'purity'. These absolute tenus like Being, the Good, or vir-
tue, become foundational grounding of a way to 'be'. But - for the Stoics the virtuous 
is a material act which fonus the shape of 'life'. So, to come back to the original 
question of a 'way of life' , Heidegger's relation between 'Dasein' and 'Being', the 
temporal place and the 'transcendent' mirrors the Stoic instruction to virtuous acts, in 
language and in gesture. Not what is material being, what is 'concern with' (Besorgt) 
but what 'is not' in the modem sense, what is absent is what is foundational. The ab-
sent and nothing, 'is' not, but gives meaning to beings and thus first makes them ap-
pear. So too for the Greeks: the judgement of the Stoic in a situation is either 'virtu-
ous' or not; i.e. beings appear within a world of judgements only. We will see, that 
the Stoic 'pathe' are particular ways to understand beings which are particularly un-
healthy in tenus of 'virtue. These judgements are poietic, not only is it poietic to 
consciousness in Schelling'S Philosophical Development, p.32 
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make judgement, the judgements themselves are poietic of the objects they pertain 
to. Therefore the poiesis of judgements is that, which' discloses' that the being, 
which cares about its own Being, cannot understand itself in terms of 'present-at-
hand' (Zu-handenes) etc. 
l. Fate and History 
The Stoics understand fate as whatever happens which we are not in control of. This 
is everything except one's own virtuous acts. All the relations of the sage towards the 
'physical' world - and the Stoics are very materialist - are determined by external 
causes. The only 'ownmost' acts of the sage are to actively 'follow' fate and to act 
'virtuously' - being virtuous however means a self which partakes perfectly in the 
universal 'logos'. This means for the sage: not to 'complain' about whatever happens 
to him and which 'is out of his control'. Fate is what is outside 'our' control - virtu-
ous acts are under our control. The sage is 'impersonal', as is Dasein, but both are 
'self' in their 'authentic' self-being in temporality. The Stoic doctrine is totally de-
voted to the personal philosophical practice which is therapeutic, none of this thera-
peutic thought is left in Heidegger's Being and Time. It does however creep back in 
with the tenn 'Gelassenheit' as a comportment of not to be taken over by the usage 
of technology189. 
To Heidegger 'history' (Geschichte) is 'Geschick', fate, what has been sent and 
which is not a succession of points in time. 'Geschick' happens in the 'polemos' be-
tween Dasein and Being190. This 'polemos' is not a 'logic' but it is a 'trial by ordeal'. 
Heidegger and the Stoics encounter the same difficulties in defining precisely the 
scope of human freedom. Ultimately, both choose to formulate freedom as 'authen-
tic' interiority on one hand determined by the 'ownmost being-able-to-be' (eigenstes 
Seink6nnen), on the other, by 'being virtuous'. Both comportments contain a rela-
tionship which opposes all 'ready- or present-at-hand' relations, all 'innerworldly' 
aspects of human comportment. What is not 'ready- or present-at-hand' is 'nothing-
ness' or 'virtue'. Therefore these terms become 'ontological'. Even the Stoic 'virtue' 
is originally ontological out of its opposition to the' external goods'. 
189 Heidegger, Gelassenheit p.22 
190 Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.l 03 
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m. Conclusion 
In Being and Time Heidegger does away with traditional conceptualisations of 'Be-
ing' in terms of substance, consciousness and subjectivity. Instead persistence de-
rives from the 'a priori' understanding of beings and the 'project' (Entwurf), which 
detennines the finite possibilities of understanding of' Being'. This Being dwells in 
the persistence of thrownness and facti city of Dasein as the interpretative temporality 
(i.e. existence) which is the finite totality between birth and death. The 'presence' 
(Anwesen) of beings is not supported by an eternal 'essence' nor a transcendental 
subjectivity, instead Dasein 'is' only in the pure 'disclosure' as existence. The origi-
nal disclosure (Erschlossenheit) is the self-disclosure of truth in the process of the 
'projection' (Entwurf) of possibilities onto the finite temporal horizon of Dasein. 
The whole complex in which Dasein is tied into 'conventional' understanding 
(thrownness, facticity, fallenness) constitutes Dasein as the limited process of under-
standing something 'as' something, i.e. from the future of the 'in-order-to' (Um-zu) 
and 'for the sake of' (Umwillen) which determines the present from the future 'not-
yet' (noch-nicht). Only after this original (a priori) revelation is there room for dis-
covering (Entdecken) innerworldly beings as objects of science. But Dasein turns 
also on itself as an object of interpretation to gain 'authenticity' and 'Self'. The self-
disclosure of Dasein as 'Sorge' modifies Dasein's relation to beings and other Mit-
sein, without evading the ties of'thrownness, facticity and fallenness l91 . This means 
that all meaning has to come through the manifestation within beings and within the 
'world' of 'being-in-the-world', who's form (RiB) changes historically. Heidegger's 
trick is to conceive of the inception of Being as the Aristotelian 'arche', which con-
tains its 'telos' already in itself and thus governs existence from the futurality of this 
'telos'. This temporality (Zeitlichkeit) then governs the limited 'possibilities' which 
are contained always already in this arche until they are all exhausted to trigger a 
new inception. The 'predicament' of thrownness is the temporality which allows 
change with persistence in time. In this temporality the modes of existence reveal 
'beings'. Heidegger calls this 'zeitigen' (bringing about into presence in time). 
191 "Sein istjeweils das Sein eines Seienden." SZ, §3, p.9 
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2. 'Poiesis' and 'Challenging-forth' 
In 'Being and Time' Heidegger has so far defined Dasein in its relation to its own 
'Being'. All our uses of the word 'is' are disclosures of the Being of beings. All such 
disclosure 'is' the existence of Dasein. In its temporal structure this existence is by 
definition incomplete. This incompletion in relation to some 'absolute', that is com-
plete and timeless is what enables existence. Dasein is constituted by the temporal 
structure of 'care' to be able to understand 'Being' as 'happening' (Ereignis). This 
originary 'knowing-one's-way-around' constitutes consciousness, not the other way 
round. So, all existence performs the henneneutic of beings 'as' whatever they ap-
pear as, to Dasein. Therefore "Being" as such 'is' not - Dasein 'perfonns' Being in 
the comportment of its own 'existence', its 'ownmost Being' and in its 'Being-with' 
(Mit-sein). Its relations, therefore, are temporal and determined in a 'project' 
(Entwurf) which it has not 'created' but which it performs unknowingly until it faces 
its 'being-guilty' and 'authentically' 'chooses' what it has been already 'given'. How 
does Heidegger then accounts for the change of paradigms of 'ontology' i.e. of the 
'way' in which beings 'appear' to us as 'an-wesend'. 'Anwesen', in Gennan, means 
being present, but also 'being-towards' 192: 'an' means 'to', like sending a letter 'to' 
Mr. Heidegger. One can see the sense; it is not about being hit by a raw sensory in-
formation, instead the 'project' (Entwurf) of Dasein reveals, and this means that we 
are open to beings which present 'themselves' within this site meaningfulness. De-
pending on the form of such 'project' (Entwurf) beings appear differently in the oc-
cidental way of 'presencing'. In Heidegger's terms, the way beings 'appear' into 
presence has turned into a 'challenging-forth', the 'Ge-stell'. 
In such a 'challenging-forth' beings do not 'presence' themselves as 'An-wesen'. Be-
ings which are calculable are mere resource (or stock, Bestand). In the challenging-
forth beings have already been disclosed (Entbergen) as what 'is' calculable and 
resource for production. Their 'Being' is 'representation' to the subject. This is at the 
heart of Heidegger' s critique of technology and science. Technology is the way we 
encounter 'beings' today, and by extension we encounter ourselves as beings and this 
means also as mere 'resource'. 'Production' in the sense of 're-presentation' ex-
192 'an-gehen' statt 'vorstellen'; 'An-wesen' u. 'Ab-wesen' as movement ofpresencing, Moerchen, 
Heideggers Satz: »'Sein' heiBt 'An-wesen' «, in Merker (ed) Innen und Aussenansichten, p.193, p.l78 
f. 
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presses the drive for control. Beings are turned into disposable 'objects' - 'stock' or 
'resource' (Bestand) - which can be 'ordered' (bestellen). The only relation the ob-
ject has is its disposability to 'representation'. We hear people speaking about 'hu-
man resources' without any hint of irony. 'Humans', when considered to 'be' re-
source can only understand beings 'as' resource, and all other possible meanings are 
frozen out, 'concealed' (Verbergen) into what is inaccessible and not 'presencing' 
(Anwesen). 
This "Anwesen" does not mean some 'external' object as a 'thing in itself - things 
are only insofar they are 'phenomena'. Heidegger describes the 'phenomenon' as 
'what reveals itself ("das Offenbare,,)193, not as 'appearance', nor purely as "forms 
ofintuition",194, but as the meaning of Being as the "Being ofbeings,,195. The tenn 
derives from 'phaino': "bringing to light", "reveal" or "mentally apparent 196and 
'phantasia', the faculty is the faculty of 'imagination', is the verbal noun of 'phaino-
mai'. The 'phenomenon' is what appears without all presuppositions from which we 
understand beings, therefore it has to be recovered from these presuppositions. Phe-
nomenology is therefore the method of ontology - it is 'philosophy' proper- the 
method to investigate 'Being' as such. In the context of 'Being and Time' the 'phe-
nomenon' in question is 'Dasein' itselfl97. 'Being' is the "transcendens schlech-
thin,,198 and in particular the transcendence of the 'Being' ofDasein". 'Presencing' 
only happens when there is a Dasein which has a 'project' (Entwurf) within which 
beings are disclosed by a meaning. If this overarching 'sense' of beings develops into 
'resource', beings are still disclosed, but only 'as' this resource while all other possi-
bilities of meaningful presencing are withdrawn from view of the' open' (das 
Offene). 'Openness' is the happening of Being, Heidegger's question is about Being 
(Sein) itself, as what 'gives' Being - not beings. However, for Heidegger this original 
'openness' of Being is hidden by the disclosure of the 'Ge-stell'. The 'openness' (Of-
fenheit) has to be 'recovered' in its original 'givenness'. 
In 'Being and Time' beings appear only in the context of some 'purpose' or 'in-
193 SZ, §7A, p28 
194 "Gegenstaende der empirischen Anschauung" SZ, §7 A, p.30 
195 SZ, §7C, p.35 
196 Liddell & Scott, Greek English Dictionary, on www.perseus.tuft.edu 
197 "Phanomenologie des Daseins ist 'Hermeneutik' in der urspriinglichen Bedeutung des Wortes, 
wonach es das Geschaft der Auslegung bezeichnet ... " SZ, §7C, p.37 
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volvement' (Bewandnis), which constitute in ontological-existential tenns 'care'. We 
grasp 'beings' in tenns of what they are for, a usage or as 'intentionality' 199. This 'in-
tentionality' precedes the actual encounter with beings - because it lets it come into 
the 'actual' presence (Anwesen). 
Ifwe think about Heidegger's description of the technological 'challenging-forth' we 
understand how hard it is not to think about things differently than in 'scientific' 
tenns or about trees as 'carbon traps': even the idea of 'saving the planet' is couched 
in the tenninology of 'resource', just like its pendant 'human-resources'. In tenns of 
the Stoics, we are 'psychopaths' who gave their soul over to 'pathe', the pathe of 
'control' in particular. This is at the root of the difference between 'poiesis' and what 
Heidegger calls 'challenging-forth'. Although already contained as a possibility in 
the 'Greek inception' 'bringing-forth' turned into 'challenging-forth' only through a 
number of reinterpretations of Greek tenninology. In particular, the self-assertion of 
the subject as the ground of all objects. We are victims of the insidious assertion of 
certainty and security of what is 'present'. To secure this 'present', beings have to be 
set and grounded into a structure of availability, which then turns out to be what Hei-
degger calls the 'Ge-stell': the' essence' of the disclosure as resource is 'Ge-stell'. 
In his lecture on technologlOO and his essay on Aristotle's concept of'physis' as 
well as UKW, Heidegger is concerned about 'poiesis' in general. 'Poiesis' is the 
general tenn for 'bringing-forth': 'Her-stellen'. All 'bringing-forth' is 'poiesis' in 
principle, but there are differences. I will seek to extract Heidegger's concept of that 
'poietic', which he uses to underpin his concept of the work of art. 
The work of art is neither 'matter' nor 'thing', it fits into a different existential-
ontological category than things. The reason for this is, that works of art are outside 
the tenns of usage, they are outside the context ofinnerworldly 'totality of pur-
poses'(Bewandnisganzheit). The 'work's' 'in-order-to' (Um-zu) is therefore in a dif-
ferent relation to Dasein's 'care-structure' than Heidegger's famous 'hammer'. The 
hammer has meaning by way ofthe 'project' as it is detennined by 'thrownness' 
198 SZ, §7C, p.38 
199 'Intention' is also the key to Stoic doctrine. It needs to be turned from beings to 'virtue' and 'lo-
gos', which then become synonyms of 'Being'. 
200 'Die Frage nach der Technik' in V A 
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(Geworfenheit), on the other hand, a work of art receives its meaning only through 
Dasein's authentic 'being-guilty'. Death, conscience and guilt are those concepts 
which transcend the 'present- and ready-at-hand' and the innerworldly 'in-order-to' 
(Um-zu). If consciousness is the intentionality of consciousness, what is the con-
sciousness without the intentionality which always has an object, the pure intention? 
Nevertheless, the work of art persists in a 'on-account-of-which' (Worum?) which 
provides Dasein with a 'project'. Because Dasein is a being to which its Being is of 
concern, its 'project' has to transcend its 'care' and disclose itself as such a being 
which is constituted by 'care'. This disclosure, which Heidegger called 
'Entschlossenheit', is a necessary supplement for the possibility of a 'success' of the 
work of art. The work of art has to go beyond the 'on-account-of-which' (Worum), 
the 'project' that governs an 'epoch' to touch its constitutive limits, and by doing 
that, unfold another part of the possibilities that are 'given' to Dasein. Meaning as 
truth is 'unveiling' because it is based on 'withdrawa1'201 - 'withdrawal' is what en-
ables the temporality of 'Da' and 'sein'. Therefore the work of art must consist of a 
surplus of unveiling in relation to its own time, which forces the unfolding into an-
other way of Being. This surplus exists only in relation to the 'on-account-of-which' 
(Worum?), which defines the horizon in which the epoch has established itself. The 
work of art is therefore able to challenge procrastinated traditions which run the dan-
ger of losing Dasein' s existence, losing its concern for Being. The work of art is a 
compelling disclosure of beings in an intuitive unmediated way. 
The work of art is outside and surplus to the 'purposefulness' of Dasein' s activities 
('Worum', 'Um-zu' and 'Besorgen' etc), without being meaningless. Therefore, it 
has to address in some way Dasein' s knowledge of itself, as self-disclosed Dasein. 
Dasein can only 'understand' what is limited202 - the Absolute is 'nothing' for it 
(Holderlin) - so the work of art does not 'represent' the absolute nor is it the abso-
lute, but points to it as what is absent. In the Romantic manner it invokes the 'ab-
sence' of the totality - the ruin and the fragment (as metaphors) are Romantic inven-
tions. Along this line the Heideggerian work of art is - functions as - what is non-
201 withdrawal is more originary than unveiling: "Zum Wesen der Wahrheit als der Unverborgenheit 
gehort dieses Verweigern in der Weise des zwiefachen Verbergens. Die Wahrheit ist in ihrem Wesen 
Un-wahrheit." UKW, pAO; Das Seiende wird der Verborgenheit entrissen." SZ, §44, p.222; VA, p.19 
202 Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Thought, p.26 f. 
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representable, has limits and temporality, and gives access to the excess. Unlike the 
everyday care (Besorgen), the work of art operates beyond the limit of what is rec-
ognisable in terms of beings. It is product and producing without 'intentionality' or 
'instrumentality'. But Heidegger goes further than the Romantics by including the 
'Absolute' as the excess of the possible into the temporality of Dasein and the work 
of art, as the limited possible. The work does not point to the absolute, it is the un-
controllable machine of production of production in 'epochal' terms. 
a. The Origin of the Work of Art 
In his lecture 'The Origin of the Work of Art' Heidegger uses art and the work of art 
to elucidate the operation of an 'a priori' truth (i.e. Being) generating itself in a form 
of 'being', which is itself a work of Dasein. The metaphysical truth has to come as 
truth into the innerworldly things. The work 'opens up a world'. Things have to be 
present as beings but as works they also generate the openness itself within which 
they are present (Anwesen). Again, it is a circular figure which gives form to some-
thing which then gives another form back. Dasein 'creates' (Schaffen) art which then 
'creates' (Schaffen) a compelling 'Gestalt' of Dasein's truth. 
The definition of the ontological position of the work of art being beyond the mere 
instrumental is traditional. Art does not dwell in the instrumental. "Wege, nicht 
Werke" (ways, not works) is Heidegger's motto for his 'Gesamtausgabe'; what is 
under way is the work, it is on the way 'at work' towards its 'telos'. The work is the 
labour of truth putting itself into 'a' work - as a being. The thinker - or artist - is a 
work of his work insofar as it is truth that sets 'itself' into the work of art. This work 
of art is a 'Gesamtkunstwerk': by setting truth to work in the work, producing the to-
tal work of truth 'as' which beings are 'brought-forth' into the 'open' the artist or 
thinker is drawn into this truth in his actions. The artist falls into the path of a truth 
which is first emerging. He is drawn by his 'work-ing' his activity, not his 'theory'. 
How can one ask a question about what is an unconditional (unvermittelt) inception 
of truth203? Any question is conceived through a 'pre-understanding' (V or-griff) our 
'knowing-our-way-around' (Sichauskennen). But there is no such advance knowl-
edge in terms of the work of art. It cannot emerge in such a question. 
203 UKW, p.62 
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What does Heidegger do in the lecture on UKW? First he dispels the common under-
standing of art as the thing made by an artist. He suggests, that the 'origin' (Ur-
sprung) of the work of art and the artist lies in 'art' itself, and that this art itself is a 
form of disclosure as self-disclosure of truth - the object and subject of the disclo-
sure
204
. He calls art 'Dichtung'. Art is the 'origin' (Ursprung) from which truth leaps 
out205. It is an activity of Dasein and most essentially in "das entwerfende Sagen" 
(the projecting Saying)206. This 'Sage' contains what is disclosed and what is 'not-
yet' disclosed, so in its 'happening', art as truth, designs the shape of the disclosing 
'open' (das Offene). Therefore it is the 'origin' of the work and the artist. 
In the first part Heidegger asks for a concept of that which confronts us in some ma-
terial form as a work of art: What is its essence (Wesen)? The work of art reveals 
something other than itself207, some other truth. This is the traditional understanding 
of the work. It is some 'thing' like all others. Heidegger goes through the classical 
definitions of beings to question their suitability for his question about the essence of 
the work of art. Is it an attribute, the unity of sensible perception or formed matter? 
The matter is governed by the 'idea' of the item and this means by its ability to per-
form a task - this is not the case for the work of art since it is not governed by in-
strumentality. Neither is able to explain the otherness of the work to instrumentality 
and the natural object. The work of art is therefore neither a 'thing'(natural object) 
nor 'equipment' (Zeug, i.e. man-made object for some use). As an example Heideg-
ger discusses van Gogh's painting "Peasant's shoes". He sees the painting of the 
shoes 'disclosing' how 'equipment' (Zeug) - shoes in this case - are determined 
within the peasant's 'world', enabling the 'world' as the totality of relations with 
things which - imperceptibly - reveal their own essence in their 'usefulness' (Dien-
lichkeit) within this peasant's 'world'. Van Gogh's painting reveals the essence (We-
sen) of 'equipment' (Zeug) as 'usefulness' (Dienlichkeit). In the painting the shoes 
reveal their 'truth', the Being ofbeings208. Therefore Heidegger introduces a new 
category of beings: the 'work' is neither a 'thing' nor 'equipment' because, although 
it is 'made', it does not have the 'usefulness' in which its Being (Wesen) is obscured 
by functionality. As a consequence the work reveals its own Being (Wesen) as show-
204 UKW, p.63 
205 UKW, p.63 f. 
206 UKW, p.60 
107 UKW, pA 
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ing the Being of beings - and this is its proper function_ In the work disclosing hap-
pens209_ As a result of the questioning of the classical understanding of 'things' Hei-
degger finds, that they use a too general concept of thing, which is unsuitable for the 
work of art due to the work being in progress of infonning the Being (W esen) of be-
ings, and thus 'being' (wesen) itself in a different way_ 
In the second section, Heidegger speaks about the agency of this revelation of truth 
in a work. The complex interdependence between the work and truth is not the work 
of Dasein or artists in tenns of conscious acts_ On the contrary, the work of art has a 
double structure in which the setting of truth is set into a being, the work, which then 
discloses the 'world' around it Heidegger describes the opposition between 'world' 
(in tenns of the disclosed) and earth (in tenns of 'bergen': safe-keeping, withdraw-
ing) as a 'strife' (Streit)_ This strife (Streit) is based on the 'Urstreit', of 'unveiling' 
as truth that opens the 'open', the 'clearing' into which the 'strife' sets up truth as a 
polarity of absolutes in which a shape has to be secured in which truth can become a 
fonn (RiB) uniting both_ In his example, the Greek temple as the work of art is dis-
closive but set back into 'earth' _ The temple discloses (as a persistent but not penna-
nent action) in a way which makes disclosure of the 'earth' possible without 'ex-
hausting' it210_ This points to the immaterial action of meaning instead of the material 
actions of' equipment', The temple in its materiality constitutes a framework of rela-
tions which lets beings appear in a meaningful wail 1_ The disclosure is 'held' open, 
it can close or shift any time_ At the same time, this 'work' is made from a mate-
ria1212, from the 'earth', and is thus set back into it: it makes earth 'visible' as the 
'undisclosable' (UnerschlieBbare )213_ 
The work is a world-disclosing happening without which there would be no 'world'_ 
As the 'strife' (Streit) this happening in the work of art reveals the togetherness of 
the two poles of the world and the earth, which both belong into the same ground and 
208 UKW, p.20 f 
209 UKW, p_24 
210 UKW, p_28 f 
211 "Das Werk halt das Offene der Welt offen_" UKW, p.30 
212 which is not 'matter', as in morphe and hyle: earth, as Gadamer points out in his introduction to 
Heidegger's lecture, UKW, Reclam edition, p_117 
213 "Wohin das Werk sich zUrUckstellt und was es in diesem Sich-Zuruckstehen hervorkommen laBt, 
nannten wir die Erde_ Sie ist das Hervorkommend-Bergende_" UKW p.31 ___ Das Werk hallt die Erde 
selbst in das Offene einer Welt Das Werk laBt die Erde eine Erde sein ____ Offen gelichtet als sie selbst 
erscheint die Erde nur, wo sie aIs die wesenhaft UnerschlieBbare gewahrt und bewahrt wird_" p.32 
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generate the 'open' (das Offene) ofa 'world,214. The work not only embodies this 
strife, it 'incites' (anstiften) and 'accomplishes' (vollbringen) this 'strife'. The 'strife' 
is a happening of 'truth' in Heidegger's sense215: not as correlation but in terms of 
'alethteia', as 'Unverborgenheit' (unveiling or disclosing). Truth is the very possibil-
ity in which one can make a decision about what is or is not correct. That there are 
beings, has at its ground the fact of 'disclosedness' (Entborgenheit) itself, which 
Heidegger calls 'the open' (das Offene) or the 'clearing'(Lichtung)216. Along with 
this it also means that there is 'concealment' (Verbergen in the two ways as Ver-
sagen and V erstellen )217. The' strife' as a happening, as change, can shift' the open', 
and thus beings are disclosed and withdrawn. Each time the comfortable familiarity 
withdraws from the 'open', it becomes unfamiliar (das Un-geheuere)218. This strife 
for 'the open' is the production of truth out of untruth as that which is 'not-yet' dis-
closed219. The immediate perception - aisthesis - of the work of art 'gives' immedi-
ate 'truth'. It is intuitively 'there' and valid, but only in a historical sense. 
In the final section Heidegger works out the relation between 'truth' and 'art'. Art is 
the origin of the work of art (and the artist) but what is the essence' (Wesen) of art 
itself? We can gain access to the 'essence' (Wesen) of art only through the work it-
self and by way of the question of how it can come about: Is the 'work' made in the 
same way as 'equipment'? Heidegger agrees that the Greeks use the word 'techne' 
for both, but goes on to amend the meaning oftechne22o. Accordingly the mode of 
'techne' is dependent on the 'essence' (Wesen) of the work in hand. So 'techne' in 
relation to 'equipment' is called' Anfertigen' (making) while the work of art is 
'Geschaffen' (created)221. 'Creating' (Schaffen) is a mode of the 'happening of 
truth ,222. 'Truth' is the mode of the 'not-yet' disclosed becoming 'openness' (Offen-
214 UKW, p.34 
215 "Die Wahrheit ist der Urstreit, in dem je in einer Weise das Offene erstritten wird, in das alles hi-
neinsteht und aus dem alles sich zuriickhallt, was als Seiendes sich zeigt und entzieht." UKW, p47 
216 Lichung and das Offene are not identical. The 'clearing' (Lichtung) is the originary happening of 
truth in opposition to 'concealment' (Verbergung), only within this 'clearing' the world opens the 
'open' (das Offene) in which Beings can appear. For the limited purposes of this text, I will not fur-
ther go into this distinction. For an elaboration on this see. v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der 
Kunst, §25, p.207 ff. 
217 UKW pAO 
218 which is more original than the familiar; "Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Unwahrheit." UKW, 
pAO, and again pA6 
219 UKW, pA7 
220 UKW, pA5 
221 UKW, pA6 
222 "Das Werkwerden des Werkes ist eine Weise des Werdens und Geschehens der Wahrhcit." UKW, 
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heit); therefore there is a dynamic in which 'truth' as a happening is a disclosure and 
a withdrawal. This happening establishes itself in beings (Seienden)223. A being in 
which truth is established cannot be a mere 'thing' (Zeug) which purpose ends in its 
'usefulness' (Dienlichkeit) and reliability (VerlaJ31ichkeit). 
The 'creation' (Schaffen) of a 'work' is therefore different from the 'making' (Anfer-
tigen) of 'equipment' (Zeug), the first discloses the essence (Wesen) of the latter. 
Heidegger argues the difference from a proper interpretation of the Greek word for 
both 'makings': 'techne'. Techne is a form of knowledge (Wissen) but not a fonn of 
'making'224. Techne is a 'bringing-forth' out of the withdrawal into disclosure (Un-
verborgenheit) and in the Greek context this means into view225 . 'bringing-forth' is a 
bringing into view, into the 'clearing' (Lichtung). Heidegger states expressly that the 
creation (Schaffen) of a work is not understood from the perspective of craft but 
from the essence of the 'work' as the happening oftruth226: becoming of the work is 
a happening of truth. The work brings-forth out of concealment (noch-nicht, (Un-) 
Entborgenen) into the disclosure (presence, Anwesen) of the 'clearing' (Lichtung)227. 
Truth in Heidegger's sense is an event or a happening of creating within beings. The 
existing work is the site of truth within which is decided the strife for the 'open' (das 
Offene) as 'clearing,228. Truth, as 'clearing' persists in 'the open' in the persistence 
of beings (Aufstellen)229. 
The dynamic of this becoming of 'truth' as a whole is set into the 'work' as 'strife'. 
The 'creating' (Schaffen) is not the creation of an artisan subjectivity nor conscious-
ness; the 'work' is not "N.N. fecit" but a "factum est,,230. The 'that' of disclosedness, 
'that' it has happened, is all one can say about its happening. It is more a 'receiving' 
pA6 
223 "WeiI es zum Wesen der Wahrheit geh6rt, sich in das Seiende einzurichten, und so erst Wahrheit 
zu werden, deshalb Iiegt im Wesen der Wahrheit der Zug zum Werk aIs einer ausgezeichneten 
M6gIichkeit der Wahrheit, inmitten des Seienden selbst seiend zu sein." UKW, pA8 
224 UKW, pA5 
225 "Wissen heiJ3t gesehen haben." and this is an a priori truth, UKW, pA5 and" Platon nennt dieses 
Aussehen, worin Anwesendes das zeigt, was es ist, ,eidos' .Dieses Aussehen gesehen haben,eidenai', 
ist Wissen." VA, p.52 
226 UKW, pA6 
227 UKW, pA7 
228 "Urstreit" UKW, 47 
229 UKW, pA7 
230 UKW, p.51 
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(Empfangeni31 . But it is not just an incessant movement. Truth has persistence as 
the shape it won in the strife between 'world' and 'earth'. In this 'unity,232 of world 
and earth the 'strife' is the shape (Um-RiB) as measure and contour (RiB). The work 
is the very structure of the' RiB' as 'strife', in which truth gains temporal persistence 
as the "Gestalt" as which truth is visible233. The "factum est" of the work is the 
'thrust' (AnstoB, StoB) 'that' the work has been 'created', not by the 'artist, but in 
terms of a 'receiving' (Empfangen), The 'that' of its emergence is inexplicable un-
like the 'making' of 'equipment'. The 'thrust' which emerges is not derivative and 
continuous from anything else. The 'being-created' (Geschaffensein) of the work of 
art is therefore the 'strife' as truth set into the material of the 'work' itself, which is 
the 'earth,234. This very difficult structure means that the work of art first 'opens up' 
a world - as the Greeks temple does - by 'setting itself back' into the earth disclosing 
the 'earth' as what 'conceals' (Verbergen) itself but also holds and grounds every-
thing else and thus 'opening up' (ErOffnen) everything around the temple. In a sec-
ond step, by inciting the strife of world and earth, which is embodied in its material-
ity (meaning: 'set back' (Zuriickstellen) into the work of art's 'earth') the work 
brings this strife into the earth by opening it up into the 'open' and holding it 'open' 
for the setting in - or establishing (Einrichten) of truth in the 'open'. Heidegger re-
places the concept of matter with' earth' to underline its independence and impene-
trability. He also changes its character from the unformed eternal to the process of 
hiding the un-disclosed. The earth is the withdrawn which (in the terms of 'physis' 
discloses itself in the clearing as 'truth' (aletheia). In fragment 123, Heraclitus' says: 
"physis likes to hide itself' and Heidegger adds, that what is unsaid in this sentence 
is, that it also 'unveils' itself: a-letheia235. Therefore, the two moments of hiding and 
unveiling of 'physis' - earth - are the 'clearing'. "1m Wesen der Wahrheit liegt der 
Zug zum Werk", says Heidegger. The essence (Wesen) of aletheia is the attraction 
(Zug) into the work. This means into setting itself out into beings. Physis as truth 
needs disclosure or even is disclosure only in its operation within a work. Not in be-
ings like tools or things but in works. Only works, can set up, into the open and as 
231 UKW, pA8 
232 UKW, pA9 
233 UKW, p.50 
234 UKW, p.50; v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.264f.: "Die Gestalt aIs das in die 
Erde des Kunstwerkes FestgesteIItsein des Streites (aIs des Risses) ist das 'Geflige' das der Streit als 
RiB annimmt, wenn er in die Erde der Kunstwerkes festgesteIIt wird." 
235 Heidegger, GA55, Heraklit, p.132 
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truth the Being of beings. But at that stage the Being of beings is twice derivative. 
Still, it detennines Dasein's truth. 
The tenn 'StoB' (push, thrust etc.) is how Heidegger describes the effect of the 'that' 
of the work of art. The 'that' is related to the 'createdness' (Geschaffensein) ofa 
work. The 'creating' is a setting up (thesis) in the 'open' as 'truth' and mediated by 
the 'RiB' by which world and earth is drawn together into a unified relation, an 'in-
between' (Fuge), within which beings appear and disappear. All appearance is gov-
erned by the 'as' by which beings become something. All 'as' is governed by the be-
ing-in-the-world ofDasein, the original inception of a 'world' is 'aletheia. 'Aletheia' 
as 'unveiling', or 'clearing' is the non-arbitary but unconditional play of disclosure 
and withdrawaL 
The 'that' of work is a 'thrust' which pushes Dasein out of its familiarity (geheure). 
The 'thrust' is truth immediately validated. The force of the' Un-geheure', the un-
canny or unfamiliar suddenly invalidates the familiar236 but only those who are 
'open' to the disclosure of truth itself, the Dasein in its 'Ent-schlossenheit' is 'will-
ing' 'stand-in' (innestehen) the uncanny (Ungeheuren) of the happening truth237. To 
endure this 'standing-in' (innestehen) as the disclosure (Entbergung), means to be 
open to the 'Ungeheure' not only as some new truth, but as the revelation of the 
truth: from one unconditioned into the contingency of some other unconditioned. 
This fonn of 'knowledge' and 'willing' is therefore of the quality ofa 'receiving', 
namely of the 'thrust' (StoB) of the work. What is received is the happening of truth 
as the openness of beings (des Seienden) within which Dasein as the 'Bewahrenden' 
endures (innestehen )238. 
The work of art is an 'event', as the 'thrust' topples the familiar, which has been be-
fore. As such an unmediated 'event' it cannot depend on some subjective 'experi-
ence' (Erlebnis) or any set rule239. The event of truth overthrows all the 'familiar' 
(geheure), because it is not instrumental or a subjective experience (Erlebnis). In-
stead it is Being itself, which happens in the event of truth. As we saw in 'Being and 
236 v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.286 
237 " .•. Instaendigkeit im Ungeheuren der im Werk stehenden Wahrheit." UKW, p.54 
238 v. Herrmann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.290 
239 Gadamer in UKW, Reclam edition, p.117 f. 
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Time', Heidegger seeks the 'Sinn des Seins' (sense of Being), but 'sense' is Being in 
the form of the 'project' as truth. In UKW Heidegger develops a process in which 
truth sets itself into 'beings' as 'aletheia': unveiling. This unveiling has always al-
ready happened when there is sense at all. It can never be 'made', it comes by itself 
on 'doves feet'240.so to speak We do not know how: the 'je ne sais quoi' of originary 
production is not' economic', it is the excess of plenitude and contingency. 
Keeping in mind Heidegger's reminder, that this 'setting' (Setzen, Stell en) is always 
understood from the Greek 'thesis,241 we see that truth is set up in 'the open' by way 
of a 'setting into work'. As Heidegger explains in the later' Amendment' (Zusatz)242, 
'thesis' is meant as a setting into disclosedness, (Aufstellen im Unverborgenen), and 
bringing into presence (ins Anwesende bringen). The word 'Feststellen' into a 'Ge-
stalt' then means to bring a contour (RiB, 'peras') into visibility. Because only if 
there is a contour, 'something' is visible. And this 'feststellen' as 'RiB' is the work: 
an 'ergon' in its 'essence' of' energeia', the' being at work' of truth. Heidegger then 
makes explicit that the account of agency is 'indefinite' but 'determinable' (unbes-
timmt aber bestimmbar) but hidden in the relation between Being and human beings, 
which is still not adequately formulated. 
Heidegger suggests that the movement, the dynamic of the whole complex of the 
work of art, artist, 'art' and the 'Bewahrer' (guardian/audience) is the historical mode 
of the emergence of truth itself. He rejects clearly the notion of the a-temporal, abso-
lute truth in favour of the concept of 'strife' (polemos). As a happening it is also an 
'inception', a 'beginning'; the work has persistence in time as truth and as such this 
truth makes the 'world' to 'world' (Welt "weltet,,)243 and brings it into the action of 
meaning. Heidegger has then determined the 'work's' position as being an object in 
the 'world', but by its essence not being part of the 'world', neither a 'thing' nor 
'equipment'. By essentially determining the 'shape' or horizon of the 'world' as a re-
sult of a 'strife' between 'world' and 'earth', it reveals the truth of the 'Being of be-
ings' not as absolute and atemporal but as temporal and 'poietic' truth. This 'strife' 
manifests itself in the 'work' not because it extends into the 'absolute' but because 
240 FN, Zarathustra, Werke YoUI, Ed. Schlechta, p.675 
241 UKW, p.47 
242 UKW, p.68 
243 UKW, p.30 
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its finity and limits (peras) enable truth to appear in the 'there' of' Da-sein', which is 
always limited by 'thrownness' and 'death', etc. 244. 
The mode of production of the work of art is never the 'creation' ofa subject245 but 
"das Festgestelltsein des Streites durch den RiB in die Gestalt.,,246. The work of art is 
not an 'opinion' of the artist. The artist's relation is a receiving (Empfangen)247. He 
does not 'set up' the truth out ofa selfhood - not 'fecit'; instead it is 'given to him as 
a 'factum est'248 - it simply 'happens'. Heidegger's terminology around the word 
'stellen' is based on the Greek term 'thesis'. So, not only does he sees the tenn 
'techne' related to 'thesis' as a 'bringing-forth' 'her-stellen', 'setting into work' (ins-
Werk-setzen) and 'ascertain' (feststellen) the setting into a Gestalt, but also his term 
'Schaffen' (creating) and 'Geschaffen' (being-created) are dependent on 'thesis', in-
cluding the terms 'Gestalt' and 'RiB', since this is the form in which beings are 
brought into the openness of truth. The agency is the strife between Being and 
Dasein. But on which pre-conscious or pre-subjective level is this strife performed? 
It can only be the Dasein itself in its 'resolve' (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) and 
thus open to its ownmost possibilities which can wrestle these possibilities from Be-
ing. This 'wrestling' would in some way be the 'creating' (Schaffen) as 'receiving' 
(Empfangen) a granting from Being. 
Heidegger says, that the work does not only need the 'creators' (Schaffenden) but 
equally the 'Bewahrenden' (guardians). The term is curious because it relates to 
'truth' (,Wahr'-heit and 'wahren' keeping safe, but also 'bewahr-heiten' turning out 
to be true) on the one hand and is defined by Heidegger as a 'knowledge' (Wissen) 
which is a 'willing' (Wollen). This 'knowledge' of the work concerns its unfamiliar 
(ungeheuer) character, which goes beyond mere 'experience' (Erlebnis), and 'under-
stands' the 'truth' being made in the work of art. Heidegger relates this 'knowledge' 
directly to the concept of 'Entschlossenheit' in Being and Time, in which Dasein dis-
244 Art and thought but also the founding of states are modes of receiving the inception of Being, how-
ever, not 'science', which is already based on a 'disclosure' but not originary disclosure itself UKW, 
pA8 
245 UKW, p.25, 54, 63 
246 "Das Geschaffensein enthiillte sich als das Festgestelltsein des Streites durch den Riss in die Ge-
stalt." UKW, p.52 
247 UKW, pA9 
248 UKW, p.51 
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closes its Being by turning away from beings to Being249. The 'Bewahrer' are there-
fore not mere 'audience' having some aesthetic experience, instead they are those 
who are open to be affected by the 'thrust' of the emerging 'unfamiliarity' or the 'un-
canny' (Un-geheure) of the work25o. The unmediated and contingent which the work 
opens up needs Dasein to 'stand in' (innestehen) the open. This together with the 
reference to Being and Time and 'resolve' (Entschlossenheit), renders Dasein ca-
pable to experience the disclosure of truth in its uncannyness (un-geheuer) precisely 
because 'resolve' (Entschlossenheit) opens Dasein to disclosure as the disclosing of 
what is unmediated with the familiar. Dasein grasps truth's unfamiliarity intuitively 
and unmediated as it 'appears' and addresses it in the 'thrust'. 
In the last passages Heidegger then proceeds to pinpoint the work of art and the art-
ist, in their mutual production of each other into the 'essence' (Wesen) of 'art' as the 
'setting-into-work-of-truth'. The 'poietic' (Dichtung) is 'art' in general as the origin 
of the 'work of art'. The 'work' is the 'setting up' (her-stellen, Geschaffensein) of 
the temporal persistence of truth25 I. Ifit is a 'work', it is foundational and in its in-
ception it already contains its end, its telos, as 'energeia' the 'being-at-work', like the 
'project' (Entwurf)252, the work 'projects' into the future and determines from this 
future, thus making truth persist in time the' Da' of the' clearing' of Dasein253 . The 
'creators' (Schaffende) cannot be seen in isolation: art, artist, work of art and the 
'guardians' (Bewahrenden) belong together into the happening (becoming) of 
truth254. 'Poiesis' (Dichtung) is the word for the particular 'Geschaffen' of art itself. 
The idea that the totally contingent work of art comes about out of 'nothing,255 
means 'nothing' in terms of Being which is 'nothing; this 'nothing' are the possible 
but (yet) undisclosed 'projects' of Dasein which it can access in its 'resolve' 
(Entschlossenheit). This is the 'strife' between Dasein and Being for the disclosure 
of the yet (noch-nicht) undisclosed possibilities, which are the essence (Wesen) of 
Dasein (having projects). 
249 UKW, p.53 
250 v. Hernnann, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, p.287 
251 "Fest-stellen" UKW, p.68 
252 UKW, p.59 f. 
253 "Dieser Verrlickung folgen, heiBt: die gewohnten Bezlige zur Welt und zur Erde verwandeln und 
fortan mit allem geHiufigen Tun und Schatzen, Kennen und Blicken ansichhalten, urn in der im Werk 
geschehenden Wahrheit zu verweilen." UKW, p.52 
254 UKW, p.57 
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Dichtung as 'poiesis' is for Heidegger language. For this purpose he makes a distic-
tion between the language of' communication' (Mitteilung) and the disclosive 'nam-
ing' (Nennen). He understands this language as a 'project' (Entwurf) in which 'dis-
closedness' (Unverborgenheit) is send (schicken) unto beings. The 'strife' of 'world' 
and 'earth' happens in the concrete historical language of a people (Volk). 
'Dichtung' as such he calls: 'die Sage' (saying), meaning the form of the disclosed-
ness (Unverborgenheit) itself. In 'die Sage' of language the 'open' (Offenef56 has 
already happened, and the arts and even poetry are governed by this original disclo-
sure (Unverborgenheit). 
The work as 'poiesis' ('Schaffen') is a 'bringing-forth' of a fonn of the 'open' in 
which beings stand out in truth (Fest-stellen). This truth is always the truth of the 
work, and all other possibilities of truth being set up have their own mode of truth. 
The fonn of the' open' is the fonn of truth which Heidegger then describes a 'RiB'. 
The 'RiB' is fonn, shape, 'peras', or "Gestalt,,257. Since truth needs un-truth (,noch-
nicht')258 for there to be truth there needs to be a shape, a horizon within which 
things can appear. The main point is, that the disclosure itself as a happening is visi-
ble in the work of art as the happening of truth itself in a visual immediacy of valida-
tion. This happens by the work of art not being instrumental, i.e. not disappearing in 
its 'usefulness' (Dienlichkeit). Truth for Heidegger is bringing-forth, 'poiesis', only 
if its production is transparent as an originary process and not a 'technical' making. 
The 'bringing-forth' precedes science in that the sciences can only challenge what has 
already been disclosed in the 'bringing-forth' of truth259. 
Truth as 'bringing-forth' is auto-poietic26o: This image of truth setting itself into its 
Gestalt by virtue of the work of art and the artist is precisely the unique mode of pro-
duction which is different from the mode of production (anfertigen) of' equipment' 
(Zeug). Truth is the absolute setting itself into temporality of the happening of truth -
as fate. The unmasterable 'strife' replaces dialectics as the controlable movement of 
the absolute spirit. Like the 'agon', 'strife' and 'polemos' are concepts resembling a 
255 UKW, p.62 
256 UKW, p.60 
257 UKW, p.50 
258 UKW, p.47 
259" Das wissenschaftliche Vorstellen verrnag das Wesen der N atur nie zu umstelIen, weil die Gegen-
standigkeit der Natur zum voraus nur eine Weise ist, in der sich die Natur herausstellt." VA, p.62 
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higher fonn of judgement, a judgement by ordeal, rather than according to a rule_ 
'Strife' sets up the rule - by setting-up truth within beings - and therefore 'has' no 
rules_ 'Art' (Dichtung) as 'poiesis' is ultimately truth setting itself to 'work ,26 J _ The 
inception of such work contains its fulfilment and' completion' already as 'energeia'_ 
But as a beginning, it is 'un-geheuer' (uncanny, unfamiliar) because it is not deduci-
ble from what has preceded it Therefore it is foundational (Stiften als Grunden), a 
'gift' (Schenkung) and 'excess' (UberfluB)_ 262 It is the excess of the possible as 'on-
set' (Einbruch) of othemess_263 _ 
The modes which are the products of this 'strife' are 'given' by fate, the ordeal of 
'strife', which is law-giving instead of playing itself out according to a 'law' _ As the 
limit, or 'RiB', the fonnation of the work of art constitutes the 'order,264_ "Giving" 
means that the inception is in no relation, cannot be deducted or inducted, from any-
thing else265 _ The other aspect of this inception is that it also contains its own' end' 
(telos)_1t is like the Aristotelian 'energeia', 'being at work' as a process according to 
the 'law' set by the 'work' towards its end_ 
The 'work' of' Dichtung', of all 'poiesis' is a founding event All 'poiesis' origi-
nates, for Heidegger, with language, but language is here conceived as what imposes 
'limits', it does not differentiate between the various art fonns266_ Poietic is the foun-
dational event The essence of 'poiesis' (Dichtung) is 'founding' (Stiften)267_ 
"Schopfen" is not 'creation', instead Heidegger points to the meaning as 'drawing', 
like drawing water from a well, which simply 'gives' _ The well is 'overflowing' 
(UberfluB) of the founding of "Stiftung"_ Nevertheless, to 'appear' as 'truth setting 
itself to work', it has to have a shape ("Gestalt") which means it has to be in the tem-
porality ofDasein as the site in which the 'open' can be established, as is described 
in 'Being and Time' _ There is no subjectivity - there is only the possibility within 
time to found a world within the strife of disclosure and withdrawal - which then es-
tablishes fonns of self 
260 UKW, p_63 
261 UKW, p_63 
262 "Die Stiftung ist ein UberfluB, eine Schenkung_" UKW, p_61 
263 "aus dem nichts" UKW, p_62 
264 Fuge is 'dike', SdA, p.350 f 
265 it is the 'Un-geheure' 
266 UKW, p.59 
267 "Stiftung ist ein UberfluB, eine Schenkung" UKW, p_61, "sich-ins-werk-setzen der Wahrheit" 
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Fonns of self are not 'at the disposal' ofDasein. In thrownness, facticity and fallen-
ness Dasein is limited and this means it is given a 'shape', "RiB" already. There are 
two figures which are in some conflict. The inception which is non-derivative and 
unmediated268 and Dasein that is always already within a 'world'. The inception as 
'arche' contains and governs the End (telos)269. Art as originary inception is there-
fore not just self-identity, it is also the continuous reassertion of this originary incep-
tion in its possibilities27o. So, the 'discontinuous' in the work of art is still contained 
in some way in the originary 'arche' of the original inception. The 'Urstreit', of 
clearing and withdrawal is the origin of truth which only is only then set into the 
strife which is set as the happening of truth into the work, setting (thesis) itself into 
the work27 I . 
In various notes from around the same time he wrote his lecture UKW and which 
were published in GA66 Heidegger characterises art in his acerbic way as 'techne' in 
terms of technology and its fallenness272. Art has become a vessel of the 'experience' 
(Erlebnis) of subjectivity, reaffinning its control over the its truth273. However, in the 
same text he also affirms that even if the work of art is ignored and outside the public 
and private space (Spielraum), it is this 'unrelational' (Bezugslos) character which is 
the guarantor of its essential historicity and which will leave the 'clearing' of Being 
in its wake. The character of 'un-relationality' (Bezugslosigkeit) to other beings also 
guarantees its relation to the 'creators' (Schaffenden) who, beyond all biographical 
relations will "sacrifice their Dasein,,274. This 'un-relationality' (Bezugslosigkeit) of 
UKW,p.21 
268 UKW, p.61f. 
269 UKW, p.62 
270 having 'Geschichte', UKW, p.63 
271 Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth, p.98 
272 "Kunst als 'techne' in der Gestalt freilich der neuzeitlichen Technik u. Historie. Sie ist eine Ein-
richtung der unbedingten Zustellung der Machbarkeit des Seienden in der Gestalt ihrer EingepaBtheit 
in die Machenschaft d.h. in ihre Gefallenheit." GA66, Besinnung, p.30 
273 "Deutung der Kunst als 'Ausdruck' des Lebens als Subjektivitat..." UKW, p.34 
274 "Das W erk ist weder sinn-bildlicher Gegenstand noch Anlage der Einrichtung des Seienden, son-
dern Lichtung des Seyns als solchen, welche Lichtung die Entscheidung zu einem anderen Wesen des 
Menschen enthalt. Die Kunst hatjetzt 'Da-seins'charakter: sie rUckt aus allen Bemiihungen urn "Kul-
tur" heraus, gehort weder vollzugs noch aneignungsmassig dem Menschen, sie ist eine Entscheidung-
statte der seltenen Einzigen; das "Werk" ist die Sammlung [logos] der reinsten Einsamkeit auf den 
Ab-grund chaos] des Seyns; das Schaffen wird weder yom "Ruhm" noch von der Nichtbeachtung 
beriihrt; es bleibt dem Wesen nach der "Offentlichkeit sowohl wie dem "privaten" Spiel entzogen und 
gehort einzig in die Instandigkeit im Untergang, der allein wesensgerechte Geschichte werden kann, 
die eine Lichung des Seyns zuriickIaBt. Die vollige Bezugslosigkeit des Werkes zum Seienden und 
seinen Gewohnten Einrichtungen verbiirgt in sich eine Zusammengehorigkeit mit dem Schaffenden, 
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the work of art, its relation to the 'abyss' (Ab-grund - the Greek 'chaos') its standing 
outside social recognition make it more operational in 'ontological' terms than the 
well integrated art which has 'fitted' (EingepaBt) itself into the machinations of tech-
nology'. The 'un-relational' of the work of art to audience (culture) and the artist 
keeps its space (Spielraum) which becomes the site of the 'decision' which is the 
'clearing' in which the 'un-related' truth comes about' on dove's feet'. This is the 
'gift' (Schenkung) out of the 'excess' (UberfluB)275. 
The work of art is not 'of' this world, it sets up a world and a new or different truth. 
It is a new paradigm, which as a 'thrust' (StoB) opens a new 'open', the contour of 
what appears and what does not, out of the plenitude of all that is disclosed and un-
disclosed alike (Being is both)276. The 'thrust' of the work of art comes out of the 
plenitude of Being, a Being which encompasses the disclosed and the undisclosed. 
'Refusal' (Versagen) is a mode of 'concealment' (Verbergen) which is equally a 
character of beings. They are not just what appears in the 'open' of the 'clearing'; the 
things that are' set' (thesis) into the' open' are the sway of Being that persists, but as 
the truth at work beings appear and disappear in a movement. This movement of 
truth 'refuses' (Versagen) itselfto the mode of 'representation' (Vor-stellen). 
Heidegger sees the work of art as the inappropriable residue which refuses to become 
'equipment' (Zeug); and precisely by its irreducibility to 'equipment' (Zeug) it can 
not become mere resource. Even the 'art-trade' which rages all around it, appears 
like a great potlatch, some form of excessive asymmetrical exchange. The economy 
of excess cannot be understood in terms of resources, except as a meltdown of its 
calculability. The total reification of modem technology is, according to Heidegger, 
rooted in the drive for a secure grip on beings, first discovers subjectivity as agency. 
The calculability, usevalue - resource which Heidegger roots in the Greek 'techne' 
(and its unfolding as 'making' and 'machination') and 'energeia' as 'actualitas etc., 
cannot appropriate art other than as 'equipment' with meaning, but not, in the last re-
sort, as 'refusal' (Versagen). What is crucial for Heidegger is, that the 'work', which 
'is', is a being and not transcendental, not only resists appropriation by modem tech-
die diesen nicht biographisch an das Werk kniipft, sondern sein Dasein als "Opfer" in den Abgrund 
wirfL." UKW, p.37 
275 UKW, p.61 
276 Gadamer, in UKW, Reclam edition, Stuttgart, p.120 
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nological and scientific understanding, but brings about, by a 'thrust' (StoB), what is 
'incalculable' and 'unsecurable' and by definition outside the 'subject-object' rela-
tionship. Any' self which deals within this realm of incertitude, cannot expect the 
self-certitude of subjectivity. Production of the work of art then, may not be a handi-
craft. Production CWirken' as Heidegger calls it) is the autonomous agency of pro-
duction - the movement of truth, Being, to which the artist 'listens' attentively not as 
a 'separate' subject, but as 'production' itself in the form of a 'Dasein', ever again 
affinning its own Being by its very own 'existence'. Dasein's existence is the 'life' it 
leads in all aspects (including deception -like the deception of the 'certainty' ofac-
cess to a resource), life is production who's agency is its existence as thrownness 
(Geworfenheit) (unhintergehbar), which, as 'care' (Sorge), is its Being. 
In his epilogue to UKW Heidegger recalls Hegel's statement that art is not the high-
est way, in which truth obtains its existence277. Heidegger leaves this question point-
edly unanswered. The reason is, that truth, has been translated into 'reality', (actuali-
tas) and thus has lost the Greek character of 'energeia', as 'presencing' (Anwesen-
heit). In 'actualitas', truth does not happen, it is 'challenged' into the control and cer-
tainty of resource, while the 'un-relational' (Bezugslosigkeit) comes from the uncon-
trolable excess. My interest lies in the relation ofDasein - and the artist in particular 
- to this excess, which is beyond control, and only 'given' as a 'gift' (Schenkung). 
b. Poiesis and Mastery 
What does Heidegger mean when he speaks about 'poiesis'? In UKW Heidegger 
does not strictly use the term 'poiesis'. It occurs in the late 'addendum' (Zusatz) 
from 1956278. Although he speaks about 'techne' and exercising techne is 'poietic', 
in his terms' disclosive', he refers to the word 'thesis' as the word for' setting up': 
truth. In fact 'poiesis' is a form of 'creating' (Schaffen), which belongs to 'techne' as 
does 'thesis'. Heidegger brackets 'logos', 'thesis' and 'poiesis' into the same cate-
gory of the Greek experience of presencing by making a few remarks about their role 
in the development of 'Ge-stell' as the essence (Wesen) of modem 'technology,279. 
'Poiesis' and 'thesis' are a 'bringing-forth' and a 'setting-up', which only in the mod-
277 "Uns gilt die Kunst nicht mehr als die hochste Weise, in welcher die Wahrheit sich Existenz ver-
schafft." Hegel, Asthetik WW, X,1,p.134 
278 UKW, p.69 
279 UKW, p.69 
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em transposition become a 'challenging-forth' (Herausfordem) within the securing 
(Sicherstellung) of the reign of technological reason280. When Heidegger speaks 
about poetry (Dichtung) as the essence (Wesen) of art, he refers to 'poiesis' in its 
'Greek' sense rather than a modem one. However, he makes perfectly clear, that 
even the modem 'challenging-forth' is at its core is still dependent on the originary 
disclosedness (Unverborgenheit). The disclosure of the 'Ge-stell', has obliterated this 
'Greek' mode of disclosing. Instead disclosure persists in the unconditional securing 
of the challenging-forth, in which beings can only appear in the form (or 'Gestalt') of 
'resource' . 
I will present Heidegger's 'diagnosis' of modem 'machination', its difference to ar-
tistic production, and Heidegger's solution in thinking 'Gelassenheit' (releasement) 
as antidote to the power of technological thinking and scientific oblivion of its condi-
tionality (of antecedent disclosure/81 . 'Gelassenheit' here means a 'non-
representational thinking, which is the opposite of the re -presentation (Vorstellen-
des Denken) of an 'object' (Gegen-stand). It is always necessary to keep in mind, 
that what 'disclosing' (Erschliessen, Entbergen) refers to is the Aristotelian concep-
tion of the operation of 'physis', in which the individual being is disclosed by the an-
ticipatory understanding of Being282. 
In the essay 'The Question of Technology,283 Heidegger understands 'poiesis' as the 
originary Greek understanding of 'Being' as 'bringing-forth' (Her-vor-bringen) into 
presence (Anwesen) as 'unveiling' (Entbergen) from 'concealment' (Verborgen-
heit)284. 'Poiesis' is 'bringing-forth' (Her-vor-bringen), and 'challenging-forth' 
(herausfordem) is one way of 'bringing-forth'. 'Ge-stell is the essence (Wesen) of 
the technological mode of the 'presencing' of beings. Dasein is thrown into this fate 
280 "Das Ge-stell als Wesen der modernen Technik kommt vom griechisch erfahrenen Vorliegenlas-
sen, 'logos', her, von der griechischen 'poiesis' und 'thesis'. 1m Stellen des Ge-stells, d. h. jetzt: im 
Herausfordern in die Sicherstellung von aHem, spricht der Anspruch der ratio reddenda, d. h. des 
'logon didonai', so freilich, daB jetzt dieser Anspruch im Ge-steH die Herrschaft des Unbedingten 
libernimmt und das Vor-stellen aus dem griechischen Vernehmen zum Sicher- und Fest-stellen sich 
versammelt." UKW, p.69 f. 
281 "das Vorgangige", VA, p.66 
282 Wegmarken, Vom Wesen und Begriff der ,Physis' Aristoteles' Physik B, I, p.314; " ... 'Epaogoge' 
bedeutet die Hinflihrung auf Jenes, was in den Blick kommt, indem wir zuvor liber das einzelne 
Seiende weg blicken, und wohin? Auf das Sein. Nur wenn wir z.B. das Baumhafte schon im Blick ha-
ben, vermogen wir einzelne Baume festzustellen. Das Sehen und Sichtbarmachen dessen, was derg-
estalt wie das Baumhafte schon im Blick steht, ist 'epagoge'." 
283 Die Frage nach der Technik, VA, p.I3-44 
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('Geschick'i85 not out of individual choice. That beings are disclosed 'as' this or 
that by Dasein does not change the fact that they are disclosed in advance in their Be-
ing as 'resource' and in addition as 'tree-ness' or 'crude-oil-ness'. When we ask 
about 'technology', in question stands the 'condition of the possibility' of this antici-
patory disclosedness as 'resource'. It is clear that Heidegger considers the 'challeng-
ing-forth' as a symptom of decline. Although, it is also a consequence of the Greek 
inception of Being. 'Being' (Sein) we should remember 'is' not a being, it 'is' 
strictly speaking not, but brings everything else into presence (Anwesen). 'Poiesis' is 
therefore never 'production' in a material sense, but the production of 'intelligible-
ness' itself. This 'intelligible-ness' precedes and is the condition of the possibility of 
'truth' and 'untruth' as correlation. What is produced by the Greek 'poiesis' is truth: 
Being (of beings), not beings themselves. Heidegger asks about the truth of Being it-
self, not the Being of beings. How does Being come about or 'is given'? 
Heidegger develops the instrumentality of technology as the fundamental and ep-
ochal decision in relation to 'presence' (Anwesen). What presences itself has to fit 
into the framework of a 'cause and effect'. The Latin 'causa' is the Greek 'aitia' 
which Heidegger translates as 'Schuld' (guilt). Heidegger argues that the Aristotelian 
understanding of the four 'aitia' is not an instrumental concern, instead it aims to de-
scribe how the mode of a persistent presence (Anwesen) can be accounted for. The 
"play" of the 'aitia' which brings-forth (Her-vor-bringen) into presence (Anwesen) is 
not 'effect'286. 'Bringing-forth' into presence is 'poiesis' as much in terms of 'physis' 
as 'techne,287. However, technology operates in a different mode. It's relation is 
more than merely 'instrumental' and the way it 'challenges' nature forces nature into 
a structure of questioning in terms of the 'causes' and excludes all else. It is impor-
tant that 'we' are always already 'thrown' into this 'mode' of 'disclosure' (Entber-
gen) as 'fate' (Geschick)288. 
'Techne', as Heidegger has described it in UKW, is not 'making' but a form of 
284 VA, p.37 f. 
285 "Als der so Herausgeforderte steht der Mensch im Wesensbereich des Ge-stells. Er kann gar nicht 
erst nachtraglich eine Beziehung zu ihm aufnehmen." VA, p.31 
286 VA, p.1 7 f. 
287 VA, p.19 
288 "Allein die Unverborgenheit selbst in der sich das Bestellen entfaltet, ist niemals ein menschliches 
Gemachste sowenig wie der Bereich, den der Mensch jederzeit schon durchgeht, wenn er als Subjekt 
sich auf ein Objekt bezieht." VA, p.26; also "Er kann gar nicht erst nachtraglich eine Beziehung zu 
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knowledge about the 'bringing-forth' into presence. Unlike the 'bringing-forth' of 
'physis' (nature), the 'technites' is the cause (aitia) of such 'bringing-forth' of 
'equipment', by virtue of his knowledge. But for Heidegger the 'technites' is not an 
'agency' which makes something, instead the technites discloses, out of the undis-
closed (Verborgenheit) which is there already as 'nothing', he brings-forth into visi-
bility (a-Ietheia), he unveils. Therefore 'techne' is a mode of the disclosure of 
truth289. The disclosure of truth, the disclosedness itself, is not a property of 
Dasein29o. 'Techne' is for Heidegger disclosure and not 'making,291. 
Technology discloses itself as 'efficacy' and with that as 'mastery,292. The 'efficacy' 
is a necessary element of a techne as 'making'. To 'make' things we already suppose 
a 'matter' and a 'fonn' which transfonns the matter. This is why Heidegger rejected 
this schema in his lecture UKW. Techne as the bringing about by way of 'making' 
needs an agency. This agency, apart from securing its own integrity and independ-
ence has also to secure the 'material' it needs for its 'making'. The identification of 
matter as the underlying substance and fonn as its classification and taxonomy, is the 
process by which technology turns beings into resource. The (underlying) drive of 
this movement is security and this means the assertion of an agency in relation to ob-
jects. The modem self-assertion is 'subjectivity' as 'hypokeimenon' ("das Zugrunde-
liegende"), which grounds all beings in their secured availability in 'representation'. 
The drive for certitude of access to the world drives both, the securing of the 
'agency' as consciousness and subjectivity and the understanding of beings in tenns 
of resource. Under the auspices of the 'aitia' as efficacy, beings are challenged to re-
veal themselves along the question of availability and duration which gives the un-
conditional mastery over beings to technology. 
Heidegger describes, in the lecture on Aristotle's' 'Physis', how 'hypokeimenon' be-
comes what 'lies before us' (Vorliegen), which is 'ousia' (bestandige Anwesung) as 
ibm aufnehmen." VA, p.31 
289 "Was dieses Bringen ist, sagt uns Platon in einem Satz des «SymposioD» (205 b) ... «Jede Veranlas-
sung fUr das, was immer aus dem Nicht-Anwesenden iiber- und vorgeht in das Anwesen, ist ,poiesis';, 
ist Hervorbringen.» ... Das Her-vor-bringen bringt aus der Verborgenheit her in die Unverborgenheit 
VOL Her-vorbringen ereignet sich nur, insofem Verborgenes ins Unverborgene kommt. Dieses Kom-
men beruht und schwingt in dem, was wir das Entbergen nennen. Die Griechen haben dafUr das Wort 
,aletheia' ." VA, p.19 
290 VA, p.26 
291 VA, p.2l 
292 which is not 'virtuosity', as Nietzsche thought 
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the eternal and unchangeable, but also 'arythmos', 'formless' (Verfassungslose)293. 
In this step, the original Aristotelian concept of 'kinesis', Being as a 'movement' 
turns into motionless ideality, and changing appearance into 'pseudos'. From here 
the way is open into the separation of 'hyle' and 'morphe' etc. What Aristotle had in 
mind according to Heidegger, was that 'physis' (Being) is the 'arche' (ausgangliche 
Verftigung) of the 'kinesis' (Bewegtheit) inherent within whatever stands by itself in 
presence (Anwesen)294. Aristotle already complains about the misconception of the 
temporal status of the 'proton arythmiston' (Vefassungslose Anwesende). Taken out-
side time this 'hypokeimenon' will become the formless 'hyle,295. And we know 
Heidegger's critique of this schema in relation to the understanding of the work of 
art. This schema cannot express the status of the work adequately because its goal is 
a universal concept of thing ness who's ultimate aim is mastery and certitude. 
'Poiesis' is the founding happening of truth ("event of truth") as the ontological way 
of bringing into 'presence'. In technological 'poiesis' the 'presence' (Anwesen) of 
beings is manifests as 'resource' (Bestand). Although this is only one mode, it denies 
and excludes all other modes and presents the essence (Wesen) of technology as the 
'event of truth ("Ereignis der Wahrheit,,)296. The essence of technology is "nothing 
technical,,297, it is the 'Ge-stell' as the mode of 'disclosure' (Entbergung). However, 
this 'challenging-forth' hides Being itself as the happening of disclosure as such298. 
Technology and art are different "constellation[s] of disclosure and concealment in 
which truth happens,,299. The 'danger' of technology is that it disguises the possibil-
ity of another mode of disclosure, a different' constellation', out of the drive for se-
curity of resources (no 'transsubstantiation' here, thanks to Luther) and certitude of 
the self30o. 
293 Vom Wesen und Begriff der ,Physis' Aristoteles' Physik B, 1, in Wegmarken, p.337 f. 
294 "Die 'physis' ist ausgangliche Verfiigung tiber die Bewegtheit ('kinesis') eines Bewegten ('ki-
noumenon'), und zwar ist sie das 'kath auto kai me kata symbebekos'. Das von der 'physis' her Seiende 
is! an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her und auf es selbst zu solch verfiigender Ausgang der Bewegtheit 
des Bewegten, das es von sich aus und nie beiher ist. Dem von der 'physis' her Seienden muB daher in 
einem betonten Sinne der Charakter des von sich her Standigen zugesprochen werden. Das von der 
'physis'; her Seiende ist 'ousia' Seiendheit, im Sinne der »Liegenschaften«, des von sich her Vorlieg-
enden." Wegmarken, p.341 
295 ibid. _ Aristotle, Physics, III. 200b 12-15 
296 VA, pA3 
297"SO ist denn auch das Wesen der Technik ganz und gar nichts Technisches." VA, p.13 
298 "So verbirgt denn das herausfordernde Gestell ... Wahrheit ereignet." VA, p.35 
299 VA, pAl 
300 For the Stoics, it should be said, the certainty of the self is the 'physis' itself: self-identity is the 
identity with the logos and that is not the modern common and garden identity 
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Heidegger's principal argument is that, because art (Dichtung) is also 'techne' and 
thus a 'poiesis', but its mode of disclosure is a 'bringing-forth' (her-vor-bringen) in-
stead of a 'challenging-forth', it has the capacity of 'saving-power' ("das Rettende") 
according to Holderlin's verses "Wo aber Gefahr ist, wachst / Das Rettende 
auch.,,301. The 'danger' of the essence (Wesen) of technology is, that it 'disguises' 
(Verstellen) the site of disclosure where truth 'happens' (sich ereignet)302. The in-
comprehensibility of art's mode of 'bringing-forth' increases with the growth of the 
'Ge-stell' as 'challenging-forth' but because of its subterranean connection through 
'techne', art does have leverage onto the 'essence' (Wesen) oftechnology,303. 
What then is 'poiesis'? 'Poiesis' is not a 'making', on the contrary, it is the binding 
(validating) mode in which 'truth' happens out of plenitude (UberfluB), although it 
also means the possibility of withdrawal (Verstellen, Versagen). However, in still ex-
isting practices art survives in a different mode of truth-event, although increasingly 
incomprehensible, which understands the poietic happening of truth and withstands -
as pure habit and tradition - the movement within the essential event of truth which is 
never, even when the 'Ge-stell' achieves total planetary control, under the control of 
men
304
. Technology is 'fate' (Geschick), not because it is inherently evil or because 
of its essence as 'securing', but because it cannot and does not 'secure' 'disclosed-
ness' (Entbergung; aletheia) but 'hides' (Verstellen) ieo5. The existential anxiety 
(Angst) has turned into onticaI 'fear' (Furcht) desparately 'securing' its access to be-
ings, which happens only at the expense of the appropriate access in form of 'disclo-
sure'. For the Stoics, this is clearly 'pathological'. The work of art, on the other hand, 
is not securable, it has its own activity which is not controlable, neither by the artist 
nor by any other economy. 
301 "But where danger is, grows / so does the saving( -power) too", V A, pA3 
302 VA, p.35 
303 "Das Wesende der Technik bedroht das Entbergen, droht mit der Moglichkeit, daB alles Entbergen 
im Bestellen aufgeht und alles sich nur in der Unverborgenheit des Bestandes darstellt. Menschliches 
Tun kann nie unmittelbar dieser Gefahr begegnen. Menschliche Leistung kann nie allein die Gefahr 
bannen. Doch menschliche Besinnung kann bedenken, daB alles Rettende hoheren, aber zugleich ver-
wandten Wesens sein muB wie das Gefahrdete." VA, pA2; "Weil das Wesen der Technik nichts 
Technisches ist, darum muB die wesentliche Besinnung auf die Technik und die entscheidende 
Auseinandersetzung mit ihr in einem Bereich geschehen, der einerseits mit dem Wesen der Technik 
verwandt und andererseits von ihm doch grundverschieden ist." VA, pA3 
304 "Allein die Unverborgenheit selbst in der sich das Bestellen entfaltet, ist niemals ein menschliches 
Gemachste sowenig wie der Bereich, den der Mensch jederzeit schon durchgeht, wenn er als Subjekt 
sich auf ein Objekt bezieht." VA, p.26 
305 "Soverbirgt denn das herausfordernde Ge-stell nicht nur eine vormalige Weise des Entbergens, das 
Her-vor-bringen, sondern es verbirgt das Entbergen als solches und mit ihm Jenes, worin sich Unver-
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c. Poiesis and Science 
"Securing" is the aspect of technology which is fed by the modem scientific method. 
Calculability is just the outward appearance of this, as the immediately following es-
say in the 'VA' explains, which follows the transformation of 'theoria' into the more 
assertive 'sciencia'. Calculability secures the 'Bestand', the disposable 'resource' 
which is open to indifferent manipulation. One could also add that the indifference to 
the 'external world', as envisioned by Socrates and Plato, actually leads to the idea of 
'Bestand' which is 'indifferent' (adiaphora) to the sage. Anyway, calculability is just 
the expression of mastery because technology hides and disguises the fact of truth 
(aletheia) as the movement of 'disclosure and concealment' (Entbergung und Ver-
bergung), and its 'constellation'. Modem science feeds into this by way of certainty, 
without realising that presence (Anwesen) had to have been established already for 
sciences to determine their 'domains' of knowledge. 
'Poiesis' is thus more originary than the technological challenging-forth although the 
latter is also 'poiesis'. This aspect is important for that reason: although Heidegger 
appears to claim that technology is a mode of Being independent from the actions of 
humans, and thus should be indifferent according to the 'historic' Being of a people, 
he does make a judgement according to the transparency of beings towards' Being' . 
And he also repeats that 'mindfulness' (Besinnung) is an option for keeping this 
transparency of beings to Being open. We can glean from this that at least this com-
portment ofDasein, in its 'auto-poietic' authentic self-transcendent self-assertion, is 
able to hold out against the total sway of 'Ge-stell ,306. 
Aristotle's 'poiesis' as 'bringing-forth' is, according to Heidegger, a 'setting up' into 
'presence' (Anwesen). It is truth, 'aletheia' as a movement. What is set up endures 
and persists in the movement of 'presence' (Anwesen). 'Energeia' as 'thesis' sets up 
into 'presence' (Anwesen; as movement). It is not to be understood in terms of the 
Latin 'causa,307. 'Thesis' is setting into a shape the way of the appearance into 'pres-
ence'. This movement constitutes (Anwesen) as kinesis. One can say that the thetic 
'work' reveals this movement, unlike the 'Zeug' which dissembles its 'truth' in 'Di-
borgenheit, d.h. Wahrheit ereignet. " VA, p.3 5 
306 Blumenberg. 'Nachahmung der Natur', in 'Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben,' p.59, 87ff. 
307 VA, p.50 
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enlichkeit' and VerlaBlichkeit. The 'work' reveals the 'that' of(Geschaffenheit)308. 
'Kinesis' (and 'dynamis'), movement, is the key aspect which Aristotle adds to the 
bringing-forth as 'presence' (Anwesen), by which the process becomes a temporal 
(zeitigen) presencing. In Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's 'energeia', it is 
then, as we have seen in the work of art, 'truth setting itself into work' not in a static 
way but in 'kinesis', but being 'perfect' at each point of its unfolding within its fu-
ture 'possibilities' (dynamis)309. The 'kinesis' has the character of 'possibility' (dy-
namis) which is the 'not-yet' and keeps Dasein to 'be' a Dasein, which still has not 
exhausted its possibilities 'to be'. Dasein's existence is the concrete life 'in the midst 
of things' . In it, it experiences beings and through the experience of beings' Being'. 
Being is the 'that' of beings, which becomes 'thematic' to Dasein only, once it has 
turned away from the immediacy of beings. 
The work of art is 'poietic' in terms of its persistence within an audience (Be-
wahrenden) to which it gives its shape of Being. The individual who comes up with a 
new shape, which then prevails, is part of the discourse of 'die Sage' within a 'being-
with'(Mit-sein) with others. At the same time the individual breaks away from the 
preconceived understanding of the 'They' (Man). Dasein' s 'resolve' (Entschlossen-
heit) enables a 'polemos' as commencement of 'poiesis'. The individual as con-
sciousness is not the origin of this poiesis. The 'subject' is only a recent construct 
and the agency, for want of a better word, is, what 'gives' Being to the 'They' 
(Man)310. 
What then is 'poiesis' if it is not consciousness or subjectivity? For Heidegger the 
Aristotelian figure of presence as 'energeia' is evidently the key to his concept of 
'truth' setting itself into work as 'at work'. 'Energeia', as Heidegger interprets it in 
'The Question concerning Technology' and 'Aristotle's concept of 'physis", is the 
'movement' (kinesis) from the 'arche', the inception, which contains its end (telos) 
already. 'Physis' is therefore the 'movement' of 'energeia' into 'presencing' (Anwe-
sung) 3 I I. 'Physis' is 'poiesis' and so it is the 'arche' (and 'aitia,312) ofkinesis313. 
308 'thesis' is "Her- ins Unverborgene ... bringen" UKW, Zusatz, p.68 
309 "It [dynamis] does not mean "mere possibility" but rather "imperfect presence" or "movement into 
presence"." Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind, p.307 
310 " ••• wo der Mensch zum Subjekt geworden ist ... ", Wegmarken, p.316 
311 "Wir Heutigen miissen ein Doppeltes leisten: ... sehen lemen, wie fUr die Griechen die Bewegung 
als eine Weise des Seins den Charakter des Herkommens in die Anwesung hat" W egmarken, p.319 
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The transfonnation of 'poiesis' and 'techne' into production (in tenns of the 'Ge-
stell') lies in a misconception of Aristotle's 'aitia' as 'effects,314 instead of the Greek 
understanding of 'techne' as a knowledge of disclosing315. 'Poiesis' is to 'bring 
forth' out of non-presence3 16 into presence in general. It applies to 'physis' as much 
as to the 'technites,317. 'Techne' is a mode of 'truth' of disclosure and not 'making' 
as mastery318. The assertive 'efficacy' of technology discloses beings as 'resource' 
including humans themselves. Heidegger's 'Ge-stell' is derived from "Be-stellen" 
(ordering), and the "Herausfordernde Stellen,,319 (challenging stetting up, deriving 
from 'thesis'). Heidegger says clearly that this is not 'poiesis ,320 but it is also a fonn 
of disclosure nevertheless and as such 'essentially related' ("im Wesen verwand,,)321 
to the disclosing work of art. The 'danger' of 'Ge-stell' is, that it conceals (Verber-
gen) the 'poietic' disclosure, and more radically, it dissimulates the 'event' of'dis-
closure' as that within which 'truth' happens322 into mastery. The 'disclosure' (Un-
verborgenheit) itself however, the 'clearing' is never a human machination ("niemals 
ein menschliches Gemachte,,)323 and cannot be 'secured' as a resource. Therefore the 
'Ge-stell' governs as 'Geschick' - what has been sent (schicken) as fate in a virtually 
blind way. What governs is what dispenses the mode of disclosure (Entbergen), be it 
'poiesis' be it 'Ge_stell,324. The highest 'danger' is the total oblivion of the event of 
disclosure (truth) and its dissimulation into the 'challenging-forth' persisting indefi-
nitely. Therefore the 'origin' of the work of art, as origin of the event of disclosure 
persists as the remainder of a different 'disclosure'. Heidegger's 'Besinnung' on 
technology uncovered that the 'essence '(Wesen) of technology is rooted in 'disclo-
312 Wegmarken, p.317 
313 " ... wo Aristotle die 'Physis' als 'arche kineseos' bestimmt..." Wegmarken, p.318 
314 VA, p.17 
315 "Sie lassen in das An-wesen vorkommen." VA, p.18 
316 "des nicht-Anwesenden", VA, p.l9 
317 VA, p.19 
318 VA, p.2l 
319 VA, p.25 
320 "Das Entbergen, das die moderne Technik durchherrscht, entfaltet sich nun aber nicht in ein Her-
vor-bringen im Sinne der ,poiesis'. Das in der modernen Technik waltende Entbergen ist ein Heraus-
fordern, das an die Natur das Ansinnen stellt, Energie zu liefern, die als solche herausgefordert und 
gespeichert werden kann. Gilt dies aber nicht auch von der alten Windmilhle? Nein. Ihre Flilgel dre-
hen sich zwar im Winde, seinem Wehen bleiben sie unmitte1bar anheimgegeben. Die Windmilhle 
erschlieJ3t aber nicht Energien der Luftstromung, urn sie zu speich ern." VA, p.22 
321 VA, p.28 
322 VA, p.35 
323 VA, p.26 
324 VA, p.37 f. 
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sure' and that the arts share this 'region' (Bereich), while still 'totally different' 
(grundverschieden) from the 'essence' (Wesen) oftechnologl25. 
To return to the UKW, we see why the 'origin' of the work of art is so important as 
the opposition to the 'essence' of technology. 'Poiesis' as 'Dichtung' discloses 'dis-
closing of truth' as 'disclosing' (Entbergen) of beings into truth. The work, as intro-
duced in UKW, is "truth setting itself into work" and this is 'disclosure' (Entbergen) 
not just of the being which is the work itself, but the way it is brought-forth as dis-
closure itself. This' disclosure' of a 'disclosure' is the setting-up of a 'world', which, 
as we have seen in 'Being and Time' is that which is seen before beings can appear. 
It comes about as 'Geschick' not as the 'action' of man, but it comes through man as 
'givenness' (Being). Again, we see the figure in which human actions become the 
'energeia', the 'being at work of truth', but they are not 'intended' actions ofsubjec-
tivity or consciousness, but a 'self in authenticity (of Entschlossenheit) which 'is 
guilt' (Schuldigsein) and which Heidegger translates as 'aitia' and 'arche'. Just as in 
the fonn of the Greek 'logos' and 'physis', the appropriate way of life was the iden-
tity with the 'logos', i.e. living in 'accordance' with 'physis' the Heideggerian 
Dasein becomes identical to itself by becoming what it already is in the 'resolve' 
(vorlaufender Entschlossenheit) and 'authenticity'. 
d. Art and the Artist 
I have to come to my central interest: the artist. Heidegger does not see the artist as 
the master of art, precisely because 'art' in his tenns is not something that can be 
mastered. He derives, in a somewhat obscure way, the work and the artist out of the 
event of art itself326. Art dwells in the works and the artists and it addresses us from 
there. The artist is acted upon by 'art' (as a mode of truth setting itself into work). 
But what is 'art'? The lecture UKW goes from the discussion of the possible con-
cepts of things, and dismissing them as insufficient for the work of art. Art cannot be 
captured in tenns of 'made' objects because all such concepts are modes of mastery 
of the external world. Heidegger's definition of a work is its unintelligibility which 
'gives' intelligibility. If the works and the artists depend on each other in the inter-
325 VA, p.42 
326 "Kiinstler und Werk sindje in sich und in ihrem Wechselbezug durch ein Drittes, welches das erste 
ist, durch jenes namlich, von woher Kiinstler und Kunstwerk ihren Namen haben, durch die Kunst." 
UKW, p.l 
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play of art, then art itself is the 'creating' (Schaffen) happening of truth. Artists and 
works are mere moments of this truth. This nevertheless means, to take actively part 
in the excess of the' Un-geheure', the 'un-mediated' etc; to draw from this excess of 
the possibilities of inception. By virtue of this excess, the 'work' as opposed to the 
'Zeug' is not hidden by its instrumentality (Dienlichkeit) and reliability (Ver-
laBlichkeit) but exposes the 'drawing' ("like water from a well,,327) from the excess 
of possibilities in the inception of Being. 
The happening (sich ins Werk setzen) of truth, however is still bound up with a 'ma-
terial' making. Such making is part of the poietic making of 'truth'. As much as Hei-
degger attempts to see the material and truth aspect as a counterplay of the opposites 
of 'world' and 'earth' in his appropriation of Aristotelian terminology, what has to be 
central is the understanding that these opposites are "unified" and in essence the 
temporal fonns of something complete at all stages. Truth ultimately is 'kinesis' (as 
'dynamis'), which 'gives' the movement as 'possibility-to-be'. Dasein perfonns this 
movement in its inexhaustible existence which 'is' its 'not-yet'. I have discussed this 
point in the section on 'Being and Time'. 
In UKW Heidegger deals with the essence of the work of art. The essence of the 
work of art is art as 'Stiftung', which means as 'giving', 'grounding' and 'inception'. 
The artist is part of this (early form of a fourfold) of art, artwork, artist and the 
'guardians' (Bewahrer) which form the force-field in which the 'world' is set into the 
'earth'. This form of the 'energeia' as dwelling and persisting in presence (Anwesen) 
by virtue of Dasein and its world. The activity of artists is never a subject-object rela-
tion of knowledge. The term 'knowledge' which Heidegger uses in the UKW is 
'techne' as the knowledge of appearance into 'Anwesen', a 'bringing-forth' of some-
thing into persistent presence as. The difference seems to me that Aristotles' move-
ment relates to the completion of the 'telos' in its 'eidos', say: ofa tree. What Hei-
degger has in mind seems that bringing forth means to keep and linger temporarily 
within the 'clearing' (Lichtung), which itself is the result of the strife between Being 
and Dasein. The 'telos' on the other hand is the historical exhaustion of the possibili-
ties within such a movement. What Heidegger implicitly assumes is that what does 
not 'appear' is still there in the withdrawal, absence as 'possibility'. Being is at all 
327 UKW, p.62 
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times 'complete' but inaccessible. This is another meaning of 'earth'. It is not only 
withdrawal but also harbouring and grounding the clearing of truth. This originary 
'safe-keeping' (Bergen) is also the originary 'withdrawal' to which all clearing must 
be derivative. This means, 'earth' is also the primary form of 'physis' , Being as 
'aletheia; coming into appearance, 'unveiling,328. 'Physis' as earth therefore also 
needs the open, without the open there would not be aletheia, there would be only 
withdrawal. 
To make art is different from making shoes. Shoes disappear in their 'usefulness' 
(Dienlichkeit) and reliability (VerlaBlichkeit). This way, what is forgotten and out of 
sight is the happening of bringing-forth into presence. This is the 'knowledge' (well, 
not really something that can be 'knowledge' but we do not have a word for this) 
which is specific for the making of art. The work of art is not only brought into pres-
ence (Anwesen), it brings itself into presence as truth bringing itself into work as the 
'open' (das Offene). In the work of art, its particular specificity, is its being brought 
about un-mediated - out of 'nothing,329. This un-mediated is visible as the 'Geschaf-
fensein", which is also an aspect of Romantic art, which points from the finite work 
to the Absolute. This is why the artist cannot 'will' such a form - if all willing returns 
to a subject-object relation, what is to be willed has to be 'known' and therefore can-
not be in any way absolute. Such "non-willing willing" then returns with the 'Gelas-
senheit' . 
Turning the 'unmediated' (Unvermittelte) and un-measured ("Un-maW') into meas-
ure and rule means to draw from the excess of the well and bring it forth into the 
temporal frame of Dasein. Just as the Greeks performed the first inception, the fol-
lowing 'art' keeps this inception going - unterwegs - to its end. As 'energeia' which 
contains its principle (arche) as that which determines the telos (end and 'work') as 
completion. Truth as 'energeia' is therefore always complete at all times of its devel-
opment and this is 'presence' (Anwesen). This figure of completeness at any stage of 
the movement also operates in the 'authentic' Dasein as 'Entschlossenheit'. Dasein is 
'perfect' in its temporality and finality, because only in this finality does it have truth 
328 Haar, Song of the Earth, p.57 
329 "Dann entsteht die Wahrheit aus dem Nichts? In der Tat, wenn mit dem Nichts das bloBe Nicht des 
Seienden gemeint und wenn dabei das Seiende als jenes gewohnlich Vorhandene vorgestellt ist, was 
hernach durch das Dastehen des Werkes als das nur vermeintlich wahre Seiende an den Tag kommt 
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and form (otherwise it would be absolute and not 'be', because' existence' only hap-
pens in time). 
The work of art is different from 'equipment', setting (feststellen) into being(s) the 
strife (Streit) between world and earth but is itself based on an original strife 
(Urstreit330), in which truth (aletheia) opens up (erMfnet) a clearing as the original 
disclosing event. Only in this original truth, as the' open' can truth set itself into a 
work. The strife is 'set back into' (Zuruckstellen) and safe-guarded (geborgen) in the 
'materiality' (earth) of the work, not as a sign, but in its 'efficacy,33I as 'strife'. 
Disclosure as 'truth' is 'set back into' the 'beingness' of the work of art as 'earth'· 
For the 'earth' to be 'visible' as the work it has to be mediated by the work itself. In 
this circle, world is set back on the earth and sets the earth up in the work to be 'at 
work' as truth. The 'earth' is disclosed as concealing and sheltering withdrawaL If 
we consider' earth' as what is outside the order of intentions, then it makes sense that 
everything reposes onto the earth as the 'ground' (hypokeimenon etc) out of which 
the world emerges in terms of 'physis'. Both, 'earth' and 'world' are not distinct but 
united in their opposition. Earth is opened up by the world but not totally and it al-
ways remains opaque to all calculative approach332. 
It has become clear why it appears so difficult to speak about artistic agency in the 
archaic event, which precedes all comprehension. But this may be the point. The ex-
cess of possibilities is always tied to Dasein and its hermeneutic powers. Part of this 
power is the 'leap' into the 'hermeneutic circle'. This 'leap' into the hermeneutical 
circle is always unmediated and a risk333. It represents the leap into the abyss which 
founds truth and which retrieved by 'poets' as the originary or authentic comport-
ment of Dasein. 
"Wissen" means 'knowledge, means 'techne', means poiesis, means making, but not 
the identity of subject and object. The knowledge of what is to be made is what de-
termines the mode of 'poiesis'. In the case of the 'work', the 'Schaffen' as 
und erschuttert wird." UKW, p.58 
330 UKW, p.47 
331 VA, p.l5 
332 Haar, The Song of the Earth, p.57 and the decontexualisating function of the earth, p.59 
333 "Das Entscheidende ist nicht aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondern ... in ihn hineinzukommen." SZ, §32, 
p.l53 
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'Schopfen' is a drawing from the "UberfluB" (excess) of the "Un-geheure,,334 that, 
which is unfamiliar and not at our disposal. What then is the 'knowledge' of the artist 
in relation to the 'strife' of world and earth which sets "itself' into the work as a 'be-
ing'? On page 43 ofUKW Heidegger defines the origin of the work and the artist to 
be 'art' itself Since truth is 'at work' in the work, it cannot be understood in tenns of 
mere thingness. The work is 'created' (Geschaffen), as that, which itself brings-
forth335. Because the 'work' determines its "Schaffen" from the future, so to speak, 
of the work as 'truth setting itself into work', the artist is in no way a subject and his 
actions are not the actions of a subject. Truth itself is "subject and object of setting 
into work ... " and because art itself is this action of truth336 the artist himself creates 
'ontologically': he brings about into a being (work) that which is the un-precedented 
truth of the inception (Anfang)337. But the artist is governed by 'art' as truth and the 
work is only 'truth' if it has a audience which keeps this manifestation safe (die Be-
wahrenden). This 'audience' (die Bewahrenden) refers to 'Being and Time,338 and 
more concretely to Heidegger's concept of 'Entschlossenheit' of Dasein. This means 
Dasein's self-disclosure as the site of Being. As 'audience', Dasein is concerned with 
its 'disclosure of Being' "aus der Befangenheit im Seienden ... ,,339 The 'willing,340 of 
the 'audience' (the 'guardians' - die Bewahrenden)341, is equivalent to the "Schaffen" 
of the artist in relation to the work. Both times the work itself, as the 'at-work' of 
truth, 'grounds' Dasein in its collective 'Mit_sein,342. Not only the artist but also the 
audience is brought into the truth 'setting-itself-into-work'. "Schaffen" and "wollen" 
operate out of the disclosure of 'Being' which happens in the 'Ent-schlossenheit' of 
Dasein to its own 'Being' as 'care' and this means its 'Geworfenheit', 'Verfallenheit' 
etc. including 'Mit-sein,343. 
334UKW, p.6l 
335 "Das Werkwerden des Werkes ist eine Weise des Werdens und Geschehens der Wahrheit." UKW, 
p.46 
336 "Kunst ist das Ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit." UKW, p.63 
337 UKW, p.63 
338 UKW, p.53 
339 "Das Wissen, das ein Wollen, und das Wollen, das ein Wissen bleibt, ist das ekstatische Sichein-
lassen des existierenden Menschen in die Unverborgenheit des Seins. Die in »Sein und Zeit« gedachte 
Ent-schlossenheit ist nicht die decidierte Aktion eines Subjekts, sondem die Er5ffnung des Daseins 
aus der Befangenheit im Seienden zur Offenheit des Seins." UKW, p.53 
340 which is a 'knowing', UKW, p.53 
341 note the 'wahr' as in 'Wahrheit': truth 
342 "Die Bewahrung des Werkes vereinzelt die Menschen nicht aufihre Erlebnisse, sondem rtickt sie 
ein in die Zugehorigkeit zu der im Werk ge-schehenden Wahrheit und grtindet so das Ftir- und Mite-
inander-sein als das geschichtliche Ausstehen des Da-seins aus dem Be-zug zur Unverborgenheit." 
UKW,p.54 
343 UKW, p.53 f. 
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Artist and work depend on each other. In this unity they 'leap' out of 'art' as their 
origin. The artist, so to speak, is made by the work as much as he makes the work. 
He is the image of the work. If the work is the inception of the setting itself to work 
of truth, so the artist has to find his work equally governed by the event of truth. 
However, it is not 'in' the artist that truth will 'work'. What does he need to leave 
truth to set up itself? He has to be 'not'. His 'absence' and one may guess the ab-
sence, which is authentic Dasein, makes 'artistic' poiesis (Dichtung), possible. 
'Ontic' practices are foundational if they prevail and persist in 'Anwesen'. Like the 
'agon' as the ultimate 'judgement by ordeal', the polemos decides the mode of 
'bringing-forth' (Entbergung). Foundational is the 'work' which transcends the mere 
'thing' (Ding) and 'equipment' (Zeug) because it is beyond predictability, outside the 
rules of the current truth; the foundational work is a work which decides other rules, 
like the judgement which creates the by action. But why should it be possible to con-
sider individual discipline in terms of 'askesis' etc. as 'ontologically' foundational? 
As P. Tillich mentions, the most general ideas, like Plato's 'Good", or 'virtue', 'lo-
gos', 'physis', etc. are transcendental and by extension ontologically normative con-
cepts. Therefore Stoic psychology, the more hyperbolic it becomes in terms of'lo-
gos' and 'physis', defines the mode of disclosure in one particular way. If the 'way 
oflife' - the philosophical life - is 'poietic', just as its judgements are 'poietic', it is 
also 'foundational' in terms of 'presencing'. This 'life' is consciousness. Conscious-
ness of any sort is 'produced' but also produces the conditions of disclosure if we 
take the circle as a guiding 'Gestalt' of Being. If the Dasein of the artist is 'authentic' 
its mode of truth also changes. This means, the 'willing' as 'knowing' of the work of 
truth becomes open to the work of truth by virtue of the 'willing' of the artist being a 
work of truth too. This truth is the operation which discloses what is sheltered and 
withdrawn into the order of a world but not as an atemporal whole. So the 'creating' 
(Schaffen) of the artist is a letting come into presence of truth, the Being of beings 
itself as active living existence. The consciousness of the artist has to make the work 
of art possible, by opening to a hitherto undisclosed truth, which he cannot master or 
calculate. The Stoic 'living in accordance with physis' is 'arete', virtuous, but not 
virtuosity of mastery. Instead it too is a letting-be of 'physis': of Being. 
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Heidegger's concept ofthis turning away from beings to Being changes throughout. 
He picks up a word of Meister Eckhart to denote a form of thinking which has turned 
away from things. Meister Eckhart uses the term 'Gelassenheit' (detachment), not 
only in a moral sense but equally in an ontological sense to cleanse one's thoughe44. 
For Heidegger this turning does not mean total blanking out of things, instead he 
uses it in relation to 're-presentational' thought which is the phantasm oftechnologi-
cal 'mastery'. 'Gelassenheit' is related to 'essential thinking' instead of're-
presentational' thought which is the will (to power) of man to ground his world in his 
own subjectivity. Heidegger criticises Meister Eckhart's 'Gelassenheit' as merely 
moral extirpation of 'self-will' and 'self-love', but Caputo shows that Meister Eck-
hart does indeed include very similar elements as does Heidegger's interpretation of 
'Gelassenheit'. Furthermore, the distinction between the 'Gelassenheit' of 'morality' 
and 'thought' seems rather questionable, since the 'turning away' from concern with 
beings is a question of virtue at the same time, it is 'ascetic' in origin, as is 'ausdau-
ernde Besinnung' (persisting meditation)345. The very idea of 'Being' can only come 
into view when there is an 'arete' (virtue) which invalidates the value of beings. Art-
ists therefore exercise, in the lucky moment, 'Gelassenheit' as the proper 'work' on 
their 'life', their 'existence', they 'sacrifice' their 're-presentational thinking' i.e. 
'willing' and 'mastering'. I consider this 'ascetic' 'poiesis' of one's own existence, 
as part of the possibility ofthe artist to 'receive' from Being the work which he 
brings into form. 'Existence' has to become a 'work of art' first. 
e. Art and the "Unumgangliche" (the non-accessible indispensible) 
The distinctive mark of science is its application of 'method'. Method determines its 
objects. Every discipline has its area which is defined by its method. Although sci-
ence is 'theory' in terms of a 'grasping', it is not technology in the sense that it 'ma-
nipulates' objects. However, science does define reality in terms of its disciplines 
and thus in terms of its varying methods. 
Heidegger points out that science always relies on the presence of 'nature', of beings, 
which it then interrogates according to its discipline and method. What science does 
344 Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, p.180f. 
345 Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, p.l78; Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p.l5 
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not ask is what or how this presence comes about in the first place346. Heidegger in-
terprets this in a way that science not only does not have access to what lies at its 
ground, for this reason it is also inaccessible by the methodology of the sciences 
themselves347. 
Dasein as 'openness' is 'affectable' by beings. 'Temporality' is the condition of the 
possibility to be affectable as 'it gives' persistence in time348. This then is the 'clear-
ing' (Lichtung); Dasein, temporality, openness is this clearing. The 'world' consti-
tutes all understanding from its intuitive, pre-conceptual understanding of beings 
right to the scientific discourse, while the original condition of the possibility to un-
derstand anything is forgotten precisely because beings are always already (i.e. a pri-
ori) disclosed in some way. In the progress to different modes of understanding, 
technological and scientific, this primal access is misunderstood. One of the major 
misunderstandings lies in the translation of 'energeia' as 'actualitas' (actus, agens, 
agency) and as 'reality,349. Heidegger interprets 'energeia' in terms of a persistence 
in presencing (Anwesen) but not a presence in terms of 're-presentation,35o. Being is 
not the highest most general 'being' but the totally different, which discloses itself 
not 'as' a being in presence (Anwesendes) but only as a "Spur die in der Sprache, zu 
der das Sein kommt, gewahrt bleibt,,351. Being is based in a being, which is Dasein. 
Dasein is therefore this particular being which 'is' only in relation to Being and not 
coextensive or identical with 'human'. 
Being 'is' not, refuses itself as a being, Dasein is pure self-transcendence: in advance 
of itself, in a world with beings, i.e. 'care'. This is the structure of absence in which 
the world presences 'beings'. Presence is only through absence. The self of Dasein is 
not a 'being' it is always without a self as being: this means, if Dasein is authentic, it 
is aware of itself 'as' absence from itself. 'Presence' appears as something being for 
someone and so Dasein understands itself first as this someone. Things appear to 
someone by virtue of affectability, 'openness', i.e. in 'temporality'. The 'essence' of 
something appears in 'existence'. Heidegger says that one cannot make the beings 
346 "Wissenschaften ruhen ihrerseits im unscheinbaren Sachverhalt wie der FluB im Quell." VA, p.67 
347 VA, Wiss. u. Besinnung, p.52 f. 
348 BPPh, p.16 
349 "Wirklichkeit"; wirken = having an effect, causa 
350 SdA, p.366 
351 SdA, p.360 
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which appear and that being to which these beings appear identicaL The latter is 
Dasein, which is only in an 'existence' who's essence has the structure of temporal-
ity itself. Heidegger goes on to outline the possible structure of such a being in which 
Being enacts itself as a 'gift' (es gibt). In 'Der Spruch des Anaximander' Heidegger 
finds the most 'originary word for Being' ("Anwesenheit des Anwesenden"), in the 
tenn of'chreon' which he translates as 'Brauch' (tradition, usage) which 'gives' 
meaning, disclosing the 'disclosure' (Anwesen, Unverborgenheit) itself, as the 'com-
ing into disclosedness' (Unverborgenheit). 
Heidegger points out that Anaximander meant the same as Heraclitus' 'logos' and 
Pannenides' 'moira'; what 'gives' this 'presence' (AnwesenJUnverborgenheit) is not 
identical with what is present, i.e. beings (ontological difference) but it 'founds' the 
temporary disclosure of beings as 'world' and into 'persistence' or 'durability' 
(Weile).1t brings about truth and untruth separating them in the Gestalt of the 'RiG', 
peras, horizon etc., which exists only as Dasein in its temporal horizon on which 
Dasein projects its 'project'352 in its 'thrownness' and 'fallenness' (i.e. Sorge). How-
ever 'to chreon', logos and moira (and Aristotle's 'energeia') do not mean efficacy 
and actuality of the bringing about of something. In an almost contrary way Heideg-
ger constructs this event of 'giving' as what is the complete otherness, incalculabil-
ity, unconditional 'dishing out'. Is this 'Ereignis' an ultimate agency? No, because 
Dasein's existence is the necessary condition for any Er-eignis to take place and 'ap-
propriate' it. What Heidegger describes is not and cannot be understood in tenns of 
efficacy and therefore of 'agency' and any fonn of subjectivity. Subjectivity, how-
ever, is necessary353 but only in a secondary step. 
Beginnings and ends: Heidegger's diagnosis of technology is that it is the final state 
of the Greek beginning to think Being in tenns of'techne' and 'poiesis' which is 
then interpreted as agencl54. Nevertheless "disclosure needs the Da,,355. So, truth to 
come into work needs a being, Da-sein, which is not just a being but has 'a world', 
i.e. understanding of Being. This Dasein has to be aware of its Being, and this is in 
Heidegger's tenns, 'outside itself' by which it already is open to Being. The question 
352 Entwurf= understanding, BPPh, xxxv. 
353 BPPh, p.155; also p.xxx. 
354 Subject as producer BPPh, p.xxx. 
355 BPPh, p.xxvi. 
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of agency - and subjectivity - as grounding has become impossible to ask_ This 
means for the UKW, that the 'artist' is never a figure of agency but a happening 
within the self-happening of 'art' as 'truth setting itself into work'_ 
"Besinnung" is a concept Heidegger developed as an opposition to "Betrachtung"_ In 
the essay 'Wissenschaft und Besinnung' (VA) it is opposed to "Betrachtung" as the 
modern challenging (,trachten nach ') of what presences itself However both are 
translations of theoria and Heidegger uses them to mark the differences which led to 
the transfonnation of Greek theoria into modern science_ The difference is, that mod-
ern science takes what is present (Anwesend) for granted and then stipulates a 
method of challenging and questioning it The method defines then the discipline and 
the scope of reality_ But, whatever method is employed, science is always based on 
the unexamined' Anwesen' of its objects_ Science cannot question the conditions of 
how its object came into' Anwesen', it can only understand what is already and chal-
lenge it with its inquisitive method356_ 
'Besinnung' relates the Greek concept of 'theoria', the view of the coming into' An-
wesen' of beings_ Similar to the concept of 'letting-be' as 'Anwesen' it belongs to 
those words H, uses to denote a non-mastery_ At the same time, 'Besinnung' allows 
to follow the essence of art as an originary mode of disclosure_ Heidegger calls it 
'knowledge' (Wissen)357_ This 'knowledge' cannot master Being, it cannot force 
about the work of art or 'truth', as 'Betrachtung' thinks it does_ 
It is not by chance that the first text of the 'Holzwege' is UKW and the last is the 
Anaximander text When considered in relation to Heidegger's lecture on the work 
of art the text describes the lost tenninology of the concept of Being as the move-
ment into and out of the' open' _ Unconcealment is first' dike', which Heidegger 
translates as 'Fug' which he describes in its function as: "weilend die Fuge des 
Ubergangs aus Herkunft zu Hingang besteht,,358, the important word is 'Ubergang' 
(=going over), in and out of presence, while 'to chreon' as what has been handed out, 
356 "Was sich jedoch bei diesem Wandel von der geometrisierend-klassischen zur Kern- und Feldphysik nicht 
wandelt, ist dies, daB die Natur zum voraus sich dem nachstellenden Sicherstellen zu stell en hat, das die Wissen-
schaft als Theorie vollzieht." VA, p_61; "Vorrang der Methode", VA, p_59 
357 UKW, p_64 
358 SdA, p_352 f 
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contains both, what is not 'in' and what is 'in' (the clearing).'Tisis' (achten)359, 
which can be 'esteem' or 'value' - or 'tact' towards each other (of what comes into 
and out of presence, out of the 'apeiron' of 'to chreon ,)360 in the process of coming 
into presence (Anwesen). 'To chreon' denotes the relationship between Being and 
beings, the relation between beings is order (Fug) and esteem (Ruch). Why does the 
'Anwesen' in the' clearing' or 'open', need 'esteem' apart from order? 'Order' 
should be sufficient. 'Esteem' (Ruch) is the 'tact' towards beings in the sense of 
'non-mastery' it relates to Dasein's relation to what appears. What appears in the 
'between' appears only due to 'Fug', and thus within the 'projects' (Entwurf) of 
Dasein. But there is a proviso attached: 'esteem', tact towards beings also means not 
to overstretch their presence in the 'between'. What is of such interest to Heidegger, 
but not quite brought into light is that one can understand this 'esteem' also in tenns 
of a warning, not to seek 'persistence' within the 'open' other than the 'that' ofthe 
'open'. If the movement of beings in and out of the open is turned into a atemporal 
(assured) presence, then the movement as Being itself becomes hidden36 !. 
'Poiesis' (Dichten) is not something beyond Dasein, it is always perfonning it by in-
terpreting the Being of beings and changing the way they appear. However, since 
primordial disclosure does not happen directly in assertoric sentences, but intuitively 
in various comportments, these interpretations are not under the control of a 'self or 
subject. Nothing which is not founded on the intuitive disclosure can claim any 
originary disclosure at alL Therefore we have to think the activity of the artist as a 
paradigmatic' openness', which is capable of the internal action of shifting these 
constructs to explore the routines which attempt to hide the original mode of all dis-
closure362. 
f. Conclusion 
In his epilogue to UKW Heidegger poses Hegel's question again: does truth still 
manifests itself in art? Is the shining of art still an 'active' (working) expression of 
359 SdA, p.354 f. 
360 SdA, p.363 
361 "'Tisin allelois' would stand for the basic relationship of the one persistent, 'Dasein', toward the 
other persistent, the 'Seiende', that makes the presence of the 'Seiende' possible by fusing the ecstasis 
to form the thing." Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger: A Critical Study of an Existentialist 
Phenomenology, p.152. 
362 "Das Denken aber ist das Dichten der Wahrheit des Seins in der geschichtlichen Zwiesprache der 
Denkenden." SdA, p.367 
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truth today? Heidegger says that this has not been decided yee63 . In the work truth 
appears, it is appearance (Erscheinung - Scheinen), and 'beauty' (Schoenheit) is not 
a sufficient reason to demand to be true. There was a time when 'beauty' was con-
sidered to be the appearance of truth as disclosure, and this was the time of Greek 
civilisation364. However, when this appearance turns into 'representation' (Gegen-
standlichkeit) it becomes merely an 'experience' (Erlebnis) of a subject. In such a re-
lation beauty is not sufficient as truth, art can therefore relate to truth only as an ob-
j ect in the' Ge-stell' . 
In UKW Heidegger develops the way in which truth sets itself into a work of art. 
Truth is not the correspondence of propositions of which we can say they are true or 
false, the truth Heidegger has in mind is the ground on which such a distinction can 
take place at alL This lies in the intuitive understanding of the world, which is 
'given' and 'valid' 'a priori', because it is already validated in actions of comport-
ment rather than in 'theory,365. In his analysis of Dasein, Heidegger shows, that the 
ground ofDasein is its 'care-structure', that means that it 'is' as transcendence, its 
being beyond itself - Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's 'intentionality - its 
'truth' is not to be as a thing but to 'exist' outside 'itself in a 'world' in intentional-
ity as 'project' (Entwurt) and in a relation to beings. This relation is Dasein's Being 
and without this relation there would be neither Dasein nor Being. The temporal 
structure is expressed by the fact that Dasein has to have a 'world', a whole of rela-
tions, to be able to relate to the individual thing in an intelligible and even in an un-
thematic, way. This is the Being of Dasein and not beings. Dasein cannot be under-
stood in the manner of other beings in terms of categories. Dasein's truth is grounded 
in its 'existence' - its 'purposeful' activity. Such a truth is 'unconditional' - it is a 
'predicament' of Dasein to always already be in such a relation (In-sein). This also 
means that Dasein has no mastery about the ground on which the decision about 
what is true and what is false takes place. This ground is not 'made' or effected but is 
'given' in the 'event of enowning' (Ereignis). Dasein is only insofar as it produces 
meaning, but the meaning it produces is not in its power because consciousness only 
emerges in the happening of such intentionality towards something (the 'Wo-zu' and 
363 UKW, p.66 
364 UKW, p.67 
365 see for instance D.F. Gehtmann, Die Konzeption des Handelns in Sein und Zeit, in: Dasein: Erken-
nen u. Handeln Heidegger im phaenomenologischen Kontext', p.288 f 
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'Umwillen' etc.). The 'Ereignis' (enowning) is Heidegger's interpretation of Aris-
totle's Metaphysics and Physics. Heidegger reinterprets Aristotle's concepts of 
'kinesis' and 'dynamis' as the moving foundation of Dasein and Being itself as its 
possibility and temporality. Thereby he avoids the conflict between the eternal and 
temporal of the 'ergon' as either lacking or being complete and outside time. 
Dasein's world is then not based on some static atemporal 'hypokeimenon' or 'hyle' 
etc, but it is an 'open' (das Offene) within which beings can appear. In terms of its 
kinetic character, beings not only appear but also disappear from this 'open' (das 
Offene). Being however, then, is not only the 'world' but also what does not appear 
in it at one time or other, what is, so to speak outside the meaningful context of this 
'world'. Being 'is' also what 'is' not what withdraws in one way or another. This 
'concealment' (Verbergen) is a 'safe-guarding' (Bergen) of the possibilities that 
Dasein has in its finite future in terms of a possible Being. The concept of 'earth' 
which suddenly appears in UKW as the opposite to the concept of world, creates, in 
the Heraclitean 'union of opposites' the possibility of 'emergence' as the temporal or 
kinetic structure in which truth becomes possible as form (RiB) and in beings (work). 
Without form (,Feststellen der Wahrheit') there would be neither Dasein nor Being. 
Both are dependent on the limiting powers of temporality (Zeitlichkeit / Weile). 
'Earth' has many possible interpretations.366 Its main one, I think, is as a non dualis-
tic replacement for the concepts of 'hyle', 'hypokeimenon' and 'hypostasis': sub-
stance, the eternal ground which comes into appearance in form, in beauty and art. It 
is also the 'arhythmos' which has no form and is not yet in the 'in-between' 
(zwischen), which 'gives' order (dike).367 'Esteem' (tisis-Ruch) is the qualification of 
how beings appear in the 'in-between' formed by 'dike' (Fuge)368. 'Tisis' relates to 
how beings persist (weilen, sich zeitigen) in the 'in-between' as the temporal 'open' 
(das Offene). Beings persist for a 'while', they come and go from the 'clearing' 
(Lichtung) but they try to persist for ever: become eternal: like the eternal ground of 
'hyle' and 'hypokeimenon' etc. 'Tisis' may also be translated with 'consideration' 
for each others emergence into the 'clearing' (Lichtung). 'Consideration' comes 
from what has 'esteem' for each other. What Heidegger interprets in Anaximander, is 
that the whole of what presences itself persists without the one's or the other's par-
366 see the four senses of 'Earth' in Haar, The Song of the Earth, p.57 ff. 
367"Zwischen" = Fuge; "Hervorkommen und Weggang" SdA, p.350 
368 SdA, p.355 
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ticularity persisting inconsideratell69 . Everything has ist time, because it is not 
'challenged-forth'. It is let to appear by itself 'showing' itself. Here we already see 
the importance of 'Gelassenheit' as the 'letting-be'. Again the reference is Aristotle's 
concept that beings 'appear' at first and originary by 'themselves' as what they are 
and that all other 'understanding' is secondary37o. 
The 'in-between' or in another word, the 'open' (das Offene) emerges out of the 
'strife' of the 'world' and 'earth'. The' earth' however is the' excess' COberfluB), the 
'well' out of which the world draws everything. The temporal form of Dasein en-
ables a 'peras' - the shape within which truth can emerge as the 'Gestalt' of truth. 
The form or shape does not 'lack' in any way but because it is in Dasein, its finity 
limits the 'clearing' (Lichtung). This 'clearing' changes its shape, as the horizon 
('peras') of Dasein's 'projects' (Entwurf). The word Heidegger translates out of 
Anaximander is 'esteem' or 'consideration'. Beings keep each other as the whole in 
temporal lingering appearance, instead of insisting on themselves and disperse into 
particulars. The consideration to maintain the whole is summed up by Rilke's verse 
about the angels: 
"The living, though, are too ready to posit a border 
between two states of being: a human mistake. 
Angels, it's said, are often uncertain 
whether they traverse the living or the dead.,,371. 
The main line of interpretation of 'earth' I pursued is the way it provides 'excess' 
(UberfluB), from which the new 'inception' draws, without being deducible from the 
previous. This inception is given to Dasein, but it is the artist (or thinker) who brings 
such an inception into the 'material' of the work to give it the 'Gestalt' of truth. This 
'event of enowning' however, precedes all subjectivity, all consciousness, all truth 
and falseness. And, what art is, is not even defined except as a material work. There-
fore the artist has also to begin before the material he applies himself to. The begin-
ning of art is at the point of the formation of a 'relation' to beings. Art is not con-
369 "Das Anwesende im Ganzen zerstueckt sich nieht in das nur ruecksichtslos Vereinzelte und zer-
steut sich nicht in das Bestandlose." SdA, p.355 
370 Sheehan, Hermeneia and Apophansis, The early Heidegger on Aristotle, p.79 f. 
37] Rainer Maria Rilke, Excerpts from the Duino Elegies, translated by John Waterfield, 
(http://www.jbeilharz.de/poetas/rilkel) "Aber Lebendige machen / aile den Fehler, daB sie zu stark un-
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cemed with beings in the sense that it doesn't have a method with which it describes 
its 'objects'. The artist has to begin in advance of any 'relation'; and as he is pro-
jected by 'art' as the setting itself to work of truth, the artist is not a subject either. 
Art, in tenns of truth is the agency which the artist only perfonns without being its 
author. It is not his mastery. Dwelling in incertitude the artist 'poetises' (Dichten) the 
inception of truth. 'Techne' and 'poiesis' is a 'bringing-forth' is not mastery of dis-
closure unlike the challenging. There is no 'virtuosity' of Being available to Dasein. 
The Stoic poiesis of judgement is also thought as a bringing forth and not virtuosity 
as 'mastery'. Only in a stepping back into 'physis' as the originary 'Being' does the 
Stoic judgement become proper. This 'logic' of 'physis' has nothing to do with the 
'logistic' of technology. 
This process is unlike the process of theorisation in Being and Time. As long as the 
everyday activity of circumspection is undisrupted there is no need for a theoretical 
'Rede' about activity. All comportment is practical. Any disruption, like the broken 
hammer' make such a consideration necessary. And disruption is what drives all 
mastery. The unexpected is the dysfunctional, and uncanny which brings 'fear' and 
ultimate' anxiety' to Dasein. Unmanageability is always part of all understanding, 
insofar it drives the 'theoretical' comportment of mastery and eternity. But Art is nei-
ther 'problemsolving' nor 'theorising' in such a way. Instead it makes something 
stand up in the 'open' filling it with the truth manifesting itself in the work (setting-
itself-into-work). Therefore, Heidegger can say it is not a 'relational' or 'deducible' 
fonn what has been before. 
The 'truth' which sets itself into work, as we have seen, does not have falsity (pseu-
dos). Heidegger follows Aristotle, who defines only the apophantic logos to be able 
to be correct or incorrect. Heidegger's whole theory of truth is not based on this sec-
ondary possibility of knowledge but on the preceding 'intuitive' disclosure (aisthesis 
and noesis). The intuitive disclosure sees always what is 'true' because the false is 
'not-seeing,372. The immediacy of intuition cannot be questioned in the way that 
statements can be. In 'Being and Time' Heidegger lays out the structure of Dasein in 
relation to beings, disclosing the 'Being' of these beings in various intuitive and 
terscheiden. Engel (sagt man) wtiBten oft nicht, ob sie unter Lebenden gehen oder Toten" 
372 Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind, p.298 
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mostly unthematic ways. Intuition is always unthematic, as is, for instance, the dis-
closure which takes place in 'attunement' (Befindlichkeit). Only in higher forms of 
language is thematic disclosure possible, which brings falsity into the equation. 
Without previous, originary intuitive disclosure there is no secondary apophantic 
disclosure. All disclosure is concerned with the Being of beings. Heidegger is con-
cerned with the 'How?' of the Being itself, that which gives the truth itself and how 
it comes about in a kinetic way. The concept of 'work' (ergon, energeia, poiesis and 
techne) are tied together by Heidegger with movement (kinesis, dynamis), so they 
become almost indistinguishable. The 'work is a 'being at work', and not-yet com-
plete. Movement (kinesis) demands incompleteness; it is an 'On the Way to ... '. Hei-
degger attempts to think this movement which necessarily has to be incomplete at 
every single point of its way, as detennined by an 'arche' as a 'telos', by which it be-
comes what it is. 
The way 'emergence' of beings appears is form: 'order' and 'esteem'. Order is un-
derstandable; it is a logos which 'synthesises' and 'diairesis' which analyses, but 
what would 'esteem' be? Is it really, as M. Eldred writes the missing relation of Mit-
sein, between human beings?373 Or is it the relation of Dasein to beings? 'Esteem' 
may be such a relation which does not divide and synthesises, but governs the unity 
of whatever 'appears' in the 'in-between' in its intuitive and originary way. 'To 
chreon' of Anaximander 'hands out'; it divides into what is disordered and what is 
ordered into intelligibility. In this 'handing out' into the 'joint' (Fuge - dike) of the 
'in-between' the relation is a harmony of appearance and withdrawal. 
The Stoic practices may give us a hint at such a relation. One such important practice 
is 'discretio' (distinguishing or right judgement). One may object that this relates al-
ready to the sphere of true and false, whereas Heidegger talks about its ground. Yes, 
this is true, but its relation is to 'virtue'(arete). Virtue is not a skill, a virtuosity in a 
particular field, instead it is a virtuosity of life itself. Judgement is therefore not the 
following of a known rule but the discovery of a rule, a 'poiesis'. Originally 'discre-
tio' answers to the question - is this a moral question? - ifnot, this thing in hand is 
'adiaphora'. It is much more than that. In the next chapter I will attempt to show that 
373 Michael Eldred, Questioning 'Die Frage nach der Technik', 
http://home.tiscali.de/ artefact/un tp 1 tclltchnip ly.h tml 
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this relation to 'situations' which is based on the exercise of 'awareness' (prosoche) 
in the Stoa lets beings emerge as they are, precisely in the way Heidegger tries to 
capture them with the 'back to the things themselves' slogan. Such an 'awareness' is 
equivalent to Dasein's 'authenticity' - which changes the 'appearance' of both, be-
ings and 'Mitsein'. - and so does the 'Stoic' 'conversion'. In their approach to beings 
the Stoics not only apply rationality, but also give the respect and esteem to what 
things 'are'. This is the opposite of mastery, and I will attempt to show, that the view 
we have about the 'virtuosity of life' is wrong, if we see it merely as a attempted 
mastery. What it really is, is a tactful relation to beings, in whatever way they appear. 
All appearance is part oflogos, and fate: 'Being' determines in a way which we do 
not choose, as Heidegger also sees it, but we can follow 'authentically' as Heidegger 
suggests or 'joyfully' as the Stoics suggest; in both ways we give 'esteem' to beings 
instead of asserting the phantasm of mastery over them. 
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Chapter HI 
Antiquity and the Way of Life 
In the previous chapter we have seen how Heidegger's vocabulary is more concerned 
with the movements of intertwining forces rather than with antinomies of totality or 
individuum, object or subject. Reality appears like the distorted space between dif-
ferent gravitational forces. The question of the forces of persistence and change, al-
ready a question for Plato and Aristotle, is reformulated to return to a Heraclitean 
unity of opposites. For Heidegger the force of human life as hermeneutics guaran-
tees both possibilities of persistence and change. To interpret, to question something 
we have to have understood something already. But this understanding is also what is 
questioned in Heidegger's phenomenology as what is continuously changing. We are 
"stirring under our own feet".' 
The hermeneutical circle avoids a disintegration into some absolute a-temporal Being 
and a temporal changeable being. It creates an unavoidable immanence of all possi-
ble interpretations, without allowing this creativity to be totally arbitrary. This crea-
tivity, variously called 'Auseinandersetzung', 'polemos', 'creativity' (Schaffen), 
'poiesis' or 'Dichtung' is the movement originary to Dasein in its relation to Being 
and both are determined by this movement. It precedes all selfhood, identity or sub-
jectivity and in fact constitutes their particular historical form. This chapter looks at 
the Greek form of constituting a virtuous 'self'. The Greeks too have understood that 
interpretation is everything. Interpretation is a form of artistic endeavour of making, 
a 'poiesis' of the interpretative character. To create one's own character, one has to 
have some form of disposition already which disposes to the intention to be virtuous. 
In effect this is a form of auto-poiesis. We see the same figure we saw in Heideg-
ger's hermeneutic circle: To be the agency ofpoiesis, there has to be a self already 
which changes itself, its disposition by with it understands and interprets. Heidegger 
is right when he denies some individual subjective agency, but at the same time there 
is an agency 'at work' (energeia) in the production of the work of art through the in-
dividual. When the philosopher sees his disposition as the material of his effort to in-
terpret things virtuously, this matter is at the same time the agency of his effort. This 
is ultimately a 'polemos' deriving from the agonic character of Greek life itself. In 
I " ... stirring under our feet. .. " Foucault, The Order of Things, 2001, p.xxix 
the following chapter I will describe how this sense of self-constitution emerged in 
Greek culture and how the Greeks formulated philosophy as the 'way oflife' in 
terms of an 'auto-poiesis' of the 'self as a 'work' (of art). Stoic philosophy appears 
to be a paradigmatic example of a praxis of changing the disposition of one's self be-
cause it not only develops the theoretical structure but also practical exercises, 'aske-
sis', to achieve this transformation of the souL 
The Stoic doctrine is tightly knit and encompasses all possible aspects of reasoned 
discourse. From cosmology and physics, language, ontology and aitiology to logic 
and dialectic. Every aspect has been covered, as it has been in all other Hellenistic 
schools with which they were in competition. I will follow Pierre Hadoe by inter-
preting the effort of systematisation as a necessary exercise to undo preconceptions, 
presuppositions and traditions and not as the attempt to ,explain' the cosmos. 
Authority was not as important as in the Epicurean school for instance, and one 
could say, that in the Stoic school one had to live on one's own wits. Therefore, in 
spite of the rich literature, they did not see scripture as a solution, meaning that if you 
have a problem, you cannot simply read up on it in some authoritative volume by one 
of the main Stoics and expect salvation without changing your life - Seneca and 
Epictetus3 both deride such attempts. They refer to Plato's Phaedrus, where Socrates 
sets out the advantages of discourse and the disadvantages of the written word. He 
does not do so by claiming that the written word is in any way different but that it 
fails to come at the right moment The living discourse, the situation and the imme-
diate reaction of the interlocutors enable them to choose the right or appropriate 
words at the right moment Ceukairos'). The right moment, is a necessary part of the 
sage's virtuous action, which is obviously impossible if relying the written word. The 
emphasis was on the direct encounter. One could call this encounter therapeutic, like 
the medicus visiting the sick, who needs to examine the patient4. This analogy is very 
common but 'doing philosophy' is, a 'techne psyche', a 'technique du soi' and Nuss-
baum points out quite rightly that the Stoic recourse to logic, reasoning and disci-
pline seems much the same as the one used by political 'powers' Foucault criticises.5 
For the Stoics this 'reason' was 'critical' at all times. It is never possible to restrain the 
powers of reason, except one falls into the trap to see it as the answer itself and not a 
2 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a way of Life (PhWL) and What is Ancient Philosophy? (WiAPh) 
3 Hadot, PhWL, p.I08; Epic!. Dis, 3,21,7-8 
4 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, pA8 ff 
5 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.54; on Foucault see also Hadot p.206 
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therapy.6 There were many other ways than philosophy to shape one's soul in the an-
cient world, much as there are today, such as religions and their various sects or as-
trology, sooth-saying and sorcery. Philosophy sets itself apart by reasoned argument 
and virtue (as opposed to religious obedience). Why is reasoned discourse (critique) 
subversive? To answer this question we have to tum to the methods Socrates uses to 
debunk the imagined knowledge of his interlocutors. He uses all the sophistic tricks 
of argument, but not to impose his own view. He leaves his interlocutors 'in aporia'. 
This is not meant to be the end though. 'Not-knowing' is the opportunity for reason-
ing. We have to note therefore that the Stoic exercises in logic and dialectics are only 
meant as an examination of the state of the soul and not to impose an authoritative 
form of doctrine. 
There is a second strand to the argument which I pursue in this chapter. The question 
of how far the concept of virtue and the classification of all external things is to be 
understood as an unfolding of the archaic 'agon' and 'arete'. Philosophical praxis 
turns the values of their disciples upside down. The highest 'good' (agathon) is 'arete' 
and the value of external things ephemeral, just like in the archaic 'agon', and I mean 
the 'agon' between 'sages' as the predecessors of the philosophers (Colli, Huizinga{ 
Wisdom, sophia, was absolute - divine knowledge. 
1. The Concept of' Agon' 
The Greek 'agon' is much more than play or competition. It is deeply rooted in the 
archaic Greek understanding of virtue. Although these concepts originate in an aris-
tocratic society they envelop the whole ofthe Greek understanding of life; one could 
even say that life itself is an agon. This has consequences for our understanding of 
the concepts of 'virtue' and 'logos' and their position within Greek understanding of 
the world. To compete one has to have skills and 'arete', virtue, is the expression for 
any skill that is necessary to compete. This is not only any military skill but also 
quick-wittedness, and all other Greek virtues like justice, temperance, piety and 
courage, or simply 'wisdom'. To be wise is to have all the virtues, because the sage 
can judge all situation. This is to become the Stoic position, centuries after the Ho-
6 "Theory is never considered an end in itself, it is clearly and decidedly put in the service of prac-
tice." Radot, PhWL, p.60 
7 I am using the German translation: G. Colli, Die Geburt d. Philosoph ie, 1975/ dt. 1981, (GdPh here-
after): "Denn indem sich das Ratsel vermenschlicht, nimmt es eine agonistische Gestalt an, und an-
dererseits entsteht die Dialektik aus dem Agonismus." Colli, GdPR, p. 72 
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meric age. It amounts to an ontologically grounded 'phronesis', applied wisdom in 
accordance with cosmic 'logos'. 
In the age of seers like Kalchas, Theiresias and Homer, who were in competition 
with each other, the agon has already a human affair. Oedipus or Theseus were in-
volved in the original agon with a god, Apollo who set the Sphinx at the gates of 
Thebes, or in the struggle with the Dionysian figure of the Minotaurus. The original 
threat of the agon comes from the challenge and temptation of the god for men to 
overreach themselves and thus to lose the measure of what is human.8 The whole 
Odyssey has the form of an agon between Ulysses and the gods supporting him and 
those seeking revenge. The whole Iliad and Odyssey is couched in the language of 
aristocratic agon. One notes, that this agon takes place across the divide between 
human and divine sphere. The agon, links these spheres, through the will to 'win'. 
But it is not the question of 'justice' in our sense that is played out in these epics. In 
the Iliad Zeus is weighing the fate of the heroes on his scales, throwing lots into 
each. The lot is what is allotted to men, their fate is thrown onto the scales. This fate 
is decided by chance played out by Zeus.9 Justice manifests itself in the agon as the 
allotted fate. Agon is the very possibility of the highest justice, the 'judgement by or-
deal'. This agon persists in the courts where rhetors compete for the jury's vote. Jus-
tice was understood to be chance from the very beginning and therefore it did not 
appear offensive to use rhetoric and sophistry to one's advantage. The process was a 
judgement by ordeal once removed from the gods. To win this agon basically means: 
''I'm right, you're dead". This form of justice is then questioned by Plato's Socrates. 
What is just has to be 'said'. The truth has to be proven. This approach fractures the 
agonic understanding of justice. Socrates asks 'What is justice?' - to be just one has 
to have a definition by which to judge. Truth has to be there explicitly in a definition. 
Judgement has to be based on knowledge. It does not matter who wins - Socrates re-
futes the knowledge of others while claiming not to know anything himself. Truth is 
not proven by winning. Socrates wants the truth to be said clearly and unadorned. 
The method of dialectic, practised for quite a while before him, created a way to dis-
prove all positive knowledge. So the resulting 'aporia' leaves the truth unsaid. Socra-
tes' agon with Apollo, trying to prove the oracle wrong and to show that he is not the 
wisest man in Athens lOis, however, decided by the old justice: Socrates is dead and 
8 Colli, GdPh, p.30 
9 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.79 
10 Colli, Nach Nietzsche, p.102 
125 
therefore he was the wisest: but he prevailed against the god according to the 'new' 
justice: his death has become the paradigm of 'injustice'. 
The Stoics take this critique further. To them the whole cosmos moves according to a 
'logos', a universal reason, which determines the equal distribution of good and bad. 
This does not mean a scientific necessity, nor 'providence' for the philosopher to not 
be affected by the external world. Instead the visible agon which brought about the 
'judgement by ordeal' has been internalised. The virtuous cannot 'suffer' defeat from 
fate, because it is not relevant to 'virtue'. To be virtuous means not to be affected by 
external things. Virtue is not only self-discipline, it is the irrelevance in the public 
display of the agon. The internal agon now takes place on a different level. It is the 
agon with oneself, or rather one's self that has to be overcome. The self, as the prod-
uct of the techne of the self becomes the more or less public work of art. To become 
virtuous the self has to change and it does so by exercise. These exercises are a 
techne, in the sense that they mould the self, but the techne is not a knowledge like 
the knowledge to make shoes. At the same time it is not comparable to 'physis' ei-
ther. The knowledge what virtue is, is 'essentially' different from the current state of 
mind so it cannot be known without a 'rupture'. It is 'un-canny' in Heidegger's 
terms. 
The Stoic wants to become a sage so the 'ordeal' cannot 'disprove' him. Ifhis dispo-
sition is according to logos, what happens externally to him is neither good nor bad 
but indifferent. The real as ordeal of the agon proves the participant to be right or 
wrong, good or bad. Chance is a 'judgement of god'. What kind of 'chance' is this 
judgement? Is it made according to a universal law? It certainly is for the Stoic. The 
divine logos contains everything that happens. Human freedom does not lie in chang-
ing this allotted fate but not to judge any such fate as 'morally' bad. Even if incon-
venient, this fate is not utterly 'irrational' it is only human reaction to such events 
that can be irrational. But the 'agon' to attain this disposition also means to know 
one's own (Socratic) ignorance in relation to fate, chance and ordeal. The change 
that has taken place for the sage is, that the universal logos and thus the allotted fate 
is not a pure game of chance any more where he could possibly lose his virtue. 
'Logos' distinguishes (critical) and unites (universal). It is the space of all intelligi-
bility without this space itself being object of such intelligibility. The logos in the 
shape of fate is not something that could be controlled by the sage. Intelligibility is 
'given' , just like Heidegger sees it. The sage 'poietically' creates his self in the im-
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age of this logos. The judgement about failure is what the Stoics understand as being 
completely under human control. The agonic 'judgement by ordeal' has been turned 
into the universal law of the logos. Men, not even the sage, 'understand' the logos, 
but the sage does not suffer from the idea of an injustice in regards to his' ordeal' be-
cause his self is identical with the logos. In a strange way the uncontrollable' ordeal' 
is turned into a metaphysical certitude. The real is the good, and wisdom is the dura-
ble knowledge of this as a basis of moral judgement. The Stoic exercises' discretio', 
or 'phronesis', with which he manoeuvres in intelligibility is another synonym of 
wisdom and virtue. It is also a definition of the 'self' as the agency of 'poiesis'. This 
self consists in the critical process of auto-poiesis. 
Understanding is what humans as Dasein 'are'. It is their 'Being. To understand in a 
different way than the current self allows, and to interpret in a way that this self 
changes essentially is a process that we have already seen in Heidegger's description 
of UKW. Neither the artist nor his audience, neither art nor the work of art bring 
about the truth that is set up in and around the work. Instead truth sets itself into the 
work of art. Truth is agency and its work, the audience and the artist. Just like the 
self of the Stoic is only agency insofar as it performs 'logos' by interpreting its own 
situation and thus changing itself into another truth of logos. 
The difference between agon and Heidegger's 'polemos' appears in his emphasis on 
Heraclitus and the continuity of strife while the agon appears to be a 'game' which 
produces a winner. The agon on the other hand is more general as a fundamental trait 
of the whole of Greek culture and is more general and persists in all aspects of 
philosophical discourse. Polemos cannot be thought without agon. 
In archaic agon winning was justification, it created justice and thus truth. With Soc-
rates the term 'good' (agathon) is added to this equation. In the new relation winning 
does not make something good and just. Socrates demands 'proofs' (pistis), instead 
of 'winning'. Maybe this is the irony: nobody can defeat Socrates because he does 
not propose a knowledge. This however, puts the 'agon' on a different level. To be 
good or right depends on the soundness of one's soul, independent of winning. This 
is the continuous labour of the self to change itself, to become wise and virtuous, 
within the human possibilities of logos, which are limited. 'Logos' is what unites the 
formless and manifold into the 'one' that is open to understanding, it is intelligibility 
itself. But there can never be total understanding. 'Logos' is duplicitous: it discloses 
and withdraws at the same time, as we shall see in the next section. 
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2. The Concept of 'Logos' 
The Greek concept of the 'logos' has a confusing breadth of meanings and functions 
which are difficult to untangle. 'Logos' is 'word' and 'language' but also' law' or 'prin-
ciple' or 'individual' and 'cosmic nature' and 'pharmakon', a cause in itself. I rely on 
Giorgio Colli's book 'La nascita della Filosofia'." It guided my research by relating 
the archaic 'agon' to the Stoic 'logos' as the strife for interpretation and at the same 
time making me aware of the dual character of 'logos' as what makes visible and 
what hides. The riddle is the striking symbol of logos. It is what hides and reveals at 
the same time. I will briefly outline Colli's main statements about the development of 
the Greek concept of , logos' to underline this duplicitous character, duplicitous, 
because the divine words are obscure, but also, because language hides itself behind 
what it means and is never itself 'visible' or 'sayable'. I think it is important to un-
derstand 'logos' in its duplicity even when used by the Stoics. The efficacy of a 'word' 
and of 'reason' can only be properly understood on the background of the archaic 
roots of the 'logos'. Equally, the 'state of mind' which surrounds the 'logos', its 
relation to the 'divine', is very different from our own contemporary experience. 'In-
spiration' and 'enthusiasm' mean that the 'individuality' fragments in such a way that 
it interacts with the divine. It is not closed off, instead it provides an openness or sur-
face on which reason can act. The 'divine' here means access to 'language' as the 
site of the ontological determination, or to Being. This is the function of the sage -
and also of Socrates, which is 'in between' the divine and the human. Colli maps the 
development of the concept of 'logos' back into its pre-history, back to the mythical 
age of Daedalus and the Minotaurus. The labyrinth is the first symbol of the emerg-
ing 'logos'. It is the product of reason and art on the one hand, the Apollonian, and it 
is governed by Minotaurus, the Dionysian 'life force' on the other. The reason build 
into the labyrinth is divine and incomprehensible to man, only the thin thread of Ari-
adne saves Theseus (the human). But there is also the Dionysian part, the animalistic 
impersonal rapture of the thread of reason. The surrender of this heritage of immedi-
ate (unconscious) life (the private production, poion) is therefore hidden from view 
in the Greek polis. Theseus defeats Dionysius in form of the Minotaurus. Reason, 
kills the animalistic but leads to the recognition of 'pain', the suffering of 'life' itself; 
but it also teaches how to defeat this pain: by denying the will oflife.'2 
II Giorgio Colli, Die Geburt der Philosophie (GdPh) 
12 "All das liiJ3t sich in den Begriffen Schopenhauers ausdrucken: die Vernunft steht im Dienst der 
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The Greek 'logos' is not only enlightened, it is also much darker than we understand 
it today. In the next stage of the history of the 'logos', the gods pose riddles l3 : The 
Sphinx poses the question under the threat of death: reason is the way out, but the 
words hide it by being metaphoricaL Then the Delphic oracle becomes the dominant 
stage of the development of reason: the Pythia speaks in tongues and a translator in-
terprets her words in dark riddles. The Pythian 'mania', the divine madness is a con-
stitutive part of 'logos' as is the interpretation which is 'measure' and intelligibility 
and which brings light into the dark words. 14 These are the two forms of 'logos' 
which are one within the Apollonian domain. In both cases language constitutes it-
self from the inspiration of the god. Truth comes to men from outside l5 . The divine 
language says what will happen but men do not understand. The logos is dangerous 
and incomprehensible, it is malicious and tempting as is the god of the oracle. The 
form of truth is a riddle. Riddles are the fonn of the further development and final 
secularisation of the 'logos' in the form of a competition between the seers l6 up to 
Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno, whose paradoxes become a last form of the riddle 
competition, but which is neither divine nor deadly. In addition the sages, and Par-
menides was a sage, were dialecticians who could argue both ways, the word was 
able to show that both ( contradictory) thesis are false, whichever thesis the interlocu-
tor chooses. The antithetic contradiction is always wrong as Heraclitus already points 
out in fragment 98.17 But it is agonic; the agon between two opinions is not a ques-
tion of 'truth'. Truth is not in words. 18 Only in the situation when the speakers are 
present can experience be shaped by dialectic (presence is a condition of 'agon' for 
Huizinga). This is also its 'truth', insofar as the divine word is incomprehensible to 
man, language has always the character of danger - the 'agon' as a 'judgement by or-
deal'. Within 'logos' is the 'cruel' god Apollo (the one who strikes from a distance, 
Animalitat, des Willens zum Leben, zuglcich aber fiihrt die Vernunft zur Erkenntnis des Schmerzes 
und lehrt, wie der Schmerz zu besiegen ist: durch die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben. 
13 Colli, Nach Nietzsche, Frankfurt a.M., 1980 p. I 84: Ratsel ist die Erscheinung dessen, was ver-
borgen ist, im Manifesten - im Wort -, ist die Spur des Unsagbaren." Colli, GdPh p.27 
14 Colli, GdPh, pJ 9f, Platon Phaidros 244ab 
15 "Dagegen offenbaren sich die Erkenntnis und die Weisheit durch das Wort, und es ist Delphi, wo 
das g6ttliche Wort ausgesprochen wird, es ist Apollo, der durch die Priesterin spricht, nicht aber Di-
onysos." Colli, GdPh, p. I 7 
16 Colli, GdPh, pA9; and Homer and the fishermen p.58: logisches Ratsel: menschlicher Agonismus ... 
sichtbare Dinge tauschen 
17. "Opposition brings concord. Out of discord comes the fairest harmony." Heraclitus fragment 98 
18 "Gorgias sagte: »Wir enthtillen dem Mitbtirger nicht die seienden Dinge, sondern die Worte, die 
von den wirklichen Dingen verschieden sind.«" Colli, Nach Nietzsche, p.IS7 
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through arrows and words).19 The words of his oracle reveal themselves only after 
the facts, then they become crystal-clear. The divine logos is a revelation of what has 
always been there. 
Drawing on Colli's analysis, we therefore have to frame the concept of 'logos', even 
as used by the Stoics, in a different light from how we would understand it today (i.e. 
after semiotics etc.) Language cuts the immediate access to 'life', and at the same 
time it reveals the pain of 'life' i.e. imperfection of the human condition. This 'logos' 
does not describe a 'method' or an instrument but the basic human ontological situa-
tion. This is also Heidegger's conclusion. Being dwells in language, or, quoting Plato 
Heidegger says that 'man's thought dwells in philosophy,.2o 
This 'thought' is the place of individuation. All 'dianoein' is knowledge and a way 
of dwelling. Equally, if we understand the 'mania' and the loss of individuation, the 
roots of wisdom are in the transgression of this individuations. The pursuit of 'logos' 
therefore is never purely the action of an individual self but in a way it demands its 
ritual destruction in the ek-stasis of mysteries. Plato and Socrates still knew about the 
inherent duplicity of the word and therefore they gave primacy to the spoken dis-
course, the back and fore of arguments and consideration, which was meant to shape 
the soul - it should bring about a revelation but not as positive knowledge. As the 
words of the riddle refuse to reveal their logical evidence, so the new form of dialec-
tic entangles preconceived understanding and reveals its failure. The Stoics also took 
on board Heraclitus' hints, dark by themselves, that there is 'withdrawal' (,nature 
likes to hide ... ' Heraclitus, fragment 123). Words can hide as much as they disclose. 
Nevertheless the Stoics are optimistic, their cosmos is. The Stoa supposes that what-
ever happens is necessary in the overall schema of things. We simply misunderstand 
external events, if we categorise them as good or bad. But in discourse the 'logoi' still 
have the power of healing the disturbed soul- philosophy is solace - 'boethia'. 
The 'pathe' in the Stoic doctrine are 'logoi' too. They follow a reason and therefore 
they are so devastating and dangerous (e.g. Seneca's Medea), to some extent they re-
veal anew the Dionysian connection which Colli points to?1 Immediacy and logos 
19: Heraclitus describes the duplicity of Apollo as the harmony of opposites. Bow and lyre have the 
same shape but opposite purposes, both are symbols of Apollo 
2°"Sofern der Mensch existiert, geschieht in gewisser Weise das Philosophieren." Wegmarken, p.19 
also ,"It is Dasein itself .... 'Physei gar, 0 phile, enesti tis philosphia te tou andros dianoia' ["For by 
nature, my friend, man's mind dwells in philosophy"] (Plato, Phaedrus, 279a) Basic Writings, What is 
Metaphysics?, p.112 
21 "Gotter sind frei von Notwendigkeit Durch das Orakel notigt Apollo den Menschen zur MaBigung, 
wahrend er seIber maBlos ist, fordert ihn zur Selbstbeherrschung auf, wahrend er sich durch ein unbe-
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belong together like mania and logos_ The pain of life and reason, these two seem-
ingly incompatible principles can be reconciled by the mediating faculty of the well 
and timely spoken word - which cannot be a written word_ The word disrupts the 
logic of the 'pathe', because it is related to this logic, just as irrationality is related to 
rationality by virtue of it being its' opposite'_ 
The words are there in front of our eyes: we do not understand; this is the fonn of the 
riddle and the oracle: being there and not there at the same time_ Words are absence 
and presence at the same time: like the arrows of Apollo the words move from one 
point to the other, they reveal their truth in the distance of time_ Words need time to 
'arrive' (Greek tragedy: the disaster has already happened, but we don't know it yet)_ 
There is another fonn of absence within the Apollonian, the visibility and invisibility 
of revelation of the oracle and the riddle_ Language itself is not accessible_ 22 And in 
language life 'itself' is not accessible_ Understanding of the Apollonian 'hints' is not 
open to man (only to the sage), and at the same time the 'individual' has to be tran-
scended to participate in an (anamnestic) unity with the divine immediacy itself 
The reason which produced the labyrinth is itself incomprehensible in its foundations 
and this is its symbolic value_ Although man participates in 'logos', he is lost in the 
labyrinth, precisely because of the 'absences' which constitute it Presence at a dis-
tance, in the absence, is very much an Apollonian character of reason, it is not 'im-
mediate' - it is in front of our eyes but not understood_ We have to follow the path, 
make our path, and the path of reason becomes more important than the 'end' _ 'Lo-
gos' mediates between the (invisible) divine and the (visible) human, so it is conse-
quent for Plato to dismiss the sensible in favour of the invisible which is accessible 
through a ( divine) 'logos' _ 23 
The word is not an 'autonomous' area_24 Words disclose otherness not identity of 
herrschtes »pathos« manifestiert: damit fordert der Gott den Menschen heraus, provoziert ihn, ver-
leitet ihn beinahe zum Ungehorsam_ Diese Zweideutigkeit schlagt sich im Wort des Orakels nieder 
und macht es zum RatseL" Colli, GdPh, p_ 44 
22 Agamben, Potentialities, p.3l; "Denn das Wort, wodurch die Worter zum Wort kommen, vermag 
ein Worterbuch weder zu fassen noch zu bergen_" Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p_192, 
23 'Beauty' is related to 'truth' and as Socrates was utterly ugly in Greek eyes, he could not have been 
neither virtuous nor telling the 'truth' _ (Symposion) Therefore it is a paradigm change when Alcibia-
des explains that Socrates is like the figure of a Silen, ugly on the outside with golden deities inside_ 
24 "Die Weisen jener archaischen Zeit - und bis Platon sollte ihre Haltung bestimmend bleiben - sahen 
in der Vernunft eine »Rede« liber etwas anderes, einen »logos«, der eben nur »sagt«, etwas Ver-
schiedenes, Heterogenes ausdriickt Was wir liber die Wahrsagung und das Ratsel festgestellt haben, 
lal3t uns diesen Zusammenhang leichter begreifen: es ist eben jener religiose Hintergrund, jene mys-
terienhafte Verzlickung, die die Vernunft durch die Vermittlung des Ratsels in irgendeiner Weise 
auszudrlicken suchL Spater ist dieser urspriingliche Impuls der Vernunft vergessen worden, ihre Funk-
tion als Anspielung, ihre Aufgabe, eine metaphysische Distanz auszudrlicken, hat man nicht mehr ver-
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knowledge and the known. We are too much used to the appropriating aspect of lan-
guage, its objectifications and its hollow opposites. But most of all language cannot 
reveal its own foundations. Words are just the traces of the immediacy and totality of 
life.25 Man must therefore be aware of the duplicity of words and their agonic malice 
(as he should beware ofthe Sophists) by considering what they do not reveal. Only 
when the arguments of the Stoic therapy change the state of the soul, has their truth 
been 'recognised'. However, on the other side, this change has to be open to scrutiny, 
it cannot be simply said to be a gift of 'faith'. The Stoics develop a practice that in-
volves dialectic and 'awareness' of nothing in particular (prosoche) as its exercise, al-
though neither of them is sufficient on its own. The Stoic exercises of giving account 
of one's actions tum the unconscious act into the conscious reality of words. The Sto-
ics see reasoning as the basis of actions. As the Cynics did not let go of reasoning ei-
ther: even the most anarchic practical jokes had a reasoned point even if it was not 
always expressed. The actions of the Cynics were like riddles of the Sages: they 
acted apparently confused and counterintuitive to surprise the questioner with a per-
fectly reasoned answer. 
Our knowledge is always incomplete. What we know are only the 'membra disiecta' 
of Orpheus or Dionysius; it is like reading a dictionary in alphabetical order (like 
Sartre's autodidact) and not being able to reconstruct (the meaning of) the text, 
which was still available to the Seers and Sages of the past: the unity between word 
and the immediate experience (an immediacy the Stoics try to reconstruct in their ac-
tions in any (contingent) situation) This decline of sophia is build into the construc-
tion of the new 'philosophical' way of knowledge as absence and ignorance. Philoso-
phy begins with a loss of sophia. 
The philosophical concept of the 'Good' and 'Virtues', the whole Socratic 'moral 
tum', is not 'moral' in our (Christian) understanding. The 'Good' is an internal 'telos' 
(final end), it does not mean being nice to everyone. It functions like the selfreferen-
tial symbol of the virtuous actions in the archaic 'agon'. Once 'dialectics' has made 
'positive' knowledge impossible (except mathematical knowledge) knowledge has to 
move from the external to the internal, the comportment, which is independent of the 
standen und der »Rede« eine eigene Autonomie zugesproehen, als ware sie ein einfaeher Spiegel 
eines unabhangigen, angeblieh rationalen Gegenstandes ohne allen Hintergrund oder sogar selbst eine 
Substanz. Zunaehst aber war die Vemunft als etwas Komplementares entstanden, als ein Widerhall, 
dessen Ursprung in etwas Verborgenem aul3erhalb ihrer lag, das nieht vollstandig wiedergegeben, 
sondem von jener »Rede« nur angedeutet werden konnte." Colli, GdPh, p.87 
25 "Aller Ausdruek ist Suehe naeh Totalitat" Colli, GdPh, p.53 
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sensible. The 'Good' is beyond the reach of dialectic and eludes definitions. In its 
self-sufficiency (autarkeia) it appears to function like a figure of absence, the invisi-
ble focus of actions redeeming them from the temporal external world into an a-
temporal eternal and impersonal of 'logos'. It tames contingence by rendering it indif-
ferent and gives structure to the incertitude of ignorance. 
The Socratic 'elenchos' (teaching through inquiry), is not an instruction but a coop-
eration to dispel false knowledge and it leads to 'aporia', an acceptance of ignorance. 
This is why philosophy has never been understood as a mere instruction in abstract 
knowledge. In Stoic terms, understanding is an experience where 'logoi' act upon the 
very fabric of the souL Giving account inquires into one's own actions in the absence 
of certitude, it is by no means a mathematical guide to right actions. (Inquiry is the 
knitting together the 'membra disiecta' of one's own dual nature between reason and 
the animalistic.) When one inquires well enough the inquiry opens one's eyes to what 
one has been looking at without seeing it This is the understanding or comportment 
which the philosophers are looking to elicit The Stoics, unlike the Epicureans, did 
not teach a merely static doctrine. As a difference from other 'ways of life' they 
thought that a philosophical approach is that one has to experience the turn of habit 
oneself. They would not offer a ready-made revelation (like the Christians and to a 
degree Epicureans) of what the different view has to be. Instead they practised the 
inquiry into one's preconceptions so one can repeat the inquiry for oneself and live 
the considered life (i.e. inquiring about what one is doing and why). Like the oracle, 
the revelation comes in the experience of the sudden understanding. 
'Man dwells in thought'. The divine and unfathomable (unhintergehbare) 'logos' de-
termines how the world appears to man: "language is the house of Being". Language 
makes not 'things' intelligible, it is intelligibility itself. In this intelligibility, which 
he is not in control of, 'man dwells'; intelligibility itself cannot be founded in some-
thing other than intelligibility?6 
The Stoic judgement is similar to Heidegger's 'resolve' (Entschluss). Both operate in 
the contingent -indeterminate situation of 'thrownness' (Geworfenheit), breaking out 
of the preconceived meaning of the 'They' (Man), which is always a repetition of 
what one has not thought (or rather fought - 'polemos ') for oneself. In the constitu-
26 Agamben, Potentialities, The Thing Itself, p.35; Bartleby, or on Contingency, p.251 f. 
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tion of all rules lies invisibly a judgement and a decision about the whole of thought 
and thus intelligibility, which Heidegger calls 'Being'. The un-canny, the incalcula-
ble and what the Stoics still saw in the incomprehensibility of the cosmic reason, are 
the remnants of what the Greek 'logos' was at its inception,27 namely an unbridgeable 
essential difference (Wesensunterschied) between human and the divine.28 Giorgio 
Colli describes the duplicity of the words and also their dark relation to the animalis-
tic and Dionysian immediacy of life. He also shows the price for the pain of this du-
ality to be overcome: the amnesia of the 'will to life', the animalistic unidividuated 
part of human nature. This repressed aspect comes then back in the form of certitude, 
the rational will to control everything even to control the very matrix of life itself is 
fueled by the suppressed will to live and the pain it causes. 
Colli describes two factors responsible for the decline of wisdom. First Zeno and 
then Gorgias take dialectic to a self-destructive level: every positive statement was 
sure to be refuted. And secondly the emergence of the public realm as the space of 
agonic discourse which turned into unrestrained rhetoric. The originally private cir-
cles of discussion were held between people of similar understanding of the matter, 
they had no doctrine or texts and relied on an unexpressed consensus of wisdom. In 
public engagements where anyone could listen in, the audience was of different lev-
els of understanding and so the speakers had to adapt by becoming rhetorical. Rheto-
ric itself led to the argument being resolved not by a logical refutation but by the si-
lent audience reacting according to emotions. Rhetoric and its reliance on written 
text lead to philosophy as literature.29 In Plato's case, the literary text itself already 
states that a change has taken place. The time of 'sophia' has passed and the wise 
have disappeared. What Plato is writing about are the lost connections of words 
which had 'proper' meaning only in the discussions of the sages. This form of com-
munication has already been lost and the nostalgic look back only confirms it. It is 
the hint at an 'object' that has never been 'in' language. 
27 The 'calculable' ofHeidegger does not mean the 'logos' but the mathematical, the Stoic 'logos' is 
incalculable. 
28 "Die Form des Ratsels will dagegen einen Sprung »andeuten«, eine unaufhebbare Wesensver-
schiedenheit zwischen dem, was dem Gott, der Wurzel von Vergangenheit und Zukunft, angehort, 
und dem Leben, wie es dem Menschen mit seinen Gestalten, seinen Farben und seinen Worten eigen 
ist. Die Zweideutigkeit Apollos driickt den Abstand zwischen Gott und Mensch aus, ihre Unver-
gleichbarkeit." Colli, GdPh, p.44 
29 "So wird die Philosophie geboren, eine Schopfung, die allzu inhomogen, allzu vermittelt ist, urn 
neue Moglichkeiten aufsteigenden Lebens in sich zu enthalten. Die Schrift, ein wesentlicher Helfer 
bei dieser Geburt, I5scht sie aus. Und die Emotionalitat, die als zugleich dialektische und rhetorische 
noch in Platon vibriert, ist dazu verurteilt, nach kurzer Zeit zu verdorren, sich im systematischen Geist 
zu sedimentieren und zu kristallisieren." Colli, GdPh, p.105 
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Plato gives hints about the wisdom that has been lost and his Socrates is a figure of 
that transition. Still half sage but already half philosopher and still trying to recover 
something from a past wisdom. What has been lost is not expressible in the secular-
ised form of dialectics nor in the emotional storm of rhetorical machinations. The 
impossibility of a positive proof (Zeno and Gorgias) becomes catastrophic when the 
connection to the inexpressible divine background of the riddle and the duplicity of 
'logos' (as reason and madness) has been forgotten.3D The Platonic doctrine of 'an-
amnesis' is a methodical reversal of this forgetting. What has been lost in the new 
concept of language is the dimension of riddle and oracle, the dimension of the di-
vine mania and mysteries.3l Plato interprets this loss as a fall into temporality. If'lo-
gos' as language becomes autonomous, its dimension is immutable and a-temporal 
and its heterogeneity becomes misunderstood as something in need of identity or a 
mere 'mirror of a rational object'.32 Instead, the language of the (archaic) sages only 
hints indirectly to something heterogeneous. Heraclitus still uses the fonn of riddles 
and he also says "The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but 
gives signs (hints)." (fragment 93). It is the distance that becomes unbearable even to 
Plato himself. That language 'is', is only a 'hint' and is not expressible in a statement 
itself but only in the form of a riddle or oracle, which in itself is opaque and with-
holds its truth precisely because its truth is not in the words but in its absence from 
the words as the divine 'otherness'. This 'otherness' is a force that is in control of 
language and thus it is 'Being' itself, which 'dispenses' (es gibt) Being to man, by 
determining understanding and ignorance, disclosure and withdrawae3. Greek wis-
dom is an 'askesis' of mediation between the totality and individuation, divine and 
human, madness and reason. Heidegger recovers here the constitution of individual-
ity and subjectivity. Both look towards the in-between within which wisdom lies and 
which artistic practice explores precisely because it ventures into the in-between 
which precedes individuation. Only after this experience can art solidify itself into an 
'object' . 
Socrates' use of dialectics is different from those previous sages by being directed at 
the 'ethical' or the comportment to knowledge rather than a purely theoretical prac-
30 Colli, GdPh, p.89 f. 
31 Colli, GdPh, p.90 
32 Colli, GdPh, p.90 
33 Co lli, GdPh, p.l 00 ff. 
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tice.34 One could object, that the speculations of the theoretical sphere have already 
been destroyed by the practices of Zeno and Gorgias. In the ruins of positive knowl-
edge there was nothing to rebuild and the only 'positive' action could be directed at 
the comportment towards knowledge itself. Into this gap Socrates inserts the method 
of 'elenchos' (inquiry leading to aporia), a fonn of dialectic as a co-operative exami-
nation and begins to inquire about the constitution of 'knowledge'. He maintains the 
qualitative difference between human knowledge and divine wisdom. The knowl-
edge Socrates seeks is not technical skill, but a knowledge of judgement of knowl-
edge itself. 'Ethics' evades positive statements and is therefore the space dialectics 
cannot destroy. Socrates shifts dialectic inquiry towards the ethical, under the topic 
of 'virtue', the classical 'arete' and the 'good' (agathon). It is 'action' (praxis) which is 
scrutinised and not positive 'theoretical' knowledge which has already been de-
stroyed. Actions cannot be true or false, they are good or bad. The original back-
ground of the divine is still remembered in the Socratic 'daimon' and 'mania' (mad-
ness).35 
The Stoics may have had an inkling of this history but by then their 'logos' has al-
ready become an autonomous region, the abstract principle of the cosmos itself and 
the dimension of the riddle and oracle (as the originary realm of reason) has been 
wiped out of memory except in the sphere of ethical education. There the difference 
between 'understanding' a text and the way of life was still at issue. This gap be-
tween an intellectual understanding of a logical twist and the living understanding 
seems to mirror the idea of the 'living word' of the archaic sage who lived with an 
understanding of both dimensions of the 'logos', reason and mania.36 The ethical edu-
cation did still take place in public and schools, but the original fonn was the dia-
logue. A dialogue is always a 'krisis', the moment in which something is decided 
which is not part of language itself; one has to 'seize this moment' and find the ap-
propriate word. A text does not offer such a moment, it does not stop and does not 
change its words in the moment. The basic idea of a dialogue is that it does not ex-
press clearly, instead it can only point towards something heterogeneous which in the 
end can accomplish the change of the state of the souL 
The background of the riddle is 'religious' inspiration and enthusiasm37, which itself 
34 Colli, GdPh, p.103; Socrates as Dionysius.Figure Hadot, PhWL, p.170 
35 Plato, Phaidros 244 .. 
36 Understanding the heterogeneity and distance of language, Colli, GdPh, p.90 
37 Colli, GdPh, p.89 f. 
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is impersonal through the union with the god (Apollo or Dionysius in the mysteries) 
or through the union with the universal 'logos' respectively; the surrender of indi-
viduality and surrender of the sensible. In both cases language has its normativity, its 
access to 'truth' not in the relation to an object (or an 'objective') but in its transcen-
dental function of supra-individual normativity. Therefore the early Stoa too is de-
termined by the 'good' as the empty never positively defined space of pure 'decision' 
(of the sage). The Cynics, however, seemed to have gone further than Socrates by 
putting into practice their access to reason as the only acceptable nonnative standard 
for their actions. This is why the question of proper justification hits the Cynics hard 
and ultimately forces a 'theorisation' in the Stoa. Nevertheless, the Stoics saw Cyni-
cism as a "short cut to virtue".38 
This leads us to the question of the voluntary and involuntary character of actions. It 
seems odd to us to understand the 'enthusiastic' (impersonal) fonn of reason (knowl-
edge) to be identified with 'volition'. The subjectivity capable of this has to be, as 
Plato would see it, already 'dead' to the sensible world so that its volition can be un-
derstood as impersonal anamnesis of the divine image of the 'good'. 
Wisdom, as knowledge, must have a criterion, at least if the analogy with 'techne' is 
to hold. Here we find the 'aporia' of wisdom, as normative knowledge, searching for 
its own 'normativity'. The Stoics proposed a 'way of life', within a language of in-
quiry about its own presuppositions. Giving account is ultimately what Socrates did. 
Later the Cynics saw themselves in opposition to the polis and its laws and taboos 
which appeared to be even more arbitrary than their own actions for which they 
could give account. The Stoics' cushioning of the bare decision of the Cynics pre-
vents us from seeing the source of action itself. Against the background of the ar-
chaic sage the Cynics could still reasonably claim a supra-individual source of all 
reason and oppose it to the laws and customs of the polis (particularly sexual taboos 
etc.), while placing their decision into the semidivine space of reason and wisdom, 
and 'logos' and 'physis'. 
The origin of the volition of the sage has to be understood in terms of the divine en-
thusiasm, which makes the 'individual' volition taking part and unifying with a form 
of divinity. This is also the proper understanding of the origin of 'autarkeia'. Not only 
is it the independence of the sage from the opinions of others, but also the independ-
ence from his own individual preferences i.e. 'pathe'. 
38 Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p.64 
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Stoic practices are, in all their divergence, tailored to this principle. While their doc-
trines vary (to a degree) their focus on 'bringing into language' what has been outside 
consideration, and ennoble it as 'a way of life', is still precisely what Socrates de-
manded. Compared to the confusion around them, the uncertainty of life, their 'con-
sidered' life was certainly therapeutic. At the same time it was not a therapy to main-
tain the status quo. Later Stoics did see their action in terms of a betterment of the 
whole of society, everybody could profit from 'philosophy', but was tailored to indi-
vidual practice first and foremost. The individual has to turn around his, or her, life 
first. In this sense language as an instrument discloses a new horizon. There is no 
judgement outside language and only within language can there be 'good' or 'bad'. 
The Stoics did understand reason as 'physis' itself, reason was 'natural' and therefore 
there is no nature to man outside language. The concept of language and reason is the 
sphere of virtue but virtue also needs material to its actions. This material are the 'in-
different' objects. They are the material of the sage's decisions, like the divine riddles 
are the material of the archaic sage. 
3. Socrates' Care of the Self 
Stoic ethics roots its normativity in a doctrine of cosmic reason but its ethics, the 
change of one's way of life is primary. Man is partaking in the cosmic determination 
through 'logos'. In this turn to Socratic teachings, the Stoic edifice extrapolates So-
cratic questioning of the constitution of the self to the constitution of the cosmos.39 It 
developed the ontological vocabulary necessary to turn Plato's 'mythological' argu-
ments about the cosmic idea of the 'good' into a coherent doctrine of 'physis', 'logos' 
and 'ethos'. The archaic ideal of 'arete' means to be virtuous in skills and this means 
in judgment. The sage and 'arete' coincide, and the good emanates from an increas-
ingly transcendent concept of 'arete' and 'agathon', which - as 'idea' - become an 
ontological foundation of normativity for human behaviour. 
Socrates initiates a reassessment of the dichotomy between 'physis' and 'nomoi' and 
Plato grounds his ethic in ontology:4o The Socratic gesture destroys imagined knowl-
edge 'doxa' / tradition and opens life to the risk of failure which is itself borne out of 
the Greek agon. His public display is therefore equally based on a disregard of "real-
ity". Instead he re-establishes a realm of action which is based on the wit of 'phrone-
39 Phaidon 9ge; Gorgias, 508a; Timaios 29d; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.17-19 
40 Phaidon 95e-99 
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sis' and the distinction between the (temporary-perceived) 'real' and the ethos ofhu-
man action (instructed by the daimon)_ The established reality of human action in 
'play' Cagon') is therefore different in quality from all other 'realities'_ 
Socratic 'logos' collects the faculties into an united 'soul' (self/ hypokeimenon), 
which constructs fonTIs of reflection and responsibility_ However, at the same time, 
as 'human-temporal' this unity is not self-sufficient and needs the 'daimon' as that 
wondrous un-canny CUn-geheure') and immediate 'access' to the divine_ The daimon 
provides 'wisdom' which is not human at all and beyond human discourse_ This and 
his claim of ignorance provides Socrates with the position of an intennediary be-
tween the divine and the human_ Socrates does 'not know' and this is what makes 
him different from all other people_ It also makes him closer to the divine, because 
only the divine has the knowledge proper to wisdom_ The daimon gives Socrates a 
link to this divine sphere_ 
Socratic irony appears as a self-separation_ Dissimulation of the self is a hiatus (RiB), 
which brings the divine and the human into a sharp relief Socrates' irony divides him 
between the two worlds, between the human and the gods_ He is on the way_41 The 
one who is 'on the way' is the bridge to the unity of essence and existence, Being and 
becoming_ Socrates as this 'bridge' tells us something important about the perspec-
tive of reflection_ The reference point of 'self' is incomprehensible if the self does 
not take measure from the divine_ The divine aspect, which was present in the riddles 
and oracles of the Presocratic time is still palpable in the Socratic persona_ The me-
diation towards the divine in tenns of the 'agathon', replaces the danger and menace 
of the divine oracle_ On the one hand Socrates re-enforces the split and division be-
tween our judgement and the desire for a secure world without surprises, on the other 
he also opens up the hiatus between essence and existence_ But maybe this is neces-
sary because the security that is demanded is not 'human', not 'real', like Socrates' ug-
liness, which hides his divine inside_42 Maybe, it is an ironic hyperbole to warn of the 
incertitude of human knowledge_ 
To be at home on the way, in the 'in-between' of man and the gods, as Heidegger puts 
it, is to be between two different ways ofthinking_43 Thinking has been put on the 
way, this is its (temporal) 'care-structure'_ For Heidegger, the two ways of thinking 
41 Hadot, Ph WL, p_90 
42 Hadot, Ph WL, p_152; Plato, Symposium, 221 e 
43nDas eigentliche Wesen des Denkens konnte sich uns zeigen, wenn wir unterwegs bleiben_ Wir sind 
unterwegs_ Was meint dies? Wir sind noch unter Wegen, inter vias, zwischen verschiedenen Wegen_n 
139 
today, are the 'calculative' thinking and 'Seinsdenken' .44 
Socrates has to be understood from the 'contemporary' critique of Sophists and Natu-
ral Philosophy.45 It is also an investigation into the human comportment necessary to 
scrutinise such apparent 'knowledge' (doxa) of the cosmos itself. How one conducts 
one's life, the 'way of life' determines ultimately what appears 'real'. Socratic consid-
eration seldom reveals another 'truth', instead it ends in 'aporia'. What is left in the 
state of aporia? It is the 'self as the place of thought which is left. The character of a 
soul is how it seeks out 'what' is real and what is not and this is what Socrates sees as 
the duty of everyone to care for. The character or 'hexis' or disposition is the mate-
rial which the Socratic discourse attempts to shape. This 'psychagoge' seduces the 
soul to its introspection, but the measure of introspection is the' divine' of which 
Socrates is the messenger.. 
The way Hadot describes Socrates as the intermediary, the atopos, is similar to Hei-
degger's 'on the way' (unterwegs), the in-between the 'calculable' and 'thinking of 
Being' (Seinsdenken). We find the character of the intermediary in Socratic irony. 
Socrates uses this self-separation to encourage his audience to get on the way them-
selves. On the way, during the dialogue he guides only to the point where there is no 
way out, 'aporia'. Here he leaves, he does not give answers. Everything is apart and 
up in the air. Irony forces the interlocutor to follow into the movement of the logos. 
Socrates' self-separation opens up the space within which this movement is possible. 
This 'on the way' does not tolerate security: Like in the 'play' (as agon) everything 
is at stake. This is also how Heidegger understands the "on the way" as 'strife' (po-
lemos) but in Socrates' dialogues the competitive aspect is very much palpable. 
There is never the security of arrival and self-identity. Irony separates and makes the 
place of dwelling an in-between: Apollo's arrows (thoughts). This is why man dwells 
in thought. 
The intermediary seem to signify the 'on the way', the risk of failure is a necessity to 
find a "way out,,46 of the 'aporia', while the imaginary security of identity and 
knowledge necessarily fails in any case. Socrates plays a game that both parties have 
to lose. Taking care of the self means to give to the human 'soul' (psyche) an 
Heidegger, Was heisst Denken, p.60 
44 But will 'Seinsdenken' be the vantage-point, like Adorno's "Erloesung", from which everything will 
be comprehensable? Adorno, Minima Moralia, § 153 
45 In addition we should remember the Peloponesian War and the state of civil war within Athens it-
self (Rule of the 30 etc.) as the driving force for such inquiries 
46 Hadot, Ph WL, p.162 
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autonomous place. This place can only be in 'logos' (language, thought and dis-
course). The Greek natural speculation did not thematise the place of knowledge, did 
not connect the ethos to the fonns of knowledge. Socrates turns this around by dia-
lectic destruction of apparent knowledge. This places the discourse about the possi-
bility of knowledge into the realm of the soul. The shape of the soul, its goodness, is 
the analysed. To be virtuous the soul has to 'know' what the 'virtue' is. Socrates then 
dialectically disposes of all 'positive' statements about what various virtues may be. 
The result is, that the 'logos' which could express this knowledge is not at our dis-
posal. The 'method' that Socrates uses is indirect. Through the destruction of'doxa' 
he attempts to 'kindle the fire of Eros' for proper knowledge. The 'Eros' is not hu-
man, it is one fonn of the divine 'mania' in which the god dispenses truth to humans. 
The Socratic gesture is as destructive to the structure of knowledge as Diogenes' 
club. Diogenes does not even allow dialogue any more, his staff-blow interrupts in-
stantly the logic of the questions: the question itself is put into question. He shows 
how easily and unpredictably sense turns into nonsense, how logos is cleverer than 
the questioner (excess of meaning). The vigilance of the philosopher is therefore not 
a pre-meditation, it is reason coming to pass in the moment, being there suddenly 
(with the help of the Socratic daimon). This is why it is an 'embodied' art like the art 
of drawing. There is practice to a degree but there is also an understanding how 
things come to pass that is intuitive and somehow outside the teachable and calcula-
ble. Neither Diogenes nor Socrates do teach - they point out, deictic, like language 
that is the intennediary, 'lekton'. (kindling the flame of...). Language is not autono-
mous. Diogenes' 'perfonnances' and Socratic dialectic do not express a positive doc-
trine, instead, through disillusionment they prod their interlocutors into self-critique 
(metastrophe) and conversion (metastrophe). 
4. Stoic Doctrine 
In Heraclitus' own time 'physis' is a nonnative cosmic principle. This was understood 
to be a critique of the contemporary moral and political praxis. Heraclitus sees 'lo-
gos', 'physis', 'cosmos' and 'nomos' as a (nonnative) unity. The Stoics appropriate the 
very same critical use of this 'fourfold'. Although they differentiate between univer-
sal and (individual) human nature, (koine and idia physis), the 'idia' is always di-
141 
rected towards the 'koine', cosmic 'logos' ('physis' and 'logos' are synonymous for 
Chrysippus) Partaking. 
The Stoic school emerged from Cynicism in the succession of Socratic inquiry about 
the self and virtue. Zeno, who was trained by the Cynic Crates, practices a less anar-
chic and less 'performative' form of Cynicism, but is still dependent on the Socratic 
concept of virtue being grounded in the' care of the self. Perfonning a practical 'cri-
tique' was the Cynics' basic tool of education, and sometimes rather embarrassing for 
the student So the Zenonian direction was a more measured method of reasoning but 
with the same 'disillusionment'-value. The Stoics try to upset all those 'unconscious' 
little presuppositions on which most, if not all, of our judgements are based, espe-
cially the 'pathe' (passions), which are also understood to be Judgements ('krisis'). 
Ultimately, under reasoned scrutiny all presuppositions must appear incongruent 
'Pathe' are based on deeply held irrational presuppositions about the opinions of 
other people and our assumptions about what is 'a good' (agathon) and what is not 
The basic Socratic argument is, that the only 'good' is virtue (arete) and everything 
else is not, or is only insofar as it supports virtue. The Cynics follow Socrates and 
radicalise his dialectic to some kind of 'deictic' performances in public, without much 
argument The disciple is left on his own to 'understand' what has happened to him 
and was given only the shortest of 'explanations'. The Stoics use 'explanation' but 
give up on the educational performace of the Cynics. These 'performances' seem 
quite similar to those stories about Zen-masters preying on their disciples to kick 
them out of complacency and the worship of authority. Stoa cloaks itself in the man-
tle of 'reason', while at the same time trying to keep its attention on the 'knowledge' 
that does not come from books but from the active experience of each individuaL 
Every situation is different and there can be no general answer to each single situa-
tion. Therefore the Stoic has to exercise his 'understanding', his 'discretio', of any 
situation and his response has to be genuinely made for this particular situation, at 
this particular time. Philosophy is the way to this frame of mind. Therefore all sys-
tematic explanations are not selfserving authoritative doctrines but tools in the hands 
of the teacher and the disciple to exercise and achieve their respective dispositions of 
the souL This 'end', or 'telos' of philosophy is called 'eudaimonia', a 'happy life'. It 
would be probably better to call it a 'well-lived life', since 'happiness' is today com-
monly used to describe precisely what the Stoics argue against: material (external) 
goods. 
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The "pursuit of happiness" as written into the American Declaration oflndepencence 
has been, according to a brief paragraph in Nussbaum, due to those who wrote it 
been educated on Epictetus and Seneca.47 Whatever the reasons, it would be difficult 
to see these words meaning anything else but the classical 'eudaimonia', particularly 
in the context of "freedom" etc ... A constitution which promotes 'eudaimonia' is rare. 
Freedom and eudaimonia are the highest ends of the philosophical life, they cannot 
be given a market value. An 'eudaimonic' life therefore does not depend on external 
goods, since they are not 'good' (agathon) in themselves rather it depends on the dis-
position of the soul. It is tempting to understand this 'disposition' in terms of "authen-
ticity", ("Eigentlichkeit") and I will try to argue that this is a quite legitimate tempta-
tion.48 In the previous chapter I attempted to describe Heidegger's conception of the 
process of Dasein's self-understanding (resolve) in terms of self-analyses of precon-
ceptions - 'thrownness'. I will try to support this with a, necessarily, rather narrow 
interpretation of basic Stoic practices. My argument is that Heidegger's claim, that 
the 'Daseinsanalyse' is a purely ontological investigation, tries to distract from the 
fact that a classical philosophical tradition is implicitly used to explain a fonn of em-
bodiment of the temporal-historical sway of Being. The reason the Stoics could insist 
on reasonable arguments is that they had close contact with their interlocutors and 
the danger of 'reason' being pursued for its own ends could be prevented. Not so ob-
viously in the age of technology, where reason has become what the Stoics feared, 
namely the means to secure access to external goods: resources. They nevertheless 
would have argued that philosophy in their sense, as a 'techne psyche' is precisely not 
a case of 'metaphysics' and 'Seinsvergessenheit', but the proper use of language under 
supervision, because nothingness (or Being) is restored by the 'revaluation of all val-
ues' (i.e. of external goods); in Stoic practice of philosophy the world becomes 
transparent to Being. 
To gauge what the Stoic are talking about when they discuss passions, it is very in-
structive to read some of Seneca's tragedies, and some of his contemporary history 
was not any less violent, What they see as the everyday cruelty of man against man 
is far beyond our experience, and they ascribe it purely to the reign of passions. They 
see the soul being gripped by the raging passion without the means to escape it. The 
tortured soul is the soul in the grip of passion: it is passively enduring its rage. Phi-
47 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.5 
48 On G.Nebel, Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.202, 
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losophy is the 'way oflife' in accordance with 'logos', the 'homologoumenos bios' is 
a life that uncovers the falsehood (pseudos) which brings about the impulse of this 
madness. The soul is a plastic material and by nature (i.e. by the ability to speak) 
open to change and so the ability to 'not act like this'. The ability not to be passive to 
one's passions means to consider one's actions. And consideration means 'knowl-
edge', not in a scientific sense but in the sense of having the skills to uncover what 
lies in a situation. It is a difficult - and possibly umesolved - question how the Stoics 
intend to deal with passions; extirpating them or just observing and not giving in to 
them. Their exercises were quite clearly the permanent self-awareness of 'emotional' 
responses. Epictetus in his laconic way to nail down his points is exemplary for this. 
Like a mantra he repeats the ultimate Stoic question: "ls it in my power or not?" - if 
it is not: what do I have to do with it? Always following the traces of passions which 
tum our lives upside down the Stoic discovers their deceit through 'awareness' (pro-
soche). I am interested in those exercises of the disposition to a hesitation within the 
impulses to actions. The Stoic may not rid himself of passions but he is not pushed 
into inappropriate actions by their impulse. The Stoa is a practice of the 'self or 'psy-
che'. It combines education, exercise and doctrine to develop reasoned actions in an 
unfathomably complex but luckily 'logical' cosmos. But Stoa is a practice first and 
foremost. Its doctrines are a support-structure. 
In Stoic doctrine, all technical concepts are fundamentally realigned to (cosmic) 
'physis' and 'logos'-. Only in this overarching causality is the Stoic ethics sufficiently 
plausible. The deterministic cosmos constitutes the fundamental problem of human 
freedom, which remains umesolved. The 'arche' of matter Chyle') and spirit 
('pneuma'), the passive and active principle (and their four elements (stoicheia): fire 
(or ether), water, air, earth) constitute the cosmos. The causes (aitiai) describe how 
things effect each other. Therefore, in a materialist cosmos, everything has to have a 
reason Caitia', Grund). The four categories are the fundamental questions by which 
the state of affairs can be described. Stoa quietly supposes a relation between thing 
and predicate. In language the predications of a thing can be analysed by thought, but 
the 'thing' remains an indissolubly mixture of pneumatic and hyletic 'matter' which 
cannot be separated. So the analysis that takes place in thought only does not impact 
in a material way on the thing itself.49 According to this the 'self can be subjected to 
49 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.81 
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such an analyses too. One can say that the Stoic semantic was not a naively represen-
tationallanguage theory. 
Stoic physics is based on the two arche ofhyle and pneuma (as the 4 elements), but 
one should not 'ontologise' these elements. They are merely differentiations in 
thought and do not have any 'reality' in themselves. 50 Everything consists of individ-
ual mixtures which are not separable except in thought.51 
The cosmos is a dynamic (tonike kinesis) unity 52, like a living organism. All things 
happen providentially from the perspective of the cosmic logos who is aware of all 
the causal connections in all time. The human partaking in logos, meaning that in 
consideration man can see and understand aspects of this reason which governs all 
aspects of life, supposes this unitary rule of the cosmos and an equivalent under-
standing on behalf of man. 
Theoria is not the paradigmatic reference of human understanding as it was for Aris-
totle. For him 'sophia-theoria' is the primary form of knowledge. It is not instrumen-
tal knowledge and only concerned with eternal laws while phronesis-praxis is a 
knowledge about actions and poiesis-techne the knowledge to produce something 
other than the act itself. The Stoics seem to shorten this division in that phronesis be-
comes the paradigm of knowledge. Praxis is then founded on the eternal logos, on 
the right disposition of the soul that partakes in the universal 'logos'. The disposition 
of the soul is produced and produces, and the results of this knowledge, judgements 
as actions ('to poiein' ) are 'poiesis'. 53 The assenting or dissenting judgement or act is 
an action in the sense of poiein.54 The impulse (horme) necessitates the action itself. 
It becomes therefore difficult, almost impossible to distinguish assent (kri-
sis/judgment), impulse, intention (horme) and poiein. However, 'krisis', the judge-
ment itself is an act of 'poiein', and the internal durable disposition, the second cate-
gory, 'poion', the product of 'poiesis' insofar it is a change in the (,material') disposi-
tion. The Stoic 'phronesis' extends from the pure knowledge of virtue towards the 
virtuous action, which appears to unite sophia and phronesis into a single item which 
is, for the Stoics a durable disposition. 
50 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.31 
51 "Die Bestimmung des Verhaltnisses von Sprache, Erkenntnis und nichtsprachlicher Wirklichkeit 
affiziert in eminenter Weise die Auslegung der Stoischen Ethik. Die Stoa basiert, wie zu zeigen sein 
wird, die Erkenntnis der Inhalte sittlicher Orientierung auf die Erfahrung einer objektiv-teleologisch 
interpretierten Natur." Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.39 f. 
52 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.SO 
53 phantasia - synkatasthesis - horme - poiein 
54 F orschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.116 
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The aim of ethics is the appropriate action (katorthema) in any particular situation. 
The Stoic exercises and theories are moulded to help this task. Although the Stoic 
system prides itself to be the most coherent, in the background is always the Socratic 
'care' of the own soul." ... the only things which are intrinsically good or bad are the 
conditions of the self' .55 
As far as I can see, the Stoic 'doctrine' does not intend to be 'law' or rule, rather it is 
the training of 'awareness' ('prosoche'); practical wisdom does not lead to 'laws' like 
'theoria'. Instead, 'phronesis' is the activity in the realm that is not understood and 
without fixed rules. Every situation needs an immediate appropriate response which 
is virtuous. 
a. Oikeiosis as Familiarity 
Oikeiosis connects Stoic claims about reason and determination with a basically 
pragmatic view of experience and intelligibility of the world. Oikeiosis is the origi-
nary understanding, similar to Heidegger's Dasein understanding things through us-
age. It is a pragmatic 'always already' understanding, a pre-understanding of oneself 
and relation to beings.56 Within this familiarity we already have the experience of 
understanding things and being able to act with consideration. 
The 'prote horme' the primal drive (and not pleasure or desire - hedone) discloses the 
natural understanding of the world. Therefore it is 'natural' and 'instinctive' for hu-
man beings to care for their survival and children etc.; it desires what is good and 
avoids harmful things. Such a being which seeks to protect and enhance its own exis-
tence knows always already what is good for it or otherwise. In its choice it defines 
the 'telos' of its existence. This strive detennines the self-relation of beings. 57 
In addition to this comes the human propensity for the use of 'logos' as the 'technites 
hormes', technician of these drives.58 Reason enables man to conceptualise from ex-
perience but not in an abstract way.59 It is the ability to structure and use experience 
in relation to external goods (relating to the animal nature). This increase in planning 
and understanding leads to an extension of the purpose of the 'honne' to not only take 
care of its physical survival, but to the survival of the faculty of reason itself. In the 
55 M. Schofield, Stoic Moral Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. B. Inwood, 
p.234; also Epictetus III. 21, 18-19 
56 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.146 
57 Cicero De finibus III,5 .16 sensus sui: defines the 'own' and the other; and accounts for the animal 
nature, and the 'life according nature'. (Seneca, Epistulae 121,5) 
58 Diogenes Laertius, Lives, VII. 86 
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development of a human being, it recognises that the use of reason is natural to its 
existence and worth being cared for. At this point the faculty of reason becomes 
more valuable ( desirable) than external goods.6o 
The doctrine of oikeiosis, explains why men strive for certain things and how these 
interests change by age etc. This incorporates instincts and sociability but for men 
also the 'logos' as the mediating force of the adult. This force expresses itself in a 
considered judgment about what is good or bad, as a distinction which is completely 
in his control independent of external facts. 61 
Oikeiosis as a natural social bond does not only hold for the city of the state one has 
been borne into, but is expanded to the whole of humankind. Interestingly it is not an 
instinctive social drive but is developed with the development of the logical faculty 
itself Although 'logos' is 'natural' it transcends what is naturally given (and what 
happens by itself)62 by the freedom of moral choice of the reasoning subject.63 
Oikeiosis and prolepsis, describe the universal and common starting point of undif-
ferentiated, general (including ethical) knowledge which is present of itself and 
which becomes the subject of methodical reflection.64 
b. Categories 
The categories are questions with which a 'being' or a state of affairs can be de-
scribed in a meaningful way. The four categories are: 'hypokeimenon' (substance), 
'poion' (qualified), 'pos echonta' (disposed), and 'pros ti pos echonta (disposed in re-
lation to something else). The last three are participles65 and intelligible only in rela-
tion to substances. "ontological aspects" of beings as mixtures of bodies. 'Poion' is a 
durable disposition, while 'pos echonta' are more temporary alterations (hand-fist). 
The 'pros ti' as a external 'relation to' is a 'quality' with regard to the whole of the 
cosmos (e.g. obligations towards other people etc.);66 
'Poion', the category of 'qualified' substances (hypokeimenon [that later becomes the 
'subject' as Heidegger points out]), comes from the same root as 'poiesis', the activity 
59 no 'dihairesis', meaning the classification of genus and species etc. (DL, VII 52) 
60 Cicero DeFin. III. 6.20-21; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.152 
61 Wrong judgements (i.e. evil) is then explained with the doctrine of the various causes by which 'lo-
gos' can be mislead. 
62 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.159 
63 Cicero De fin. III, 19.63; Hierocles, Ethische Elementariehre Ko!. IXX,2 ff.; S.G.Pembroke, 
Oikeiosis, in Problems in Stoicism, p.114 ff. 
64 Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethics 1195 a I ff. 
65 Jacques Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, p.228 
66 Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics, p.23 I 
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of a techne. The 'poion' expresses "a dispositional state, not necessarily permanent, 
but highly durable; such features require the presence of a causally active 'poiotes' in 
the subject (for example, prudence in the prudent man).,,67 The disposition of charac-
ter therefore needs a material cause unlike the hand making a fist, which is merely a 
momentary 'pos echon'. The category of 'poi on' is important because it secures a be-
ing's identity within time, without which no individual freedom could be main-
tained.68 The 'poi on' is open to 'poiesis', to production or in this case education. Such 
a production does take place for its own end, which according to Aristotelian distinc-
tions would make it a 'praxis'. In Stoic materialism and causality, however, this dis-
tinction is less clear.69 
Chrysippus criticises Aristo and argues against a plurality of virtues. Instead, for him 
virtue is a 'poi a', 70 a durable state or quality of the soul. As such, it is a body mixing 
with another body to achieve the mixture of a virtuous person. As a stable mixture it 
defines the individual quality of a soul. This durable state, or disposition ofthe soul 
determines its actions (the motivation of actions). This state is not 'given', instead it 
is possible under conditions. There are exercises, Caskesis') which change the quality 
(poion) of the hypokeimenon (substance or "Zugrundeliegendes", i.e soul, which has 
not yet become 'subject'). 
c. Fate (heimarmene) and Determinism 
Stoic determinism was the preferred target for their contemporaries, saying that it is 
incompatible with human freedom. In fact it would make any ethic irrelevant (lazy 
argument etc.). Fate (heimarmene) is the cosmic logos in past, future and present. 
Therefore, if the doctrine of causality is taken seriously, teleological determinism is a 
necessary result. Apparently this determinism is a mixture of Platonic, Aristotelian 
and atomist thoughts. (1) Platon (Nomoi 10) connects 'physis' and 'tyche' with 'logos' 
and 'telos', physis is not itself a principle of order, it needs a cosmic pneuma or 
'nous' as an ordering force. (2) Aristotle's concepts of chance (automaton) and fate 
(tyche) do resist the concept ofa universal reason of the whole cosmos. Aristotle, 
like Plato differentiates the 'telos' of a contingent reality from a divine reality of eter-
67 Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics, p.230, The relation of Stoic categories to their grammar is also dis-
cussed in Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, pA7 
68 'idion poios'= individual qualities and 'koinos poion' = qualities of a genus) Forschner, Die Stoische 
Ethik, pAS 
69 Assent/judgment is cause of actions (to poiein); Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.116 
70 Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics, p.232 
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nallaws which is perfectly detennined.71 (3) Leukipp and Demokrit: developed ato-
mism as a causal detennination instead of a teleological one; a materialistic, mecha-
nistic and causal cosmic process.72 
The question of free will is the question if 'one could have acted differently'. The 
theory of actions (judgement - phronesis), however, is a psychology. It is concerned 
with the material state of the soul. This means the Stoic solution of this question lies 
purely in the internal state CGemlit', Stimmung), as an 'attitude' or disposition. There-
fore the sage is able to avoid 'confrontation' with the uncontrollable external world of 
things. The view of the sage is turned inside, not only because it is the source of the 
logos, but also because this internal logos is part of the cosmic logos, which mirrors 
the order of the external whole. What is not in our control cannot be predicted and 
whatever happens is 'adiaphora' in relation to the virtue of the sage. The contempo-
raries of the Stoics were not convinced, but the argument is neat and puts the Stoic 
focus on philosophical praxis as the exercise of the soul to become virtuous (and thus 
partake in the 'logos') into the foreground. What is important is the method of dis-
illusionment of one's own actions, making one's own actions transparent will eventu-
ally lead to an 'understanding' ofthe way things happen in the external world. i.e. 
thatthey are not in our control an no reason to bother us. 
Stoic detenninism is a template to all disputes about human freedom. Everything is 
detennined by providence. To act virtuously means to act appropriately in any given 
situation, not following a law that is imposed, but following a 'natural state of mind'. 
Happiness (eudaimonia) means to follow (cosmic) nature which "requires living in 
accordance with virtue".73 If cosmic nature 'physis' is also rational 'logos',74 it holds 
that this disposition is 'rational' in the Stoics view. The connecting point between na-
ture and virtue is reason. To live according to nature means to live according to rea-
son, which again means according to virtue. This however does not mean a 'mathe-
matical', calculating, character of reason as we have become used to. For instance: It 
is unreasonable to mourn for ever after someone close has died. The emotional dis-
turbance leads to an unreasonable disposition which leads to suffering. Suffering is 
not reasonable. This does not mean the Stoic sage does not have pain, this means that 
71 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.10l ff. (three causae, 'aitiai' in Aristotle, Physis, 196 b 10-29); 
physis moves according to 'telos'. 
72 Still, there is latent determinism in Plato and Aristotle: the realm of actions is influenced by inborn 
and acquired habits. Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.104 f. 
73 T.M. Irwin, Stoic Naturalism and ist critics, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, p.346 
74 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.2l7 
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his judgement or belief is never impeded by it, i.e. he does not start blaming or com-
plaining about humans being mortal. But importantly he does not judge what hap-
pens as morally 'bad'. Suffering lies in the 'logos' about the pain, not the pain itself 
For the Stoics, reasoning is not only about detennining what the appropriate action 
is, but also an exercise to effect a 'material' change of one's own disposition. What is 
our 'own', is the 'self as 'soul'. In this play of cause and effect the Stoic detenninism 
is in a way a necessary counterbalance of the freedom of the soul. Freedom is to fol-
low the flow of the cosmos: 'eurheua'. Exercises in reasoning and contemplation act 
on the soul, and change materially its 'hexis' or disposition75 in such a way, that it be-
comes more 'homologoumenos bios', similar to the universal logos. It is therefore 
understandable that, whatever happens externally, the internal agency always has the 
possibility to act one way or other because in alignment with the cosmic logos, it par-
takes in the whole Ckoine physei') of the cosmos. The sage therefore always follows 
the 'logos' and will not try to act against it (i.e. wish something that is not in his 
power). The 'reasoning' and 'hexis' of the sage has the fonn of a disposition of mind 
and is synonymous with phronesis.76 This way the Stoics extend the reach of 
'phronesis' into what would have been seen as theoretical wisdom (sophia). This hap-
pens, if virtue is made the highest telos and the measure of all external things. Be it 
as it may, it is certain that the connection ofphronesis with the cosmic logos in the 
phrase 'homologoumenos bios' means that its actions are somehow justified by re-
course to those universal rules, i.e. everyday actions (at least of the sage) are directly 
authorised by the cosmic logos. 
The 'highest end', the 'telos' of Stoic philosophy, is therefore not separated into dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge (sophia, phronesis, techne) here all knowledge is meas-
ured by the concept of virtue. And furthennore, it is not an examinable knowledge 
but manifests itself solely in the intention of the act rather than in the act itself Inten-
tions are not subject to fate, they are solely in the power of the self in depending on 
its mode or disposition. Since the disposition is susceptible to exercise, it is in the re-
sponsibility of every individual to fonn the mind in a way in which it can follow 
physis / logos, which itself melts into indistinction with virtue. 
Fate and detenninism, from the point of view of philosophy, are the necessary base-
line to develop the concept of internal freedom, independent of the external world, 
75 disposition as 'diathesis' (reasoning) Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.213 
76 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.205 
150 
just as the remit of reason is extended with the purpose to disrupt orthodoxies of 
every kind just as Socrates used of all tricks of rhetoric to set himself and his inter-
locutor up in the aporia of knowledge. 
d. Pathe 
The most discussed subject within Stoic ethics are emotions or passions (affects or 
'pathe').The alleviation of suffering needs a theory of 'suffering' and passions are the 
cause of suffering. One should always remember that the Stoa tries to rationalise 
those practices and exercises that it has developed rather than developing an ontol-
ogy and deduce rules for life from it. One should also take into account that even in 
classical times there has been a shortage of 'sages', so if everyone is irrational except 
the sage most people are irrational. The Stoic discussions of the psychology of im-
pulses is always a practical exercise within a particular situation (ad hominem). 
Pathe, pachein, passive and passion come from the same root and mean 'passivity' as 
in 'suffering an illness'; 'being acted upon', rather than being active. The sage may be 
ill, because this is his fate, but he will not submit to the impulse that this is a moral 
'bad', because he 'knows' that it is morally indifferent. In the Stoic doctrine of ' pat he', 
the aspect of differentiation is that they are all directed at an external good which can 
never be a moral good. The pathe which make us think that something is good are 
pleasure and desire, and those that make us think of something as bad are pain and 
fear. 
A perception is always a 'phantasia' and an ("proposition-like") 'axiomata', image and 
proposition.77 This means whatever we 'see' we have immediately with it its 'mean-
ing'. Now I have the choice to assent with this impression (,synkatasthesis') or not. 
We assent to it or not. But how do we? Usually, we do not deliberate, the impulse is 
the belief that drives our actions. Equally, doubt inserts itself within a fluid series of 
actions without our deliberation. These are not lengthy conscious 'deliberations' 
about the probability of the perception being true or not. Therefore it is not necessar-
ily clear what kind of hesitation there may be that could interfere between a percep-
tion and a 'pathe' making us assent and act in one way or other. The doctrine of pas-
sions is dependent on the possibility of accurate perceptions. Not only sensual and 
cognitive, but particularly the perception of the internal psychical life which comes 
under the scrutiny in Stoic exercises. Deliberation can therefore exercise the faculty 
77 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.68 f. 
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of judgement but the immediate and correct intuition of the situation is dependent of 
the sage's immutable disposition. We perceive something including its accompany-
ing 'axiomata', and guess its correctness. This works fine as long as we encounter 
things in a relationship which Heidegger would call 'being concerned with' (Be-
sorgen). What the Stoic's assent is about, in my opinion, is that it is not only that our 
judgement can establish a correlation between the perception and a world, a mere 
correspondence or "correctness,,78 but it is a judgement about the 'agathon' the good 
or otherwise of this perception. Although 'correctness' is presupposed, its realm is re-
stricted to the question of 'virtue' only. Passions determine the familiar relation to 
things. If we are hungry food is 'good'. Not so the Stoic, for him only the intention 
with which we utilise food is good or bad. The sage does not have passions in this 
sense because he is always aware which things are indifferent, and which actions are 
good and which are not. His passions are called 'eupatheiai', which are: joy, volition 
and caution (in respect of perceptions which are unclear he withholds his judge-
ment). 
Impulse, Chorme') "is the necessary condition for action", 79 it is a motion of the soul 
and a mental event as a reaction to an impression. It can be articulated as the 'move-
ment' of the soul towards something. 'Dianoia' is thought and consideration, it is the 
application of 'logos' in one way or other, but it seems impossible for men not to use 
it perfectly, except for the sage. The guiding question of the Stoic discussions is how 
to act appropriately = rationally (in the absence of gods and sages). "Pathe" are'im-
pulses' based on wrong evaluation which lead irresistibly to actions. Therefore 'pathe' 
are judgements since only a judgement of assent can lead to an action. 
This leads to another sort of impulse in the non-sage: the 'selection'. Stoic education 
is about the right choice of action. There is however, a class of objects, which are in-
different, which are nevertheless beneficial or not, like food or health or illness etc. 
Therefore it is not bad to have a meal, but because it is never sure one can attain a 
meal when one expects it, one should therefore limit one's expectations too. This 
"impulse with reservations" (B.273) is a purely practical advice, for training 'aware-
ness' Cprosoche') to one's actions. Stoic philosophy is interested mostly in this 'tech-
nical' side. Therefore its terminology is also determined by its application in the tui-
tion of their followers. 
78 Heidegger, Wegmarken, 'V om Wesen der Wahrheit', p.76 f. 
79 Tad Brennan, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, p.265; impulse = assent, Brunschwig, 
Stoic Metaphysics, p.IIO, fn3 
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This namely, not control-freakery and pathological extermination of 'passions' is the 
aim of Stoic exercises, it is a disposition of the soul to evaluate things differently. 
Stoic freedom lies in the possibility of 'apatheia' or 'ataraxia', which means not acting 
on wrong impulses which are determined by the external things .Tranquillity of the 
soul regardless of the external state of affairs is only possible if the value of things 
has been understood properly as indifferent. It is the possibility to act otherwise, 
other than assenting to the (irresistible) impulse of the passions. 
Eupatheia is the opposite of pathe. Suffering does not only mean discomfort, it most 
of all means that one's soul is determined by external things (desire for -, or fear of 
something). Eupatheia, means to be able to live in tranquillity of the soul, because 
external things do not cause disturbance. It does not therefore mean to be in control 
of what is outside oneself, but to be aware of how the soul considers and accords 
value to things that occur. Internal consideration determines the 'ontological' status 
of things, i.e. the way they 'presence' themselves. The Stoics define this space in the 
mind of an individual, constituted by the ability to 'select' through a consideration of 
arguments or by disposition, as the space where a human is independent from the ex-
ternal state of affairs. The Stoics stipulate therefore that virtue is a state in which the 
self-forgotten relation to things is disrupted. This means man is revealed as obsessed 
with things and has to be dis-illusioned from their 'reality' (ifhe suffers enough to 
want to do so). The human is here disclosed as the site of judgement which is neither 
identical with being absorbed by its relation to beings nor dispassionate atemporal 
spirit. On the contrary, the whole procedure leads back to the involvement with the 
things but on a 'different level'. Heidegger describes the effect of 'resolve' 
(Entschlossenheit) in precisely in the same way. In 'Gelassenheit' he describes the 
possibility to change the comportment towards technical things, and not to be gov-
erned by them. Later in the text he calls it a 'letting-be'. This 'letting-be' is based on 
the Aristotelian idea that things appear to us before we inquire into their being, they 
'presence themselves'. This 'presencing' is more originary than the inquisition, the 
court of reason. It is concerned with an intuition of beings which is originary but has 
been forgotten, just like the virtuous intuition is natural and has to be recovered.8o 
Suffering is what lets people contemplate the state of affairs. This is already the point 
at which we hesitate to take things for granted and to withhold judgment, and we 
80 Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind, p.303 
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hesitate to assent to the 'phantasiai hormetikai' (passions). This is what ancient 'eupa-
theia' and 'eudaimonia' mean more than anything else: 'not to be driven like that', to 
have the ability not to act on (misunderstood) desires or (wrong) beliefs. 
The Stoics understand their 'project' in terms of emotional health rather than seeking 
absolute certainty. So, although their 'project' is a 'critical' epistemology, they would 
not have understood the desperation for a certainty other than a moral one, since all 
else takes place in a causal cosmos of destiny which is morally neither good nor bad 
but indifferent and not worth of certainty. 
However, what is equally implicit is that human beings are not 'naturally' without 
suffering, depending on their individual dispositions that result from the 'natural' 
mixtures. Naturally people desire pleasure and fear pain and all subsequent passions 
like jealousy, regret, mourning etc. and they make a judgement that this is a good or 
bad action. What causes 'suffering' is in Stoic terms the wrong judgement. The 
judgement or belief implicit in an passion (due to it being an impulse to action) has 
to be educated, otherwise it causes suffering. The human soul has enough plasticity 
in this system for it to be altered. Ethics is not "natural", it is consequence ofreflec-
tive understanding, of prolepsis ['prolepsis' 'scheme' of (natural) pre-conceptions are 
a priori tendencies or impulses common to all people]. 'Prolepsis' is the necessary 
'pre-conception' of the morally good and bad that is part of human universal nature 
Ckoine physis') but it needs to transcend the mere natural horme by following the 
'natural' faculty of reason. 81 
e. Unity of the Soul 
Implicit in such a practice of judgement is a mental unity of the acting agent. Al-
though the Stoics talk about parts of the soul, it is made clear that it is a conceptual 
or rather functional separation only. 'Logos' in this sense is the unifying force within 
the human being, which enables it to 'will' and to change its disposition. Without this, 
there would be no agent of such a volition. Nevertheless, the 'logos' is part of Stoic 
conception of 'physis', nature; 'physis' and its two principles are the normative forces 
for all actions.82 The mixture of matter and pneuma, and 'tonike kinesis', or 'tonus' 
control the principles of all individuation. Movements in the 'force-field' determine 
the disposition of the individual. 83The Stoic soul, 'hegemonikon' unites all internal 
81 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.155 
82 'logos' as a 'force-field', Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.58 
83 Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics. p.29 
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faculties of the mind (imagination, impression, assent, desire and reason are the pos-
sible states of the hegemonikon Cpos echon', in a relation).84 From this it becomes 
clearer, that the structure of Stoic physics and categories is tailored towards the ex-
planation of reasoned/virtuous acts. The soul is suspended in the force-field and dis-
tribution of the natural logos, and only within the soul the logos acquires the particu-
lar function of thought - 'noein' Cdianoia'), as a unifying force of the individual itself 
Only a unified self can have responsibility. In other words, human nature is disposed 
to reflection, which means it considers by natural disposition not by an external rea-
son.
85 The internal qualities ('poiotes,)86 are therefore more important for the realm of 
good or bad, rather than the resulting (external) acts themselves. 87 
f. Exercises (askesis) 
Historically the Stoa has developed on the basis of the individual 'care of the self as 
it was proposed by Socrates and the Cynics. It also adopted a mixture of systematisa-
tion from Platonism and Aritotelianism. However, these systematic parts were rather 
didactical and developed under the critique of competing schools. 
Judgment, selection and assent are events, not states: the disposition of the soul is a 
'state', which guarantees the 'appropriate actions' (katechonta). 'Selection' is central to 
Stoic practice: (1) the sage's: choice/volition is always virtuous (,hairesis'); (2) the 
disciple'S Cprokopton') selection of preferred indifferents ('ekloge') always vicious. 
Stoic practices strengthen the (Socratic) 'self in its 'autarkeia'. Something that was 
alien to Socrates who depends on a personal daimon, as the intrusion and interfer-
ence which supports but also limits the 'self and connects it to an external divine. In 
a way, the Stoics appropriated the Socratic 'daimon' into their concept of individual 
and cosmic 'logos'. The way man is able to part-take in the universal logos becomes 
his 'daimon' guiding him to make a right judgment. The whole cosmos is a continu-
ous material-spritual mixture of which principles can be discerned, but which form 
84 "Gesundheit oder Krankheit der Seele, d.h. Tugend oder Laster und ihre Aeusserungen lassen sich 
dann bestimmen durch die Kategorien 'poion' und 'pos echon', des dauernden und voeruebergehenden 
Zustands des Logos in den einzelnen Funktionen in die er eingelassen ist; "es gibt Teile der Seele; in 
sie ist der Logos der Seele eingelassen; und es gibt eine bestimmte Verfassung im Logos; und die 
Seele ist schoen oder haesslich entsprechend dem herrschenden Teil, der sich so oder so verhaelt in 
seinen eigenen Teilen"." (Anm. 59: SVF II, 47la Galen) Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.60 
85 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.132 
86 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.62 
87 "Mit der Bestimmung der Tugend als 'hexis' (,diathesis') bzw. 'poiotes' ist der begriffliche Rahmen 
rur jene Verinnerlichung der Stoischen Ethik bereitet, die den sittlichen Habitus des Subjekts unab-
hangig vonjenen Haltungen und BetiHigungen denkt; die an die Gegebenheit von Umstanden und den 
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an inseparable unity. The disposition of the sage is a localised durable mixture. His 
ability to intuitively suspend judgement is based on the exercise of' awareness' (pro-
soche). The choice of the sage is based on these two things the disposition and 
awareness. 
There are various examples of exercises, but the main thrust pertains to two themes. 
The discretio between "what is in our power and what is not" and the complex issue 
of ' pat he', emotions. What is exercise in discretio? It is a practice of producing a 
judgement on whether to assent to an impression or not. Awareness Cprosoche') to 
what presents itself - the situation as far it is discernible - is at the heart of both, the 
art of judgement and the question of pathe. The application of the judgement to any 
situation, is a practice of reasoning. But this reason means first of all taking account 
of the own position and dis-position. It is not just the external situation but equally 
the internal, psychical situation that is opened up in the practice of ' pro soc he'. 'Pathe', 
understood as (wrong) judgement, is put under observation form another point or 
perspective. But this perspective is not just a further point of view at all. If we do not 
mistake the insistence on 'logic' or 'reason' as a scientific 'objective' reason, but as a 
process of re-considering what one has just thought, instead of following it 'blindly', 
'prosoche' is a mode of 'consideration' and a standing apart of thought. Within the 
gap inside the immediacy of consciousness the Stoic philosophical practice takes 
place as a production of the disposition of the 'soul', the character, that itself pro-
duces judgements. 
Ethic is not a list of rules. Instead, through these exercises the character changes the 
understanding of a situation and the appropriate action follows intuitively. (The right 
judgement is given to the self of the right 'disposition', and this disposition is attain-
able in exercise (askesis). This disposition is based on a 'logos', which itself has, as 
we saw, itself its roots not just in 'reason' but also in a divine 'mania'. Stoic provi-
dential and causal cosmos positions human freedom as a practice of the self, which is 
separated from the rest (autarkeia). This way the ethical is the only 'real' and secure 
possibility of the soul. The 'ethical', if understood from the lagon' is precisely what 
comes as fate from the divine (daimonia) as divine judgment, i.e. the 'un-canny'. 
Stoic determinism means, whatever happens universally (cosmos as one whole or-
ganism) and locally is fate (heimarmene) in the sense of logical but incomprehensi-
Besitz ausserer Mittel gebunden sind." Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.66 
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ble causality. Virtue is here more then the Aristotelian measure, it is a concept of 
transcendence which relates men to a totality. 
'Choice' or 'selection' however is an individual responsibility. I may judge food to 
have value, but it is not a 'good' ('agathon') in any ethical sense; whether it is ethi-
cally good or not lies purely in the way my judgement has been made, i.e. in the in-
tention. This makes me think of the judgement of the Stoic less as a judgment, apply-
ing a given rule to a situation (following naturel'kata physin'), than a decision about 
the applicability of a judgment. As long as the object is external to the selection it-
self, this object is adiaphora. Virtue is self-referential and is not dependent on the ex-
ternal object's 'value'. Nevertheless, these external things are the 'material' to which 
the judgement or discretio of the sage is applied88. The sage's relation to the 'adia-
phoron' is virtuous too, so his impulse - judging it 'adiaphoron' - is virtuous. Virtue is 
the virtuous impulse from the virtuous disposition itself.89 The sage however is able 
to use the adiaphoron in any way he sees fit (virtuous) because he will not be se-
duced to ascribe any moral value to it. 
The Stoics regard the production of a judgement as 'poiesis'. In any given situation a 
decision is taken anew (an event) but it is based on a durable state of the soul;90 The 
decision ([pro ]hairesis) about the assent / action to what presents itself, is a material 
creation of the soul (but in accordance with 'logos', 'homologoumenos bios,).91 Even 
if the non-sage perfonns the same action in the same situation, his action will not be 
virtuous, because his disposition is not virtuous and he does not have virtuous im-
pulses. The assent / action is always new ('fresh') because it is the event in the mo-
mentary situation. The judgement has to be made anew each time in accordance with 
the phantasia and axioma. The sense is, that the sage's assent to the situation and the 
virtuous act seems to be the same, cutting short the process of consideration because 
it is already hard-wired into the sage; to him virtue is immediate intuition. Then the 
sage might just be a robot? The 'prokop ton', the philosophising adept struggles and 
for him each situation is new. In the practice of 'consideration' he does not under-
stand the situation perfectly nor does he understand completely his own presupposi-
tions - he will become aware, however, of all the ignorance and his incertitude in any 
88 Chrysippus, Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.195 
89 The immediate virtuous intention is based on the enduring disposition. In makes the judgment im-
mediate and intuitive and thus indistinguishable fron Heidegger's concept of truth which is 'a priori', 
but still historical. 
90 "Situationsethik" Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.194 
91 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.194 ff. 
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situation. If the sage can be certain, the 'prokopton' can never be certain. As the 
common situation, incertitude is the place of philosophising. Ariston for instance, a 
contemporary of Zeno, was still closer to the Cynical roots of the Stoa and he saw 
the freedom from external goods itself as the licence to do anything which he judged 
to be virtuous. This more anarchic strand of Stoa has been subdued in the systemati-
sations of the later time 
The Cynics, still within the safety of the polis, did take at times a rather ironic view 
of the laws of the state. Diogenes is said to have been mocking laws which he per-
ceived as 'unreasonable', but he still did obey them even if 'ironically'. But what is 
the quality of understanding when the Stoics cannot show an actual sage with perfect 
judgment? It lies in the continuous practice to shape the disposition of the soul. Be-
ing 'on the way' Cprokopton' means 'in progress') in the temporality of our finite pos-
sibilities, as Heidegger would put it. Which means the struggle (polemos) for the (re) 
assertion of meaning from an ossified (traditional) meaning of the past into the 'pro-
ject', the 'futural understanding' and unfolding of the 'given' Being. However, for 
Heidegger this is mediated within the 'kairological' structure of 'care' which gives ac-
cess to what is 'given' - as the possible. In the 'blink of an eye' (Augenblick) the 
normative event delimiting the possibilities which are given to us is revealed 
(=becoming what one is). This determines the perspective of understanding on one 
hand and at the same time the struggle to renew the way to make meaning. The 
closeness of the kairological event and thought, present in 'Being and Time' points 
forward to 'On the Way to Language', where Heidegger proposes to a 'language of 
Being' transcending the language of metaphysics. This is a language of 'decision', it 
is normative by being beyond the 'subject-object-relation', it partakes in the 'universal 
logos', which is the 'polemos', the strife between world and Earth on the one hand 
and Dasein and Being on the other (as a judgement by ordeal). Stoa insists on 'logos' 
as 'consideration' as human nature and Heidegger seems to put his concept of 'pole-
mos' (,Aus-einander-setzung': setting-apart) into this tradition. Heidegger's 'decon-
struction' as such a 'polemos' seems to be a successor of 'consideration'. Scrutinising 
the presuppositions of one's judgements. But can virtue reveal itself in a calculative 
discourse? Here the Socratic heritage prevails, although there is a universal logos, 
there is no insurance for it to be intelligible to everyone at all times (i.e. certainty). 
But, philosophy itself, the practice of what one can achieve, is the appropriate exer-
cise to progress Cprokopton') in understanding and faculty of judgment. This means 
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philosophy changes the disposition of the soul and this in turn makes a discourse 
possible which is not mere 'sophistry'. This training of 'logos' entails also necessarily 
the investigation into one's own 'intentions': why do I desire this thing? indulge in 
such activity? Considering these questions in a 'reasoned' manner will dis-illusion the 
hopes and investment I put into these desires. (fetishism) The Stoics always insist 
that factual knowledge or mere skill of argument is not enough, this is a constant re-
frain in Stoic literature. The threshold between language and soul, which the Stoa has 
so easily overcome with the argument of partaking in the logos, always resists mere 
language and 'consideration'. There has to be more than just 'understanding'. The Sto-
ics call it 'conversion', when mere words transform themselves into a different under-
standing of things. In dialogue language and experience coincide to such degree, that 
'something is understood' differently than mere memorisation and it effects a material 
change in the disposition of the 'prokopton'. 
g. The Virtuous Choice 
When one considers a thing to be useful, it begs the question about the 'intention' of 
this use. According to the intention the process of decision itself is judged 'good' or 
'bad', and this is what is meant with 'homologoumenos bios'. 
The use of reasoning in most classical philosophy however, needs to be understood 
in its context of, on the one hand in discussions with other schools, on the other in 
the education (psycha-goge) of the disciples. Logical dissection should not be per-
fonned for its own purpose.92 Dialogue is always meant as the way of questioning 
traditions and preconceptions. Although the theoretical edifice of the Stoics is com-
plex and coherent, it is not there to convey ossified doctrines. The Stoic non-sage, 
questions his own impulses, in the analytical language of the passions; he also ques-
tions those who care to talk to him about them. This resembles the Socratic method 
(of' elenchus') employing 'logos' to 'kindle the fire' of the love for wisdom. 
The Stoic doctrine of actions is based ofthe differentiation of good and bad, virtuous 
and vicious actions relating to goods which are in themselves 'indifferent' 
(adiaphora). In this division the 'indifferents' (adiaphora) are the 'material' of the 
sage's judgment. Men act in accordance with nature, 'physis' (idia physis = human 
nature, which means human social live, family, politics, life in the state and commu-
nity etc. i.e. 'kathechon') and 'logos' (as in the partaking in 'logos', as part of cosmic 
92 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.34 f. 
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nature), the faculty of 'consideration of 'good' and 'bad' Ckatorthoma'). Consideration 
presupposes a motivation and the highest motivation is virtue. 
'Logos' and 'physis' are normative and critical concepts that relate to human actions. 
The Stoics separate two kinds of right actions. The 'katechonta' are actions which 
are justifiable by reason in relation to a probable good, but can never be a good in 
themselves. This means that they are not 'virtuous'. Only when it is chosen 'for its 
own end' is it virtuous and thus 'katorthoma'. The final end of all actions is coexten-
sive with the 'autarkeia' of the sage, because of its independence from the series of 
causes (means and ends). 
Humans act in accordance with nature Cphysis'). For instance, they love their chil-
dren; but they are also able to do so in accordance to the rules and morals of a com-
munity.93 However, it is important to understand the distinction between 'kate chon' 
and 'katorthoma' properly. The Stoics differentiate between things and actions, the 
first are 'adiaphora' and indifferent at all times, while acts are either good or bad, 
meaning the intention of an act is what is virtuous or not Thus even things to which 
we ascribe a value in our life 'in accordance with nature', are not the proper locus of a 
decision. The locus of Stoic 'autarkeia' lies entirely in the motivation (impulse, 
horme) of an act This obviously means that the distinction of 'good' or 'bad' is never 
applicable to things. These can never be good (agathon) or bad (phaulon) in them-
selves. Instead our motivation of their use is either good or bad .. 94In short the 
'adiaphora' are not a third class between good and bad. Good and bad are the quality 
of actions in respect to adiaphora, at least as long as adiaphora are there to be acted 
upon, these two things do not exist on the same level. This is the source of the idea of 
'autarkeia': all external objects are adiaphora because what matters are the motiva-
tions of actions, i.e. 'arete'. 
From the point of view of a 'prokopton', the act of choosing is purely a reasoned and 
considered one. He does not have a permanent disposition of virtue but his reasoning 
may be more durable than others. Nevertheless he has to operate in a situation of to-
tal incertitude of choice because he is totally vicious. However, because he is 'in pro-
gress' he is already aware of this incertitude. His awareness is what carries his whole 
behaviour. He does not take things that are presented to him as proven facts. Tradi-
tions, habits, expectations and his 'status' among his community are only superficial 
93 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.l87 / Cicero De off, 1.,3,7 
94 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.197 ff 
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factors in his considerations. Therefore 'what is preferred' amongst the 'adiaphora' is 
not only that it can be argued that they are 'natural' but also appropriate in the situa-
tion which he finds himself in. He has to understand his own surreptitious desires 
(i.e, fetishism) which express themselves in arguments to meet their external ends 
and consider whether his choice is guided by such a motivation rather than to find a 
virtuous motivation. Here the question of the 'natural' becomes important insofar as 
what is natural to humans is not only survival but also discourse (i.e. reason). What 
guides the 'prokopton' is logos as that which is 'natural' to humans in terms of con-
sistency within confusion. The Stoic therapeutic discourse is a purgative which pro-
gressively dis-illusions presumptions and presuppositions which (mis-) guide the 
prokopton on his way. The discipline of 'prosoche', and discourse in tenns of 'giving 
account' is the praxis of such a 'poietic' understanding of individual 'autarky'. 
The philosophy of the ancient world 'educates', one way or another to lead a good 
life. For the Stoa this eudaimonic life was founded on the cosmic unity which ex-
pressed itself in virtue. Stoic cosmology and ontology underpins the fonn of 'reason' 
as normative without spelling out all rules for all cases. The virtue the Stoics speak 
about, is not is not a means to some external 'benefit'; the only benefit is virtue itself 
It is the image of some hilarity to see the Stoic seem tranquil in situation of pain and 
anguish.95 Brennan96 points out quite rightly, that if Stoicism were just a way to put 
on the mask of indifference on one's face to keep up appearances, the Stoic school 
would not be of any interest other then as an art of acting. If it would really be an ex-
ternal appearance of the Stoic which is at the heart of these practices then people like 
Foucault would be right to understand it as an aesthetisation of the self; a fashion, a 
fancy costume and every time we realise how shallow it is we swap it for a new out-
fit By reducing human freedom to 'virtue', to look at life 'sub specie virtutis' so to 
speak, everything else that happens becomes really indifferent This is where the ar-
chaic 'agon' and its 'arete' return in an internal setting; all external things, all attach-
ments and desires cannot rationally justify the virtuous act, it has to come from else-
where. This becomes clearer if we understand why the Stoics point out, that virtue 
cannot be found 'where 'we' are not in control' (i.e. anything external to the soul), 
95 (" •.. er traegt kein zuekendes und bewegliehes Mensehengesieht, sondern gleiehsam eine Maske mit 
wuerdigem Gleiehmasse der Zuege, er sehreit nieht und veraendert nieht einmal seine Stimme: wenn 
eine reehte Wetterwolke sieh ueber ihn ausgiesst, so huellt er sieh in seinen Mantel und geht lang-
samen Sehrittes unter ihr davon."; walking away under a cloud ofrain ... FN Werke, Sehleehta, Bd III. 
p.I030) 
96 T. Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate, pA f. 
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precisely because only virtuous acts, as understood from the 'agon', can have their 
motivation solely in themselves. External objects create an external motivation 
which is never 'virtuous'. The' askesis', 'measure', that we do not desire anything 
but 'virtue' is circuitous and therefore so hyperbolic. Who has no attachment has 
'everything', which is the totality immediacy is regained, through de-
individualisation by 'homologoumenon' with 'logos' and 'physis', life according to 
the divine 'reason'. 
The philosopher does not 'fight' with others, he struggles within his own soul for 'vir-
tue', which is always only related to the internal 'motivation' of acts. This does not 
mean that the Stoics do not eat or do not have homes, or would not fight for them, it 
describes solely the state of attachment towards these things, a comportment or atti-
tude. The ancient Greek idea of 'arete' and 'agon' describe this point perfectly.97 
'Arete' consists in a different way of evaluation. 
The conclusion is that knowledge and virtue are inseparable, the first leads necessar-
ily to the other. Knowledge can only be virtuous because it circumscribes all which 
is a 'flourishing' life Ceudaimonia', 'a well lived life'), and therefore it is 'virtuous'. 
'Eudaimonia' is defined through the motivation, or impulses Chonne') of acts, which 
means that, since all virtuous acts are perfonned for their own ends, 'eudaimonia' is 
not an external motivation for virtuous acts (as Kant would have it) but instead per-
fectly coextensive with virtue and knowledge. 
As said above, 'agon' and 'arete' describe a different 'reality' in which what counts are 
not earthly goods but 'the Good' Cagathon'). One can understand all the examples of 
potlatch and excess, mutual gift giving etc. as fonns of archaic 'agon'. According to 
Huizinga, the exchange of gifts is a 'agon'. The excess of giving reflects the irrele-
vance of (accumulative) 'value'. There cannot be any value in 'earthly things' i.e. in 
their accumulation as 'resource' (Bestand). I am comparing the structure of the 'agon' 
with the Stoic concept of intent. My suggestion is that this 'turning' of what is valu-
able (='real value'), this 'conversion', is 'the way oflife', the 'bios', which is over and 
above the mere 'production' of 'zoe'. It has however been 'rationalised' by the Greek 
and Hellenistic philosophy into a 'private', i.e. 'poietic' praxis of the self. This way 
the originally public display of the 'agon,98, has become a private and 'individual' 
struggle. 
97 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.9, also on "potlatch", p.5S 
98 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.64 
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h. The Therapeutic Aspect of 'Logos' 
Everything appears to move according to the cosmic law, but this just points to a 
general distribution of events. The Stoics tend to exaggerate the necessity governing 
the cosmos to explain the realm they consider the proper place of human freedom, 
which is the intention - no cosmic law can detennine 'human intentions'. We are al-
ways 'free' to understand which things are virtuous and which are not (this is a cate-
gorical difference to the knowledge about the external world). This ability is not de-
pendent on external affairs but only on the individual disposition. The intent gives 
meaning and organises the 'appearance' in which beings are understood 'as' some-
thing. 
The Greeks insisted on actions, not just 'knowledge'. Knowledge has to be 'embod-
ied', and become one's nature, rather than being a disembodied 'vessel of knowledge'. 
The Greek experience of 'knowledge' and in particular 'ethics' was therefore a'dig-
ging under our own feet', they first developed the wherewithal of psychagogic argu-
ment and consideration. This is not only a freedom of scrutinising arguments per se, 
but scrutinising one's own way of thought and life in general. 
The embodiment of virtue in the disposition of the sage, gives him the intuitive cer-
tainty of judgment, while everyone else has to 'master' the incertitude by 'considera-
tion'. 'Poetic' practice receives its abundance from the side of the incalculable but 
also from the strife which comes from the blindness of the calculable. This happens 
as an event, judgement is the singular which is encapsulated in the work of art and 
momentarily sheds light on both, the singular and the general, as long as the judge-
ment is "fresh,,99 in the Stoic sense. IOO 
What is the relationship between the general (law) and the particular (case)? The 
analogy with medicine shows that each particular case is based on exceptions which 
can modify general rules. General rules cannot be applied to the individual without 
taking account of the particular case. IOI The complexity of any possible situation 
(labyrinth), pure contingency which occurs within reason, i.e. language, make it nec-
99 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.381 
100 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.51: logoi (non-religious and non-poetic) are pharmaka as in 
Gorgia's Eukomium of Helen or Sophia rids the soul of pat he (Demokritus (DielslKranz B31) 
101 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, 65 f. 
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essary for medicine to try to understand every case as a special case. 102"Aristotle tells 
us, that "the person who is good at deliberation without qualification is the one who 
improvises according to reason and the best for a human being in the sphere of things 
to be done" (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethic, 1141b13-14); he associates this ideal closely 
with the observation that practical wisdom is concerned with particulars and not with 
general rules alone (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethic, 1141bI4-16).,,103 "Wisdom is con-
cerned with particulars": this may not mean it is outside all rules, but it evades the 
subsumtion to a degree. This degree is 'what is human' in the sense, that the neces-
sary complexity is incomprehensible and 'indeterminate ('aoriston'). 104 
General rules therefore do not encapsulate the whole of the ethical situation, there is 
a substantial surplus, excess, which detennines the situation and has to be elicited in 
the singular: this is wisdom and not knowledge, if knowledge is only the ability to 
apply general rules. Wisdom however concerns itself with the particular. We already 
know that in the age of philo-sophy 'sophia' is what has already been lost; philosophy 
is the labour of mourning which seeks to overcome and translate this loss or absence 
into an new form of discourse. "In the context of love and friendship, it is possible 
that Aristotle may recognise particularity in a yet stronger sense, recognising that 
some valuable fonns of ethical attention and care are not even in principle generalis-
ab1e.,,105 ... "Situations must be grasped with an "eye" for all their complexities: in 
short Aristotle twice remarks, "the discrimination lies in perception" (EN 11 09b 18-
23; cf. 1126b2-4) .... But the ability also requires a resourceful imagination, and an 
ability to confront the new case, picking out its salient properties. This ability, Aris-
totle plausibly insists, must be learned through experience - for only experience of 
particulars yields an eye for what is salient and an ability to seize the occasion (kai-
ros 1096a32), where medical imagery is used again.,,106 
The medical analogy however, does not hold in one particular case. 107 The theory of 
medicine is not necessary for the patient (asymmetrical relationship) but necessary 
for ethics (autarkeia). Philosophy is not an asymmetric relationship and finding out 
the theory of ethics as a goal in itself will be beneficial for the patient. The use of 
'logoi' is already necessary for the effectiveness of'logoi' as 'pharmakon'. The pa-
102 Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethic, 11 07a29-32; 1137b 17-19; 11 03b34-11 04al 0 
103 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.67 
104 Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethics, V. 1128a 25 ff. 
105 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.67 
106 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.68 
107 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.69 ff. 
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tient has to understand the arguments for their efficacy_IDS Since man 'dwells in 
thinking', at least in his normal state, he is accessible through words_ 
There is a necessary condition of 'order' in the 'patient' itself which makes him sus-
ceptible (or not) for the study of ethics_ However, there is a 'logos' for every (or most, 
i_e_ severe disorders are expressly excluded) conditions of the souL Since every hu-
man acts in accordance with a motivation (=impulse) and such a motivation is open 
to 'logoi', it is in principle possible to clarify the motivation and guide a person to the 
'good' = virtuous motivation for his actions with arguments_ Equally, there is a suspi-
cion of pupil's own statements which could be deceiving (need to be analysed in 
terms of 'denial' etc_), even if unknown to the pupil itself I 09 
There is a certain ambiguity about the universal law and exceptions or individual 
cases_ The underlying argument is on the side of the law but the individual case is 
always particular and exceptionaL As in medicine, the judiciary is guided by the in-
dividual case_ Every case has its own merits or exceptional circumstances (occasio) 
which cannot be decided purely according to a law_ Instead the 'law' has to be de-
cides in each case_ This decision is based on the case (exception) and the law_The 
individual does not move according to the 'laws of nature', it is exceptionaL This 
Stoic 'situationism' satisfies the archaic incomprehensibility of the 'logos' (labyrinth) 
and the principle access to it (riddle)_ For the prokop ton the situation is the same as 
for someone who has received his oracle from Delphi: everything is before his eyes, 
but he has not understood yet 
" Life is a carefully crafted work of art to the sage_"IIO For the sage life is the mate-
rial for his judgment This is the agon for the sage_ Although this judgement is his, its 
normativity flows from its partaking in the cosmic logos_ Between these poles he 
creates his life like the artist (technites) creates a work of art_ His life is 'produced' 
like the work of art_ The term 'poietika' used by the Stoics in relation to the 'moral 
goods' again relates to a causality within the strife for virtue_ They are things which 
will be supportive causes for the enhancement of a virtuous state of mind without 
causing the conversion themselves_ III This effectiveness is not, something external, 
but a relation of the whole to the part_ The Stoic concept of 'eudaimonia' is not some 
external telos (end) of virtuous actions, but is integral to the virtuous disposition it-
108 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p_70 
109 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p26 
110 "Dem Weisen wird sein Leben zum planvoll gestalteten Kunstwerk_" Forschner, Die Stoische 
Ethik, p_206 
165 
self. Therefore the class of objects called 'poietika kai telika' (e.g. virtues) are not 
simply an external means but ends in themselves. 
i. Virtue as Wisdom 
I have been using the words 'good' and 'virtue' a lot without clarifying these concepts. 
What is virtue? The four Greek virtues are justice, piety, courage, temperance and 
their totality is called wisdom, but it also means any form of excellence and success 
in human actions. Anyone could be said to have 'arete' in the sense of a skill, which 
is based on a knowledge of the matter. For Socrates the question of this 'knowledge' 
becomes a question of definitions: knowledge is the ability to give a definition. The 
realm of arete is political-moral action (courage, piety, temperance (sophrosyne), jus-
tice (dike) and wisdom (sophia)); whereas 'techne' is used as an analogy in the sense 
of its ability to 'give account', and then he asks about the possible 'knowledge' of 
such actions in terms of a definition which would withstand dialectical questioning. 
Many dialogues inquire into the relations of these virtues, whether they are the same 
and how they relate to the 'good' ('agathon') as the general term for the virtues and 
whether they are teachable. This question remains unanswered and therefore the 
knowledge of virtue remains on the border between the human and the divine. 
Virtue is the 'knowledge' of the 'good' (agathon), manifesting itself in the virtuous act 
flowing from the virtuous disposition. In Socratic terms however, it is unattainable to 
humans in a perfect form of'episteme', except in the negative way of 'knowing not to 
know', which is Socrates' starting point - 'known unknowns' so to speak. After his 
trial Socrates argues about the act of evading the sentence, saying that he would flee 
if someone could make an argument which he could not refute. 1 12 This means, that 
'virtuous' has to be found within dialectical argument. The Stoics hold on to this idea 
in the form of the term 'homologoumenos' which means that the sage's decisions are 
'consistent' in terms of discourse, virtue equals reason equals nature. 
Socrates revaluates values in a conversation; he questions the reasoned account of 
virtuous actions. The interlocutor has to admit not only that he is wrong but also that 
the opposite is not true either, there is no knowledge of a matter at all. Socratic igno-
rance opens the realm of 'being on the way' as dialogue between people who progress 
III Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.180 f. 
112 Plato, Crito, 46.b 
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more or less on this path to the knowledge ofthe 'good'. The Stoics hold that the sage 
is possible, but nobody admits to be the sage. The sage is a reminiscence of the 
Presocratic past and appears as the divinely inspired figure, of measure and 'possibil-
ity'. The original Presocratic enthusiasm of logos, language as riddle, keeps open the 
realm of language which prevents a merely 'objectifying' understanding. 
Plato's dialogues leave the question of whether virtue is teachable or not open. His 
attempt at answering this question is the doctrine of anamnesis (Meno), where Socra-
tes elicits geometrical knowledge from the uneducated slave boy by asking him ques-
tions. In analogy, the knowledge of the 'good' is already in our soul, and it means it is 
not taught as something unknown but it is taught as something which is there by the 
nature of the soul itself. The doctrine of anamnesis works as a surrogate concept of 
'human nature', as this nature will be expounded by the Stoics later. Virtue is of an 
essentially different category to the knowledge of external objects (techne), it can 
evaluate other kinds of knowledge, i.e. according to 'good' and 'evil' instead of use-
ful not useful, correct or incorrect. Virtue is not a specific knowledge and therefore 
Socrates can claim that he does not teach 'anything' (particular) other than knowledge 
itself, and therefore it cannot be instrument to something else. This means virtue is 
the measure of all else. Virtue is the 'intent' or 'telos' in respect of actions. This is 
why the Stoic sage is 'self-sufficient' (autarkeia); which means that he is arche and 
telos .. He lives to be able to apply his virtue. I 13 
It marks the decline from wisdom to 'philosophy', when 'wisdom' as virtue has be-
come public argument,! 14 or even entertainment I 15 and Socrates draws the conse-
quences by turning the view 'towards the 'inside', the soul or self (so away from the 
'sensible' as the revelation of 'truth'. The link between the divine and human has 
turned into the nature of the soul, as partaking in the spiritual universal sphere like 
the gods themselves. Wisdom as a knowledge which is not instrumental to something 
else, is not technical knowledge, but is able to judge other knowledge. If it consists 
of a 'recollection' of non-sensible ( divine) knowledge then it is more akin to original 
human nature. 
In the 'Apology', Socrates does not claim to teach anything; he does not claim to 
have the virtue of wisdom, he therefore explicitly denies to have any knowledge (i.e. 
113 Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p.9 f. 
114 Colli, GdPh, p.92 
lIS The question of 'What is ... ?' is a common form, Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.lll 
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to be wise); however, he claims that to be able to evaluate knowledge(-claims) it is 
necessary to have virtue and this means to have wisdom, as an ability to judge 'good' 
and bad' and he proves it by debunking the Athenian's false claims to knowledge. He 
may not be 'wise' but as philosopher he is wiser than the others. Is what is 'good' 
sayable in clear definitions? It appears as an ultimate goal, but Socrates does not 
come any closer to it. His aim is solely to 'kindle the fire of the love of wisdom', to 
put people 'on the way' and to examine their (perceived) knowledge. This enthusiasm 
for wisdom oscillates between the analogy of technical 'knowledge' and the divine 
'wisdom' represented by the Delphic oracle. The Stoa explored these problems by 
formalising them into a structured system of therapy. Chrysippus saw that the virtu-
ous disposition to virtuous actions is 'virtue' itself. Virtue is the action which has its 
end in itself and which is not directed at external ends. Virtue is the impulse (horme) 
to do 'good' actions. What is the relation of virtuous disposition, virtuous impulse, to 
the 'good' (agathon)? The 'good' is not external to the virtuous action in the sense 
that virtues are instrumental to the 'good'. 
The Stoic equation is: what is in my control is the possibility to act with 'arete'. Vir-
tuous is what is 'logical' i.e. 'natural' according to the cosmic principle. The 'good' 
(agathon) is the virtuous choice which is not motivated by external objects. By virtue 
of partaking in the 'logos', the human soul can 'live in accordance with nature'. This 
would have been alien to the archaic Greek understanding of 'arete', which appeared 
not to be 'natural', on the contrary, the 'rules' were what was man-made, in a way the 
'nomos' (custom, law), as tradition. This 'aristocratic' Homeric age of heroes and 
sages, has disintegrated by the time of Heraclitus and the connection to the world of 
the Presocratics was based on the link between 'physis' and 'nomos'. If one sees it 
from the analogy of medicine, which is probably the most common explanation of 
philosophic activity at that time, common to most schools, the normative baseline is 
'health', which is itself not an abstract concept we could define with any certitude. 
Rather, it is a pragmatic attitude which is always hard to question and harder to de-
fine precisely. So the methods of all the different schools are not meant to define on-
tological categories of 'health'. Instead they are only useful insofar as they have the 
desired effect in the particular moment ofthe dialogue with the teacher (or therapist). 
The question is only: does it work? and the apparently coherent theory around be-
comes nothing more than a mental support for those not yet completely accustomed 
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to the necessary therapeutic habits. Probably because the Stoics were much less ex-
clusive than other schools and continued the Socratic Eros of 'paideia', this mental 
support was considered acceptable. Plato grounded the health of the soul on his onto-
logical system. We will see, that this' ontology' has to explain the possibility of un-
derstanding as a movement, which not only generates understanding, i.e. knowledge, 
but at the same time it constitutes the self of the 'knower', and is thus reflexive. The 
knower knows that he knows. What happens to him if he admits not to know? He has 
to take' care of his self . 
I hope it has become clearer what the Stoic development consists of: the archaic 
'arete' has been turned into the universal 'nature' of the cosmos; physis, 'logos' and 
human partaking in 'logos', ontologises 'arete', and roots it firmly in a 'consideration', 
which, again, is not vacuous arguing, but is meant as a way of changing the disposi-
tion of the soul, is a material change of the soul (following Stoic 'materialism'; there-
fore their sophisticated theory of causation within the cosmos as fate etc. follows 
their ethics, by confinning the 'logical' unfolding of the world. The cosmos is an or-
ganism, so good and bad are balanced in the overall picture, even ifnot in every par-
ticular locality.). There is an ontological connection between virtue, physis and lo-
gos, a form of necessity which renders actions good or bad, depending on the dispo-
sition of the soul. This is not an ethics of commandments but a logic of embodiment, 
because discourse and reason do not provide the 'good' virtuous decision, it is the vir-
tuous disposition of the agent that performs the action of a judgement. 
The highest knowledge is the knowledge of virtues. The knowledge of virtue is wis-
dom (Plato, Polit.3). It does not occur just as 'theoretical knowledge' it is also al-
ways embodied in the sage's actions. Wisdom determines or rather constitutes the 
'self of the sage. His character, or disposition becomes 'durable'. 
i. Virtue and Conversion 
The 'quality' of the sage, his 'hexis' or disposition, has to be durably virtuous be-
cause a temporarily virtuous intention would allow vicious intentions which would 
not be very sage-like. He is able to differentiate (discretio) in any given situation 
'what is and what is not under his control', which is another way to say that what 'is' 
onto logically is only our intention, the Heideggerian "as". There is an equation be-
tween knowledge and disposition. The disposition is produced by exercise, and the 
one who decides to exercise has to have already understood suffering. The disposi-
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tion of man is the way how things appear, what the 'sense' of beings is. It is the for-
mulation of the essential hiatus between logos and human 'life' and therefore the ne-
cessity of 'strife;' for a way of life as an interpretation of its 'how?'. 
What does the sage know? He is able to distinguish what is a moral question and 
when to apply his judgement. So not only is he able to distinguish but also to per-
ceive the situation on which he decides in the 'right' way. There is therefore more to 
the virtue of the sage than the 'knowledge' what is one's own. The Stoics simply de-
scribe this in the form of perception, but obviously this is more complex than the 
structure phantasia / axioma (appearance and proposition expressing it)- synkatasthe-
sis (assent) - honne (impulse); the process of 'consideration' as the 'critical' faculty 
(logos) is the analytical tool providing -the 'natural' way of also being able to act oth-
erwise. In his ability of distinction and choice, the sage is durably disposed to be vir-
tuous. He judges intuitively because his Being has qualitatively changed. I think it 
should have become clearer, why I argue that the Stoic theory of judgement, al-
though talking about eternal law (of the cosmos), is in effect a theory of the constitu-
tion of law and judgement as intuition and thus a self, which resembles Heidegger's 
Dasein. The Stoics (Chrysippus insisted on this) see the passions as parts of the ra-
tional soul. There are no rational and irrational parts of the soul, on account of the 
passions being judgements too. This is interesting in so far as it makes 'passions' not 
something that is innate but something acquired like a disposition. What is acquired 
is the form of judgement which expresses the 'horme' the drive or desire in relation to 
survival and the social sphere. I think this is important for human behaviour in the 
void of uncertainty. Passions are always already present in the 'Man' ('They') of the 
people the Stoics live with. 
The Stoics claim that the human drive towards reason, by virtue of his ability to 
speak, is also the drive for virtue itself. The value of virtue and the indifference of 
external objects in relation to it is therefore innate to human beings through their 
ability to speak. This is the 'homologoumenos bios'. We do not live in the immediacy 
and necessity of not only 'animal life' but also keep traditions open to scrutiny. Tradi-
tions are also the ways we use 'passions' - and thus always fall back into the (pleasur-
able: "sweeter than honey") logic of, for instance, 'anger', a common topic for the 
analysis of passions in Stoic literature. Just anger and vengeance are part of (Roman) 
culture but not innate and therefore they make people behave worse than wild beast 
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because they are unable to withhold themselves from the logic of vengeance and go 
to extremes. Seneca probably knew what he was talking about having lived in the 
age of Caligula and Nero. 
What is the 'prokopton' to do? The Stoic thesis is that since passions are 'rational' as-
sumptions, they are open to rational consideration, but first one has to become aware 
of one's inner movements (i.e. judgements). Philosophy is the practice of this aware-
ness and of change. The whole theoretical edifice of philosophy is aimed at making 
this practice, this 'embodiment' or habituation intelligible to someone who wonders 
whether and how one might improve one's life. What we need to do is to become 
aware of what we actually do/think as we perform everyday tasks. 'Discretio' 
(phronesis) is only possible in this duality of self-awareness. The falsity of judge-
ments lies not in their effects but in their intention, the intention (honne, impulse) is 
based on assumptions that do not withstand consideration of what is in one's own 
power. 
5. Conversion 
Conversion is a U-turn; a turning around of the whole of one's life with all its habits 
and the presuppositions on which these are based in everyday life. Conversion means 
turning what we think of as real into what is not real and what we think of as not real 
into what is real. What we think as real is what is familiar in the way of animal sur-
vival, therefore to turn the eye on one's self means to turn away from the outside to 
the inside without becoming one's object. This resembles Heidegger's turn from 'be-
ing concerned with' (Besorgen) to the resolve (Entschlossenheit) or Dasein's self-
disclosure. For the Stoics all habits, indiscriminately, are wrong if they are not per-
formed with reason, i.e. a consideration which is itself embedded in disposition. The 
lack of perfect wisdom means that arguments are needed to find the best possible ap-
proach. 
The paradigm of conversion (peri- or meta-strophe) is Platonic. "Training for 'death' 
is training to die to one's individuality and passions in order to look at things from 
the perspective of universality and objectivity". I 16 It invites the philosopher into the 
immortality of thought. The inverted reality of everyday life shows the faint similar-
ity, or sublimation, of the archaic riddle and the risk of death. Here the risk is build-
in as the trade-off for the admission into the timeless kingdom of 'logos'. The riddle 
116Hadot, PhWL, p.95 
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has become internalised and embodied, insofar as the body i.e. the drive of survival 
and individual life are afflictions and error which need to be overcome by the eternal 
logos. Temporality is a sign of falsehood. Being 'dead' to the temporal is the libera-
tion into the eternal logos. "Nothing in human life is worthy of concern ... ".117 Con-
version then is the tum to the eternal 'logos', away from the sensible world. The soul 
which is unaffected by the sensible will tum to the 'Good' by itself. I 18 
The divine 'logos' is thought thinking itself. To be dead to the sensible means to re-
turn into the permanence of the universal logos. This would however deny the tem-
porality of life itself. Thought and understanding then, must be guided by this uni-
versal thinking. This thinking as virtue is the thinking of the' one' the unity that the 
'logos' gives to men. Thinking is division and union and the highest and virtuous is 
to know that all separation of beings and all classification roots in the 'one'. 
Conversion involves this nexus between thought and one's own life, like a medicine 
that is swallowed and incorporated, so the soul is acted upon by 'logoi,.119 The use of 
words, as deliberation or inner dialogue is an exercise which liberates us from the 
tyranny ofpassions. 120 The body as the sensible is full of desires, but it has to make 
them felt in perceptions which come together with 'axiomata' (statements), desires 
are always also words. These words however are not the desires themselves, they are 
so to speak displacements of desires, they are not what they seem to be. This is 
where Psychoanalysis sets up its tents. Stoics were aware of these deceptions, they 
were also aware of necessity of the 'kairos', the right moment for actions and words, 
if these words were to achieve their best therapeutic effect. 
Although conversion is often described as a sudden enlightenment, it is a passage 
and mostly a long one, from one state of the soul to another, in the Stoic case it is a 
'material' change in the state of the soul. The stages are: 1) ignorance, 2) suffering 
(through reason-life dichotomy), 3) recognition of suffering (through reason), 4) un-
derstanding of the causes of suffering, 5) eudaimonia. Conversion as a passage be-
tween two worlds of realities refers back to the archaic age of Heraclitus. His critique 
of common beliefs about the world and the 'real' knowledge of 'wisdom' about the 
world is still audible in 'philosophy'. It has however changed some aspects. 
The passage of conversion is like the Delphic oracle, everything is said but one has 
117 Plato, Politeia, 604 b-d 
118 Plato, Meno, 81 e 
119 For the Stoics the soul is also 'substance', and as such part of the body, but not a subject as (hy-
pokeimenon). 
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not understood the message yet. After the event the message is crystal clear. The 
prokop ton learns in this passage how to understand the riddle, which he himself is. 
To the conversion belongs the end (telos), a method and a 'natural' disposition. Since 
the 'being on the way' means not being the one nor the other, i.e. being the in be-
tween, man is always somewhere 'not'. Socrates is here the paradigmatic intennedi-
ary because his 'not-knowing', or ignorance, has progressed from the phantasma of 
knowledge, the ignorant ignorance to a cognoscent ignorance. 
One can say that all philosophies describe the life of desires as a 'mad' life, driven by 
things which are open to the contingency of fate, and passions. Being driven in such 
a way, is a disease of the soul, an unbalanced state. Such a state is recognisable by its 
unreasoned judgements. Appropriate actions cannot flow from a confused soul, and a 
soul is confused when it is not consistent (disposition) and thus rational in its 
choices. Rationality in this sense is a calculation, an optimisation of my psychical 
state, assuming that I wish to be in a tranquil and considered state. One should not 
mistake it for a state of mind itself. Consideration is a tool and exercise, but the state 
of mind which the philosopher seeks is one of openness - being attentive but not fo-
cused on an object. To solve a riddle one has to listen to all the meanings of the 
words, not just to the superficial, but to the metaphorical and hidden meanings. The 
metaphorical meaning is a diversion, the distance across which Apollo's arrows are 
hitting their target. His ways are indirect and surreptitious (arrows, disease etc. ).121 
When the god invents a metaphor it is still in some reasoned but indirect way con-
nected to what is hinted at. The sage's wisdom is able to follow these serpentine 
paths and connect the seemingly disparate. How does he do it? He is versed in 'pro-
soche', awareness to what presents itself and is able to follow and understand the 
thread of thought which is invisible to others. Equally, the philosopher learns through 
the exercise of awareness to the contingent situations which present themselves to 
him and considers the right judgements and actions appropriate to them. 
The image of death goes two ways. The sage is threatened with death by the riddle 
while the philosopher seeks 'death' by exercise. We can interpret this now better. The 
death for Plato is a 'being dead to this (perishable) world', as to this 'sensible and 
temporal' world; a sense eagerly taken up by Christianity. The death of the sage is 
the game he has to engage in to be a sage: he lives under the rule of the agon and one 
120 Hadot, PhWL, p.95 
121 Colli, GdPh, p. 18 
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cannot refuse the offer of an agon without losing his life: because one's life is irrele-
vant. Philosophy takes up this idea metaphorically by saying that if one is to be able 
to follow these invisible threads one has to be dead to the superficial appearance 
which deceives the view of the underlying connections 
The 'conversion' is a disclosure of Dasein to itself (in its temporality and possibili-
ties). In Heidegger's case, it is the 'nullity' (Nichtigkeit) ofDasein, i.e. its Being, as 
the 'Open' or the 'clearing while in antiquity it is a virtuous comportment, that 
makes beings be seen as they present themselves. If conversion is the letting go of 
attachment to external objects then the care for the self is ethical too. This however 
means, if we interpret it through the 'agon', the irrelevance of anything except the vir-
tuous comportment and disposition of the self. The result is the same: man is a sur-
face, within which things appear as meanings (judgements). Beyond all 'as' is the 
hermeneutical situation itself, which constitutes the 'self' of the philosopher. The 
strife (polemos) of interpretation, of thought is the original movement that creates, 
"setting truth into work'. The work of the Stoic is a letting-truth set itself into the 
work which is the sages comportment, his 'way of life'. The very own of the Stoic 
sage is, that he does not confuse external things with what is his 'own' and thus does 
not identify himself with external things. 
Although the Stoa points to people who are obsessed with becoming rich, seeking 
public offices and fame etc., it does not say that all external things are bad, instead 
they only point out that one should 'not to be taken over' by the desire for the one or 
other. The Stoic 'indifference' goes further than just avoiding 'being driven', by taking 
up the concept of the 'self, as an individual, as the self-responsible actor whose 
authority comes from an universal 'logos' . The self is constituted by the movement 
of thinking, and this means it is had ('echo') by logos. 
Conversion is a turning to my 'own' being possessed by logos. What is in my 'own' 
power means to look at the 'self not as a body but as a process of thinking. This is a 
process, a way of approaching things with 'consideration'. This consideration, how-
ever, although innate as a faculty of 'logos' has to be exercised like a craft, as techne, 
but this does not mean that there is a 'techne' of the self and that it can be 'said'. I22 
122 " .•. der, der die Wahrheit kennt, soll sie auch »sagen« ... ".Colli, GdPh, p.185 
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The 'self itself is a techne of thinking .... 'Biou techne', the 'art oflife" 123 describes 
the knowledge of a pharrnakon that furthers psychic health through internal exer-
CIses. 
'Conversion' can be understood as a 'turning' ('Kehre'), precisely from thinking Being 
as the 'Being of beings' to thinking from Being itself (Seinsdenken). Because thought 
turns to itself, as recognition of temporality, possibilities and authenticity the own 
'way oflife' comes into view not as a 'being' but as what is the locus of the 'giving' 
Ces gibt'), which gives a 'way of life'. Heidegger's 'language of Being' is the language 
of 'Seinsdenken'" and therefore cannot be the language of common metaphysics. 
This 'turning' is a complex process of contradictions weaving themselves together. 
On one hand the oblivious taking for granted of the presence of 'beings' and, on the 
other hand, the way Dasein turns its gaze onto itself by way of 'Seinsdenken'. The 
third aspect is the "Auseinandersetzung" (polemos-logos), which is the 'turning' be-
tween Dasein and Being, in which Dasein's possibilities are unfolded historically. 
123 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desires, p.5 
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Chapter 4 
Heidegger and the Stoics 
The question of the thesis was how art comes about. What kind of self is necessary to 
produce a work of art, which has turned in Heidegger's inquiry into an ontological 
foundation_ This question has now shifted to the concept of the 'author' of such a 
work, which changes and institutes practices which change the modes in which Be-
ing is comprehended_ Heidegger uses the Aristotelian concept of techne to under-
stand how Being materialises itself in the work and then 'works' out of this work as 
the a priori truth into which Dasein is thrown_ The Stoic concept of paideia and con-
version is equally grounded in the idea ofteche (techne psyche), by which the 'self' 
is re-constituted in a conversion_ This too is a poietic process, and has necessarily to 
find some 'a priori' from which it is constituted_ This is 'arete' or 'agathon' as the 
'telos' of 'human nature' _ 'Human nature' is the truth of the human self which sets 
itself into work in the exercises of the Stoics_ 
The guiding question of this thesis has therefore now become: how is any agency of 
change possible? The Greek answer was that change is explained by movement, 
thought and possibility while persistence is explained by eternal perfection of the 
'idea' or 'telos' _ Heidegger uses Heraclitus' fragment 51: "People do not understand 
how that which is at variance with itself agrees with itself There is a harmony in the 
bending back, as in the cases of the bow and the lyre_" to undennine the metaphysi-
cal dualism between persistence and change, Being and becoming_ The relation be-
tween Dasein and Being constitutes change and temporal persistence as one single 
and unified movement of fate (Geschick) and this fate has to be achieved in strife 
(polemos)_ 'Geschick' is 'ordeal' or predicament. In 'Being and Time' Heidegger 
takes the step to determine human existence as Dasein, that which makes 'meaning' 
out of its essential absence (ek-static), out of not being self-identical totality and thus 
atemporaL According to Plato and Aristotle that which has possibilities has also a 
soul, a self has the possibility of choice_ 1 This means that thinking has possibility 
'not to' (dynamis) because it is 'essentially' a 'not-yet' _ The thinking that has choice 
constitutes a self as Dasein: it has a world that gives meaning to what presences it-
1 Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III. p_152 
self: conversely, Dasein is thrown into its world which gives meaning to beings, it is 
not its choice: thought constitutes a 'self out of the givenness of its mode of Being. 
Dasein's active interpretation forms and changes its world and its 'self. Aristotelian 
'phronesis', the knowledge of active life and 'techne', the concept of productive 
knowledge, are two aspects of human existence Heidegger accepts, while 'theoria', 
the pure contemplation of the eternal disappears out of this picture because the per-
fect and eternal cannot be part of Dasein, it would be the end of Dasein as polemos 
and logos. Therefore the Greek' concept of' eternal' ideas, logos, morphe is brought 
back into a temporal setting, but without loosing ist teleological character as that 
which is 'a priori'. 
Hermeneutical interpretation is the movement of thought that discloses its possibili-
ties in the reinterpretation (Wiederholung) of tradition. Thought has always to think 
'something' which is outside itself (just like Heidegger's Dasein is outside 'itself as 
the 'care-structure'). Heidegger explores the essence (Wesen) of such a being that is 
not a 'being' but that makes beings 'presence' themselves in an 'as' - structure. The 
productive knowledge of techne is at the basis of all ontology of the Greeks.2 The 
techne has a knowledge of the 'telos' of the movement, it is a specialist knowledge, 
like medicine. 'Phronesis' is the knowledge of judgement without the specialist 
knowledge of production.3 The production of 'techne' is the fundamental 
conceptualisation of Greek ontology: 'Bringing - forth' is a knowledge of how to 
bring into 'presencing' (Anwesen). The movement of such 'bringing-forth' 'as' 
something determines all possibilities of Dasein. However, all such production is 
dependent on the knowledge of the 'telos' or 'eidos' which is the truth or essence of 
what is to be brought into 'presencing' (Anwesen). As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the 'telos' or the 'idea' of the 'good' or 'arete' is the highest (and eternal) 
form of knowledge of human actions. This 'technical' understanding' of all bringing-
forth also applies to one's own souL Within this dynamic arc between 'arche' and 
'telos', the self is 'on the way', as 'energeia' or in the Platonic term as 'paideia' of 
the self. The self changes and with this change its Being changes too. The question 
how the 'telos' changes is then answered: with a new inception Carche') which 
comes from the transcendence of 'Being'. 
2 The Platonic demiurgos is a 'technites' too. 
3 Jaeger, Paideia, VoL2, p.87 
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Heidegger and the Stoics agree that change of the self is not only possible but neces-
sary. It takes place as the movement oflogos, as 'polemos,4, the tension between the 
transcendent Being and Dasein which exists only insofar as it performs the 'pole-
mos'. The Stoic life is a considered life. Thinking as polemos and logos are forms of 
'consideration', forms of giving account In consideration the disposition, or 'hexis' 
of the soul changes. The Stoic idea of virtue and wisdom implies, that such a think-
ing is not disengaged from the everyday as Aristotle's 'theoretikos' may be consid-
ered to be. On the contrary, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the everyday is 
the 'material' of the sage's virtue. Without the everyday the sage would not be a 
sage. He is therefore not a divine figure outside temporality, he is a Socratic figure 
which is 'atopos' (inbetween), knowing what is in his power and what is not, the 
'known unknowns'. 
1. Conversion and the Self 
The Stoic exercises for a conversion are a struggle for the constitution of an 'authen-
tic' self; 'authentic' 'according to nature'(kata physis). According to Heidegger, it is 
the state of anxiety, when the unity of a world from which all things receive every-
day meaning disintegrates to become 'questionable' and to give way to a process of 
essential self-disclosure (Entschluss) of the self Conversion then would be the con-
stitution ofthe 'authentic' self that understands its essence (Wesen) as 'care-
structure'. The Stoic reasoning has the purpose to bring about such a state too: for the 
Stoics 'according to nature'; for Heidegger according to the temporality of Dasein 
and its 'project' (Entwurf); for both this means according to 'logos', as that in which 
all beings receive their mode ofpresencing (Anwesen). The ground of such a 
'presencing' (Anwesen) is the 'techne' as bringing forth, whether as 'physis' or a 
human 'techne', both operate according to the same model of 'arche' and 'telos'. 
Involvement with beings is necessary, but at the same time it is part of an illusion 
about one's self. For Heidegger, proper 'care' is the care of the 'self, as the 'aware-
ness' of the process itself of 'making meaning' through the 'care-structure'. The 
originary human involvement is the 'decision' (Entschluss) about the form of such 
involvement and its preceding 'inception' or 'arche'. For the Stoa, as for Heidegger, 
man has to tum away from attachment to things, towards himself as the happening of 
4 "Polemos und logos sind dasselbe." Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, pA7 
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meaning. Dasein is the process of 'making meaning' in its strife for disclosure, while 
for the Stoics man 'partakes' in logos; in both instances human actions 'reveal' a 
world as well as the way by which they are revealed and which 'comes over' man 
from the 'Ungeheure' (uncanny). The Aristotelian 'echon' in the phrase 'zoon logon 
echon', goes both ways: logos has the zoon, as much as the zoon has logos. Partaking 
is a fonn of 'echo' (having and being possessed). The 'polemos' comes over Dasein 
and detennines a 'self as the way things 'presence' themselves. 
'Gelassenheit' (,letting-be') is for Heidegger a version of the 'polemos', in a muted 
tenninology, but still a strife for meaning as a movement of 'presencing' (Anwe-
sen).5 The strife for meaning which takes place as the action of the 'poets and think-
ers' is an 'agon' and as such it is a 'judgement', a 'decision' about what persists as 
tradition and constitutes the essence of Dasein. 'Agon' is a 'trial by ordeal' or the 
'judgement of god', which decides the fonn and path that the unfolding of a particular 
way of disclosure (i.e. Being) takes and this is Heidegger's superior agency of 'his-
tory'. Was there to be no strife, be it as 'polemos' or 'Gelassenheit', meaning would 
disappear and so would Dasein. The 'agonic' character of 'polemos' is rooted in the 
strife for the self because this self is always the product of a disclosure of Being, of 
that original 'setting apart' of 'polemos' (Aus-einander-setzung). Such creative 
(schopfen) 'thesis' (setting) is not action of a selfbut action which constitutes the 
self and its essence (Wesen). The 'agon' is the 'habit' (ethos) of 'partaking' in the 
cosmic 'logos' which is impersonal because it precedes the constitution of the soul 
itself. Detachment or 'letting-be' (Gelassenheit) means the freedom from being oc-
cupied by things, and turning to what makes these things 'visible' in the first place: 
the self which is that from which all disclosure is possible. In the process of conver-
sion the 'self' as the basis of judgement is 'thrown up' into the air redefining (unfold-
ing) the action of thought and disclosure itself. The whole self 'turns around' towards 
itself. The judgement that constitutes the self also first establishes the way we en-
counter the particular, a situation, observation etc. 
The 'poiesis' of the Stoic disposition describes the constitution of a self in the first 
place. As Gadamer points out in his essay 'Vorfonnen der Reflexion,6 that to have 
choice, in the fonn of possibility (dynamis), is only possible for a self that is aware 
5 Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, p.81 f. 
6 Gadamer, Kleine Schriften III 
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of itself. In Aristotelian tenninology self-movement (auto-kineseos) and possibility 
(dynamis) make temporal human existence thinkable. The possibility to change, to 
have a choice, the 'polemos' of Heidegger, is Dasein itself. And, Dasein is only itself 
if it makes 'authentic' choices. The work of the 'self' is 'energeia', the 'being on the 
way' within its possibilities (dynamis). These possibilities are not arbitrary but de-
tennined by the concrete situation, the polis, birth, everything that is not in our con-
trol. Conversion as a turning around and away from the external world thus thema-
tises the constitution of self and the modes of disclosure as much as of 'self'-
disclosure. 
2. The 'Ungeheure' (uncanny) and the Self 
Heidegger translates the Aristotelian 'daimonia' as 'das Ungeheure' (uncanny, literally 
'monstrous,).7 It is 'uncanny' because it is the 'withdrawal' of Being and does not 
'emerge' itself as do all the other 'beings'. In Aristotle's Ethics, the demonic (divine) 
is the subject of the philosopher, the life of 'theoria', as the acme of 'eudaimonia'. 
For Heidegger it is an indication of the merely latent awareness of the 'question of 
Being' (Seinsfrage). "But the uncanny appears 'only' in the fonn of the 'un-uncanny' 
(i.e. everydayness)."g It is not accessible in the fonn beings presence themselves and 
therefore the way we understand beings does not give us a clue about their constitu-
tion. Socrates has no 'access' to the divine, instead it 'comes over' him. This means 
he is not the 'author', but he has ears to hear. He is appropriately 'attuned' to divine 
wisdom by discerning its 'telos'. 
Socrates uses two aspects of such a 'daimonia'. On the one hand his 'personal' dai-
mon who warns him not to do something, on the other hand the' Eros', which, as a 
god, seduces his listeners to educate their' self', before they act on others. Meno 
compares Socrates with the sting of a sting-ray to describe the effect of paralysis that 
Socratic elenchos (examination) has on his interlocutor. At the same time Socrates 
offers to share the effort of argument and continues with his examination until some 
fonn of 'aporia' appears and the discourse comes to a halt. Hadot follows the myth 
of 'Eros', and describes the attributes of Eros as thrift and cunning. I have pointed 
this out in the previous chapter. This is a much more complex image of Socratic in-
vestigation and closer to the ways Socrates uses dialectics to disann his interlocutors. 
7 Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethics, 1141b,7; GA54, Parmenides, p.150-54 
8 GA54, Parmenides, p.l51 
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It also shows the aspect of being detennined to the' care of the self as a thrifty de-
tennination and not a 'surrender' to fate. Socrates is a hunter of beautiful souls (Jae-
ger), he ties them with the bond of Eros to himself to shape them (paideia) to the love 
of wisdom. From loving Socrates they progress to love the' good', 'arete' itself. As 
the mediator of the divine, Socrates 'leads' pedagogically the soul of the youth to the 
love of the 'divine' arete, without 'teaching' arete itself. He is 'thrifty' in mediation, 
not in the techne of arete but in the 'techne psyche', the seduction to the care of the 
self as a service to the divine and transcendental virtue. 
The Socratic use of the daimon appears like a faint parody of the original conception 
which Aristotle describes as something of an 'essential' difference between the 
world of the humans to the divine and eternal. Heidegger uses this concept as an ab-
solute otherness and alienness to the 'Geheure', the realm of our everyday explana-
tion and understanding. The 'Un-geheure' is the exception by way of origin: The 
everyday comes from the exception. It is that from which all 'un-uncanny' (Geheure) 
originates. We have seen this process described already in UKW, where truth origi-
nates in 'untruth,.9 The concept of redemption is rather alien to the Greeks anyway, 
the essence of Greek life lies in innerworldly 'virtue'. As we have seen this concept 
is rooted in the agon and thus in the continuous 'risk' of death. This submission to a 
divine 'ordeal' is also a submission to the 'Ungeheure' which governs from outside 
of the 'Geheure' and is thus acknowledged in the agonic ritual. lo 
Attunement (Stimmung) as a disclosive affect 'comes over' Dasein; it is a 'given' 
disclosure. Fate (Schicksal) is dispensed by the 'arche' of the inception of Being. 
The 'shine' from the 'Ungeheure' comes equally 'over' Dasein. Everything 'is 
given' and overwhelms Dasein that dwells in the (Geheure). But Dasein dwells in 
'dianoia', in thought, in its disclosive action and in a movement in which it is never 
itself, but always changing by thinking something and thus making meaning. Dasein 
is affected by the (Ungeheure), by (the possibilities of) Being. In UKW Heidegger 
uses the tenn 'StoB' (thrust) to explain the way in which the 'Ungeheure' affects 
Dasein and changes its 'truth'. The notion of 'polemos', as that human activity that 
wrestles a measure from Being is better understood as 'respect', 'tact' towards what 
discloses itself and is related to 'dike' (justice) which Heidegger interprets as 'Fug' 
(joint) in the Anaximander lecture. I I 
9 "Die Wahrheit ist in ihrem Wesen Un-wahrheit." UKW, pAO 
10 "divine judgement", Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.81 
II SdA, p.352 f., 
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To 'dwell' is an expression that focuses all of Heidegger's main concepts: Dasein 
and Being, world and earth, thought, logos, polemos and polis, existence, facti city 
and fallenness (sich-vorweg-sein; schon-sein-in, sein-bei).12 To dwell already sup-
poses a site. Not in a geographic sense, but as an unthematised grounding, a know-
ing-one's-way. This site (Ort) as thought and logos also means the possibility to fail, 
to lose the agon or polemos, utter non-meaning, withdrawal and death. 
Heidegger equates dwelling (wohnen) with a pastoral way ofDasein 'to be'. He 
makes the point which he prepared in his Pannenides lectures (GA54) by thinking 
'dwelling' as the 'essence' (Wesen) of Dasein from the creation of a 'site': the 
'polis' preserves a fragile and temporal habitation which can tum into 'a-polis' at 
. 13 
any tIme. 
Heidegger sees the difficulty of the incomprehensibility of the totally different and 
uses the (Greek) metaphors of light, shining and visibility emanating from the divine: 
'theao'. This visiblity is also the Greek conception oftechne. 14 'Bringing-forth' 
(Hervorbringen) means to 'let something appear' (Erscheinenlassen) not to 'make' it, 
but to give visibility and a place and 'site' to dwell which has borders, and limits 
(,Ein-friedung'). 'Poiesis' which is the act oftechne and is therefore thought from 
the realm of visiblity is enabled by the Un-geheure, the transcendent, and that which 
is not under the control of Dasein. 15 The 'possibility of 'poiesis' of judgements is 
then essentially linked to the Un-geheure. 
3. Consideration, Decision and Volition 
The Greek concept of thought is directional movement: life is kinesis. To think 
'something' takes thought out of itself (ek-stasis), as Heidegger rephrases it and 
'boulesi' (decision and volition) are synonyms of thought as the process of life, 
12" Bauen heiJ3t urspriinglich wohnen. Wo das Wort bauen noch ursprtinglich spricht, sagt es 
zugleich, wie wei! das Wesen des Wohnens reicht. Bauen, buan, bhu, beo ist namlich unser Wort 
«bin» in den Wendungen: ich bin, du bist, die Imperativform ist, sei. Was heiJ3t dann: ich bin? Das 
alte Wort bauen, zu dem das «bin» gehort, antwortet: «ich bin», «du bist» besagt: ich wohne, du 
wohnst. Die Art, wie du bist und ich bin, die Weise, nach der wir Menschen auf der Erde sind; ist das 
Buan, das Wohnen. Mensch sein heiJ3t: als Sterblicher auf der Erde sein, heiJ3t: wohnen. Das alte Wort 
bauen, das sagt, der Mensch sei, insofem er wohne, dieses Wort bauen bedeutet nun aber zugleich: 
hegen und pflegen, namlich den Acker bauen, Reben bauen." Heidegger, Y A, Bauen W ohnen 
Denken, p.147 
13 GA54, Parmenides, p.134 f 
14 yA, p.160 
15 This would also chime with the 'agon' as the public and visible display of 'ordeal'. 
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bios.1 6 Thought as movement is also a 'production' to perfonn self-constitution of 
truth. The priority of 'techne' serves as the model to the Being of beings in toto. This 
'production' into visibility is the 'bringing-forth' of 'techne'. 'Techne' is a knowl-
edge of bringing into. The Stoic doctrine calls the constitution ofa 'self', its 'pneu-
matic constitution' of 'hexis', which is the disposition of the soul through logos, the 
living according to logos (logoumenon). 'Bringing-forth' (poiesis) is always tied to a 
form of 'knowing'. And this 'knowledge' stems from the vision of the telos, the ei-
dos. In Heidegger's terms it would be that Being dispenses a mode of' logos', a tem-
porary emergence of limited practices and possibilities that inhere in these practices 
and calls them 'die Sage'. If the polemos -logos determines the 'mode' in which be-
ings are disclosed, then the measure between disclosure and withdrawal is dependent 
on the human action within this logos. The self is a product of the application of this 
logos, thought, and therefore care of thoughts is the way to virtue, to the constitution 
of the self understanding its own constitution in its own 'thoughts'. To change the 
soul one has to change thinking. The Stoic exercises happen on the individual level 
of thought Thought is logos and therefore connected to the transcendent (Being). 
Consideration shapes the pneumatic constitution of the souL 17 If Socrates is wisest in 
Athens, as the oracle said, and only knows that he does not know, his mode of think-
ing is to acknowledge the essential gap between the divine and transcendent There-
fore Heidegger calls Being the transcendent itself as what is hidden behind beings. 
That the self'is' care-structure, means that it is 'in-between', the 'unheimisch' (un-
homely) that which dwells in thought of something and not itself The temporality of 
human existence as Dasein is rooted in what Aristotle describes as desires (horeksis) 
as absence: basic needs. These define human nature as deficient in relation to what is 
perfect Metaphysics runs into the problems of the possibility of such perfect non-
deficient eternal being of a self-thinking thought How can what is perfect at all 
times have movement, thought, and make meaning? All answers end in an aporia 
Need as absence is what is not in controL Incertitude is based on the human nature of 
need and absence. What is absent is not only food or shelter, absence is the absence 
of 'telos', that human condition always means to be 'on the way'. The Stoa answers 
16 Jaeger, Paideia VoL2, p.95 
17 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.64 
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to this with education, an active process to fulfil the' arche' of human beings. This 
does not mean to become divine, but to dwell perfectly in incertitude, and this means 
to have 'arete' and 'phronesis' because only when one is 'human' and is not in 'con-
trol' does one need 'phronesis'. 
'Presencing' (Anwesen) is a process based on something absent. Unlike the perfect 
and eternally present, the 'idea' or Chyle', temporal beings disclose and withdraw 
themselves to and from humans. Heidegger 'wrestles' this processual character of 
disclosure and withdrawal from Aristotle to avoid the metaphysical bias between a 
perfect a-temporal and temporal imperfect. The processual imperfection of Dasein is 
Dasein's 'perfection. IS This also opens the possibility for the phenomenological 
question how beings appear by themselves: it turns around the question of 'things in 
themselves' because beings are only revealed by the measure of their temporal dis-
closure in the 'clearing' (i.e Dasein). Therefore the phenomenological question is not 
about the absolute eternal present of beings in the intentionality of transcendental 
consciousness, but about the always already temporal presencing in the existing eve-
ryday consciousness. 
To think is to think 'something': to be turned towards some 'being'. This way a be-
ing is disclosed 'as' this or that. Without such intentionality there is neither thought 
nor logos nor a self. The self discloses itself to itself first' as' something. But it is not 
a 'thing', it is an 'absence' that enables the setting up of the 'clearing' in which be-
ings appear. This 'setting apart' (thesis, Aus-einander-setzung, polemos) is logos 
which gives measure to the 'apeiron' or the abyss (Ab-grund, chaos). Thinking is to 
address beings 'as' something. Thought gives them a place in its 'world', the world it 
has been thrown into. Thought as 'polemos' re-trieves (Wieder-holen) the tradition 
from the 'arche' of the first inception (Anfang) and re-interprets and unfolds it until 
it has arrived at its 'telos', either to dispose of Dasein or to initiate another inception. 
Heidegger's 'polemos-logos' is a thetical setting-apart of both, the 'apeiron' in the 
inception and of the 'world' Dasein has been thrown into. 
This 'world' is the model l9, the measure from which beings disclose themselves to 
us. Like Plato's demiurg, who, as a cosmic 'technites' (demiurgos) creates the world 
18 Sheehan, Heidegger's Philosospy of Mind, p.303 
19 a kind of temporary 'idea'. 
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by taking measure from the eternal ideas (which he did not produce)20, so Dasein 
takes measure from the historical mode of Being it has been thrown into. However, 
this Dasein is just the possibility of a self, it changes with the change in the mode of 
Being. Dasein is a dynamic force which constitutes itself in the process it itself is. 
Not only in terms of its own mode as the process of interpretation (volition), but also 
in terms of the world it is thrown into, i.e. its 'care-structure', Dasein has to exist in a 
given situation, and this situation determines the way it understands itself and the 
situation. As the historical self, Dasein thinks polemically and in this process it does 
not only change its interpretation but by extension also itself as it unfolds its possi-
bilities. 
Heidegger describes the end of consideration, of polemos, as 'death', as the ultimate 
limit of the possibility of 'meaning'. Humans are aware of death only as the death of 
others, but their own death as finality of possibilities is not the bodily death but the 
end of meaning. In its 'agonic' traces consideration is a 'polemos', an inquiring dis-
course and effort, testing the limits of what is sayable and what is unsayable, disclos-
able or undisclosable. For the Stoics consideration is not just logic, rhetoric and dia-
lectic, but an account that inherently changes the disposition of the soul as it changes 
the 'appearance' of things. Logos is a 'play' (agon), and in this play beings are sepa-
rated and unified in thought, without assuming that these separations are a 'real' ac-
tuality. Stoic consideration, understood through the lens of the Presocratics, is 'ago-
nic'. Truth is disclosed by, and as, something that 'comes over' us, or 'is given'. We 
have 'choice' (hairesis) by way of 'arete' to follow this predicament as our own .. 
Of course, it is questionable to call the Stoic exercises an 'auto-poiesis' - 'therapy', as 
seen in the previous chapter, is more appropriate since it is concerned about some-
thing that is brought back into balance rather than something that is created. This 
rests on the question of 'human nature'. As we have seen, the process of 'considera-
tion' is, in the Stoic doctrine, 'natural' to humans. It is natural only if one can recon-
cile nature and reason. The continuity of cosmos-nature and human nature (thought) 
appears to be 'natural' to the Greeks but it feels odd to us, even if we read about it in 
Heidegger. Heidegger's critique, that disclosure is thought only in relation to beings 
rather than itself as Being dismisses that this Being was thought, at least since Socra-
20 "Phytourgos" Politeia X, 597d 
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tes, in tenns of 'arete' and 'agathon' and later in the Stoa, as a detachment from be-
ings and therefore did thematise a fonn of existence which reflected on logos as the 
source of possible modes of Being even though it took place in a teleological fashion 
and grounded on an apparently atemporal 'logos'. Nevertheless, in the strife and ef-
fort of a change of 'hexis' of the soul, the individual begins to shape questions about 
the way of understanding which reflect modes of creation (Schaffen) which Heideg-
ger expresses in UKW. For Heidegger 'energeia' is the model for the union of oppo-
sites, of Being and becoming. At its root is the ontological structure which deter-
mines how beings can become or emerge into their 'Being' (Wesen). For Heidegger 
the process of 'physis' is 'Being', in so far as it is the way in which 'beings' come into 
view or 'emerge' (energeia) into disclosure. This Aristotelian concept of Being as be-
coming (energeia) gives Heidegger the model for his own ontology in UKW. The 
question what actually 'is' and in what sense, or in tenns of what logos it 'is', can 
only be accessed in the temporality of a becoming that also persists as 'truth' 
(aletheia as a 'process' of unveiling). 'Truth' as 'unveiling' (aletheia) is immediate 
and intuitive and not open to 'discourse', only to collective practices. The Stoic con-
sideration does not 'explain' truth, on the contrary, it is a poietic action in relation to 
the disposition of the soul with the aim of creating a 'hexis' which intuitively under-
stands beings i.e. is 'open to Being' by being 'fitted into' (Einfuegen) by its life in 
'accordance with nature'. 'Arete' means to be overcome by 'physis' and 'logos' and 
thus being able to take one's measure from the openness. 
The Stoa, inspired by the Socratic-Cynic tradition, understands men to 'dwell' in lo-
gos, meaning in argument. To "dwell,,21 is more akin to a 'being possessed ('echon') 
by' language rather than 'having' (like being in control of) language.22 For Heideg-
ger fonns of understanding are 'existence' and humans exist only in so far as they 
perfonn the' as' -structure. This dwelling itself is unthematised unless the disclosing 
also discloses itself as such and not as some other 'as' in the wholesome world of the 
'ready-at-hand' (Zuhanden) and 'circumspection' (Umsicht) etc .. 
The guiding principle is the turning away from the value given to objects to the value 
of actions which then give value to things. Therefore transcending the factual reality 
of external security ofthe 'ready-at-hand' by actions which consider the external as 
indifferent, such actions become the paradigm of a new self-understanding of the es-
21 Heidegger, What is Metaphysics in Basic Writings, p.l12 
22 Heidegger, Einftihrung in die Metaphysik, p.132, 134 
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sence of Dasein as the process of the 'clearing' (Lichtung) as the locus of disclosure. 
It is evident that this attitude is based on the archaic 'agon', its 'virtuosity' and the su-
periority of 'virtue' to 'production'. 
To inquire about the agency in art is to ask about the possibility of change: change 
means to have possibilities, and by extension a self which thinks itself thinking. To 
have such reflexive awareness constitutes the possibility to apply thinking to think-
ing itself, and thus to change the self Does this mean, that the self has' control' over 
itself? is 'arche' and 'telos' in one? This would mean that there is no possibility of 
the self to change, it means to be a foundational subjectivity which itself is not sub-
ject to such change nor to the agon of understanding. 
4. 'Agon', 'Polemos' and 'Logos' 
The Greek 'agon' (play) has a wideranging meaning. The most important of those is 
the juridical aspect of 'ordeal', which leads to 'arete' as the necessary condition for 
the proper agon. On the one hand it is the decision as justice and truth, on the other 
the archaic alignment to the 'arete' as the transcendent to external goods. But 'agon' 
also meant social entertainment. Huizinga describes the Socratic question "What is 
x?", as a common 'agon', a form of play and jest. Plato's literal form, a comical dia-
logue23 makes this plausible: what is said in jest may have a serious ground. Socrates 
asks what 'is' virtue and expects a dihairetical answer. This is a game too: to demand 
a particular form of explanation. Why such a form and not another? It is a game and 
its rules are arbitrary or customary. Socratic dialectic and dihairesis are customary. 
What appears to be new is that this game becomes more 'serious' than before. Socra-
tes appears to want to know what virtue 'really' is in terms of a definition. Virtue is 
the central concept of Greek thought. Although it comes from aristocratic archaic so-
ciety,24 it is tied to the 'agon' which permeates the whole of Greek society. So to de-
fine virtue in terms of a set of skills, of virtuosity, appears to be a sensible endeav-
our. But Socrates goes further: In Plato's Politeia anyone 'arete' is clearly under-
stood to be a form ofwisdom?5 Wisdom is the ability to think correctly and thought 
gives account. It has the form of the right answer to the question: Like Oedipus' an-
swer to the Sphinx. It is clear and unequivocal. This, however, is the form of agon. 
Socrates takes his interlocutors for a ride into an unwinnable agon. The question 
23 "farce" Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.149 f. 
24 Arete and ariston have the same root (according to Werner Jaeger, Paideia Vol I, 26 f.) 
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'What is x?' does not ask who's opinions prevail but 'What is the (divine) truth of 
virtue?' Socrates examines where someone can express this truth in accordance with 
dialectical distinctions, but nobody can. So the oracle was right that Socrates is the 
wisest in Athens and dies. The 'agon' was not between Socrates and his interlocutors 
but between Socrates and Apollo.26 
In this process the form of the agonic answer becomes a neccessary and sufficient 
form of 'knowledge'. It certainly is an agon, a game, and it only appears that the an-
swers shall 'really' express 'virtue' or by extension 'wisdom'. The Presocratics have 
practised dialectic as an 'agon' to prove and disprove any thesis. This display did not 
prove anything about reality. On the contrary, it showed the labyrinthine character of 
'logos' which shows while it hides. It showed that the 'real' things were hidden by 
'logos'. The sages knew that one would overstretch 'logos', if one demanded from it 
'to tell the truth', but they had enough discretion and tact not to do so. Only the Sybil 
can 'say the truth without fragrance' (Heraclitus) and this logos is the expression of 
divine mania. The wisdom of the Presocratics is reflected in their right judgement 
about the possibilities of logos. 
If conversion is a turning in the thinking of Being instead of a thinking of the Being 
of beings, and the philosophical conversion a turning to the 'daimonia' (Un-canny), 
then the mediating concept is the lagon' of this 'un-canny'. In 'play' (agon), all that 
'is', in the sense of beings, loses all meaning; because all such meaning is constituted 
in the process itself. The outcome of the lagon' is, in philosophical, terms the mani-
festation and unfolding of Being, from which meaning is given to beings. The dispo-
sition of 'arete' is the 'fitting into' (Einfligen) in terms of a dike (Fug, joint). 
Philosophical 'conversion' creates what Huizinga understands as 'play': the attitude of 
not taking for real the 'realities oflife' (beings and 'production'), not taking it 'seri-
ously'. This is a change of the whole 'self' and the 'agon' determines the "real" itself 
by ordeal. Logos as agon is the strife for intelligibility by which what presents itself 
in these rules (of visibility) is intelligible and necessary because it is also Fug (joint). 
Although everything is determined (by fate/universal causality) in its possibilities, 
'decisions' are "real" insofar as there is an lagon' of the right judgement, which then 
persists and 'comes over' the individual unthematisably (a priori). 
25 in Plato's Politeia, Gadamer, Vorgestalten der Reflexion, in Kleine Schriften III., p.2 
26 Colli, After Nietzsche, p.l 02 
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The 'agon' of antiquity is therefore the origin of the philosophical comportment inso-
far it introduces a specific distinction into human involvement with things. One dis-
tinction is detennined by things, objects ('production' or what we may call 'obsessive' 
attachment) and the other is 'free' from this attachment to things by virtue of ' con sid-
eration' ('logos'); it is irrelevant to have or to lose anything, including one's life ('be-
ing dead to the world'). This is the original pattern not only for philosophical relation 
to the 'world' of things, but also to Heidegger's implicit 'ethics' in Being and Time, 
when Dasein falls into anxiety and the web of meanings and values, that have been 
constituted by Dasein's 'struggle' with Being ('polemos'), disintegrates and Dasein 
confronts its essential emptiness which is the ontological ground within which Being 
detennines the mode in which the world appears to Dasein. Philosophy of antiquity 
sees the self, emptied of attachment to things, as the space of human freedom. The 
figure of conversion is: to go away from things, practising for death and returning to 
a new relation with beings; similarly Heidegger describes Dasein's self-disclosure 
(authentic resolve [Entschlossenheit]) as a turning away from things towards itself 
and turning back towards things in a different awareness of them and a different 
mode in which they appear in relation to Dasein. In the mode of 'thinking of Being' 
(Seinsdenken), the certitude of presence and beings is exchanged with the inaccessi-
ble, un-canny, in-calculable 'Ereignis' of Being. In both cases it is an 'epoche', a 
withholding of involvement which institutes the difference in perception. The agency 
of thinking, of change and possibility, cannot be thought of in a mechanistic sense. 
To think the possibility 'not to' one has to have thought something already. There 
has to have been a movement (kinesis) already. Thinking is always already in motion 
(auto-kinoun) 27. This thinking is the soul, which knows 'ideas' as a distant memory. 
Ancient wisdom is a mode of 'disclosure' of the 'self as interpreting according to a 
cosmic impersonal 'logos'. This logos 'comes over' man by way of 'arete'. Thinking 
and interpretation of a situation and soul are the same as process. One constitutes the 
other within the process of intelligibility. Aristotle's divine 'unmoved mover' (kine-
seos akineseos) is pure thought thinking itself. Equally the soul can think itself as 
thinking.28 The soul is a more originary self when it applies thought to the thinking 
which it itself is. Therefore it realises itself as having possibilities in relation to the 
27 Gadamer, Vorgestalten der Reflexion, Kleine Schriften III, p.9 
28 just like hearing and seeing are reflexive Gadamer, Vorgestalten der Reflexion, p.5 f. 
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thinking' of something'. To realise these possibilities to think something otherwise is 
a 'polemos' of the self as Dasein, with its Being, which is what it has been 'thrown' 
into. 
Heidegger uses Aristotle's concept of 'energeia' to explain Dasein's existence as a 
self-generating process. Although Dasein is not 'physis' and it does not have a bio-
logical 'arche', Heidegger interprets Dasein's Being as determined by an 'arche', the 
first inception according to which all the polemical unfolding of that Being takes 
place until a new historical inception 'is given' by a more originary Being (Seyn). 
The movement, the thinking that first constitutes Dasein and its Being is an 'arche' 
from which Dasein interprets its Being. This interpretation is the 'polemos', and it 
takes place in logos. This logos determines what is self, identity and difference. It re-
sembles the Presocratic agon between the sage and the questioning god: the sage 
navigates the labyrinth of reason while the god knows all the unfolding of the 
'arche'. Dasein is 'on the way' between the 'arche' and its 'telos'. If Dasein would 
arrive at its 'telos' (exhausting the possibilities of ist Being, without receiving a new 
arche, it would cease to be 'Dasein'. 
Dasein itself moves in thought of beings but it understands Being because it can 
thematise its own essence (Wesen). Thinking changes the 'pneumatic constitution,29 
of the soul. It is therefore 'on the way' moving according to its 'arche' which deter-
mines its possibilities. Thinking cannot achieve the perfection of the 'unmoved 
mover', it is in motion (energeia) to its 'telos'. Heidegger's Dasein can only be 'en-
ergeia', but not an 'ergon', it cannot achieve its 'telos' without ceasing to 'exist' as 
Dasein. Thinking is therefore auto-poietic, a self-constituting movement, without es-
sence, without a completion in perfection. 'Psyche' (soul) in Heidegger's terms is 
"the ground and modus of the relation to beings" while "when Being itself comes 
into view, the demonic, the transcendent exuberance makes itself felt through shining 
into the 'Geheure",.3o 
5. Conversion and Enthusiasm 
Conversion flows from a certain way oflife into a qualitatively different way of life. 
It is a process in which the world becomes visible in a different way. How does this 
29 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.64 
30 GA 54, Parmenides, p.147 
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chime with Heidegger's critique of world-views ("Weltanschauung")? Heidegger's 
argument is that world-views are just part and parcel of the particular manifestation 
of Being in the modern world. They are all based on one single decision about what 
it means to 'be', namely modern 're-presentation' (Vor-stellung), The world has be-
come an 'image,.3] He does not see a possibility to 'calculatively' change this under-
lying status of 'Being' within the historical framework of 'Ge-stell'. In particular, ac-
cess to the underlying fonn of Being is obstructed by the 'world view' itself. On the 
other hand, there is a 'poietic' input by Dasein into the manifestation and into the un-
folding of such a fonn of Being. The 'poets and thinkers' who first bring such a fonn 
into play have a practice and listen well to Being, precisely within the very possibil-
ity of authenticity in their existence. If such poets and thinkers bring about a mani-
festation or unfolding of a current mode of Being, then their work is aligned with a 
'cosmic' logos, that fonn of arche which governs such unfolding. This 'authenticity' 
allows them access to the temporal (limited) possibilities of their age. Within the 
modern age the governing Being manifests itself in the fonn of technology and 'Ge-
stell'. This is a mathematically reduced fonn of understanding. It is a 'deficiency' 
within the understanding of the working of language and Heidegger pins down this 
deficiency to the exclusive use of the mathematical method within modern scientific 
discourse. Conversion can therefore only take place in the realm in which words are 
related to things, which is what the ancient philosophers did in their exercises, as far 
as they were able to hold on to the Presocratic duplicity of 'logos' as both, reason and 
mania (Un-geheure, in-calculable). 
The Stoics understand perception (aisthesis) as 'phantasia' (from phainomenon, what 
presences itself) accompanied by an 'axioma' (proposition). They presuppose the in-
telligibility within which judgements can take place. Unlike for Heidegger, this is not 
in question for the Stoa. Things appear in various stages of clarity, and the sage as-
sents or does not. The receiving soul has not been divorced from the appearance, 
from the presencing. World and soul are tied together by the logos which gives and 
guarantees intelligibility. But equally 'reason' is not an inquisition in which what ap-
pears has to justify itself. On the contrary, the inquiry into objects refers back to the 
self as the carrier oflogos and 'good' or 'bad' actions. 
31" Sobald die Welt ZUlli Bilde wird, begreift sich die SteIIung des Menschen als Weltanschauung." 
Heidegger, Die Zeit des Weltbildes, in Holzwege, p.91 
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We have always understood judgement to mean that there is an existing rule to which 
the fact is subsumed. In the Stoic teaching of ethics however, we do not find these 
positive rules. On the contrary, the Stoics refer to the sage as the paradigm who 
makes appropriate judgements about the world but they do not spell out the laws 
which would subsume all particular cases. I understand this to be a Presocratic heri-
tage. Dialectic is the art of the negative; no positive statement can withstand its de-
structive power.32 So virtue is to not hold on to what is dialectically indefensible. 
Heidegger's pursuit of a 'language of Being', empowers itself to be beyond the (dia-
lectical or) scientific 'reason' of philosophical discourse. Heidegger's struggle for a 
new language is in his mind the unfolding of the possibilities of current being or a 
struggle (polemos) for the advent of a 'new' inception. 
The Stoic exercises use the notion of 'pathe' to justify the efficacy of'logoi' as a 
'phannakon' of the soul. Philosophy uses language as therapy to dispel any positive 
statements of knowledge and to keep the 'being on the way' as a kind of management 
of incertitude within reasoning. Gods make neither judgements nor choices because 
they are a-temporal. Only humans can make choices because they are in time and 
therefore they do not see the whole. Therefore the sage can be perfect by being over-
come by 'logos' and make virtuous choices. The doctrinal 'explanations' of Stoic 
doctrine are subservient to their use as a therapy of the soul. Therefore the direct in-
teraction is important to them. The right word (logos) at the right moment (eukairos) 
is therapeutic, the word on the page is not conducive to the right moment. I think 
Heidegger's approach is comparable to the Stoic practices insofar as their 'therapy' 
severs the conditions of the possibility of 'beings' being in a particular way, which is 
oppressive (as a withdrawal of the access to Being) in the sense of Heidegger's de-
scription of technology. The Stoic exercises give the ideas of' openness to Being', 
'authenticity', 'Entschlossenheit' and 'Gelassenheit' a more intuitive character.33 
32 "Die Konsequenzen dieses Mechanismus sind verheerend. Jedes Urteil, an dessen Wahrheit der 
Mensch glaubt, kann widerlegt werden. Aber das ist nicht alles; sondem weil die ganze Dialektik das 
Prinzip des ausgeschlossenen Dritten fUr unumstol3lich halt, das heiBt davon ausgeht, daB, wenn eine 
Behauptung als wahr erwiesen wird, die Behauptung, die ihr widerspricht, falsch ist und umgekehrt, 
ergibt sich fiir den Fall, in dem man zuerst eine Behauptung und dann die ihr widersprechende Be-
hauptung als wahr erweist, daB beide Behauptungen wahr und falsch zugleich sind, was unmoglich 
ist. Diese Unmoglichkeit bedeutet, daB weder die eine noch die andere Behauptung etwas Wirkliches 
bezeichnet, nicht einmal einen denkbaren Gegenstand. Und aus der Tatsache, daB kein Urteil und kein 
Gegenstand sich der dialektischen Sphare entziehen kann, folgt, daB jede Behauptung haltlos, wider-
legbar ist, daB jede Lehre, jeder wissenschaftliche Satz, ob er nun einer rein en oder einer experimen-
tellen Wissenschaft angehort, unterschiedslos der vernichtenden Kritik ausgeliefert ist." Colli, GdPh, 
p.79 f. 
33 "Auf dem Grunde dieses eingefUhrten Aufgangs und Aufschlusses seines Wesens in der [arete] ist 
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Ancient philosophy had still the inkling of the scope of reason, its connection to the 
incomprehensible (Ungeheure) and the intuitive, so that it was able to see it as the 
language of therapy. It used the force of dialectic to destroy the everyday notion of 
the control of the appearance (Anwesen) of beings. The 'logos' is not simply some-
thing 'ready-at-hand' (Zuhanden). After dialectic has done its work, nothing will be 
left, except what has value in itself, this is the openness to Being as a grounding. 
(That this self-grounding has been unfortunately re-interpreted at the beginning of 
the modem age, as the self-assertion of subjectivity is another matter) 
Heidegger attempts to recover the originary understanding of 'reason' (logos), which 
has an understanding of the limits of the possibility of intelligibility and can 'respect' 
them. At the begining of the enlightenment the critique of this 'reason' has set in too, 
with Hamann it has found an expression worthy of Socrates, and it continued 
throughout the ages of which Heidegger's critique was only one expression. That rea-
son is always part of the deception of language is the thread running through all these 
texts. Recollecting the scope of original 'logos' is a practice which exceeds science 
and technology. Such a practice lacks the drive for certitude. 
Stoic conversion differs from Christian conversion: the faithful knows the solution 
already; the revelation is there in faith.34 The Stoics had to bear the incertitude of not 
being sages but knowing that a different understanding is possible and necessary. But 
they prepared the ground for being 'dead to this world', meaning that one does not 
take seriously the distinctions and separations without understanding the unity of the 
whole of intelligibility as what 'is given' in the divine logos. They prepared the psy-
chology of turning one's whole life around by way of argument and exercise, and 
they made this way of life a possible goal for everyone. Christianity had the certitude 
of revelation, and the modem age wanted to keep this certitude without the faith by 
way of mathematics. Certitude is the only thing the Stoics did not have. Their whole 
being was kept in the incertitude of consideration. The everyday riddle was how to 
act appropriately, this was a test and they gave account of this struggle. This exercise 
of giving account is the considered life - and not a 'mathematical' ethic. The' calcula-
tion' of the sage is not what Heidegger calls calculative thinking. 
By giving account, the everyday understanding of what is desirable, is turned around: 
der Mensch "entschlossen", aufgeschlossen, entbergend-entborgen zum Seienden." GA54, Par-
menides, p.lll 
34 Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Is Left. In: Epoche, Volume 7, Issue I (Fall 2002), pp. 1-14 
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conversion changes the 'Being of beings'. Reason does not pertain to the things in 
this world but to what it is 'not': the 'Being' that reveals beings. That is what 'arete' 
means for Heidegger because of his recovery of the Greek concept of Being.35 'Noth-
ingness' is the withdrawal of the original reality of the logos and its incomprehensi-
bility. Nevertheless, man 'dwells in dianoia', it is 'natural' for man to live in intelligi-
bility. Discourse is therefore not about expressing 'what is' as a positivist fact. Dis-
course is always a community of those who are maintaining a certain constitution of 
meaning. The Stoic's discourse is a conversation of conversion. This conversation is 
a reassessment of the meanings of the worldliness of the world. The ultimate end of 
this struggle is to change the intentionality of the philosopher; for virtuous intention 
has a different concept of Being (and not only ofa 'Being of beings'). 
The path to change this perspective is for Heidegger 'authenticity', which emerges as 
the 'anthropological' concept of 'virtuous' existence. The comparison with Stoic con-
version has been made by Hadot and others.36 For an ontological conception of 
'authenticity', there needs to be some form of human agency which Heidegger calls 
existence. Without human existence there is no 'Being' either. Irrespective of the dif-
ferences in the concept of language and 'Being', those 'techniques of the self seem to 
have persisted and the one most employed technique is 'prosoche' (awareness). 
Authenticity and conversion develops through access to the 'particular' and the ex-
ception, the 'Un-geheure' is transcendence in the sense that it provides the possibility 
of Dasein to reflect on ist own 'structure'. The sense that governs disclosure springs 
from the exception and not from the (pre-conceived) mathematical model as method 
of certitude, which dissimulates the access to Being by laying claim to totality itself. 
Awareness (prosoche) does not work to the rule, it is not attention to one object (or 
its knowledge - 'as' -structure), but attention in general to one's thoughts in which 
beings disclose themselves. From the very mechanics behind everyday and unre-
flected judgements, which are made purely on the basis of what we take for granted, 
emerges the possibility of inquiry (into what is not perceived but at the basis of 
judgement) in the form of ' pro soc he'. 
Knowledge cannot be "placed "ready-made" within the soul" .37 Knowledge of the 
'good' is never abstract knowledge of the good without any desire or conviction to-
35 GAI9, Sophistes, p.lll 
36 Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.202 
37 Hadot, WiAPh, p.65 
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wards the 'good' itself To be virtuous knowledge needs to have the 'disposition' or 
comportment to be so. To 'know' the theory of how to swim will not save you from 
drowning. The desire (horexis) and love of this knowledge of virtue therefore is vir-
tue itself when it occurs. Kindling the fire of this 'desire' (horexis) for virtue is what 
Socrates did, instead of teaching something that one cannot express as knowledge: 
openness to Being. 
The question of what the 'Good' actually is, is not to be answered because it cannot 
be positively encased in language, it can only be lived by exercising one's actions 
and scrutinising them in logos. Socrates still asks whether the 'just' is actually also 
the 'good' (agathon) itself38 Aristotle places the 'good' into the realm of his ethics 
and politics as a question of means, ends and measure.39 The 'good' seems the gen-
eral concept for what everything aspires to, or strives (horexis, horme) for by nature. 
This is the terminology of the Stoics: to live according to nature, while 'nature' (phy-
sis) is equivalent to reason ('logos') as the underlying cosmic law of 'appearance' 
(Anwesen) through 'universal' intelligibility.4o The 'good' (telikon agathon) is there-
fore the 'end' (telos) itself in relation to which everything else is a means and which 
is itself never means to something else, and this delimits a qualitative difference of 
the human logos to all other beings. For human beings this 'telos' is 'eudaimonia'; it-
self a rather empty and fonnal concept of human 'perfection'. The Stoic life is fo-
cused on the actualisation of all human possibilities qua nature (physis). The essence 
of 'eudaimonia' lies in actions emanating from a durable disposition of the soul and 
not performed under the duress of traditions or fate.41 The state of such a disposition 
comes about in a sudden 'qualitative' conversion (metastrophe, metabole, [Umschlag: 
Heidegger J). The sage is 'qualitatively' different from the foo1.42 The sage is not en-
trapped in his relation to external objects by thinking of them as a 'good', instead he 
only pretends, 'as if they are of value. Conversion then is the paradigm of change 
and of agency itself 
Heidegger calls 'physis' Being (Aristotle's physis) because it describes the possibil-
ity of 'emergence' (presencing) and not the eternal 'presence'. Being is only in 
38 kalon or dikaion; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.ln 
39 Ari: Nicomachian Ethics, AI, 1094 a 3 
40 Although the cosmos is not eternal, the original cosmos ends in 'ekpyrosis', and the remaining 'lo-
gos spermaticos' then inaugurates a new inception. 
41 hexis, diathesis; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.174 
42 "Mit 'poiotes' bzw. 'hexis' wird eine Beschaffenheit des Subjekts bezeichnet, die nicht abhaengig is 
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Dasein's existence. The dynamic, the drive (horexis) towards an 'as-structure is natu-
ral to humans. Therefore there is an underlying anthropology in Heidegger. Human 
beings 'want' to understand and not not understand. 
Dasein's 'authenticity' occurs when the view of Dasein is turned from the investment 
with beings towards one's own way of engagement with them. This means that the 
meaning that appears to have been so self-evident before has collapsed because it is 
not supported by beings but by one's own directedness. To have a world and to elicit 
meaning from the world is therefore a human activity which does not come to man 
from beings but originates within the human condition itself. 
For Plato the demise of the archaic sages brought the loss of 'sophia', which was the 
innerworldly presence or access to normative 'logos,.43 As much as these wise men 
preferred to express themselves in riddles and hone their skill of destructive dialec-
tics, they still constituted a (privileged) link between the divine 'logos' and the human 
sphere. They retained the duplicity of 'logos', it's depths and incomprehensibility and 
danger, which cannot be retained in a brief chat at the agora. Nevertheless, Plato is 
still aware of this loss, and the dynamic of such a separation as he sees the result in 
the form of the Sophists. His and Socrates' point is that it is very well to teach a par-
ticular 'techne', knowledge, but that the knowledge of the sage is not particular in that 
sense but is general so as to inquire about the claim of any knowledge. The 'ethical' 
aspect appears as a concept of a general faculty of judgement, 'phronesis' which in 
itself then becomes a form of ethical disposition.44 
The shift from wisdom as human participation in the divine logos to self-education is 
in Greek culture rubricated in terms of disease and health. The healthy soul strives 
for 'wisdom' as its end. Wisdom is not the exception but it is imperative to strive for 
it by virtue of its being 'natural' to human beings. The wisdom of the archaic sage 
was bestowed by inspiration and enthusiasm and not the result of 'volition' (in the 
modem sense). For Socrates it was still demonic inspiration but already connected to 
the educational effort. 
Human discourse is always second best to the knowledge of the sage, but without 
von dem Haben von Dingen, die ausser dem Subject liegen." Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.175 
43 Plato's insistence on normativity as expressed by the 'ideas', is new and radically different to the 
Presocratics. They did not have any investment with 'society' with the polis (almost to the contrary 
e.g. Heraclitus, who lived as a recluse and a critic of contemporary mores). Plato has to insist on a 'te-
los' which also grounds political ethics. Heidegger does the same when he speaks about 'Volk'. 
44 habit = 'diathesis' (hexis in Ari); also = phronesis; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik,.p.205 "nach 
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discourse there would be no consideration and no soul at all, only immediacy and 
forgetting. Logos as consideration is connected with divine 'inspiration' and the 
'Ungeheure' as some form of otherness, non-individual and partaking in cosmic lo-
gos with its 'agonic' dangers. Heidegger desired to be inspired and enthused by 'lis-
tening' to Being, to be open to the novel sway of Beings, or rather the unfolding to its 
last conclusion of nihilism and thereby wrestling a new language from Being itself. 
This enthusiasm authorises for Heidegger the daring 'breaking open' and re-gathering 
of tradition. Gadamer called Heidegger's wrestling with language "Sprachnot": it is 
an emergency of language, an 'emergency' which called for exceptions. 
6. 'Arete' and Poiesis 
Arete is a concept of transcendence. It comprises wisdom and phronesis which give 
measure to human Dasein. It gives a point of access to Being. This access is the 
measure of disclosure and withdrawal. In his lectures on Parmenides45 Heidegger 
writes that 'arete' is 'Entschlossenheit'. Dasein is disclosed (Entschlossen) to itself 
as a hermeneutic 'process'. The access of Dasein to Beings is Dasein' s disclosure 
(AufschluB) and 'being fitted' (Einfugung) into its 'essence' (Wesen). It is a similar 
process as is 'dike' (Fug) as 'joint'. Man is 'fitted' into his essence, Dasein is given 
over to Being, it is ' fate (Schicksal). But 'arete' is something that man 'desires' 
(horexis). This gives it the movement which is an inescapable 'natural' effect and 
which constitutes the originary 'truth' in the Heideggerian sense of the intuitive 
'knowing one's way around'. 
Here Heidegger also mentions an etymological relation between arete and ars or 
techne.46 This does make sense, if we remind ourselves that art is the 'setting' (the-
sis) of itself into the work of truth. This 'thesis' is then not a 'subjective' form ofar-
bitrary opinion, but connected to the 'essential' fitting (Einfligung) and disclosure of 
Dasein itself, it is the 'truth' of Being. The 'being fitted' into one's own Wesen is 
'arete' by way of 'dike' which Heidegger translates as 'Fug' or 'fligen' (Joint, join-
ing, jointure, but also the verb 'fitting') Dasein into its 'essence' (Wesen) as fate 
(Schicksal).47 
fest en regeln" ; eutaxia = knowlwdge how to act; Forschner, Die Stoische Ethik, p.207 
45 GA 54, Parmenides, I09ff. 
46 GA 54, Parmenides, p. I I I 
47 GA 54, Parmenides, p.I37, " ... einfuegen ins SchicksaI ... " 
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'Phronesis' is the authentic 'fitting-into' (sich fUgen) the historic 'essence' of Dasein. 
This is possible through Dasein's authentic resolve (Entschlossenheit), which Hei-
degger calls 'arete' .48 The measure between disclosure and withdrawal is no total 
disclosure (outside temporality) and no total withdrawal (without world). 'Discretio' 
is the sage's ability to discern what is 'in my power': it asks about the 'Fug' (joint) 
into one's 'essence'(Wesen). Discretio is a phronesis about how to inquire and inter-
pret: for Heidegger it is the measure that its 'polemos' gives to Dasein. 
The Stoics deal with this relation of control directly and it would be a misinterpreta-
tion of their concept of logos to interpret it as a form of control. On the other hand 
they do not subscribe to an Aristotelian idea of the mean or average between two ex-
tremes. The change lies in the aligning of logos and disposition, 'life according to lo-
gos' means that soul and logos coincide. 'Arete', virtue lies in the intent of actions 
according to logos. Actions are governed by an original insight into the essence (We-
sen) ofDasein (GA 54, Pannenides). The presencing of beings is governed by this 
essence of Dasein. If Dasein' s intentions are 'vicious' they force the beings that 
presence themselves into an interpretation that is determined by an inauthentic 
Dasein that is not discloses to itself (not Entschlossen). 'Arete' therefore is a neces-
sary step to gain 'phronesis' as the measure of how far to inquire into the Being of 
beings, how to disclose without dissimulation (Verstellen) the access to the 'Unge-
heure', that from which we receive fate (Schicksal). This measure depends on 
Dasein, it happens in its 'polemos' with Being that Dasein's involvement with beings 
(existence) is governed by the idea of certainty, control and (subjectivised) agency 
today. There was no 'necessity' in the first inception for this to happen but it was the 
possibility, as Heidegger showed in his texts on technology and science. 
Ifwe look back to the UKW, we see Heidegger dividing the 'bringing forth' (Her-
vorbringen) of tools, and the sphere of the 'ready-at-hand' (zuhanden), and 'creation' 
(Schaffen) of art, although both are different from the challenging forth (Her-vor-
stell en) of the modem 'Gestell'. All are forms of 'thesis' (in its original meaning of 
'to set up', or 'to bring to stand' in the 'open,).49 All three are variants oftechne, the 
knowledge of the 'brings forth'. The bringing-forth originates in the circumspect ac-
48 GA 54, Parmenides, p.lll 
49 UKW, p.68 f. 
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tivity of Dasein within its being-in-the-world. The creative bringing forth is different 
for two reasons. The first is the relation to the 'material', the earth, which is 'set-up' 
within the work rather than 'used-up' by the tool. (UKW, 33) The earth is 'set-up' 
into the open and therefore the tool that is made is 'used up' and disappears within 
the context of its use (Dienlichkeit) and is not visible as the 'bringing-forth' itself 
that is set-up in the work.50 Art is the production of truth itself. It sets itself into the 
work and therefore the work is not fecit (made by a self or subject) but 'factum est'. 
Furthermore, artistic creation (Schaffen) is a 'foundation' (Stiftung), which stresses 
its transcendent relation to the everyday (Geheure). Foundation (Stiftung) as gift, 
grounding and inception 'comes over' to Dasein and hands Dasein over to its truth as 
essence (Wesen). The foundation comes directly from the aforementioned 'Un-
geheure'. What arrives and stands up within the open 'presences' (Anwesen) tempo-
rally within its truth and its shape (RiB, peras). The agency of this 'setting-up' (the-
sis) into the 'open', or 'clearing' is not a subject but it is that of Dasein as its possi-
bility, which is the 'openness' to Being and that is 'arete'. Virtue is the 'ontological' 
activity of humans to be open to the historicity of Being. Arete is art as a 'way of 
life', or conversely 'bios' is the art of Dasein. Arete as the Stoic 'life in accordance 
with nature' is a 'gift' like the 'foundation' or 'creation' of the work of art. What 
Heidegger calls 'Dichtung' is the 'awareness' which enables the 'Ungeheure' to spill 
into the (Geheure), the plenitude from which the finite Dasein attains the limited dis-
closure of its Being. Being is another word for truth. The artists have to be equipped 
with awareness: with 'phronesis' and 'arete' as the measure and openness to the dis-
pensation of Being, which then persists in its works as does the Greek temple in 
UKW. I am not so much interested in the 'bringing forth' or 'setting itself into the 
work' of works, but rather in the 'phronesis', the disposition to act appropriately in a 
contingent situation, which is the result of 'arete' the authentic self-disclosure of the 
self as constituted by its own thinking and decision (bouleo) which is dispensed by 
and from the demonic (Ungeheure) plenitude, of all possible disclosures, of which 
we only see a fraction each time. 
Why does Heidegger call such an agency polemos (or logos or Being or letting-be)? 
It is obvious that it denotes a non-personal, non-subjective action. The result of 'po-
50 "Aber das Geschaffensein des Werkes hat gegeniiber jeder anderen Hervorbringung darin sein 
Besonderes, daB es in das Geschaffene mit hineingeschaffen ist." UKW, p.51 
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lemos' as agon is an 'ordeal' (Schicksal, 'ananke') and thus handed out, given etc. 
Change and persistence turn without one overwhelming the other and without there-
fore becoming self-identical. Persistence is always 'totalitarian' in its resistance and 
change is never redemption. Phronesis is 'knowing' that the measure of differentia-
tion is a question of certitude. Conversely certitude is only imaginary when the dif-
ferentiation is inappropriate. What Heidegger thinks as 'Volk' is a Mitsein of where 
those who do the differentiating know when to stop, as 'tisin' in the Anaximander 
fragment. 
The Stoics exercised their' discretio' of 'phronesis' in relation to the divisions of the 
logos. The power of 'setting-apart' (Aus-einander-setzung) is not itself a measure: 
Presocratic dialectic is purely destructive when not practised among the sages, be-
cause the sages knew that they did not 'know' in one particular way, they only knew 
that they know their way around 'logos'. The agency therefore lies in a constituted 
soul, constituted by being obsessed by 'logos', which is on the way changing itself to 
achieve or rather to receive' discretio', a tactfulness towards the disclosure, or having 
the right judgement how much to disclose and what to leave undisclosed 
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A Conclusion 
It is not easy to sum up this long investigation. The focus was on the artist as agency, 
in an age which has squarely disposed with such an autonomous concept. Ironically 
there are more 'artists' then before. Through Heidegger we have seen how closely 
connected artistic production is with Greek ontology and how such an ontology is 
connected with the idea of an eudaimonic life. 
To reflect on one's 'way oflife' already means to have thematised one's unacknow-
ledged presuppositions and practices. To 'choose' a 'way oflife' according to logos, 
means precisely not to lead a life that is unquestioned, it means a 'considered' life. 
And for the Greeks it does not only mean a consideration in the 'apophantic' lan-
guage, but in a deeper and immediate fonn of intuition. All this however, takes place 
under the topic of 'techne' and poiesis, which, as we saw are 'ontological' categories 
of 'emergence'. The Greeks did not drag beings in front of the court of reason, rea-
son made beings emerge without force. Although they valued acting higher than be-
ing acted upon, their action was a 'considered' one with sufficient respect for the 
'emergence' itself. The disclosure of beings was letting emergence happen. And in 
this agency they know themselves in agreement (teleologically) with the cosmic lo-
gos. 
The mode of 'production' as a universal ontology, however, tempts to apply mislead-
ing questions about action and control. When we speak about art we imply an agency 
which makes it. What we mean is an intentional activity of an agency. Agency, from 
'agere' doing, 'actus' action, can be just a force of nature like gravity. Art however 
needs a different activity. To act there needs to be a subject or self which 'knows' 
what it is doing i.e. intention precedes action. This intentionality is consciousness of 
something that is not (yet). There needs to be a desire (horexis), a need or want 
which constitutes a movement (kinesis) towards the fulfilment of such desire. The 
knowledge of the end also means the choice 'not to'. To have choice means to have a 
self in some way which can reflect on itself as one that is 'lacking' or that 'has' an 
absence. 
We have inherited a vocabulary of 'being' which we apparently cannot escape. The 
activity of art is a particular example of the various concepts of the artist - from a 
mere craftsman to a 'genius', connected to a divine sphere - to Heidegger's expres-
sion of the work of art being a 'factum est' without any agency of an artist. What the 
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artist has 'lost' the work of art has gained: it is now a foundational gesture, which de-
tennines a whole age in the way it discloses beings. Art has become, not a 'mirror' 
but the foundation of a mode of Being. But within Heidegger's concept of Dasein 
also dwells an 'artist'. Dasein as what 'acts' represents the space of the possibility of 
'self' in relation to its mode of Being. Any 'self' is dependent on the mode of Being. 
This 'existence' means the labour of interpretation, of making sense of beings in all 
possible ways. 
In the history of metaphysics the knowledge of the means and methods leads, accord-
ing to Heidegger, directly from the Greeks to modern technology. The Greeks con-
cept of 'Being' as presence, is expressed in tenns of 'poiesis', a techne of matter and 
a fonn. This process of emergence of beings by themselves, is not something that the 
Greek 'observer' is in control of. On the contrary, the Stoics repeat that man is not in 
control except of his own judgements. As we saw in the discussion of the 'agon' in 
chapter 3, such judgement about what is right was a question of fate and ordeaL Such 
public display of justice was then internalised as the judgement of the self. With the 
Stoics the question of 'control' is radicalised, into the paradigm of 'physis' and 'lo-
gos' as an inescapable cosmic causality which is 'certain' but unknowable, while in 
our soul we find the certitude of the 'logos' of judgement. Life is separated into this 
certainty and total uncertainty (fate). The Stoic sage lives in the uncertainty of cos-
mic causality, but in the moral certainty of his 'logos' and discernment. This cer-
tainty is not based on rules and laws but on the detachment of the soul from a 'logic' 
of 'pathe'. The sage discloses beings from the (dis )position of self-disclosure as (par-
taking) in the universal 'logos'. The average Stoic (prokopton) however, does not 
have such 'disposition' and has to use the 'logos' of consideration and argument to 
repeatedly disillusion his illusions of certitude. Such therapeutic considerations, the 
'considered life' are a strategy to dwell in incertitude, and this means to 'modify' or 
'poietically' produce one's own 'self' through the therapeutic logos, or 'paideia'. 
Therefore this 'self' can never turn into an institution of certitude in relation to exter-
nal objects, as it does in the Cartesian meditations. The Stoic 'knowledge' concerns 
the purely 'moral' question of our comportment to beings, which flows from our 
'psychical' constitution. The ego is 'poietic' in both senses, it is a work of art that 
produces itself as art: auto-poiesis. Certitude is a function of an agency that takes it-
self too seriously. 
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According to Heidegger there is always a horizon of understanding, within which a 
self is constituted in terms of its possibilities and possible choices. The horizon de-
termines the way of the disclosure of beings. It determines what is 'true'. It is always 
a communal and inescapable 'truth' and not an individual deliberative truth. The self 
is possible only within this a priori horizon within which it acts. The movement that 
changes the horizon is not open to the self of individuals because the self is a secon-
dary manifestation of truth. Truth manifests 'itself in cultural practices as the a pri-
ori horizon. The horizon is dynamic. It shifts and is constant at the same time. How-
ever, according to Heidegger, certain people can influence a change through their 
practice of 'poiesis'. This Heidegger calls 'polemos' between Dasein and Being. 
Dasein and Being are not independent agencies, but according to Heraclitus' word 
they are a 'unity of opposites'. This opposition is both movement and limit of the a 
priori truth. 
What would be necessary for such a poietic self to be agency of art as truth? One is 
the understanding of self-constitution and secondly the origin of truth, of the 'a pri-
ori' itself. Both are linked by the same 'arche' or 'inception'. The selfas secondary 
manifestation cannot view what comes into its view as 'real' in the same way as it 
does when understanding the 'world' from its self-positing as that which produces 
(Vorstellen) its objects of knowledge to itself. Once Dasein discloses (Entschliessen) 
its own constitutive character it questions the being which appears to it in a different 
manner. The manner of such questioning changes the 'presencing' of beings as much 
as the 'self itself. In this sense art is not just a reflection on our 'way of life' but ac-
tually the unfolding of our 'possibilities'. 
The self then cannot be understood outside its relation with beings, and this means it 
has to be understood as a 'poiesis', as being constituted in the process which it itself 
'performs'. Since the self is thought of as the agency of need and movement, the self 
is always in relation to what it needs and therefore in 'logos' (what enables relations, 
'legein' - collecting together) 
Logos, accordingly, is what gives to the self its own unity. It is only in logos that a 
world can be for Dasein. Heidegger therefore develops the being-in-the-world as the 
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a priori horizon in which beings are disclosed in their 'as'. This does not disclose lo-
gos and the self as that which discloses. To tum around and look at itself, the 'self' 
has to lose its worldsl , all the totality of (purposeful) relations (Bewandnisganzheit) 
in what Heidegger calls 'anxiety'. It is in anxiety and in its being-towards-death that 
Dasein as the proto-self loses its context and is thrown back onto its own possibility 
to be and this is its structure, which Heidegger is then able to describe as the 'care-
structure'. In this process of self-disclosure Dasein detaches itself from its involve-
ment with beings and discloses itself as being 'essentially' different, i.e. 'being' 
purely as disclosing, i.e. its 'project' (Entwurf) within the [purposeful-patternJ total-
ity of (purpose) relations] (Bewandnisganzheit). Dasein's 'freedom' is therefore the 
(re )interpretation of the possibilities within the conditions it has already been 
'thrown' into. If Dasein discloses itself in such a way its comportment (to beings and 
to itself) necessarily changes. This description is very similar to the classical 'con-
version' (metastrophe, peristrophe). 
The Stoa interprets human beings as 'zoon logon echon' too. The logos is an active 
logos but it also deceives in terms of the 'pathe', which are modes of reason. Pathe 
and eupatheiai are disclosive on account of their directedness. Thought is always 
outside itself and therefore it is in the intentions towards beings and the ends which 
determine actions, that this relation manifests itself The Stoics see pathe (Stimmung) 
as disclosive, just as Heidegger understands it as disclosive. The therapeutic logos is 
that which carefully dismantles this horizon of understanding, in Heidegger's terms 
'anxiety' (Angst). In the Stoic discourse, anxiety is not 'thematised' but the 'aporia' 
in which Socrates and his interlocutor find themselves, is the same situation. Socra-
tes, as the therapeutic agent, points from the aporia to the 'agathon' as the original 
'telos' of 'human nature'. Arete and agathon describe a comportment to things that is 
equally detached from its involvement with beings as is 'authentic' Dasein and is 
therefore a disclosure of Dasein to itself as that which consists of its comportments to 
beings, but especially to other Dasein as 'being-with' (Mitsein). 
This however is also the point at which the question of agency becomes crucial. 
Greeks did not experience the necessity to justify such internal 'agency' because in 
the archaic agon the concept of (public) display of 'honour' was a sufficient form of 
51 and also stops to be a self since the 'self' is part of such 'world' 
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justification.52 With Socrates this changes. Public display becomes an introspection, 
even if not a self-reflection. The self is clearly a product of a 'techne psyche', a care 
of the self, not in an 'aesthetic' sense but the ontological sense of the question of 
what 'human nature' is. The agency of the self constitutes itself out of the pressures 
for (self-)justification which the drive to internalisation after Socrates has produced. 
Just as the destruction of the polis as the determining site of social interaction has 
disappeared into the vast expanse of the Roman empire.53 
The 'self therefore is the possibility of a comportment to beings. If a practice 
changes a comportment, it also changes the being (Wesen - essence) of Dasein. The 
Stoics express it in the Aritsotelian concepts of 'poiesis'. The human disposition is 
change through 'education' (paideia) to achieve its 'telos' (human nature) of being 
one with the' logos'. This logos is one of those miraculous word for everything. It 
unites and separates, it is the reason through which beings 'presence' themselves, but 
as language itself it is unsayable. The figure of thought is clear: logos and self are the 
carriers of meaning. If the self 'partakes' in the universal logos (i.e. Being), it has, so 
to speak, the same position as the 'authentic' Dasein as the 'care-structure', past all 
attachments to beings and its comportment has radically changed. 
There is a remnant ofteleological thought in Heidegger's concept of 'authenticity'. It 
is the point of human achievement, of a heroic strife for such achievement. Although 
it 'comes over' man in the experience of anxiety, it is the voice of the 'authentic' 
Dasein as 'Gewissen' which calls itself out of its fallenness (Verfallen) to itself. The 
difference to Aristotle and the Stoa is that Heidegger does not think 'human nature' 
to be an 'essence' (a being, 'zuhanden') and therefore the 'therapeutic' aspect of 
Greek logos is not expressed in terms of the poiesis of a (material) disposition. Nev-
ertheless, in UKW Heidegger offers an interpretation of poiesis which determines the 
change of the a priori horizon of understanding. On one hand poiesis is concerned 
with a bringing-forth into visibility, a material production, which is radically differ-
ent from the technical production of 'stuff' (Zeug). On the other hand there is a 'poi-
esis' of 'truth'. The poiesis of art draws from the plenitude of possibilities which are 
given to Dasein from the transcendence of Being. This appearance can never be un-
der 'control' but it is always part of a practice. These practices are the subject of the 
Stoic exercises. The virtue of the sage lies in his discernment, his' discretio', or 
52 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p.lOO 
53 Heidegger's polis-apolis (GA54, Parmenides,), is even then a phantasy, the polis is no more 'Mit-
sein' than mere internality 
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'phronesis', which detennines his 'intentions'. The 'intention' is 'a priori' because 
thought has always something 'in mind'. How this is then understood, depends on 
the individual comportment. Such a 'conversion' in disclosing beings is a change in 
that comportment. More than that, it changes the 'self which is not given 'essen-
tially'. The 'authentic' Dasein is only certain in its difference to the beings it dis-
closes. It cannot be other than in 'logos' i.e. in some 'relation' to beings, disclosing 
beings. 
The tenns 'agency' and 'certitude' are presuppositions of 'production' (techne). As 
soon as things are understood in their essence as product the questions we ask are di-
rected onto a wrong path. If we ask the wrong question we get lost. Therefore the 
concept of 'phronesis' and 'discretio' are more than just fonns of a rational life. Not 
being 'techne' means that the judgement is not based on a 'specialist' knowledge, but 
on a unfathomable 'good' judgement that reflects the constant 'view' of the 'good' 
(agathon) itself. The virtue, as the measure of actions is not just a method but a lo-
gos, that 'comes' naturally, and not calculatively. Such a disposition is the work of 
the soul itself. The 'techne psyche' is the artistry to achieve such disposition. And 
this is defined by an alignment to the cosmic logos, meaning that it is not a 'per-
sonal' but a 'universal' (a priori) disposition, which 'comes over' the sage, as much 
as the work of art is a 'factum est'. Autonomous agency here is a wrong aspect of ac-
tion, because actions of the sage flow from the impersonal logos which discloses. 
Agency and the autonomy of the 'author' of art is then shifted away from subjectiv-
ity and its self-certitude. If we can still call such a movement 'agency', or the result 
'art'. What is left is art as self-disclosure of Dasein in its thrownness. If art has be-
come a form of the 'prima philosophia' , and its object is the condition of the possi-
bility of disclosure, then it also has to question its own agency by which it is consti-
tuted and part of it is to understand itself in terms of 'a work of art'. Once the self is 
not just 'bracketed', but seen as an artifice, we can be more charitable and approach 
art and the self with a more 'therapeutic' agenda. It will also open the way to real 
'wonder' which is at the beginning of all philosophy54 and of art. 
54 " Soc: I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said 
that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in 
wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of 
Thaumas (wonder)." Platon, Theaetet, l55.d 
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BPPh Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
EiM 
SZ 
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Sein und Zeit 
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